Political institutions of democratic forces are necessary to shape an agenda focused on the national interests of Belarus
Opening remarks by Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transition Cabinet and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, at the Minsk Forum 2026
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
The forum organizers reached out with a request to share an update on the state of democratic institutions. I will try to present my perspective.
With all due respect to everyone participating in the Belarusian democratic movement and fighting against the dictatorship in Belarus, over these three-plus decades we have never had such a large-scale, developed ecosystem and infrastructure as we do today.
Never before have we possessed genuine real institutions like those we have managed to establish: the President-elect and her Office, the United Transitional Cabinet as the executive body, and the Coordination Council as an elected, representative body. For the first time, the Belarusian democratic movement has political institutions that represent a real political alternative to the Lukashenka regime.
This is the core. Yet around it, there are also a lot of civil society initiatives and organizations covering practically the entire spectrum of issues and problems related to Belarus and Belarusians. Yes, these are all NGOs, but looking at this system as a whole, we are basically seeing a proto-state. At the very least, within this broad ecosystem, we can certainly find the experts and personnel pool needed to staff any ministry. This is crucial, especially when evaluating historical precedent—such as the Central Round Table in the former GDR (East Germany). It was thanks to such experts, who worked in the specialized working groups of the GDR Round Table, that it was possible not only to ensure an inclusive process, but also to implement real reforms, draft a new package of GDR laws, and secure a transition of power. Human resources are the foundation for future democratic transformations in Belarus as well.
The last element of the democratic movement I wish to mention—while certainly not the least in importance—is the independent Belarusian media. Here we see a certain paradox: despite all independent media being expelled from Belarus by the Lukashenka regime and branded "extremist," the demand for independent information among our people has never been higher. And all of this is happening under the extraordinarily difficult conditions that both the media and all other components of the Belarusian democratic movement face today.
All of this represents our achievement—one that is crucial to develop, support, and scale up.
I am addressing you today in a rather non-standard capacity for a politician. At the same time I represent political institutions—serving as Deputy Head of the United Transit Cabinet and as a delegate in the Coordination Council, where I lead the largest parliamentary faction, which won the elections twice ("Latushka’s Team and the Movement for Freedom"). At the same time, I represent the National Anti-Crisis Management, an expert organization, while also engaging in media work.
Why is that? Why not focus on just one role? This is indeed a point of criticism I occasionally face, as do other representatives of the democratic forces. But the truth is that right here lies one of the key challenges facing our entire movement, our political institutions, civil society organizations, and the media: a shortage of human resources. It exists, and we must openly admit it.
The reason is not only that we all operate under constant pressure and threats from the Lukashenka regime, which is waging a real war against us, including targeted attacks and abductions. The other side of the coin is serious resource limitations, which prevent our structures, organizations, and media outlets from competing with the commercial sector for qualified personnel and specialists.
At the same time, as I noted earlier, the democratic movement has never been as institutionally and systematically developed as it is today. I will not list every example, but I will highlight those that can confidently be called unprecedented.
First, the degree of presence of the Belarusian agenda, alongside the level of representation and recognition of Belarusian democratic forces worldwide, is the highest in the entire history of the Belarusian democratic movement. I say this with full respect for those who have been fighting the regime for 30 years. Take the Coordination Council as an example: we have official delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly. Recently, we also received an invitation to the Nordic Council. This alone is unprecedented. The level of contacts maintained by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is unprecedented, as is the very existence of the institution of the President-elect within the Belarusian democratic forces. Furthermore, the vast number of resolutions passed by international bodies, parliamentary organizations, and national parliaments recognizing our political institutions is historic.
Second, there is the level to which the issue of the Lukashenka regime’s international accountability has been raised today. This includes the scope of adopted sanctions, for each package of which we submitted concrete proposals. Even more significant as a precedent is the inclusion of the Belarusian issue on the agenda of the International Criminal Court—the launch of a preliminary investigation into the situation in Belarus regarding crimes against humanity committed against Belarusians.
In the context of the ICC, this also includes Lukashenka’s war crimes: the deportation of Ukrainian children. Behind both cases lies a great amount of highly professional legal work conducted under the leadership of the National Anti-Crisis Management with the support of our colleagues across the democratic movement. Next is the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The mandate of the established Special Tribunal was extended to representatives of the Lukashenka regime largely due to the efforts of the Coordination Council delegation to PACE, which proposed the necessary amendment to the Resolution on creating the Special Tribunal. International justice regarding the Lukashenka regime and its accountability for crimes against both Belarusians and our neighbors has never been closer. And that accountability will come.
The third precedent—which we might still be underestimating, but which remains extremely important—is the elections to the Coordination Council. For the first time, a secure, independent digital platform was created for a real, free, and democratic expression of the will of Belarusians. Twice now, through this voting system, we have managed to ELECT a representative body for the democratic forces. Naturally, we would have liked to see hundreds of thousands of people vote. But let us remember the conditions under which these elections take place, the danger voters face, and what participating in the elections threatens candidates with. Despite all of this, we have successfully organized voting twice and elected the Coordination Council. The very fact that this is an elected body allows us to hold the recognized delegations I mentioned earlier. It is essential for us to remember this and to help develop and strengthen our independent election mechanism and representative body.
We can talk a lot about achievements, and we can also be very critical. I am certain there are many different opinions regarding democratic forces and institutions, and how things should be done. The same applies to civil initiatives or independent media, which constantly face criticism—sometimes even from democratic politicians or those who consider themselves as such. But this is the very nature of the democratic process we are engaged in, and the democracy we strive for.
In emphasizing the importance of information work inside Belarus, I am not referring only to independent media. With all due respect, it is not the media’s job to shape the political agenda, draft strategy, or propose political solutions and a framework for overcoming the crisis in Belarus. Moreover, the media cannot report on things that do not exist. And, of course, our political institutions cannot dictate the agenda to the media.
