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Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National аnti-сrisis management, Leader of the «Team Latushka and Movement “For Freedom”» faction of the Coordination Council of the 4rd convocation The European Union is changing its approach to sanctions against the Lukashenko regime For a long time, the European Union's sanctions policy toward the Lukashenko regime resembled a heavy medieval battering ram. To land a single blow required gathering the will of 27 states, spending months on diplomatic haggling, packing hundreds of restrictions into one giant package, and ceremonially presenting it to the public. However, while Brussels' bureaucratic machinery slowly turned its gears, the Lukashenko regime acted swiftly. Internal repression in Belarus has long since turned into a continuous conveyor belt, while hybrid aggression on the EU's external borders — from artificial migration waves to the deep integration of Belarus's military-industrial complex into the Kremlin's war machine — changes shape faster than diplomats manage to agree on the agenda of the next summit or sanctions measure. The analysis shows: the traditional model of European sanctions is running out of steam. To stop the dictator, the EU must abandon cumbersome mega-packages and shift to a strategy of flexible, rapid, and even unpredictable pressure. The main enemy of European effectiveness on sanctions is the right of veto, through which a single country can block a decision by all the others. When the European Commission puts together another large-scale sanctions package, it tries to fit everything into it at once — from restrictions on banks and raw material exports to personal bans on judges and security officials. At that moment, a fundamental vulnerability of the whole system emerges — the veto right of any one of the 27 EU member states. Here's how it works in practice: Blackmail and concessions: individual states start delaying the adoption of the entire package, demanding personal exemptions for their own businesses — be it national companies, importers, or financial institutions. Dilution of restrictions: in an effort to save the package and achieve unanimity, Brussels makes concessions. As a result, the document emerges from negotiations looking like "Swiss cheese" — full of holes and stripped of its original force. Loss of the element of surprise: six months of negotiations give the Lukashenko regime and its intermediaries in third countries an ideal window of opportunity to reassign assets, change logistics routes, and open new shell companies. In pursuit of loud political PR and outward unity, Brussels has been building sanctions monoliths that require enormous effort to agree on but are often circumvented in practice. It's clear that this approach is losing its effectiveness. And a new approach to sanctions pressure policy has matured. The EU needs a fundamentally new sanctions strategy toward the Lukashenko regime. Its key principle is narrow thematic focus and speed. Illustrative photo. https://x.com/kajakallas/header_photo Instead of launching exhausting negotiations over a compromise mega-package once every six months, the EU should switch to a continuous stream of targeted decisions. What are the advantages of this concept? 1. Neutralizing the veto power: Vetoing a large-scale package under the pretext of protecting the national economy is easy. But when a one-page targeted decision is put on the table — concerning, say, 3–5 specific intermediary firms or 3 Belarusian judges handing down sentences to political prisoners — vetoing it becomes politically toxic and practically impossible for any EU capital. 2. Rapid response: For any harsh move by the regime — another repressive trial, a border provocation, handing an enterprise over to serve Russia's military-industrial complex — the EU should respond with an instant, thematic decision, without waiting for the formation of another large package. 3. Automatic "mirroring": Belarus is still used as an offshore loophole for evading restrictions imposed against Russia. The new approach will make it possible to build chains of sanctions: once a Russian entity is added to the ban list, shortly afterward, a targeted decision blocks its Belarusian twin or logistics partner. The era of unwieldy, sluggish sanctions packages has come to an end. Attempts to tie together, in a single document, the interests of shipowners, farmers, and the security of the whole of Europe sometimes discredit the very instrument of restrictions. The future of effective foreign policy belongs to targeted, fast, and continuous action. A strategy of "a thousand pinpricks," implemented through rapid thematic micro-packages, will deprive the Lukashenko regime of its main resource — time to adapt — and will force it to pay a real and immediate price for every act of repression and aggression.

The image is illustrative in nature The issuance of Polish humanitarian visas for former political prisoners and their family members, repressed Belarusians, as well as the legalization of former political prisoners and their family members on the territory of Poland, became one of the main topics of discussion during a meeting between the deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet, head of the NAM, Pavel Latushka, and the director of the Consular Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry, Justyna Chrzanowska. The NAM's lawyer and Coordination Council delegate, Mikhail Kirylyuk, also took part in the meeting. During the meeting, the parties discussed: the issuance of Polish humanitarian visas for former political prisoners and their family members; the legalization of former political prisoners and their family members on the territory of Poland; inviting close family members of Belarusian citizens who hold a residence permit in Poland on humanitarian grounds; matters related to granting international protection to citizens of Belarus on the territory of Poland, taking into account new approaches to migration policy in Poland. During the meeting, solutions were found, with the support of the Polish Foreign Ministry, for a number of complex individual situations related to providing humanitarian assistance to citizens of Belarus. Photo: Archive Separately, Pavel Latushka presented detailed information on the human rights situation in Belarus. Specifically for this meeting, the political prisoner support initiative "Dissidentby" prepared information reporting that in July 2026, 78 new criminal cases of a political nature were recorded. In a broader context, since the beginning of 2026, 694 new cases of politically motivated persecution have been recorded. The meeting was also presented with information from the human rights center "Viasna", according to which, in July 2026, 38 people were recognized as political prisoners. Pavel Latushka particularly drew attention to the fact that the human rights situation in Belarus has not changed.Political sentencing continues, and sentences in criminal cases opened in previous years are being finalized. At the same time, the so-called "list of extremist organizations" is significantly expanding. As an example, the most recent decisions by the regime's courts were cited on including Euronews and the Polish Press Agency (PAP) on the so-called list of "extremist materials," as well as recognizing the European Humanities University as an "extremist organization." Pavel Latushka noted that hundreds of Belarusian initiatives, registered both in Belarus and on the territory of Poland and other European countries, have been designated "extremist organizations." Representatives of the Polish Foreign Ministry agreed that there was and is no basis to believe that the Lukashenko regime is reducing repression in Belarus. Regarding travel to Belarus by persons holding dual citizenship — Belarusian and Polish — representatives of the Polish Foreign Ministry noted the importance of taking into account that "Polish citizens who also hold Belarusian citizenship are, under Belarusian law, regarded exclusively as citizens of Belarus. As a result, in a crisis situation, a Polish consul will not be able to provide consular assistance to a Polish citizen who also holds Belarusian citizenship. This also applies to minors." Pavel Latushka thanked the leadership of the Consular Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry for the effective working meetings. He expressed gratitude for the assistance provided by Poland's foreign affairs agency in obtaining humanitarian visas for citizens of Belarus, as well as for help in resolving various complex individual situations. An agreement was reached that informational materials on the repression inside Belarus will continue to be shared with the Polish Foreign Ministry on an ongoing basis. Separately, Pavel Latushka reported on the recent increase in transnational repression against citizens of Belarus living on the territory of Poland, linked to in-absentia sentences, attempts at recruitment, blackmail, and pressure exerted on activists through relatives and family members living on the territory of Belarus.

