Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National аnti-сrisis management, Leader of the «Team Latushka and Movement “For Freedom”» faction of the Coordination Council of the 4rd convocation Thesis of speech by Pavel Latushka, Member of the Coordination Council Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe at the PACE session on Belarusian culture Mr. Сhairman, distinguished colleagues, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Rapporteur, Member of the Polish Sejm, Madam Agnieszka Pomaska for your work and for your support. Your meetings in September with Belarusian cultural initiatives in Warsaw and Białystok, as well as your contribution to drafting the key report give us hope for establishing effective European mechanisms for long-term support of Belarusian culture inside and outside of Belarus. We know that a systematic destruction of national identity is taking place in Belarus. According to PEN Belarus, at least 428 cultural figures have been dismissed on political grounds. Hundreds of cultural organizations in Belarus have been liquidated. All private culture initiatives have been liquidated. More than 100 cultural figures are currently behind bars, held in special facilities, or placed under house arrest. Among them is the legendary musician, radio host, and composer Aleh Khamenka, leader of the group "Palac". We remember the tragic death of political prisoner and artist Ales Pushkin, who died in prison in July 2023. It is very important to emphasize that what is happening in Belarus today is not simply repression. It is an attempt at the complete absorption of Belarus by the ideology of the "Russian World." Now we are struggling with the Russian world, so support of our national culture, support of the Belarusian language is very important. For us, culture today is our main front of resistance and national survival. Supporting the independent culture of Belarus is not just a humanitarian step, but an investment in a democratic and secure Europe. Once again, I thank the Chair and the Rapporteur, Madam Agnieszka Pomaska. Thank you for your attention.

Pavel Latushka Deputy Head of the UTC of Belarus, Head of the NAM, Leader of the «Team Latushka and Movement “For Freedom”» faction of the Coordination Council of the 4rd convocation. Photo: NAM media Photo: lookby.media Theses of the speech by Pavel Latushka, Member of the Delegation of the Coordination Council to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, to the PACE Parliamentary Network on the Situation of the Children of Ukraine Today, a lobbying thesis is being heavily pushed upon us claiming that Belarusian potash is a matter of global food security. Active lobbying is currently underway to reopen transit through Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. The United States has already resumed buying potash following the lifting of U.S. sanctions; the first ship carrying 30,000 tons departed from the port of Ust-Luga in Russia's Leningrad region, heading to the Port of New Orleans in the U.S. However, we cannot forget that Belarusian potash serves as an instrument for committing war crimes. In 2023–2024, the National Anti-Crisis Management documented in detail a system involving the unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children from temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus, followed by their ideological indoctrination into the narratives of the "Russian world." According to our data, at least 3,500 Ukrainian children have been transferred to Belarus. According to a report by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab dated November 16, 2023, prepared on the basis of materials provided by the National Anti-Crisis Management, the transfer of at least 2,400 children was recorded between February 2022 and October 2023. We have already taken concrete legal steps to hold those responsible to account: We submitted two official communications to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC in The Hague during a meeting with Brenda Hollis’s investigative team. The Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General’s Office of Lithuania have launched investigations into these facts; my colleagues from NAM and I have given testimony as witnesses in these cases. Following a visit to Kyiv and a meeting at the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, I handed over a list of orphaned children to the Ukrainian side to assist in bringing them home. "Belaruskali" serves as the key institutional and financial link in this criminal system: More than 2,050 Ukrainian children were sent to the "Dubrava" children's camp, owned by "Belaruskali." Systematic actions aimed at erasing the national identity of Ukrainian children were carried out within its walls. Former Director General Ivan Golovaty personally signed documents, allocated funding, and provided buses for the transportation of the children. Golovaty ordered the "Dubrava" camp to be prepared and used to host Ukrainian children. He issued specific instructions regarding the operation of the camp during their stay. Lifting restrictions or unfreezing the assets of "Belaruskali" would directly legitimize and fund an entity implicated in war crimes. On behalf of the democratic forces of Belarus, I ask all our partners: To firmly reject any initiatives aimed at lifting, easing, or granting exemptions regarding the import and transit of Belarusian potash To maintain a strict and uncompromising sanctions regime against "Belaruskali," as this company has effectively funded war crimes.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National аnti-сrisis management, Leader of the «Team Latushka and Movement “For Freedom”» faction of the Coordination Council of the 4rd convocation Thesis of speech by Pavel Latushka, Member of the Coordination Council Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, at the EPP Political Group Dear colleagues, Since 2020, Belarus has been going through one of the most dramatic periods in its modern history. Since then, the Lukashenka regime has unleashed a massive campaign of repression against the Belarusian people — unprecedented in scale in modern Europe. These widespread repressions continue on a daily basis. According to information from the human rights centre Viasna, dozens of people have been convicted on politically motivated charges in Belarus in just the past few days. Among them are a veterinarian, a teacher, a kindergarten worker, an IT specialist, a bank employee, and an aviation professional. The regime is prosecuting people from every profession and every section of Belarusian society. As of September 2026, the so-called “list of extremists” already contains 6,930 people. The so-called “list of organizations and groups involved in extremist activities,” which is used for political persecution, includes 377 entities. In addition, the so-called “list of persons involved in terrorist activities” contains 1,475 people, 726 of whom are Belarusian citizens. The majority of people are placed on these lists only as part of politically motivated persecution. We see absolutely no change in Lukashenka’s domestic policy of repression. As political prisoners are released, the regime sends new people to prison in their place. Today, this has become a conveyor belt of repression. However, domestic repression is only one side of the coin. At the same time, while suppressing the Belarusian people, the regime is actively contributing to the escalation of tensions in the region and supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Since the beginning of 2026, we have been observing continuous military activity. Since August 24, dozens of large-scale military exercises have been launched involving the armed forces across all branches of the military: the Air Force and Air Defence Forces, artillery brigades, tank battalions, signal troops, as well as the territorial defence forces. Across Belarus, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is also actively conducting exercises focused on suppressing protests, while exercises involving the Internal Troops are also taking place. Lukashenka has appointed a former Chief of the General Staff as a deputy head of his administration, with responsibility for military affairs, despite the fact that there is already a State Secretary of the Security Council responsible for the military sphere. In practice, this means coordinating the entire civilian system of government with the Belarusian armed forces in wartime, from the central level down to the local level. A coordinator has been appointed to oversee this policy and assess war