Seized and Not Let Go? The Real Reason Behind Lukashenko's Refusal to Travel to Washington
- Pavel Latushka
- Mar 5
- 10 min read
Pavel Latushka on Whether the Donald Trump Administration Has Officially Recognized Lukashenko as President
Is Lukashenko a president from a legal standpoint, and do the United States recognize him as president? Many will point to the fact that Donald Trump maintains personal communication with the dictator, that senior State Department officials and personal representatives of Donald Trump have met with Lukashenko, and that there are at least two letters addressed by President Trump to Lukashenko. Let us examine this carefully.
On February 16, the Telegram channel "Pool Pervogo" published a video in which dictator Lukashenko began justifying himself regarding the reasons why he could not fly to the Peace Council meeting in Washington.
In the video, Lukashenko stated: "Was I supposed to fly to Washington via South Africa because of these sanctions? If you wanted me there, resolve the issue so that I can freely fly in and out".
He added: "There's also the security question being raised. 'Ah, Lukashenko was scared...' — it's a security issue, they say. Listen, that's not Lukashenko's problem. I have never been afraid of anyone and I don't intend to start. That's utter nonsense. 'Someone will grab Lukashenko there and not let him go home.' Complete stupidity! I cannot even imagine such a thing happening to any other president or to me". Let us examine what was said in greater detail and try to understand what truly motivated the refusal to travel to the U.S. capital. Essentially, three key issues raised by Lukashenko deserve attention, the first of which is:
Were sanctions truly the main obstacle preventing Lukashenko from flying to Washington?
In the current political realities of the White House, sanctions alone would not have been an insurmountable barrier to a Lukashenko visit to Washington. They create pressure, complicate procedures, and raise the political cost of such a visit — but they do not make it impossible.
U.S. President Donald Trump has already demonstrated that sanctions are, for him, a tool of policy — and the meeting held with Putin in Anchorage against the backdrop of war, sanctions pressure, and an arrest warrant is a vivid example of this. The question then becomes a different one — it is not a matter of "whether it is possible", but of "whether they would want it".
From a geographical standpoint, the flight was also entirely feasible. A polar route over the Kola Peninsula area allows one to bypass European airspace and is actually shorter in distance than the routes taken by the leaders of Kazakhstan and Pakistan. Their presence at the summit, therefore, is explained not by kilometers or logistics, but by something else entirely. Sanctions, then, serve as a convenient excuse for Lukashenko — a cover, as we shall see, for hidden fears hinted at by the dictator's own phrase: "Lukashenko was scared because someone would grab him". And that brings us to the second question. Could Lukashenko be arrested, even assuming someone regards him as a head of state?
Let us begin with the fact that the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is right now investigating war crimes related to the deportation of Ukrainian children, including possibly to Belarus.
The answer to this question is therefore unequivocal: in the case of the International Criminal Court, states parties to the Rome Statute not only may, but are obligated to arrest a head of state upon the Court's request.
The International Criminal Court, unlike national jurisdictions, does not recognize head-of-state immunity from criminal prosecution. The reason is simple — already in 1998, when the Rome Statute was adopted, the states parties agreed that the ICC must be able to hold accountable those most responsible for the gravest crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. Accordingly, Article 27 of the Rome Statute is unambiguous: the official status of a head of state, and I quote, "shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility."
If the ICC has opened an investigation and judges have issued an official arrest and surrender request, ICC member states are obligated to arrest and surrender that individual to The Hague. It is also important to note that since November 2025, ICC arrest warrants have been confidential. This means that, subjectively, the risk of arrest in the territories of Rome Statute member states arises for a potential perpetrator as soon as information about an investigation into a situation in which they are implicated becomes known.
There are ample precedents for arrest warrants and surrender requests targeting heads of state — not only before the ICC, but before other international criminal tribunals as well. Consider:
Omar al-Bashir, the dictator of Sudan and the first head of state against whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant;
Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia, who was tried and convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity before the Special Court for Sierra Leone;
Rodrigo Duterte, the former President of the Philippines, who was extradited to The Hague on charges of crimes against humanity committed against his own people, whose ICC hearing began just yesterday;
And, of course, Vladimir Putin, against whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant in March 2023 for the deportation of Ukrainian children, and who faces arrest and extradition to The Hague.