V. Putin and A. Lukashenko. Photo: Dmitry Astakhov / Sputnik / Reuters For years, propaganda hammered the same myth into Belarusians' heads This is the myth that Russia is our main sponsor, ally, and savior. Supposedly, without the Kremlin the Belarusian economy would collapse, factories would shut down, and people would freeze. We were told that surrendering sovereignty was merely a modest price for cheap gas, endless loans, and a guaranteed market. But let's look at the reality of the summer of 2026. Today this myth has finally fallen apart. Selling out sovereignty has not brought Belarus wealth. It has brought isolation, toxic sanctions, military threat, and… plain and simple swindling. The Lukashenko regime didn't just drag us into someone else's war of aggression — it managed to do so on terms where Belarus pays for everything and gets nothing but empty promises in return. Falling under harsh European or American sanctions for contracts with the military plants of an aggressor state is, in itself, a crime against our country's future. But there's a cynical rule in business: high risk should be compensated by high profit. And what do you call a situation where you incur every possible international sanction, lose European markets, end up isolated, but don't get paid by the partner you did it all for? That's not called a "strategic partnership." That's called complete, absolute being a loser. And dozens of Belarusian enterprises now find themselves in this humiliating loser status. Our industrial giants were assured: "Russia's military-industrial complex is running at full capacity, there are mountains of gold there, an endless stream of money!" And what was the result? In the end, that money ran out. The systemic economic crisis in Russia, compounded by the collapse in the fuel sector, has now reached Russia's "defense industry" too. Look at the courts. For the first time in history, Belarusian enterprises — both state and private — have started massively filing lawsuits in Russian arbitration courts against the "elite" of Russia's military-industrial complex. If last year conflicts could still be smoothed over "amicably" — when the sums were relatively small and giants like Rostec paid their bills — in 2026 the dam broke. Booth of the company "Peleng" at MILEX–2023. Source: voennoedelo.com The flagship of Belarusian optics, the enterprise "Peleng," is now forced to sue the Saratov Aggregate Plant over a debt of nearly 1 million US dollars. And this plant is part of the "High-Precision Systems" holding of the state corporation Rostec, and produces the vaunted "Khrizantema-S" anti-tank systems. The leader of our military-industrial complex, "Volatavto," a manufacturer of chassis for electronic warfare systems and missile complexes, filed a lawsuit in June of this year against "Motovilikha Plants" — Russia's only full-cycle artillery and "Grad" rocket launcher manufacturer. The claim amount is again around 1 million dollars. The first hearing is already scheduled for August. Private business has also been caught under this steamroller. The Smolensk-based company "Avtotekhinmash," a major distributor of BelAZ equipment, is suing the "Ilyushin Aviation Complex" (the very same UAC holding within Rostec, manufacturer of the Il-22 flying command posts). Belarusian enterprises supplied products, risking their reputations and incurring lifelong sanctions, while Russian military giants simply shrug and don't pay. A Belarusian worker finishes his shift, but there's no money to pay his wages, because the "ally" turned out to be bankrupt. Why don't Russian defense giants pay our factories? Is this just a coincidence? Not at all. The answer lies in the catastrophic state of Russia's financial system. Just recently, Russia's Ministry of Finance announced it is temporarily halting the placement of federal loan bonds (OFZ). The official wording sounds laughable: "in order to help stabilize the market situation." But we all understand what's really happening when officials start talking about "stabilization." Simply put, no one is lending Russia money anymore. Even Russia's own banks refuse to buy into this gamble. Last week an OFZ auction was cancelled due to a complete absence of buyers. And that's already the third failed auction since the start of summer! Out of the 1.5 trillion rubles planned for the third quarter, Russia's Finance Ministry managed to scrape together a symbolic 10 billion. Russian authorities have built a classic financial pyramid scheme. In 2023, they borrowed 2.8 trillion rubles through OFZ bonds. In 2024 — 4.4 trillion. In 2025 — already 7.2 trillion! For 2026 they had planned to pull another 6.5 trillion out of the market. But the financial bubble has burst. Bond yields have soared to an insane 13–17%. Today, servicing the government debt eats up 9% of all of Russia's budget expenditures. Have you thought about that figure? Russia spends more on interest payments on its debts than on the entirety of its healthcare and education combined! The hole in Russia's budget will soon reach 6 trillion rubles, and expenditures were quietly increased by another trillion in recent days. Where is the money for the war supposed to come from? The National Wealth Fund has only 3.6 trillion rubles in liquid assets left. That's not even enough to cover the current deficit, let alone the need to repay 3 trillion in old debts. What way out does the Kremlin have? A well-known historical way out — internal default. Robbing its own banks and freezing payments, as it already did in August 1998. And only a few weeks remain until a new potential default. The alternative is simply printing unbacked rubles. But that's a different problem — inflation. And it is to this sinking financial pyramid that Lukashenko has tied the Belarusian economy for good! What does all this mean for the citizens of Belarus? Finance Minister Uladzislau Tatarynovich proudly talks of a transition to a "deficit-free budget." But at what cost? In 2025, the deficit of the republican budget was 4.5 billion rubles (about 1.6% of GDP). At the same time, the regime took out another 1.2 billion dollars in loans from Russia, finally hooking the country onto the needle of credit dependency. But now the credit source has dried up. There's no money in Moscow. And how does Lukashenko respond? In the 21st century, with a nuclear power plant in the country, Lukashenko calls for switching heating in Belarus to… pellets, firewood, and biofuel! And proposes leaving natural gas as a mere "reserve source"! A country that was promised to become a "technological hub" is, through the regime's efforts, being thrown back into the Middle Ages — to stoking furnaces with wood and sawdust. Because gas has to be paid for, and soon there will be nothing to pay with! But that's not all. The moment the slightest friction arises in relations with the Kremlin, Russia doesn't hesitate to strike at Belarus's most painful spot — our industry and agriculture. Rosselkhoznadzor is once again massively imposing restrictions and special laboratory controls on Belarusian meat and dairy products this year. In 2026, restrictions were imposed on 11 Belarusian enterprises, and another 15 were placed under enhanced monitoring. Rosselkhoznadzor has never really been about veterinary matters — it's a tool of economic blackmail that Russia uses to protect its own producers and pressure Minsk. Belarus finds itself in a vicious circle: Dependence on the Russian market has cost it trade with the European Union. Sanctions have blocked our banking sector and cut off access to modern technology, equipment, and logistics chains. And the Russian market itself is now deflating, refusing to pay its bills, and strangling Belarusian