readiness at every level, from districts to regions. Lukashenka is also actively contributing to Russia’s aggression. Hundreds of Belarusian enterprises are working for Russia’s defence industry. Russia uses Belarusian infrastructure to facilitate and guide drone strikes against Ukraine, and now also against the Baltic Sea region. It is important to have no illusions about this: Lukashenka is not a “mediator”. Lukashenka is an aggressor and a direct ally of the Kremlin. Double-track strategy We welcome and support the efforts of the United States to secure the release of political prisoners in Belarus. However, the fundamental problem remains: the conveyor belt of repression. The Americans secure the release of some political prisoners, some sanctions are lifted, and Lukashenka puts new people behind bars. And this cycle can continue for a very long time. So, to achieve real, rather than cosmetic political change in our country, we propose a double-track strategy. First, the United States, using its sanctions mechanisms against the regime, as well as tools of non-traditional diplomacy, has the necessary influence and resources to secure the release of all political prisoners and bring an end to repression. Second, we call upon the European Union and other democratic nations to consistently apply sanctions mechanisms as leverage to achieve real, systemic changes in Belarus. This represents the unified position of the democratic forces—the United Transitional Cabinet led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, and the majority of the Coordination Council: conditions must be imposed on Lukashenko. A national dialogue, utilizing a round-table mechanism, is required to resolve the deep domestic political crisis in Belarus. I would like to emphasise that the national dialogue strategy we are proposing is also supported by the European Union. In the 2024 Council Conclusions on Belarus, point 5 states: "The EU calls on the authorities of Belarus to engage in a genuine and inclusive dialogue with all elements of society with a view to holding free and fair elections, under the observation of the OSCE/ODIHR and in accordance with internationally recognised standards". And we ask you not to decide the fate of Belarus without our participation. Any deals with the regime made behind the back of Belarusian society are doomed to fail. Only a dialogue that includes Belarus’s democratic forces as a subject, facilitated by European democratic states, can guarantee genuine change in Belarus. Our fundamental principle remains unchanged: “Nothing about Belarusians without Belarusians!” Thank you for your attention.

The image is for illustrative purposes. Source: trans.info As early as last year, representatives of the European External Action Service approached the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM), requesting additional arguments to strengthen the grounds for sanctions against a number of legal entities subject to restrictive measures. We provided this information to our European partners. In particular, NAM submitted information showing that Ukrainian children had been unlawfully transferred from the occupied territories of Ukraine to the Dubrava sanatorium, owned by Belaruskali, where they were subjected to ideological indoctrination. As a result, these facts were added to the grounds for the EU’s decision to impose sanctions against Belaruskali OJSC. The actions of the Lukashenka regime in this matter are regarded as war crimes. NAM previously submitted two communications to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Amid discussions about the possible lifting of sanctions on potash fertilisers and Belaruskali OJSC, the EU has both extended the sanctions and strengthened the grounds for their application. The grounds concerning other companies were also supplemented or revised. Belshina OJSC was included in the sanctions list again, with an updated statement of reasons. Previously, the Court of Justice of the European Union had annulled the sanctions against the company after representatives of Belshina OJSC challenged the previous sanctions decision in court. The grounds for imposing sanctions now reflect additional facts showing that Belshina supports the aggression by supplying tyres for use by the Russian army, conducts trade through intermediaries controlled by Dzmitry Lukashenka, and engages in other such activities. We thank our colleagues from the Belarusian Investigative Center, BelPol and the Bureau, who also participated in this work. As Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of NAM, stated: “The decision of the Council of the EU to extend sanctions against the Lukashenka regime confirms the consistent position of our European partners: as long as repression continues in Belarus and support for external aggression does not cease, restrictive measures will remain in place and be strengthened. The updating of the grounds, including those concerning companies such as Belshina OJSC and facts related to Belaruskali OJSC, demonstrates that sanctions policy is becoming even more legally robust and is supported by additional evidence. Cooperation between Belarusian democratic forces and European institutions strengthens the international accountability of the individuals and organisations involved and increases the likelihood of further legal consequences at the international level.” Background: The additional grounds concerning individual companies, as well as revised information concerning a number of individuals subject to European sanctions, were reflected in EU Decision No 2026/426 of 26 February 2026, which introduced certain amendments to Decision No 765/2006 governing sanctions against the Lukashenka regime. Through the same decision, the Council of the EU once again extended all sanctions against the Lukashenka regime for one year — until 28 February 2027. The dictator refuses to change his policies: repression within Belarus and aggression beyond its borders. The extension of restrictive measures is the consequence.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Maksim Ryzhankou and Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski. New York, USA, 22 September 2026. Photo: t.me/BelarusMFA By meeting with the foreign minister of dictator Lukashenko, Poland has now given the regime a huge credit of trust. First and foremost, it is a credit in terms of security: the security of its borders, its internal security (we remember the regime's active complicity in hybrid aggression against the EU and Poland), and the security of the Polish minority in Belarus. We have heard a large number of statements and warnings from the Polish authorities that the coming months may be very difficult precisely in terms of security. Whether the regime has enough agency to make use of this credit is an open question. But I think that breaching this credit will be the regime's last mistake, in the sense that it will put a final end to the question of its agency and independence. Whether this snowdrop will bloom depends entirely on this factor. I hope that during the meeting the head of Poland's foreign ministry, Radosław Sikorski, representing the country that is the main friend and partner of the Belarusian democratic forces and Belarusian society, raised the issue of the humanitarian crisis in Belarus. I hope he stressed the importance of ending the mass repressions against Belarusians inside the country and beyond its borders, the largest in the history of 21st-century Europe, as well as transnational persecution and the deportation of Belarusians to Poland. I also hope he drew the regime representative's attention to issues related to Lukashenko's "passport decree". And this list of the regime's repressive actions is far from exhaustive. The Lukashenko regime has not changed its aggressive and repressive policy to date; it continues to pose a threat both to its neighbours and to Belarusians themselves. Therefore, the credit given to it requires the regime to significantly change this policy, and for now I would assess its ability to do so quite critically. And, of course, all of this is now being closely watched by the Kremlin, which has completely different plans for Belarus and for using it for its own purposes. We must not forget that Lukashenko has bound himself hand and foot with a significant number of military agreements with Russia. For us as Belarusians, the most important thing remains the fate of the Belarusian people, which, we would like to believe, will not be decided behind Belarusians' backs. As our Polish friends say, "Nothing about us without us" ("Nic o nas bez nas").

