It is necessary to work with society, not to give Lukashenko a crutch

Pavel Latushka, Warsaw 2025. Photo: NAU‑media

Original article: reform.news

The release of Siarhei Tsikhanouski has intensified the discussion about the possible change of strategy for the democratic forces. Reform.news turned to Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of the National Anti‑Crisis Management, with a request to share his assessment of the proposed steps.

— How do you assess Valery Kavaleuski's words about the need to abandon pressure on the Lukashenko regime and strive for the release of political prisoners?

— I would like to start with a basic thesis — sanctions and pressure are not the goal, but the means. If there are no sanctions and pressure, there is no point for Lukashenko to start any negotiations or take any actions at all. As one of the participants in previous negotiations in 2015, I remember that the regime’s primary interest was lifting sanctions, while the EU conditioned that on the release of all political prisoners and liberalization of internal policy.

The aim of the current sanctions (as reflected in the EU’s own decisions to impose them) is to change the regime's internal repressive and external aggressive policy. Only communication under pressure on the regime can yield results. This is not theory — it’s practice that I have personally witnessed. Lukashenko has no incentive to enter negotiations without pressure. And contacts with the regime in our situation, if we abandon pressure, are simply a call for capitulation. To shut up, tuck tails, sit on hind legs, raise hands and say: "We surrender, we agree with the continuation of state terror policy". Maybe someone agrees with that. I do not.

— What do you see as the reason for the releases of political prisoners "by batches" over the past year?

— Lukashenko counted on gaining results in his interests through small concessions — lifting sanctions and regaining legitimacy. I assume that if he expects a serious response from the EU and the US, he must make a serious gesture. This is not my subjective position but that of the EU and the US, repeatedly voiced in meetings with them.

— To what extent can democratic forces influence the actions of Western democracies toward the Lukashenko regime — visits, contacts, imposition or lifting of sanctions, appointment of ambassadors, and so on?

— The general policy of the EU, as well as the US, is developed independently but taking our opinion into account. For this, relevant instruments have been created — a consultative group "Belarusian democratic forces — EU", strategic dialog with the UK, Canada, and the US. The Coordination Council has its official delegation in PACE, etc. External subjectivity of the democratic forces is rather high. But there are countries that do not share the general EU position. We have influence, but final decisions in any case lie with the partners. As for the US, before and during visits there was constant communication. The American side is fully aware of the position of the democratic forces.

— Kavaleuski believes that softening rhetoric and active diplomacy led to prisoner releases over the past year while ultimatums and pressure are counterproductive, and emphasizing the role of democratic forces in exerting pressure is harmful to freeing political prisoners. What do you think about that?

— We have a common strategic goal — an independent, free, democratic Belarus with no place for repression and political prisoners. It was not softening of rhetoric that led to releases over the last year (how was that expressed?), but significant changes in economic and foreign policy situations.

Now the economic situation has changed in external markets and within Belarus itself. Sanctions have become more tangible for the regime. If after the 2020 events and immediately after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin largely compensated Lukashenko for his losses from sanctions, this past year it has become much harder for Russia to do so.

Over the past few years, the total volume of sanctions against the Lukashenko regime has significantly increased, and bypassing them has become more complicated. Trading restrictions against Russia and Lukashenko’s regime have been harmonized almost 90%. And we see how sanctions reflect in economic statistics. Instead of artificially created economic growth driven by military orders, we now observe its gradual slowdown. Month by month, the deficit in foreign trade is growing. For goods it has already exceeded $2.6 billion; together with services it reached nearly $1 billion. The growing current account deficit means currency flows into the country are drying up, capital is leaving. All this creates real problems for the regime.

Yes, the effect of sanctions could have been felt much sooner, and we shouldn’t have waited five years. We told our partners that sanctions should be large-scale and swift, literally knocking them off their feet, but that would have hit businesses and economies of the countries imposing them. So our partners seemingly chose a different strategy: gradual, consistent sanctions that allowed their businesses and economies to adapt. But at the same time the constant threat of increased sanctions would compel dictators to restrain further escalation.