exports with duties and barriers. But the most terrifying thing isn't the economic losses. The most terrifying thing is what the regime is turning our land into. Belarus has been turned into a military staging ground for the Kremlin. Our infrastructure has been placed at the disposal of a foreign army, provocative military exercises are being held on our territory, and foreign military facilities are being deployed. Just recently, in June 2026, Lukashenko signed a law ratifying yet another protocol to the Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation. In July, Russia ratified this document as well. They have made the procedure for mutual military deliveries and procurement even simpler. Specifically, the list of Belarusian enterprises and organizations entitled to directly participate in military-technical cooperation with the Russian side is being expanded. This allows more factory and research sites to cooperate without complex intermediary schemes. The procedure for drawing up contract documentation has also been streamlined and sped up. The mechanism for approving and forming lists of military-purpose products to be supplied has been revised, which shortens the time needed for agencies to review applications. Cooperation in research and development work is being simplified. Time spent on administrative procedures for supplying the security agencies of the Union State with equipment, components, and ammunition is being reduced. Thus, Belarusian factories are being turned into a free repair shop for Russian military equipment, and Belarus itself into a direct participant in the regional military confrontation. The MZKT-7930, manufactured at the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant, in service with the Russian army. Source: abw.by Look at the map. We've ended up in complete isolation from our neighbors — Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine. We are on the brink of direct involvement in a military conflict with the NATO bloc. And for what? So that Kremlin generals can wage their senseless war for a few more months, all while not paying Belarusian factories for the equipment supplied? For a long time we were told there was no alternative to an alliance with the Kremlin. We were told that "friendship with Russia" was a guarantee of stability. Today we see the price of this "stabilization": It's the default that the ally's economy is hurtling toward; It's millions in unpaid debts owed to our enterprises; It's the switch from gas to firewood and pellets; It's the constant fear of war and the complete loss of international standing. Belarus should not be held hostage to someone else's imperial adventure. We don't need war. We don't need someone else's debts and someone else's defaults. A Belarusian worker should not be working for free for a foreign country's army! Not working for an army waging a war of aggression against our neighbor and a hybrid war against our other neighbors. Our path is the restoration of Belarus's state sovereignty. We must immediately withdraw from this military adventure, revoke all the protocols turning us into a staging ground, and declare strict neutrality. We must diversify our economy, regain European and global markets by lifting sanctions through a return to democratic norms and the release of all political prisoners. We must build pragmatic, equal, and mutually beneficial relations with all our neighbors — both West and East — rather than serve as vassals of a bankrupt empire. Belarus deserves to be a modern, prosperous, secure European state.

The image is illustrative in nature Catastrophe awaits Belarus if Lukashenko holds on for another two or three years! And it's very important for this to be known — not only by those of us who oppose this obscurantism, but also by officials within the system. You are driving the country into an abyss. And at the head of this train — the engineer — is Lukashenko. We constantly hear claims from the regime about "stability" and "the economy adapting to sanctions." However, if you set aside the current windfall from a neighboring state's military orders and look at the long-term trends, a picture of the most severe systemic crisis opens up before us. Belarus is in a phase of exhausting the basic factors of economic growth — above all, human capital. And within the state's current model, the country has no internal resources to pull out of this nosedive. But an important reserve for development today remains the forced emigration that Lukashenko contemptuously refers to as "the fugitives." Let me break down this dynamic using numbers and facts. The main constraint on any long-term growth is demographics. And here Belarus has reached a historic low. Based on recent years, the country's total fertility rate has fallen to ~1.2, against the 2.1 needed for simple population replacement. The annual number of births has broken a historic low — around 54,000 children per year. For comparison: in the mid-1990s this figure exceeded 110,000. The country is losing 40,000–50,000 people annually to natural population decline. But the destruction of the demographic structure is most vividly seen in the example of Minsk. The capital, which historically compensated for the natural decline of the regions through an influx of young people, has itself become a depressed area. In a city of two million, fewer than 10,000 children are born per year, and the death rate exceeds the birth rate by almost a factor of two. Think about that — twofold! 2 million residents, and only 10,000 babies born per year in the capital. Why is this critical for the economy? In 15–18 years, the generation entering the labor market will be physically half the size of the group retiring. The share of the population above working age is rapidly growing. By 2035, there will be more than 65 pensioners and children for every 100 working people. Under such conditions, a pay-as-you-go pension system is mathematically unsustainable without a continuous increase in budget subsidies. The second factor is an institutional and economic dead end. International expert institutions estimate Belarus's potential GDP growth at 1–1.5% per year. That's a level of protracted stagnation, cementing a growing lag behind the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Belarus's economy has run into three structural barriers: First — a labor shortage and falling productivity. The shortage of personnel has spread across all sectors: from industry and healthcare to IT. But trying to compensate for the shortage of workers through administrative wage increases, without growth in labor productivity, only fuels inflation and drains enterprises' working capital. Second — technological and market mono-dependency. The reorientation toward Russia and the break with Europe have turned Belarus into an appendage of its eastern neighbor. The country has lost access to Western equipment, technology, and potential loans. Third — the dominance of an inefficient state sector. State enterprises continue to absorb subsidies and preferential loans, redistributing resources in favor of unprofitable production at the expense of suppressing the private sector. Given this structure, external labor migration from Central Asian countries will not save the situation: Belarus cannot offer competitive wages in hard currency or clear legal guarantees. Now let's look at the flip side — the Belarusian diaspora that has formed since 2020. The authorities calculated that pushing opponents abroad would bleed civil society dry. In reality, what happened was a process of forced export of human capital, which in emigration has not just been preserved but capitalized. By the most conservative estimates, 600,000 Belarusians — 6.4% of the country's population — now find themselves outside the country. These are not abstract numbers; this is a specific cross-section of society. And the sooner Lukashenko goes, the sooner we'll be able to realize the scenario I want to present to you now. According to the National Bank of Poland, the average age of migrants from Belarus does not exceed 40, with the overwhelming majority being active people under 45. Half of all Belarusians in Poland are under the age of 34. The employment rate among our relocated compatriots exceeds 65–70%. About 60% of Belarusian citizens in Poland have higher education. The image is illustrative in nature Thousands of Belarusian businesses have relocated and been re-established in Poland, Lithuania, Georgia, Germany, and the USA. