Lukashenko Is Preparing a "Trojan Wagon" for the EU
- Pavel Latushka
- Apr 30
- 6 min read
Lifting sanctions from the regime means potentially sponsoring Russian aggression
The "lesser of two evils" dilemma in the context of sanctions does genuinely appear complex, and the emotions surrounding it are entirely understandable. At first glance, the logic of certain experts seems attractive: why give Russia (the aggressor state) millions of dollars in transit fees when Belarusian potash could be routed through the EU, with the proceeds going to support NATO's defense capability or even Ukraine?
However, this view is fundamentally flawed, as it ignores reality. Drawing on facts and statistics, one can convincingly demonstrate that lifting sanctions on the transit of Belarusian fertilizers will benefit Russia incomparably more than the Kremlin's current revenues from transshipping Belarusian fertilizers through its own ports and moving them along Russian railways.
1. The Kremlin's logistics revenues are a drop in the ocean compared to the Lukashenko regime's military-industrial cooperation with Russia's defense sector
Russia earns approximately $570 million per year from the transit of Belarusian potash, and that money goes toward the war. This is true. But what is overlooked is where the billions of dollars from unimpeded fertilizer exports through EU ports would go.
Those funds would go to the Lukashenko regime, whose economy is effectively the rear workshop of the Russian army. Depriving Moscow of $500 million in logistics revenue in order to hand Lukashenko billions to sponsor the Russian defense-industrial complex is not the lesser evil — it is a catastrophe.
Facts and statistics:
According to BELPOL, more than 500 Belarusian enterprises are integrated into the Russian military-industrial complex.
Deputy Head of Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service Oleg Lugovsky states that more than 80% of Belarusian enterprises are currently fulfilling Russian state military orders.
Belarusian factories — such as "Peleng," "AGAT," and others — use budget injections to produce fire control systems for Russian tanks, artillery shells, and navigation systems. Belarus even assembles "Geran" drones (the equivalent of the Shahed-136).
The financial oxygen that the Lukashenko regime will receive from the resumption of transit through the EU will be immediately converted into weapons for Russia. Having lost $500 million in logistics, the Kremlin will gain billions in subsidies in the form of finished weaponry and components from Belarus.
2. The unified customs space turns Belarus into a "back door" for the Kremlin
Lifting sanctions from Belarusian companies — even partially, as occurred in 2025 with American sanctions — creates legal channels through which Moscow circumvents restrictions.
Russia and Belarus form a unified customs space with no border controls. There is effectively no way to verify what is happening inside the Union State of Belarus and Russia.
Any easing of measures against the Lukashenko regime is a ready-made channel for Moscow. If Belarusian potash begins flowing through Europe again, Lukashenko's structures — which have the closest ties with Russia — will gain legal access to Western financial flows and technologies.
The real dependence of the Belarusian economy on Russia reaches nearly 90% (taking into account intermediate imports and infrastructure). Revenues from potash routed through the EU will simply strengthen an economy that works 90% in the interests of the aggressor state.
3. Market reorientation
The regime's lobbyists frequently speculate on the theme of famine in developing countries. However, lifting sanctions does not mean that cheap Belarusian fertilizers will miraculously save the Global South.
According to data from the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), China's share of Belarusian potash fertilizer exports grew from 17% in 2021 to more than 70% in 2023. Lifting EU and US sanctions (as occurred in March 2026 following the release of political prisoners) simply facilitates transactions for buyers who previously avoided the associated risks. Lukashenko earns money by selling potash not so much to the poorest countries as to wealthy global players. He in turn directs the proceeds to support the part of the economy that, as we recall, serves as the rear for the Russian war machine.
4. The revival of industrial smuggling as a shadow source of war financing
Granting Belarusian fertilizers access to Baltic ports and increasing cargo turnover with the EU carries another threat — hidden, yet extremely advantageous for the regime: the large-scale revival of smuggling.
Historically, it was precisely the rail trains carrying bulk cargo — primarily fertilizers — that served as the main channel through which record volumes of contraband cigarettes entered the EU. These were not artisanal quantities but industrial-scale operations, generating hundreds of millions of euros in unaccounted profits for the shadow sector.
Sanctions and the closure of freight connections dealt a serious blow to these shadow schemes. Today, out of desperation, the regime has been reduced to absurdity: contraband is forced to be moved across the border using weather balloons. This is a vivid indicator of how effectively the traditional logistics channels have been cut off.
If freight trains begin running to the EU again, a flow of contraband will return to Europe alongside legal potash. These super-profits bypass the official budget and settle in the pockets of structures close to Lukashenko. Smuggling is a powerful source of enrichment for the regime, which is also directly converted into support for Russian aggression and hybrid attacks on EU member states.
Any concession to the Lukashenko regime — whether transit of fertilizers, access to financial markets, easing of aviation restrictions, or the opening of rail routes — is not always merely a "political compromise." It often turns out to be, regrettably, the pumping of money and technologies into the defense-industrial complex of the aggressor, and the provision of logistical chains that daily supply the Russian army with resources for waging aggressive war.
In the politics of 2026, "economics" is merely an extension of the battlefield. Attempting today to separate "peaceful Belarusian potash" from "Lukashenko's aggressor defense-industrial complex" is like trying to separate the gunpowder from the bullet that is already flying toward its target.
Continuing the analysis of lifting sanctions on Belarusian fertilizer transit from the perspective of EU national security — it is clearly visible that resuming transit worth billions of dollars is a strategic mistake, but the resumption of the physical presence of thousands of trains on European territory is an operational threat that is frequently underestimated.
The world has already seen its "Trojan Horse." Allowing a "Trojan Wagon" into the EU today is categorically impermissible. Potash transit involves transportation on a colossal scale. We are talking about thousands of wagons and hundreds of trains every month.
It is physically impossible to conduct a thorough inspection of every ton of granulated potash in every wagon without bringing the entire transport network to a halt. And this is not only about cigarette smuggling. It is an ideal environment for transporting prohibited cargo. Beneath a layer of fertilizer, electronic warfare systems, components for sabotage groups, or reconnaissance equipment could be moved.
Modern sensors, disguised as components of railcars, are capable of reading parameters of critical EU infrastructure — bridges, tunnels, track conditions — in real time, transmitting data to the intelligence services of both the dictator Lukashenko and Russian intelligence.
The railway routes from Belarus into the EU pass through strategically important NATO hubs. In the event of escalation, potash trains could be deliberately and deliberately brought to an emergency halt at specific points in Lithuanian or Polish infrastructure, blocking the transfer of NATO troops to the Baltic states. This is an instrument for the instantaneous paralysis of regional logistics. And lifting sanctions on Belarusian fertilizer transit will send the final signal that Europe is prepared to trade its security principles for short-term gain.
Against the backdrop of statements about the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, any transport corridor becomes a humanitarian shield. The regime can declare that an attack on transport infrastructure — or even an attempt to detain a suspicious cargo — is a threat to the "Union State," to which it will respond with full force.
Resuming transit without a change of regime in Belarus is not merely an economic decision. It is the voluntary opening of the fortress gates to the adversary's supply train. Any potash wagon may carry not only fertilizers, but also risks: hybrid attack, espionage, political destabilization.
This is a matter of national security of the highest order. Giving Lukashenko money is bad. Giving him control over Europe's railways is catastrophic.
Do you think our neighbors are aware of this threat of soft penetration through logistics, or does the lobby acting on behalf of those with an interest in economic contacts with the regime still exert too strong an influence over them?
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