Unfortunately, this also gave the Lukashenko regime and the Kremlin time to adapt to restrictions. However, that adaptation too has limits, especially as the total volume of sanctions kept increasing. Now ignoring it, hiding problems behind false statistics is almost impossible. It’s time to start making concessions.

I would like to remind that in 2020 the EU and US were ready to dialogue with Lukashenko, but he chose to refuse dialogue and chose maximum brutality. Now maximum levels of sanctions and the threat of criminal prosecution are in place, and now he is entering contacts and cosmetic steps. Let us not forget that sanctions were imposed on various grounds: for election falsification, human rights violations, migration war, hijacking of an airplane, and aggression. So there will be different grounds for their lifting. Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions, and I would ask not to simplify this question to a narrative of “they lift sanctions, he releases all.” There are still very clear demands on the regime formulated by the international community.

As for contacts with the US, Lukashenko managed to start contacts when the US began open contacts with Russia. Thus the foreign policy situation changed. I would also note that the United Transitional Cabinet, including the National Anti‑Crisis Management, is not trying to score political points on such a sensitive topic as political prisoners, but some of our partners within democratic forces are trying to publicly rack up political capital on it. We are cautious in assessments and certainly do not hijack the spotlight.

You cannot hide behind nice words about the fate of political prisoners, trying to argue that for the Cabinet it is not a priority. The thesis "if you don’t share my strategy, it means you don’t want political prisoners freed" is manipulative.

— And yet, do you see anything rational in the proposals to change the strategy of the democratic forces?

— Some representatives of the older generation of the opposition actually state that their interests coincide with Lukashenko’s and essentially propose following the path of the so‑called "Azerbaijanization" of Belarus — where human rights, repression, and a normal political process are simply not mentioned. In response to this thesis I would note that it resembles the "Makeevization of foreign policy" of Belarus, which was formed in 2015. Its main thesis: only Lukashenko is the guarantor of Belarus’s independence from Moscow. Then I ask: if tomorrow there is no Lukashenko, who will guarantee independence? Only the Belarusian people striving for an independent, free democratic Belarus can be the guarantor.

It is easiest today for some politicians to stand next to Lukashenko and give him a crutch so he will not stumble. For a politician it is much harder to work with society and motivate it to defend the interests of the country.

Simultaneously loud are the voices proposing the "new" strategy — "release of political prisoners". There is nothing new here. This demand and position have been voiced by the main structures of the democratic forces since 2020 and has never changed. The only thing different in the "new" strategy is the absence of the word "release all political prisoners". Much is said about diplomacy, and I, as a professional diplomat with the rank of Ambassador, having conducted a huge number of negotiations in my life, can say — it is wrong to give up your position before negotiations, trying to guess the expectations of the opposite side.

Another point of the "new" strategy is "de‑isolation".  What’s new about this position? The theses of de‑isolation of Belarusians, their mobility, have sounded at meetings, speeches by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, representatives of the Cabinet, and the Coordination Council. The Coordination Council in 2024 adopted a resolution on simplifying visa regimes and improving cross‑border movement for Belarusians. If, however, we talk about de‑isolation of regime representatives, then it is again an attempt to meet the expectations of the opposite side?

The alleged "new" strategy thesis — "restoration of a full‑value civil process" — so that the desire to participate in the country’s development ceases to be dangerous and punishable. An absolutely logical position already voiced by both the United Transitional Cabinet and the Coordination Council. What’s the novelty? The main question is how to ensure these conditions are met, these goals achieved. Let us acknowledge that now, the ball is not on the side of the Cabinet or the Coordination Council, but on Lukashenko and his regime. It’s not that we are not ready to talk, but they are afraid to lose the ball and continue to play with the fates of people and the country on their half of the field.

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