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians are, right now, gaining direct understanding of how European justice, the banking system, and Western technologies work. Those whom the regime's cheap propaganda calls "fugitives" are, from an economic standpoint, accumulated development capital held abroad. When the current model exhausts its resources under the pressure of the demographic deficit and shrinking external subsidies, Belarus will face a question of survival. The current bureaucratic apparatus will have problems with personnel and a financial cushion to carry out structural reforms. The country's revival will require the fulfillment of three key tasks, where the diaspora has an important role to play: 1. Attracting capital and financial stabilization For macroeconomic stabilization and reforms, Belarus will need direct investment and loans. The diaspora will become a guarantor and bridge for attracting international aid, private capital, and the return of assets moved abroad. 2. Institutional and personnel transition We won't have to reinvent the wheel. Over the years abroad, pools of experts have formed — lawyers, economists, managers — ready to implement reforms step by step. 3. A demographic and technological "ricochet effect" Repatriating even 30–40% of the specialists who have left, in the first years after a change of regime, will provide a rapid technological leap forward. This means the return of the IT sector, an influx of young families, and, as a result, a turnaround in the depressed trends in the labor market. We need to stop viewing emigration solely as a tragedy and a loss. In the context of long-term history, it is a forced preservation and multiplication of human capital. The authorities have created a system inside the country that is incapable of reproduction — not demographically, not economically, not technologically. The death rate being twice the birth rate in Minsk is the final diagnosis of the model of state that Lukashenko has created. The dictator is destroying our nation. He is the worst ruler in the entire history of the Belarusian people — he is destroying the people. The real potential for Belarus's modernization today lies, in part, outside the country as well. And our task is not simply to wait for change, but to shape its architecture, strengthening ties between business, expert communities, and international partners. Belarus can be saved and restored. And a key driver of this process can be, among other things, that very human capital which is today being tempered and growing in exile.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National аnti-сrisis management, Leader of the «Team Latushka and Movement “For Freedom”» faction of the Coordination Council of the 4rd convocation A systemic ethnocide and cultural genocide of the Belarusian people is happening right now, today In Russia and Belarus, laws are being passed on the "genocide of the Soviet people" and the "genocide of the Belarusian people" during the years of World War II. The Prosecutor's Office — formerly under Shved, now under Gary — uses this historical tragedy as a political club against opponents. But while they hide behind the past, a real ethnocide is being carried out in present-day Belarus. What's behind this term? Ethnocide is a deliberate policy of destroying a people's national identity and self-awareness. The lawyer Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term "genocide," emphasized that genocide is not only physical killing. Its most important component is cultural genocide — that is, the targeted destruction of a group's language, culture, and historical memory, turning them into obedient "mankurts." This is exactly what has been happening in Belarus since 2020. Let's turn to the dry but frightening figures from the National Statistical Committee. According to the census, in 1999, 85.6% of citizens considered Belarusian their native language. By 2019, this figure had dropped to 61.2%. And over the past 10 years, the number of schoolchildren studying in Belarusian has decreased by 34.4%! Now, across the whole country, only about 8% of schoolchildren study in their native language — that's just over 88,000 children in a country of 9 million. But the situation is most catastrophic in the capital. In Minsk, only 1.6% of schoolchildren study in Belarusian! That's just over 3,500 children in a city of two million. This is the lowest figure among all regions. Belarusian-language gymnasiums in the regions are being forcibly switched to Russian, and as of 2026 there isn't a single language school in the country where foreigners can officially study Belarusian. Today only 1.4% of normative legal acts in Belarus are published in Belarusian. The language is being deliberately squeezed out of every sphere. The "Our Grunwald" historical reenactment festival. Source: ru.belarus.travel The regime isn't even ashamed of its intentions. The head of the National Library and a member of parliament, Vadim Gigin, openly declared the destruction of cultural initiatives on air with propagandist Azaronok. He put it this way: "Will there be a thaw? You'll get this 'thaw' over your head. We will root it out completely. And the fact that you're squealing there, that you're panicking there, that your faces are twisted — for us that says we're doing everything right. And moreover, neither 'Ragna' nor this 'Grunwald' will be the end of it. (…) And believe me, just as we once simply incinerated 'Knihaŭka', it will go on being the same way." And propagandist Azaronok adds that he personally monitors the internet in search of "sedition," looking for where Belarusian poets gather or where souvenirs with national ornamentation are sold. And the result of their dirty work is plain to see: The Ragna ethno-store has been shut down, the HONAR and LSTR Adzieńnie brands destroyed. The "Our Grunwald" historical reenactment festival, held for 16 years running, has been banned. More than 117 cultural figures are behind bars or under "chemistry" (restricted-freedom sentences) — among them Pavel Belavus and musician Aleh Khamenka. The outstanding artist Ales Pushkin was tortured in prison and died. More than 260 cultural organizations have been liquidated, and at least 428 cultural figures have been dismissed for political reasons. All Belarusian cultural centers abroad — the "Free Kupalaŭcy," the Museum of Free Belarus, "Budźma Belarusami" — have been declared "extremist." Merely viewing their materials in Belarus can lead to prison. The "Our Grunwald" historical reenactment festival. Source: ru.belarus.travel As the former director of the Kupala Theatre, I see this merciless purge from the inside. 