For those who have become the proud holders of an ICC arrest warrant or a warrant from another international tribunal, life changes instantly. They typically begin immediately avoiding jurisdictions where arrest may threaten them. They are effectively on the run for the rest of their lives or until their arrest, compelled to fly around or travel around jurisdictions that are dangerous to them during international travel. One may recall how al-Bashir fled South Africa in 2015 while still in the status of president.
There is also always the risk that during flights a technical malfunction may occur, forcing the aircraft to land somewhere the wanted individual faces arrest.
Lukashenko relies on his immunity, but evidently doubts its effectiveness himself.
But even if any doubt remains regarding Lukashenko's perception of the risk of his own arrest — on the grounds that he is "a president" — let us pay attention to his following phrase: "I cannot even imagine such a thing happening to any other president or to me." Once more: "any other president or to me." I am convinced Lukashenko did not phrase it that way deliberately. What surfaced was his hidden, subconscious fear. And is he a president?... Of course, clearly he considers himself one... But is he a president from a legal standpoint, and does the inviting party recognize him as one? Because if not, then this citizen's flight to Washington could, with a high degree of probability, turn out to be one-way. No one doubts that he has mentally tried on Maduro's prison jumpsuit many times and imagined sharing his fate.
And here, many may object, pointing to the fact that U.S. President Donald Trump's attitude toward Lukashenko is different. He maintains personal communication with the dictator; senior State Department officials and personal representatives of D. Trump have met with Lukashenko. Moreover, there are at least two letters addressed by President Trump to Lukashenko containing the phrase so coveted by the dictator: "President of the Republic of Belarus."
Yet what does that phrase actually mean? It is interesting to note that prior to the operation in Caracas, President Trump referred to Nicolás Maduro as the "leader" of Venezuela. Does the phrase "President of the Republic of Belarus" in a letter's heading constitute recognition of Lukashenko as president from the standpoint of the United States of America? Because if not, Lukashenko cannot count on the personal immunity enjoyed by de jure recognized heads of state. Let us examine this.
I will note that for the purposes of our analysis, only de jure recognition is relevant, as de facto recognition of control over a state without de jure legitimation does not unambiguously resolve the question of personal immunity for Lukashenko. The example of Maduro is instructive — the United States did not recognize him de jure as president.
So how do the United States carry out de jure recognition of a foreign president?
Under the U.S. Constitution (Article II, Section III), it is the President who holds exclusive authority to recognize a specific individual as the lawful president of a foreign state. These powers have been reflected in U.S. case law (Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015)).
The U.S. President may issue an official statement — often through the Secretary of State — recognizing a specific individual as the lawful president of a foreign state. This may be done:
first, through official White House press statements or communiqués;
second, through diplomatic notes or official communications sent to U.S. embassies and the relevant foreign government;
third, through the acceptance of credentials: the official reception of an ambassador appointed by the recognized president.
These practices are formalized in the U.S. Foreign Affairs Manual (§ 102). Private letters or communications are not mentioned therein, as internal policy draws a distinction between official and informal communication.
At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) establishes that the intent of the executive branch must be taken into account — meaning the actual substance of a communication matters, and that substance must unambiguously be directed toward recognizing an individual as the president of a foreign state.
So has the President of the United States officially recognized Lukashenko as president?
What is known is only Trump's address to Lukashenko as "Mr. President" on the Truth Social platform and two letters from the U.S. President addressed to the dictator on White House letterhead.
Let us begin with the Truth Social post.
The U.S. President used his personal social media account — unconnected to his official capacity — to address dictator Lukashenko in a form acceptable to the latter, for a humanitarian purpose: the release of political prisoners.
This post, neither in its content nor in its form of communication, can constitute an official act of recognition of dictator Lukashenko as president.
Let us turn to the letters. Here is the first of them.