The project "Conversations about Transition: How to Get Out of Autocracy". Episode 1. The GDR: How election fraud triggered the fall of the regime Episode 1. The GDR: How election fraud triggered the fall of the regime NAM report "National Dialogue for Belarus. A comparative analysis of national dialogues in Germany, Poland and Spain as possible models for resolving the political crisis in Belarus" We present the first episode of the NAM project "Conversations about Transition: How to Get Out of Autocracy", which is based on the NAM report "National Dialogue for Belarus. A comparative analysis of national dialogues in Germany, Poland and Spain as possible models for resolving the political crisis in Belarus". In these films, we explore the experience of Germany, Poland and Spain in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Our goal is not to find a model that can be copied. That is impossible. Rather, it is to use an analysis of historical experience to identify the possible contours of a Belarusian model of transition: a model that would make it possible to end the internal confrontation, protect the country's independence, preserve functioning state institutions and return to citizens the right to determine the future of the Republic of Belarus for themselves. For us Belarusians, this is not just history: it is a set of lessons for a future transition to democracy.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National аnti-сrisis management, Leader of the «Team Latushka and Movement “For Freedom”» faction of the Coordination Council of the 4rd convocation Opening remarks by Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transition Cabinet and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, at the Minsk Forum 2026 Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, The forum organizers reached out with a request to share an update on the state of democratic institutions. I will try to present my perspective. With all due respect to everyone participating in the Belarusian democratic movement and fighting against the dictatorship in Belarus, over these three-plus decades we have never had such a large-scale, developed ecosystem and infrastructure as we do today. Never before have we possessed genuine real institutions like those we have managed to establish: the President-elect and her Office, the United Transitional Cabinet as the executive body, and the Coordination Council as an elected, representative body. For the first time, the Belarusian democratic movement has political institutions that represent a real political alternative to the Lukashenka regime. This is the core. Yet around it, there are also a lot of civil society initiatives and organizations covering practically the entire spectrum of issues and problems related to Belarus and Belarusians. Yes, these are all NGOs, but looking at this system as a whole, we are basically seeing a proto-state. At the very least, within this broad ecosystem, we can certainly find the experts and personnel pool needed to staff any ministry. This is crucial, especially when evaluating historical precedent—such as the Central Round Table in the former GDR (East Germany). It was thanks to such experts, who worked in the specialized working groups of the GDR Round Table, that it was possible not only to ensure an inclusive process, but also to implement real reforms, draft a new package of GDR laws, and secure a transition of power. Human resources are the foundation for future democratic transformations in Belarus as well. The last element of the democratic movement I wish to mention—while certainly not the least in importance—is the independent Belarusian media. Here we see a certain paradox: despite all independent media being expelled from Belarus by the Lukashenka regime and branded "extremist," the demand for independent information among our people has never been higher. And all of this is happening under the extraordinarily difficult conditions that both the media and all other components of the Belarusian democratic movement face today. All of this represents our achievement—one that is crucial to develop, support, and scale up. I am addressing you today in a rather non-standard capacity for a politician. At the same time I represent political institutions—serving as Deputy Head of the United Transit Cabinet and as a delegate in the Coordination Council, where I lead the largest parliamentary faction, which won the elections twice ("Latushka’s Team and the Movement for Freedom"). At the same time, I represent the National Anti-Crisis Management, an expert organization, while also engaging in media work. Why is that? Why not focus on just one role? This is indeed a point of criticism I occasionally face, as do other representatives of the democratic forces. But the truth is that right here lies one of the key challenges facing our entire movement, our political institutions, civil society organizations, and the media: a shortage of human resources. It exists, and we must openly admit it. The reason is not only that we all operate under constant pressure and threats from the Lukashenka regime, which is waging a real war against us, including targeted attacks and abductions. The other side of the coin is serious resource limitations, which prevent our structures, organizations, and media outlets from competing with the commercial sector for qualified personnel and specialists. At the same time, as I noted earlier, the democratic movement has never been as institutionally and systematically developed as it is today. I will not list every example, but I will highlight those that can confidently be called unprecedented. First, the degree of presence of the Belarusian agenda, alongside the level of representation and recognition of Belarusian democratic forces worldwide, is the highest in the entire history of the Belarusian democratic movement. I say this with full respect for those who have been fighting the regime for 30 years. Take the Coordination Council as an example: we have official delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly. Recently, we also received an invitation to the Nordic Council. This alone is unprecedented. The level of contacts maintained by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is unprecedented, as is the very existence of the institution of the President-elect within the Belarusian democratic forces. Furthermore, the vast number of resolutions passed by international bodies, parliamentary organizations, and national parliaments recognizing our political institutions is historic. Second, there is the level to which the issue of the Lukashenka regime’s international accountability has been raised today. This includes the scope of adopted sanctions, for each package of which we submitted concrete proposals. Even more significant as a precedent is the inclusion of the Belarusian issue on the agenda of the International Criminal Court—the launch of a preliminary investigation into the situation in Belarus regarding crimes against humanity committed against Belarusians. In the context of the ICC, this also includes Lukashenka’s war crimes: the deportation of Ukrainian children. Behind both cases lies a great amount of highly professional legal work conducted under the leadership of the National Anti-Crisis Management with the support of our colleagues across the democratic movement. Next is the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The mandate of the established Special Tribunal was extended to representatives of the Lukashenka regime largely due to the efforts of the Coordination Council delegation to PACE, which proposed the necessary amendment to the Resolution on creating the Special Tribunal. International justice regarding the Lukashenka regime and its accountability for crimes against both Belarusians and our neighbors has never been closer. And that accountability will come. The third precedent—which we might still be underestimating, but which remains extremely important—is the elections to the Coordination Council. For the first time, a secure, independent digital platform was created for a real, free, and democratic expression of the will of Belarusians. Twice now, through this voting system, we have managed to ELECT a representative body for the democratic forces. Naturally, we would have liked to see hundreds of thousands of people vote. But let us remember the conditions under which these elections take place, the danger voters face, and what participating in the elections threatens candidates with. Despite all of this, we have successfully organized voting twice and elected the Coordination Council. The very fact that this is an elected body allows us to hold the recognized delegations