58 people were dismissed from the Yanka Kupala National Academic Theatre, 36 of them actors — essentially the entire troupe! Russian directors and actors are being appointed in their place. The only fully Belarusian-language theatre is being forcibly russified. From 2019 to 2024, the number of book titles in Belarusian shrank from 1,271 to 893, and the total print run fell by almost 700,000 copies. The independent publishers "Yanushkevich," "Knihazbor," and Gutenberg Publisher have been declared extremist. The Information Ministry has banned 258 books, and the lists of so-called "extremist materials" now number more than 9,000 items. Uladzimir Karatkevich's novel "Wheat Ears Under Your Sickle" has been dropped from the school curriculum! More than 50 leading historians have been dismissed from institutes and universities or forced out of the country. For 2026–2027, Minsk and Moscow are introducing unified history textbooks for the "Union State," in which the period of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth is presented as a harsh ordeal, and the Russian Empire as an era of peace. Monuments to Kosciuszko and Kalinowski are being dismantled, while an 11-meter monument to Alexander Nevsky is being erected in Minsk. And do you know why this is happening? Vadim Gigin. Source: sb.by I'll recall one personal conversation with Lukashenko, back when I was still working in the ministry. He once told me, one on one: "I would speak Belarusian myself, but then Putin would sell me oil at a much higher price." That is the whole essence of this politician. He is ready to sell out the Belarusian language, culture, and history for cheap oil, gas, and the preservation of his own power. The Western world has long treated the situation in Belarus simply as a local human rights crisis. This is a dangerous mistake. LSTR brand sweatshirt with the "Ave, Kastuś!" print. It depicts Kalinowski with insurgents, styled after "The Last Supper." Source: nina.nashaniva.com Today, culture is the front line. Without large-scale support for the Belarusian language and identity, the European Union will end up with either a new Russian province on its border, or a country whose mentality has been completely replaced by a Russian one — aggressive and militarized. The destruction of culture is turning 9 million Belarusians into a faceless mobilization resource for the Kremlin. Research by the Ebert Foundation shows that it is precisely nationally conscious Belarusians who most support Belarus's European path. By destroying the language, Lukashenko is destroying the country's European future. A nation can survive without borders, but it will never survive without national identity. If we don't defend Belarusian culture today, tomorrow we'll have to build new Russian military bases and go into another "special military operation." But I believe in our people. The Belarusian language lives on in our hearts, in our books, and in our resistance. Share this video, like it, and write in the comments what the Belarusian language means to you today. The truth must be heard!

Celebration of July 27 in the 1990s. Photo restored and colorized using AI July 27 is the most important date for modern Belarusian statehood. It was on July 27, 1990, that the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Belarus was adopted. This date is the birth of our modern state, the culmination of the struggle that Belarusians waged against the imperial Soviet machine. This is the shared victory of the Belarusian people. It was the main state holiday in the period from 1991 to 1996. Today it is also a symbol of stolen independence — when Lukashenko moved Independence Day to a different date, attempting to rewrite our history. July 27 remains our reference point in the struggle for freedom that we must wage again. And this is the goal of our struggle — to return Belarus to Belarusians. So that our state holidays reflect the history of the Belarusian people, rather than being the result of one man's decisions. A man who for some reason believes that he himself is Belarus, although, as we all well know, he was against our country's independence from the very beginning. Independence did not appear on its own back then, and it will not be restored on its own now. Behind it stand people — many people of different convictions and political views, but united by one goal. It's important for all of us to remember this. Especially those who currently work within the system: remember that the true enemy of Belarusian statehood is Lukashenko and those he serves. And he certainly does not serve the Belarusian people. July 27 is the true Independence Day of the Republic of Belarus. And when we can once again freely celebrate our state's holiday, it will mean one thing: Belarus has returned to normalcy, and the dark page of our history is closed. Long live Belarus!

The image is illustrative in nature An International Law Lesson for the Lukashenko Regime As you know, the NAM team is now actively working to bring representatives of the Lukashenko regime to accountability along three main lines. These are: Crimes against humanity committed against the Belarusian people. Deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus from temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. An act of aggression against Ukraine. However, it's important to note that we also have a fourth line of work. Right now another case against Belarus is proceeding at the International Court of Justice, initiated by Lithuania. For now we're not disclosing all the details of this process, but we continue to work on it actively and systematically. And today we'll talk about the absurd reaction that followed from the regime to the lawsuit at the International Court of Justice, and clearly show just how deeply degraded the level of the Lukashenko regime's chief lawyers has become. Who defends the regime? A portrait of a pseudo-professional Let's go back a bit. On June 26, the head of the Main Treaty and Legal Department of the Lukashenko regime's Foreign Ministry, Andrei Popkov, commented on the progress of the case initiated by Lithuania at the International Court of Justice against Belarus over the organization of a flow of illegal migration. And he made, to put it mildly, astonishing statements for someone holding the position of chief lawyer of the regime's Foreign Ministry. Who is Andrei Popkov? Head of the Main Treaty and Legal Department of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry Andrei Popkov at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum, June 25, 2026. Screenshot: video He is an international lawyer, a career diplomat. After returning from the post of the regime's Ambassador to South Korea, he headed the Main Treaty and Legal Department of the Foreign Ministry for the second time. So Popkov is essentially the regime's chief international lawyer. And here is what this person states regarding the possibility of using international justice mechanisms and Lithuania's appeal to the International Court of Justice: "It is clear that legal aggression is, for us, a manifestation of the collective West's undermining of the international order based on the norms and principles of the UN Charter, and in particular the undermining of its key components. This is the system of international justice and dispute resolution. We respond to all these new challenges in accordance with the principles of international law, within the framework of the relevant international judicial procedures. Our Russian colleagues have already accumulated significant experience, but we are only learning. And we appreciate any kind of support from the expert community and from friendly countries." This is an astonishing claim. It doesn't just demonstrate professional incompetence — it evokes outright pity from fellow professionals. Let's explain why this statement is a disgrace for a diplomat of this rank. For every international lawyer, the International Court of Justice