So, working on both political strategy and strategic communication rests primarily on political institutions and their media teams. This is a huge amount of work that requires appropriate support and resources. My thesis is simple: if we do not have an independent Belarusian policy and our own political agenda oriented toward Belarus's national interests, our independent media will be forced to report on the policies of the Lukashenka regime. And that will not lead us to a democratic transition.
I can clearly imagine representatives of the media at a potential Round Table in Belarus, participating in its expert groups. However, I cannot imagine the Round Table itself without our independent policy, political institutions, and the politicians driving it forward—institutions that have developed and adopted a Round Table strategy for Belarus, leading that communication and communicating it to Belarusians to shape public demand.
Our team—the National Anti-Crisis Management—initiated this concept and strategy. Over recent months, we prepared a comprehensive study on this topic, analyzing the experience of democratic transitions in three European nations (the GDR, Poland, and Spain) and formulating a crucial framework adapted to Belarus. Artsiom Brukhan, Speaker of the Coordination Council and my colleague at the National Anti-Crisis Management, presented this strategy at the "New Belarus" Conference. In the near future, we will publish this study along with a series of documentary films based on it. We extend our gratitude to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for supporting this project. But our work promoting this concept, as well as our political and media work in general, extends far beyond this.
Regarding the idea of a Round Table: while still imprisoned, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski called for a national dialogue in Belarus. At the time, I remember, this caused concern and misunderstanding among many of us. But as we began to analyze the concept more deeply, we realized that this is exactly the path used by many nations during transition periods from authoritarianism to democracy—as demonstrated by the GDR and Poland.
We have developed the following approach: first, we needed to secure the agreement of the core political institutions of the democratic forces in support of holding a Round Table. A corresponding decision was adopted by the United Transit Cabinet led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya; Later, our faction initiated a resolution in the Coordination Council, which passed with over 80% of the vote. In addition, the Round Table concept was approved by the primary political forum of Belarusian democratic forces—the "New Belarus" Conference, which took place this August in Warsaw.
Thus, today we hold a firmly confirmed position across all democratic institutions and the majority of the Belarusian democratic community in support of the Round Table idea.
This initiative has also received support from international partners. The primary importance of dialogue between the regime and Belarusian society was articulated in the Council Conclusions on Belarus adopted by the Council of the European Union on February 19, 2024, where paragraph 5 states: "The EU calls on the authorities of Belarus to engage in a genuine and inclusive dialogue with all elements of society with a view to holding free and fair elections, under the observation of the OSCE/ODIHR and in accordance with internationally recognised standards."
In addition, following active consultations with European capitals, the European Commission noted in its statement on August 9, 2026: "We also reiterate our call on the Belarusian authorities to initiate a genuine and inclusive national dialogue."
So as of today, we also have the backing of our primary European allies.
The central topics of a prospective round table would be preserving the independence and sovereignty of Belarus—on which there is absolute national consensus among Belarusians—and preventing Belarus from being dragged into an active phase of the war against Ukraine — an issue on which a national consensus has also formed.
Potential peace talks to end Russia's war against Ukraine could create conditions for establishing a long-term security architecture in the region. Yet without accounting for the voice of Belarusian society in these negotiations, regional security will remain fundamentally incomplete. Without an independent, democratic, and stable Belarus, the crisis will persist. Resolving the broader regional foreign policy crisis is impossible without first resolving the domestic political crisis within Belarus.
Everything the democratic forces do and propose will be meaningless and impossible to implement without the support of the Belarusian people—without their interest and engagement in our work. But how is that measured? A fellow politician recently told me that his friends in Belarus are uninterested in and indifferent to what the democratic forces and our team are doing. I don’t know how many friends were being referred to or how representative that sample was. But I have my own data. For example, the media team at the National Anti-Crisis Management compiles monthly performance reports. And yes, we rely on these metrics to measure the interest of Belarusians—just as independent media outlets do. Given current conditions, comprehensive sociology and public opinion polling are inaccessible to us. In this respect, we are all in the same boat, and the quality of our work, as well as public engagement, can largely be evaluated through these metrics. The figures our media team recorded for August stand at 15.5 million views, with over 70% from an audience inside Belarus.
Another crucial topic I want to address today is potential peace negotiations regarding Ukraine. Indeed, today we see no readiness from the Kremlin to enter genuine negotiations to end this most horrific war of the 21st century—Russia's aggression against Ukraine, supported by the Lukashenka regime. However, we must be prepared for such developments. For us as democratic institutions, it is imperative in our communications with European and American partners to uphold the principle that deciding the future of Belarus without the participation of the Belarusian democratic movement and civil society is unacceptable. It is not Lukashenka who should determine the future of Belarus, but the Belarusian people.
We require a firm stance from our European and American partners that, in the event of peace talks on Ukraine, the presence and voice of Belarus's democratic forces and civil society must be guaranteed. A repetition of something like the 1921 Peace of Riga cannot be allowed.
To achieve our strategic goal—holding a Round Table to resolve both the deep domestic political crisis and the international crisis surrounding Belarus—we must execute tactical steps that enable us to reach this goal. We propose a dual-track approach:
First, the United States, utilizing its sanctions mechanisms against the regime alongside non-traditional diplomatic channels, has the necessary power and resources to secure the release of all political prisoners and end political repression.
Second, we call on the European Union and other democratic nations to systematically apply sanctions mechanisms as leverage to achieve real, systemic change in Belarus.
I want to thank the organizers of the Minsk Forum for the invitation and for the valuable discussions that took place yesterday, continue today, and will continue in Brussels and Berlin.
I wish all participants success and a productive conference!
Thank you for your attention, and Жыве Беларусь!
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