I mentioned earlier. It is essential for us to remember this and to help develop and strengthen our independent election mechanism and representative body. We can talk a lot about achievements, and we can also be very critical. I am certain there are many different opinions regarding democratic forces and institutions, and how things should be done. The same applies to civil initiatives or independent media, which constantly face criticism—sometimes even from democratic politicians or those who consider themselves as such. But this is the very nature of the democratic process we are engaged in, and the democracy we strive for. In emphasizing the importance of information work inside Belarus, I am not referring only to independent media. With all due respect, it is not the media’s job to shape the political agenda, draft strategy, or propose political solutions and a framework for overcoming the crisis in Belarus. Moreover, the media cannot report on things that do not exist. And, of course, our political institutions cannot dictate the agenda to the media. So, working on both political strategy and strategic communication rests primarily on political institutions and their media teams. This is a huge amount of work that requires appropriate support and resources. My thesis is simple: if we do not have an independent Belarusian policy and our own political agenda oriented toward Belarus's national interests, our independent media will be forced to report on the policies of the Lukashenka regime. And that will not lead us to a democratic transition. I can clearly imagine representatives of the media at a potential Round Table in Belarus, participating in its expert groups. However, I cannot imagine the Round Table itself without our independent policy, political institutions, and the politicians driving it forward—institutions that have developed and adopted a Round Table strategy for Belarus, leading that communication and communicating it to Belarusians to shape public demand. Our team—the National Anti-Crisis Management—initiated this concept and strategy. Over recent months, we prepared a comprehensive study on this topic, analyzing the experience of democratic transitions in three European nations (the GDR, Poland, and Spain) and formulating a crucial framework adapted to Belarus. Artsiom Brukhan, Speaker of the Coordination Council and my colleague at the National Anti-Crisis Management, presented this strategy at the "New Belarus" Conference. In the near future, we will publish this study along with a series of documentary films based on it. We extend our gratitude to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for supporting this project. But our work promoting this concept, as well as our political and media work in general, extends far beyond this. Regarding the idea of a Round Table: while still imprisoned, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski called for a national dialogue in Belarus. At the time, I remember, this caused concern and misunderstanding among many of us. But as we began to analyze the concept more deeply, we realized that this is exactly the path used by many nations during transition periods from authoritarianism to democracy—as demonstrated by the GDR and Poland. We have developed the following approach: first, we needed to secure the agreement of the core political institutions of the democratic forces in support of holding a Round Table. A corresponding decision was adopted by the United Transit Cabinet led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya; Later, our faction initiated a resolution in the Coordination Council, which passed with over 80% of the vote. In addition, the Round Table concept was approved by the primary political forum of Belarusian democratic forces—the "New Belarus" Conference, which took place this August in Warsaw. Thus, today we hold a firmly confirmed position across all democratic institutions and the majority of the Belarusian democratic community in support of the Round Table idea. This initiative has also received support from international partners. The primary importance of dialogue between the regime and Belarusian society was articulated in the Council Conclusions on Belarus adopted by the Council of the European Union on February 19, 2024, where paragraph 5 states: "The EU calls on the authorities of Belarus to engage in a genuine and inclusive dialogue with all elements of society with a view to holding free and fair elections, under the observation of the OSCE/ODIHR and in accordance with internationally recognised standards." In addition, following active consultations with European capitals, the European Commission noted in its statement on August 9, 2026: "We also reiterate our call on the Belarusian authorities to initiate a genuine and inclusive national dialogue." So as of today, we also have the backing of our primary European allies. The central topics of a prospective round table would be preserving the independence and sovereignty of Belarus—on which there is absolute national consensus among Belarusians—and preventing Belarus from being dragged into an active phase of the war against Ukraine — an issue on which a national consensus has also formed. Potential peace talks to end Russia's war against Ukraine could create conditions for establishing a long-term security architecture in the region. Yet without accounting for the voice of Belarusian society in these negotiations, regional security will remain fundamentally incomplete. Without an independent, democratic, and stable Belarus, the crisis will persist. Resolving the broader regional foreign policy crisis is impossible without first resolving the domestic political crisis within Belarus. Everything the democratic forces do and propose will be meaningless and impossible to implement without the support of the Belarusian people—without their interest and engagement in our work. But how is that measured? A fellow politician recently told me that his friends in Belarus are uninterested in and indifferent to what the democratic forces and our team are doing. I don’t know how many friends were being referred to or how representative that sample was. But I have my own data. For example, the media team at the National Anti-Crisis Management compiles monthly performance reports. And yes, we rely on these metrics to measure the interest of Belarusians—just as independent media outlets do. Given current conditions, comprehensive sociology and public opinion polling are inaccessible to us. In this respect, we are all in the same boat, and the quality of our work, as well as public engagement, can largely be evaluated through these metrics. The figures our media team recorded for August stand at 15.5 million views, with over 70% from an audience inside Belarus. Another crucial topic I want to address today is potential peace negotiations regarding Ukraine. Indeed, today we see no readiness from the Kremlin to enter genuine negotiations to end this most horrific war of the 21st century—Russia's aggression against Ukraine, supported by the Lukashenka regime. However, we must be prepared for such developments. For us as democratic institutions, it is imperative in our communications with European and American partners to uphold the principle that deciding the future of Belarus without the participation of the Belarusian democratic movement and civil society is unacceptable. It is not Lukashenka who should determine the future of Belarus, but the Belarusian people. We require a firm stance from our European and American partners that, in the event of peace talks on Ukraine, the presence and voice of Belarus's democratic forces and civil society must be guaranteed. A repetition of something like the 1921 Peace of Riga cannot be allowed. To achieve our strategic goal—holding a Round Table to resolve both the deep domestic political crisis and the international crisis surrounding Belarus—we must execute tactical steps that enable us to reach this goal. We propose a dual-track approach: First, the United States, utilizing its sanctions mechanisms against the regime alongside non-traditional diplomatic channels, has the necessary power and resources to secure the release of all political prisoners and end political repression. Second, we call on the European Union and other democratic nations to systematically apply sanctions mechanisms as leverage to achieve real, systemic change in Belarus. I want to thank the organizers of the Minsk Forum for the invitation and for the valuable discussions that took place yesterday, continue today, and will continue in Brussels and Berlin. I wish all participants success and a productive conference! Thank you for your attention, and Жыве Беларусь!