in The Hague is a kind of main temple, a Mecca and symbol of the profession. It's the center of legal doctrine formation and intellectual gravity. Participating in an ICJ case as the official representative (agent) of one's country is often the pinnacle of a career one can only dream of. And here, the regime's chief international lawyer, at a moment when he should have shown the full weight of his knowledge, experience, and his department's potential, and demonstrated readiness to confidently defend the country's interests, instead starts looking plaintively toward Moscow and publicly declaring that he and his team are "only learning." Now let's imagine a situation where Belarus's real interests — not the regime's — require an appeal to the ICJ to settle a dispute with, say, Russia, or other actions necessary to defend the country's sovereignty by legal means. Andrei Popkov's statement directly proves that neither he himself nor the regime's Foreign Ministry have any capacity for this. Popkov's attempt to call the use of international justice mechanisms "legal aggression" and "undermining the system" deserves special attention. He tries to convince us that some imaginary "collective West" is breaking the world order. This is a striking claim. Let's start with the basic facts: the International Court of Justice was established after World War II as the UN's principal judicial organ specifically for the peaceful, civilized settlement of disputes between states. The Court's Statute was adopted by 50 founding states simultaneously with the UN Charter and is an integral part of it. At present, the UN Charter has been signed by 193 states. And, as we all well remember, Belarus was one of the founding countries of the UN! That is, in essence, a co-author of both the Charter and the Court's Statute. Here the regime's chief international lawyer displayed an "incredible" command of the skill of substituting concepts. What was once laid down by Belarus itself as a civilized means of resolving disputes, he calls "aggression." The use of legitimate instruments of international law becomes, in his telling, "undermining the system." Next, the regime's representative decided to disclose some details of Belarus's position in the memorandum submitted to the ICJ in the case initiated by Lithuania. And here we found some highly interesting details. Let's start with a well-known fact: the regime, unfortunately representing Belarus, submitted its written position on the case back on January 19 of last year. Meanwhile Lithuania is only required to submit its own by July 20. For any lawyer this looks strange, since as a general rule it's always the applicant party (the plaintiff) — that is, Lithuania — that submits its position first. Here Popkov gives a very clear explanation. He names three possible options for handling the case within — quote — the "jurisdictional stage." One of these options is organizing a separate procedural stage to examine all questions of the court's jurisdiction and the admissibility of the application. According to Popkov, this option is typically proposed by the president of the court during in-person consultations with the parties. In professional legal language, this process is called bifurcation of the case. But according to the regime's chief lawyer, it was Lithuania (the plaintiff state) itself that proposed bifurcation, and he personally agreed to it. I would like to speculate on how events actually unfolded and who really proposed what, but I'll limit myself to noting that this is exactly how things always go in a legal dispute — accepting the other side's proposal. So what's the outcome? The government of Lithuania filed a lawsuit against Belarus at the International Court of Justice. Source: Lithuanian Foreign Ministry On July 14, 2025, at a meeting with the Lithuanian side and the President of the International Court of Justice, Andrei Popkov didn't just agree to bifurcation. In effect, a role reversal took place: at this specific stage, Lithuania became the respondent, and Belarus the applicant. In an international judicial proceeding, the respondent always has a procedural advantage. It can react to the plaintiff's position, calmly preparing counterarguments to an already-formulated written claim. And Popkov voluntarily gave up this advantage! Why was this an advantage? Because jurisdictional objections could have been raised through a traditional objection within no later than three months after the plaintiff party submits its memorandum, or already within the proceedings on the merits. In both of these scenarios, Lithuania would not have had significant opportunities to react to the regime's legal position, since it would no longer have been able to depart from the position originally set out in the Memorial. So what did the regime get in exchange for such a surrender of position? Apparently, only one thing: the ability to prepare its written position over 6 months instead of 3. Put simply, Andrei Popkov ineptly squandered a key procedural advantage in court just to drag out the process by a measly three months. Who won in this situation? That's for you to decide. But it's obvious that the regime's entire tactic is built exclusively on the desire to drag out the negotiation and judicial processes with Lithuania. They are trying to delay the inevitable end in the faint hope of a miracle. Perhaps the regime hopes to wait out a change of power in Lithuania toward someone more loyal. Perhaps they believe Moscow can somehow pressure Vilnius. But neither will happen. Lithuania has had three changes of government since 2023, yet its position on Belarus remains unshakeable. And the Kremlin grows weaker by the day. The delay tactic is simply the regime's own admission of its inability to act within the legal field. And the main reason for this is a shortage of qualified personnel. Over 30 years, the system has effectively destroyed and shut down any opportunities for the development of an independent school of international law in the country. That's why we're seeing such childish procedural errors already at the very first stages of the case. Will the experience of his Russian colleagues, on whom he relies so heavily, help Popkov? Let's recall: in 2022 Russia went down exactly the same path in the case initiated by Ukraine over violation of the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide. And in the end Russia lost that very "jurisdictional stage" spectacularly. So let them share their experience of defeats. In conclusion, I want to note that the Lukashenko regime has created for itself an illusion of absolute immunity, completely ignoring the rules that Belarus itself once helped establish. It is precisely the regime's behavior — denying the existence of the system of international law — that undermines the system of world legal order. It is precisely the sense of total impunity that led Belarus to commit real, not merely legal, aggression against a neighboring state, one that has taken the lives of thousands of civilians. If Andrei Popkov is only learning today, then Lithuania is right now giving him and the entire regime an excellent practical lesson. A lesson that international law works, and that accountability will have to be borne for any crimes. And we recommend that Foreign Ministry officials learn faster. Something tells us this is far from the last international case against the regime. For our part, we are already actively preparing a "new training course" for them. Taking this opportunity, we once again express our full solidarity with Lithuania's courageous and principled stance, as well as with its approaches to compelling the regime to comply with international law and Belarus's obligations.