The letter's heading reads: Mr. Alexander Lukashenko. President of the Republic of Belarus. Minsk. And here many will say: there it is — an official letter on White House letterhead where, beneath the dictator's name, appear the words so coveted by him: "President of the Republic of Belarus".
But there is a nuance. The standard protocol title used when addressing a head of state, "His Excellency", is absent before the name. Here, for comparison, is how it appears in President Trump's letter to the President of Kosovo.
How ironic, is it not? The Lukashenko regime does not recognize Kosovo as a state at all. Yet the U.S. President uses "Her Excellency" when addressing Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu — but not when addressing him.
Let us turn to the form of address. When addressing the dictator, the U.S. President writes "Mr. Lukashenko," explicitly omitting the title "President." You might point to the heading — but protocol is protocol, and when addressing a recognized head of state, the use of the title, not the surname, is obligatory. We can return again to the letter addressed to the President of Kosovo for reference.
Now, the content, which briefly covers three points: the First Lady of the United States conveys her best wishes and congratulations on the occasion of a birthday; congratulations follow on Aryna Sabalenka's victory; the letter concludes with an expression of hope for progress toward shared goals.
What we have, in the end, is a letter whose content is entirely personal in nature and, moreover, was delivered through John Cole, who was present in Minsk at the time in the capacity of Trump's personal lawyer and trusted associate.
I emphasize: not an official representative of the White House or the State Department with a corresponding mandate. The U.S. President thus made it clear that this letter does not constitute an act of recognition of the dictator as the head of Belarus.
At this point, some may raise the question of the peace summit invitation. Was there not an official letter, analogous to those sent to other heads of state? Does that not constitute an act of recognition? Lukashenko was invited to the summit in the same manner as other heads of state, some will say.
Was it truly the same? Let us examine this.
Here is the invitation from President Trump to the dictator, shown by Belarusian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Varankov. Let us look at it carefully.
What do we see?
Once again, the title "His Excellency" is absent; once again, the form of address is "Mr. Lukashenko." How does this compare to others?
The letter to the President of Kosovo shown earlier is, in fact, the summit invitation. Here it is again.
And here is the invitation to the President of Argentina.
And here, to the Prime Minister of India.
To the Prime Minister of Cambodia.
Interesting, is it not? It is as though the U.S. President is making it clear: yes, I am inviting you — but not as an equal among other heads of state. And certainly not recognizing you as President.
But that is not the final detail. Looking closely at the photograph with Varankov, one can clearly see that the invitation is being displayed in a folder belonging to the Lukashenko Administration. This leads to the conclusion that this invitation reached the Foreign Ministry not from the American side, but from the Lukashenko Administration itself. This allows for a well-founded assumption that the letter was transmitted through unofficial, non-diplomatic channels.
This letter, too, therefore does not constitute an act of recognition of Lukashenko as president. One could deliberate at length on the advisability of such approaches by the American side. But it is important to understand that while both the letters and the social media post carry significant political weight, they in no way affect Lukashenko's current status as an unrecognized head of state. He remains politically and legally deficient, which creates direct threats of arrest for him in many countries — including the United States.
It is not without reason that we recalled Nicolás Maduro. In January of this year, Nicolás Maduro appeared before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Manhattan). A fact that many have forgotten: it is this very court that is handling the case of "the unlawful forced landing of the Ryanair flight" — which, just as in Maduro's case, may be characterized as terrorism.
And at that point, so to speak, it hit Lukashenko. He was seized by fear.
What do we have in the end? It was not sanctions that stood in the way of Lukashenko's trip to Washington — they are merely being used by the dictator as a convenient pretext. Does Lukashenko have reason to be afraid? — Absolutely.
We can reasonably suppose that even if not in the U.S. itself, then during a flight through international airspace, Lukashenko's aircraft could experience technical problems and be forced to land somewhere where an arrest warrant awaits him — where he is an ordinary criminal without immunity. Fear is the true motive behind the refusal to travel to Washington.
Is he afraid? Well. He accuses everyone around him of stupidity — yet himself reveals to all that it is fear that governs his words. The psychology of the blind spot, live on air. On the video, with evident uncertainty, he himself made reference to fear, and even named a specific one: "someone will grab him and not let him go home".
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