Deputy Head of the UTC of Belarus, Head of the NAM, Leader of the "Latushka's Team and the 'For Freedom' Movement" faction in the Coordination Council of the 4th convocation Pavel Latushka. Warsaw, Poland. Photo: NAM-media The situation in Belarus, the accountability of the Lukashenko regime, and possible ways out of the deep domestic political crisis in Belarus were the main topics of discussion at a meeting between Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and delegate of the Coordination Council, and a delegation of the Flemish Peace Instituteand members of the Flemish Parliament. Flanders is a federated entity and the northern region of Belgium. During the meeting, held at the Museum of Free Belarus, Pavel Latushka informed the representatives of Flanders about the dramatic situation inside Belarus and about the continuing unprecedented political repression in the country, which has taken on the character of a conveyor belt. The meeting was also attended by the Speaker of the Coordination Council, Artsiom Brukhan, and by Uladzimir Astapenka, Representative for International and European Cooperation of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of the Coordination Council's delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Head of the Coordination Council's delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Uladzimir Astapenka. Warsaw, Poland. Photo: NAM-media Separately, the Deputy Head of the Cabinet spoke about the institutions of the Belarusian democratic forces and the network of civil society organisations and initiatives that has been built. It was emphasised that this is a unique situation, and that the existing institutions are an alternative to the Lukashenko regime in international politics. Pavel Latushka noted the importance of the work being done to bring representatives of the Lukashenko regime to justice for the war crime of deporting Ukrainian children to Belarus, the crime of aggression, and crimes against humanity against the Belarusian people. He also spoke about the Lukashenko regime's support for Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Pavel Latushka. Warsaw, Poland. Photo: NAM-media During the meeting, Pavel Latushka presented the two-track strategy: "The United States, using its sanctions mechanisms against the regime as well as methods of non-traditional diplomacy, has the necessary strength and resources to secure the release of all political prisoners and an end to the repression. Second, we call on the European Union and other democratic countries to consistently use sanctions mechanisms as leverage to achieve real, systemic change in Belarus." Answering a question from a Flemish representative about the effectiveness of sanctions, Uladzimir Astapenka stressed that they have a serious impact on the Lukashenko regime, while it is important that sanctions directed against the regime provide for flexibility towards Belarusian society. Uladzimir Astapenka also noted that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Belarus, signed in 1995, contained a clause stating that for the EU, human rights are essential to maintaining trade and economic relations. It is precisely on this principle that the European Union builds its relations with other states. Speaker of the Coordination Council Artsiom Brukhan. Warsaw, Poland. Photo: NAM-media The Speaker of the Coordination Council, Artsiom Brukhan, spoke in detail about the idea of holding a Round Table in Belarus, the problems this initiative may face, and the benefits Belarus and Belarusian society would gain from it. The Speaker also emphasised the importance of the elections to the Coordination Council and the unprecedented efforts the regime made to disrupt the elections to this representative body of Belarusians.

Yury Harauski escorted by police outside the courthouse in St. Gallen, Switzerland, September 2023. Source: currenttime.tv Today, 22 September 2026, St. Gallen is hosting the appeal hearing in the case of Yury Harauski, connected with the enforced disappearances of Belarusian opposition politicians Yury Zakharanka, Viktar Hanchar and Anatol Krasouski in 1999. TRIAL International, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Human Rights Centre "Viasna" played an important role in bringing the case before a Swiss court. "The significance of this trial goes far beyond the case against one of the perpetrators of the killings. It is not only a matter of restoring the right of the victims' families to truth and justice, but also important practical experience in applying universal jurisdiction, a mechanism that makes it possible to seek accountability for grave crimes when justice is unavailable in the country where they were committed. This experience is of particular value for efforts to initiate similar proceedings in other countries as well. I would like to recall that although Harauski was acquitted, the court of first instance found it established that Zakharanka, Hanchar and Krasouski were abducted and killed, and that representatives of the Belarusian authorities were involved in the crimes. And this has already become a historical fact recorded in the course of judicial proceedings," said Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the NAM. The trial shows both the possibilities and the difficulties of this mechanism: how to collect and assess evidence decades later, verify the testimony of former members of the security forces, work with witnesses and victims, and ensure high-quality interpretation and compliance with fair trial standards.