The image is illustrative in nature Consequences for the Lukashenko Regime European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who presented the initial draft of the 21st sanctions package on June 9, mentioned a proposal to align trade restrictions on Belarus with the measures against Russia in order to prevent sanctions evasion. "We are coordinating trade restrictions on Belarus so that it cannot serve as a loophole for Russian trade," Ursula von der Leyen stated. In the end, that is exactly what happened. The list of products banned from export to Belarus was expanded. Restrictions now cover nickel and beryllium powders, nickel and its alloys, certain materials for the aviation and defense industries, as well as drone equipment, including ground control stations, electronic jamming and interception systems, launchers, servomotors, and flight interruption systems. The EU also introduced additional restrictions on imports of goods from Belarus. These cover a number of ores and metals, unwrought zinc, zinc and chromium oxides, tall oil, glassware, and automotive parts. Transitional periods are provided for contracts already concluded: deliveries of tall oil, glassware, and auto parts are allowed to be completed until October 25, 2026, and Hungary will be able to continue importing certain Belarusian hydrocarbons until the end of the year. Other details of the proposed sanctions against Belarus for supporting Russian aggression against Ukraine include: oil refineries in Russia and Belarus, with EU sanctions specifically targeting the European Trading Company LLC (a distributor of Belarusian petroleum products in Russia) and the Mozyr Oil Refinery; a ban on cryptocurrency operations for 11 cryptocurrency platforms and companies (including a Belarusian crypto platform and Hi-Tech Park resident White Bird) that help Russia evade sanctions; the addition of new Belarusian companies to the sanctions list for assisting Russia's military industry (Chip and Dip LLC; Rogachev "Diaproyektor" Plant OJSC; KB Displei OJSC; Zavod Korpusnykh Izdeliy CJSC); expansion of the ban on Belarusian citizens owning assets in, controlling, or sitting on the board of directors of any company providing services in the cryptocurrency market and regulated by MiCA — the EU's Markets in Crypto-Assets regulation; protection of legal entities from lawsuits outside the European Union in connection with compliance with sanctions requirements. EU member states also agreed to extend the current price cap on Russian oil for another 12 months. The new sanctions package expands restrictions on the Russian financial sector (32 Russian banks), bans specific transactions, and introduces new rules on the use of cryptocurrency, while also adding more vessels of Russia's shadow fleet and their intermediaries to the sanctions list. The new package will also restrict visas for former Russian military personnel, introduce additional trade bans, and place sanctions on approximately 218 new organizations. At the same time, due to the positions of several member states, restrictions on fish trade were dropped, measures against Russian military personnel were softened, and Patriarch Kirill was removed from the list. A compromise was also reached on supplies of Russian LNG to third countries. Greece successfully insisted that the EU allow deliveries and related purchases under contracts signed before February 24, 2022, although any increase in volumes by EU operators will be limited, and the EU Council will review the exemption annually. This is an important sanctions package for Belarus. Despite the fact that the regime has thrown colossal effort into preventing new sanctions from being introduced, freezing them, or even having them lifted and weakened, the pressure continues and is intensifying. Most importantly, the attitude toward the Lukashenko regime has not changed.

The image is illustrative in nature In recent days, a series of high-profile statements have come from Lukashenko, the head of his Administration Krutoy, and Defense Minister Khrenin. "Violators of discipline" during the harvest campaign are planned to be sent to military training for 2–3 months — in particular, to the southern border with Ukraine, at the disposal of special operations forces. Lists of offenders are to be drawn up by mobile "troikas" consisting of the chairman of the district executive committee, the head of the enterprise, and the military commissar. At the same time, standard restrictions on age, health condition, or qualification will not be taken into account. What is actually behind these decisions? Is this really an attempt to "restore order," or are we witnessing a test run of a hidden mobilization scheme? Taking into account the fact that a dictatorship complicit in the war against Ukraine is in power in Belarus, it cannot be ruled out that, under the pretext of "disciplinary training," the regime intends to implement precisely the latter and begin taking people into the army through a simplified scheme. Why? First, this kind of scheme allows the regime to bypass the risks of open mobilization. Officially announcing it would be more difficult for the regime — it could cause panic and serious social tension. But the format invented by Lukashenko of "training for offenders" allows civilians to be taken without an official declaration of mobilization and outside established procedures. In essence, a person is deprived of freedom and sent to the army simply by decision of his superior and local officials. At the same time, we see that these people are already being pre-labeled with terms like "pilferers," "drunkards," "loafers." This is a tried-and-tested dehumanization technique, through which the regime explains its sick logic of action to society and portrays those being mobilized as marginals no one would pity. One can also assume that behind such actions of the regime lies a transformation of the repressive system. This closely resembles the Belarusian version of the Russian scheme for mobilizing convicts, but with even harsher specifics, in which the army plans to forcibly take in simply people considered by the regime to be offenders. At the same time, this helps the regime avoid risking its career security forces, whom it considers the mainstay of its power. It's no secret that the Kremlin is actively pushing Belarus toward deeper involvement in its aggression. Hence a cynical calculation arises: send ordinary workers into a potentially dangerous zone and use this resource if needed or if the Kremlin demands support for the military aggression. It cannot be ruled out that this experience is being closely monitored in Moscow. If Belarusian society accepts such a hidden draft under the guise of "corrective training," the Russian authorities — who already face the question of whether mobilization is necessary — could replicate exactly the same scheme at home. The potential scaling of this scheme to other sectors should also be considered. If the system works in agriculture, exactly the same tool of hidden mobilization could be extended to industrial workers, students, and so on. In the end, any infraction could become grounds for sending a person into the army. Officials and military commissars on the ground who sign these lists of "offenders" should remember: you are becoming accomplices in the unlawful deprivation of liberty and the sending of people into zones of heightened danger. And for Belarusians right now, it is critically important to understand the regime's real motives, to support one another, and not to allow themselves to be turned into expendable material.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National аnti-сrisis management, Leader of the «Team Latushka and Movement “For Freedom”» faction of the Coordination Council of the 4rd convocation An appeal by Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transition Cabinet of Belarus and Delegate of the Coordination Council, to the officials of the regime 32 years of lost time. Remember that footage when Lukashenko stood in the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus and read the oath, placing his hand on the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus—a constitution that was democratic overall, but gave him the opportunity to come to power, and which he subsequently practically tore apart, shredded into pieces, and subordinated all power to himself alone. A greedy man who craves power, wants a lot of money, and wants to rule over people's fates. 