Pavel Pavlovich Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka's Team and the 'For Freedom' Movement" faction in the Coordination Council of the 4th convocation Today we will try to examine yet another economic and geopolitical miscalculation by the Lukashenko regime. The analysis shows that the regime is tying the country's transport and oil system to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is sinking both economically and militarily. "The fuel shortage in Iran is worsening; the country is short of about 15 million litres of petrol per day." Source: Podolyaka.ru At the end of August 2026, Iran was gripped by an acute fuel crisis. Kilometre-long queues at petrol stations in Tehran, Isfahan and Tabriz, the paralysis of domestic logistics and a record devaluation of the national currency became symptoms of a systemic collapse. Against this background, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated directly that Iran is "in its dying economic agony", and that Washington and its allies are launching a large-scale campaign of "economic strangulation" of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). "Members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during a rally marking Al-Quds Day in Tehran." Source: RBC Bessent publicly warned that the United States intends to systematically, tranche by tranche, impose harsh secondary sanctions against all of Tehran's allies and accomplices without exception. The US Treasury Secretary's quote to Fox News should sound like an alarm bell in Lukashenko's palace: "We want this conflict to end. The fastest way to end it is to provide no support to Iran. We will systematically identify and eliminate every such bad actor." And it is precisely at this moment that the dictatorial regime in Minsk decides to act as one of the key fuel sponsors and logistics partners of the Tehran regime. The attempt to profit from Iran's fuel famine and to use the International North–South Transport Corridor will cost Lukashenko immeasurably more than the short-term gain he expects to receive. To understand the scale of the dictatorship's involvement in these schemes, let us turn to operational data on rail shipments and export consignments disclosed by the Community of Railway Workers of Belarus. In 2025, through the line of just one major logistics operator, the state enterprise Belorusneft-Trans, 594,687 tonnes of Belarusian petroleum products in 10,359 tank cars were sent via Russian port stations. The absolute core of this flow is motor fuel: 444,360 tonnes of motor petrol and 112,498 tonnes of diesel fuel. Together they account for 93.6% of all the enterprise's port shipments. But where are these colossal volumes of high-octane petrol and diesel going? The statistics on the geography of shipments reveal an anomalous, critical concentration on the Caspian direction. The port and export stations of the Astrakhan hub of the Volga Railway and the Republic of Dagestan, namely the stations of Trusovo, Novolesnaya and Makhachkala, received a total of 520,850 tonnes, or 87.6% of the entire export port flow of Belorusneft-Trans! Let us break this logistics chain down link by link: Trusovo station (Astrakhan Region): The largest destination. 300,078 tonnes of petroleum products (including 246,232 tonnes of petrol and 53,846 tonnes of diesel fuel) were sent here to Terminal Ilyinka LLC. Terminal Ilyinka is not an end consumer, but a specialised oil loading complex designed to receive fuel from Belarusian rail tank cars, store it temporarily and load it into river-sea class tankers. Novolesnaya station (Astrakhan Region): 198,258 tonnes of cargo (154,672 tonnes of petrol and 43,586 tonnes of diesel fuel) were delivered to Transoil Terminal LLC. This is the second most powerful transshipment complex in the Caspian region, operating in tandem with the tanker fleet. Makhachkala station: 22,514 tonnes of petroleum products passed through it. The two Astrakhan terminals alone, Ilyinka and Transoil, accumulated 498,336 tonnes, which amounts to 83.8% of the total volume shipped by Belorusneft-Trans through Russian ports. For comparison: the once-key North-Western Baltic direction shrank in 2025 to a modest 61,800 tonnes (with 36,008 tonnes of petrol going to Luzhskaya station and 21,142 tonnes of oils to Predportovaya station). How does this chain work as a whole? The route is extremely transparent: Stage 1: Trains are formed at Barbarou station (serving the Mazyr Oil Refinery) and Navapolatsk (Naftan). Stage 2: Transit via Russian railway networks to the Astrakhan hub (Trusovo, Novolesnaya). Stage 3: Loading into Caspian tankers and sea passage to Iran's northern ports: Anzali, Caspian, Amirabad and Nowshahr. Stage 4: The fuel is used either directly to relieve the acute shortage on the Iranian domestic market, or transited across Iran by tanker trucks and rail to the southern port of Bandar Abbas for subsequent delivery to third countries of the Global South within the International North–South Transport Corridor. After the closure of the European market and the blocking of transit through Ukraine in 2022–2024, the Lukashenko regime found itself completely dependent on Russian port infrastructure. However, strikes on the infrastructure of Ust-Luga and the Baltic terminals, as well as a sharp rise in freight costs in the North-West, forced Minsk to look for an "emergency exit". The Caspian-Iranian vector seemed to Lukashenko an ideal salvation. First, it allowed him to sell fuel directly to Iran, which is suffering from a refining crisis. Second, it opened access to the Indian Ocean. But the dictator made a strategic mistake. By betting a significant part of his special rail exports of petroleum products on the Caspian card, Lukashenko entered into a direct coalition with the regime in Tehran precisely at the moment when the US and its allies moved to the final phase of the forceful and economic elimination of the IRGC's resource base. When Scott Bessent announces the "systematic elimination of bad actors", he does not mean abstract entities. Entirely specific legal entities and individuals fall into the crosshairs of the US Treasury and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC): Belarusian shippers and producers: Mazyr Oil Refinery OJSC, Naftan OJSC, the state enterprise Belorusneft-Trans. Transport operators: the Belarusian Railway (BZhD) and the fleets of specialised tank cars involved in the scheme. Russian logistics proxies: Terminal Ilyinka LLC, Transoil Terminal LLC, Global Trade LLC, as well as Caspian shipping companies and the tanker fleet. What exactly will this mean for the Lukashenko regime and, unfortunately, for our country's economy, as long as an illegitimate ruler remains in power? Every tank car of petrol sent via Trusovo and Novolesnaya towards Iran is recorded by US satellite and financial intelligence. The imposition of direct blocking sanctions (SDN List) against Belorusneft-Trans, BZhD and associated banking structures means a complete freeze of any remaining international settlements. No schemes involving yuan, dirhams or crypto assets will save companies that come under targeted pursuit by the US Treasury as part of the "strangulation of Iran". A significant share of port exports is tied to the Caspian trade route. If the US imposes secondary sanctions against sellers and carriers, or if military action escalates in the Caspian region with the blockade of the Iranian ports of Anzali and Amirabad, almost 90% of Belarus's Caspian fuel exports will stop in a single day. Minsk simply has no alternative routes. Russia's North-Western port region (Ust-Luga and St Petersburg) is overloaded, is under constant threat of drone attacks and shows a drop of more than 50% in the transshipment of Belarusian petrol. The Murmansk direction (the First Murmansk Terminal), where individual trains were sent on a trial basis via Kola station, can handle only a drop in the ocean. The Black Sea is blocked by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. By tying Belarusian exports to Iranian transit, Lukashenko has turned Belarus's state assets into hostages. Instead of being a transparent, Europeanised hub, Belarus under Lukashenko's leadership has turned into a "grey carrier" supplying fuel to internationally ostracised regimes. Lukashenko is selling out Belarus's national interests for the chance to obtain short-term cash from his Iranian and Russian allies. "Supporters of the Houthi movement at a mass rally in Sanaa after US strikes on Yemen." Source: Reporters.live In addition, Lukashenko continues active military cooperation with Iran. A heavy cargo Boeing 747 of the airline Qeshm Fars Air, registration EP-FAB, is flying to Minsk for the third time in the last few weeks. The airline and its aircraft have been under US sanctions since 2019 for cooperating with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in arms deliveries. According to flightradar24.com data, the aircraft departed Tehran on 8 September 2026 at 1:00 AM UTC and arrived in Minsk at 6:18 AM UTC. Route of the Qeshm Fars Air cargo Boeing 747, registration EP-FAB, from Tehran to Minsk according to Flightradar24 data. Source: Flightradar24 / Nasha Niva Before that, the aircraft flew to Minsk on 26 August. On 27 August, EP-FAB departed Minsk, made an almost five-hour flight over Russian territory, and then returned to the Belarusian capital. The next day, 28 August, it flew to Tehran. The cargo Boeing 747-281F(SCD), registration EP-FAB, belongs to the Iranian cargo airline Qeshm Fars Air. On 24 January 2019, OFAC added Qeshm Fars Air and two of its Boeing 747s, including EP-FAB, to its sanctions list. This carrier is controlled by Mahan Air and operated cargo flights on behalf of the IRGC's Quds Force, including delivering weapons and other military equipment to Syria. In addition, a secret arms trafficking network involving Iranian and Belarusian parties that supports the Houthi insurgent movement in Yemen was exposed earlier. Iran stepped up arms deliveries to the Houthis using aircraft of the Belarusian transport company Rada Airlines (already under sanctions). It delivered cargo from Tehran to undisclosed locations in the Red Sea area (Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan). From there, part of the cargo was transferred by small vessels to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. The network was engaged in the covert transfer of weapons and military technology to these areas in violation of international arms embargoes. The operation reportedly relied on a combination of forged transport documents, dual-use goods and indirect routes through third countries to conceal the origin and final destination of the shipments. The structures of the Lukashenko regime are believed to have provided logistical support and supplied components, while Iranian operatives coordinated transshipment via sea and land routes from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. "The Houthis have disabled the Saudi East–West oil pipeline, and the seizure of Perim Island has strengthened their control over shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait." Source: belmarket.by As a result, a few days ago the Houthis used drones to damage the strategic East–West oil pipeline in Saudi Arabia, which could cost the global market 4% of its oil supply. On the same day the pipeline was hit, the same Houthis seized the strategically important island of Perim in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and effectively established control over shipping on this crucial global transport route. Belarusian Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Mohammad Taghi Osanloo during a meeting on the sidelines of the Beijing Xiangshan Security Forum. Source: Reform.news Just recently, on 15 September 2026, Belarusian Defence Minister Viktar Khrenin met with Iran's Deputy Chief of the General Staff Mohammad Taghi Osanloo on the sidelines of the Beijing Xiangshan Security Forum. The parties "confirmed their commitment to further strengthening bilateral cooperation in the military sphere". As representatives of democratic Belarus, we declare: The Belarusian people must not pay for the dictator's adventures. Supplying fuel to the Iranian regime is the personal initiative of Lukashenko and his inner circle, not the choice of Belarusian society. We warn the management of BZhD, Belorusneft-Trans, the Mazyr Oil Refinery and Naftan: participation in logistics chains supplying Iran, at a time when the US has announced an operation for the "economic strangulation" of the IRGC, is a direct path to personal international sanctions. We will appeal to our international partners, the US, the European Union and the United Kingdom: when introducing tough measures against the Caspian-Iranian route, sanctions must be clearly targeted at the wallets and logistics operators of the Lukashenko regime, while preserving opportunities for Belarus's future economic transformation. Belarus does not need transit through Iranian deserts under the threat of American missiles and sanctions. Belarus needs a return to civilised, understandable and premium European markets. But this will only become possible when the toxic dictatorship that is dragging our country to the bottom together with rotten terrorist regimes in Asia is dismantled. Support for Tehran will become for Lukashenko not a lifebuoy, but a cast-iron weight that will finally drag his regime to the bottom.

A. Lukashenko in Shklou District, Mahiliou Region. Belarus, 2026. Source: president.gov.by/ru Alexander Lukashenko's personal inspection of Shklou District ended in yet another purge of officials. The helicopter landed right on a field of the "Haviady-Agro" agricultural enterprise, where the dictator was supposed to be shown the flax harvest. But instead of a nice picture, a completely different one emerged: missed deadlines, a crop rotting in the ground, and Lukashenko's verdict: "Did you want to show how not to work? People should be jailed for this! This is horror, a nightmare! Put the region under martial law." Everyone without exception got their share: the head of the Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee Anatol Isachenka, Minister of Agriculture Yury Harlou, and the recently appointed aide Nadzeya Katkovets. They were told directly: if even one metre of land remains unploughed, they will lose their posts. And behind this latest purge of officials, a deep systemic crisis is clearly visible, where officials' personal fear of a sudden inspection, repressive Soviet practices and the specifics of manual control all converge at one point. What unsettles officials most in this situation? The absolute unpredictability of the dictator's reaction and the realisation that status no longer protects them. For years they lived within the familiar paradigm of "Potemkin villages". Before Lukashenko's visits, only the ceremonial routes and model fields along the roads were polished, while all the problems and decay were pushed out into the backcountry. But the Shklou case has shown once again that this camouflage does not guarantee officials any peace of mind. And here a managerial paradox arises. The system itself drives the official into a trap: failing to show the required result is not an option, as punishment follows immediately. Showing the real state of affairs is not an option either, as it means dismissal. As a result, the only survival strategy becomes concealing problems until the very last moment. And when this illusion collapses because a helicopter happens to land in the wrong place, the repressive apparatus switches on its usual mode of searching for the guilty. All of this refers directly to the Soviet cult of strategic crops and the Stalinist practice of fighting "wrecking". In the USSR, certain plants were brutally sacralised: under Khrushchev, for example, it was maize, and for failing to meet maize targets, party secretaries lost their party cards and careers. In modern Belarus, flax has been elevated to this rank: it is literally woven into the state coat of arms and has itself been declared the main national brand. In this sense, the spoiling of the flax harvest is, for the regime, essentially an attack on its very ideology and a personal insult. "The battle for the harvest". Belarus, 2026. Source: news.by Just as Stalin's people's commissars hunted for "class