32 years of lost time. Lukashenko will never become a democrat, a liberal, or a pro-Belarusian politician. He is obsessed with power, personal power. For him, freedom for the people means the end of his rule, the end of his personal wealth, but most importantly for him—ruling over the fates of others, destroying, torturing, raping, shooting, and killing. And deriving pleasure from it as well. This is a man who has lost all human qualities, or perhaps never had them in the first place. This is a man who knows no feeling of compassion. He gets self-gratification from humiliating others. He punishes those who do not praise him, do not grovel, and do not deliver laudatory, flattering speeches to him. His power is based on the basest of human traits. On coercion rather than conviction, on fear and pressure, on the fear of death, exile, and destruction as an individual. He does not need strong personalities around him. Let us imagine his future. In exile and in torment. Yet he will still be found, because he has created such a vast number of enemies against himself. And they can be divided into two categories: First, those who seek revenge and/or legitimate justice. On his orders, an unprecedentedly colossal number of Belarusian men and women have been killed and humiliated. And the second group of his enemies are those who know that he knows about them. But I also believe in the second outcome—he will be put on trial. I would very much prefer a Belarusian court. If not, then a court in The Hague. All of Lukashenko's roads lead to The Hague. By the way, Lukashenko has found another serious enemy—Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, who will always want to bring him to justice. A few words about the future of the nomenclature surrounding Lukashenko. They also have two options. Of course, there could be more, but let us take two main ones as a foundation: Renounce Lukashenko. This will need to be done very soon; your time in power is rapidly shrinking. His time, and therefore yours. The second option—officials could be cast out by the people or likewise stand trial. The time to make a decision is shrinking. Relentlessly. An opportunity for the officials is a coup d'état or a round table with society, with the Belarusian people, where we can reach an agreement. And you can do this. The Belarusian people, just like you, are tired of Lukashenko. Turchin, the Prime Minister, and Volfovich, the State Secretary of the Security Council, can do this. You can do this if you are not cowards. And then you will go down in the country's history. Get rid of the old man! This will need to be done, and very soon. Time is relentlessly accelerating. 20.07.2026 Warsaw

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National аnti-сrisis management, Leader of the «Team Latushka and Movement “For Freedom”» faction of the Coordination Council of the 4rd convocation During the VI "TUTAKA" Festival of Belarusian Culture, held in the Baryk area near Gródek in the Podlaskie Voivodeship of Poland, the National Anti-Crisis Management organized a panel discussion titled "The Round Table in Poland in 1989: Is Such a Scenario Possible in Belarus?" The discussion was attended by the deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet, head of the NAM, Pavel Latushka; the speaker of the Coordination Council of Belarus, Artsyom Brukhan; the deputy director of the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Stanislava Hlinnik; the head of the Belarusian Union in Poland and head of Belarusian Radio Racyja, Yauhen Vapa; the former Ambassador of Poland to Belarus and Georgia, Mariusz Maszkiewicz; and Belarusian and Polish historian, professor Aleh Latyshonak. "We see that in the near future a window of opportunity may possibly open. And when it opens, we must have a scenario. Jaruzelski in Poland was not ready to hold a round table, but was forced to go for it — Lukashenko today is not ready. But it's not known what will happen when this window of opportunity opens," noted Pavel Latushka. "When we talk about a round table, I would agree with the thesis that you can't simply take Poland's historical experience and transfer it a hundred percent to Belarus. The situation has changed, technologies have changed, the political and geopolitical context — everything is different, but it seems to me that in all peaceful transitions — the round table in Poland, the round tables in the GDR, the transfer of power in Spain — there was always one important thing: the readiness for it among the political elites, both the opposition and, primarily, the nomenklatura," emphasized Artsyom Brukhan. "Our task is to be ready for various scenarios. I personally choose the round table as the thing that will most quickly help preserve the lives of Belarusians. This must be our consistent path to democracy. It is probably the longest, but it is also the least costly for people," noted Stanislava Hlinnik. "A round table must, I believe, be a broad public consensus. It must be an agreement of the entire political opposition for this to even start. And the question, once we get down to specifics, is where it should take place. In Poland, the round table took place in Poland. The question is: where should the Belarusian round table be held?" stated Yauhen Vapa. "The speed of development and transformation of Polish politics, economy, everything in Poland was not what we wanted from the very beginning. Why? Because we gave the communists too much. The problem is not that we haven't reached democracy, that we're now in a bad situation. No. Poland, fortunately, is the best example in this region of Europe of a positive transformation from dictatorship to democracy, but it took us 10–15 years," noted Mariusz Maszkiewicz. "Everything that has happened in history during my lifetime was unexpected for me, and so I try to imagine every scenario, with the round table being one of the scenarios, but there can also be others. Every option is possible, and one needs to at least morally prepare for each option," emphasized Aleh Latyshonak.

Video: NAM-media From May to September, festivals of Belarusian song and culture are held in towns, gmina centers, and villages throughout the Podlaskie Voivodeship of Poland. The organizer of the festivals is the Belarusian Social and Cultural Society in Poland, which this year marked its 70th anniversary. This time, alongside the "TUTAKA" festival, the village of Bandary in the Michałowo gmina also hosted the "Belarusian Hasciounia" festival, which has been held for 25 years now. 14 regional ensembles performed at the festival, from various towns and villages of Podlasie, including the "Krynitsa" choir, which has existed for 43 years and was founded by the Belarusian Social and Cultural Society. Also present at the festival was the deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet, delegate to the Coordination Council, Pavel Latushka. During the festival, Pavel Latushka held a meeting with representatives of the Belarusian minority in Poland. In the course of it, opportunities for mutual cooperation and support for Belarusians were discussed. Belarus previously provided assistance in developing the culture of the Belarusian minority in Poland. However, at present the Belarusian state has renounced this support and has practically ceased any assistance to the Belarusian minority in Poland. During a conversation with the chairman of the board of the Belarusian Social and Cultural Society in Poland, Bazyli Siegień, Pavel Latushka noted the importance of uniting the Belarusian diaspora and the Belarusian minority in holding various events aimed at preserving and developing Belarusian song and culture. The festivals are held with the support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and local authorities of Poland, for which Pavel Latushka expressed gratitude to the Polish side. "I consider it very important for the Belarusian diaspora currently living in Poland to know about these events. This is a unique opportunity to attend Belarusian cultural events in Poland and get acquainted with Belarusian folk art. I am convinced that everyone interested in Belarusian culture will greatly enjoy being present at these events," — noted Pavel Latushka. Video: NAM-media The main event that sums up the results of the festivals is the gala concert of the All-Poland "Belarusian Song" Festival, at which this year Pavel Latushka established an annual prize for the best performer.