enemies" under the notorious "law of three spikelets", a harsh 1932 decree under which a spikelet cut in the field or a broken collective-farm tractor meant ten years in the camps or execution, today Belarusian officials are promised to have their "heads torn off" and are threatened with handcuffs for failing to meet agricultural targets. "You'll answer to me with your head! Rock solid!" Phrases like this have long become the dictator's signature style at any meeting. In the same way, in Soviet times agronomists and engineers were sent to the GULAG for "wrecking" by letting fields become overgrown with weeds or leaving machinery standing unrepaired. All because the command-administrative system simply does not know how to work with any incentive other than paralysing fear, even though it is precisely this fear that paralyses any initiative on the ground. Interior Ministry officers and military personnel take part in transporting and guarding grain. Belarus, 2026. Source: news.by Parallels, by the way, can also be traced with other totalitarian regimes. For example, in the Third Reich, under Göring's "Four-Year Plan" and the concept of the "battle for production", agriculture was also subordinated to a rigid militaristic logic. Failure to meet agricultural norms or irrational use of land was treated as sabotage and punished by a tribunal or by being sent to concentration camps. The appointment of special aides to oversee the regions there is strikingly reminiscent of today's system of the dictator's aides for the regions and the introduction of "martial law" in the economy of Belarusian regions. The goal is to compensate for the system's inefficiency with harsh administrative pressure on its own executors. And finally, the current rout near Shklou is a direct continuation of Lukashenko's personal repressive tradition: he has transferred his experience of running a state farm to the scale of the entire country. And this practice of personnel purges has been built up over years. For example, in November 2012, after a visit to "Barysaudreu", heads rolled across the leadership of the entire industry for the failed modernisation of woodworking, and the plant's director Uladzimir Maltsau ended up in the dock and received a real prison sentence. In August 2018, a public dressing-down took place in Orsha District, with shouts of "The government is sabotaging my instructions! One month, and everything must be done!", which cost a deputy prime minister, two ministers and the head of the Viciebsk Regional Executive Committee their posts. In March 2019, there was the inspection of the "Slizhy" farm and the notorious case of the "shit-covered cows", with the screams "They are sick, they are dying! Have you lost your minds?", which instantly cost Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Rusy, Minister Leanid Zayats and the chairman of the district executive committee their posts. Over time, this system finally evolved: agronomists, economists and managers of agricultural enterprises were effectively pushed away from real management. The State Control Committee, the Prosecutor General's Office, the KGB and the Interior Ministry have become the main auditors of Belarusian fields and farms. Constant police raids checking fuel tanks and searching for siphoned fuel, criminal cases against farm directors for trying to conceal livestock deaths in order to meet targets, harsh prison sentences for failing to meet planned norms, and inspections of fertiliser storage have clearly proven that the agricultural sector in Belarus is not managed according to the laws of economics. The absurdity has gone so far that the regime involves military enlistment offices in overseeing sowing and harvesting, and security officers together with military commissars carry out inspections at agricultural enterprises, assess the quality of machine operators' work and threaten to send "negligent workers" and officials who fall behind schedule straight into the army or to corrective labour. It turns out that today it is not the relevant ministers and industry experts, but the security forces and the prosecutor's office that have become the main managers of the Belarusian economy. And the rest of the officials are openly given to understand that failure to fulfil plans will be judged "according to the laws of wartime". Do the officials themselves understand where all this is leading? When, behind every broken tractor and every unharvested metre of land, they can already quite realistically picture a prison escort. And what do they plan to do next with this understanding? After all, only yesterday they silently watched, and some obediently took part in, the mass repressions against the Belarusian people, expecting that batons and criminal cases would certainly not concern them. And today the repressive machine is turning on them. Pastor Martin Niemöller. Source: stmegi.com The famous lines of the German pastor Martin Niemöller come to mind: "When the Nazis came for the communists, I remained silent; I was not a communist. When they came for the social democrats, I remained silent; I was not a social democrat. When they came for the trade unionists, I remained silent; I was not a trade unionist. When they came for the Jews, I remained silent; I was not a Jew. And when they came for me, there was no one left to speak out for me." After all, everything is happening according to exactly the same formula: when they came for civil society, the officials remained silent, because they did not consider themselves part of it. But today the regime has come for them, and there is simply no one left to stand up for them.

Head of the "Belarusian House in Warsaw" foundation Ales Zarembiuk, Director General for European Affairs of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hana Hubáčková, Deputy Head of the UTC/Head of the NAM Pavel Latushka. Photo: NAM-media There are no illusions regarding the Lukashenko regime, noted Hana Hubáčková, Director General for European Affairs of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during a meeting with Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the NAM. On the Czech side, the meeting was attended by the Czech Ambassador to Poland, Břetislav Dančák, and on the Belarusian side also by the head of the "Belarusian House in Warsaw" foundation, Ales Zarembiuk. During the meeting, Pavel Latushka presented the two-track strategy that the democratic forces are proposing to their partners: The US uses its mechanisms to stop the repression and secure the release of all political prisoners; The EU, using sanctions and diplomatic mechanisms, insists on systemic change in the country and on the start of a dialogue between representatives of the functional authorities in Belarus and Belarusian society. Hana Hubáčková noted that this is an approach the Czech Republic supports, because it is important to achieve systemic change in Belarus. During the meeting, the parties agreed that, despite the release of political prisoners, the situation in Belarus has not changed, and the unprecedented level of repression continues every day. Separately, the Director General for European Affairs of the Czech Foreign Ministry said that the Czech government is preparing a decision, to be adopted in the coming weeks, that will simplify the process of obtaining Czech visas for relatives of Belarusians living in the Czech Republic. At the meeting, Pavel Latushka spoke about the activities of the institutions of the democratic forces and about the Coordination Council's delegations to the most important European inter-parliamentary institutions. He also spoke about the situation in Belarusian culture, which is being deliberately Russified by the Lukashenko regime with the Kremlin's support in order to change the mentality of Belarusians, and about the NAM's work on bringing representatives of the Lukashenko regime to justice. Hana Hubáčková confirmed the Czech Republic's position of full solidarity with the democratic forces of Belarus and its readiness to continue its support, noting that the Czech Republic remembers what it is like when a country lives under a dictatorship and political prisoners are held in its prisons.