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Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council Pavel Latushka on how the regime is gradually building an updated repressive system in Belarus. Recently, the commander of the internal troops Nikolai Karpenkov announced a major reorganization of special units. The special purpose detachment "Buran" in the Gomel region has been transformed into a separate military unit No. 3033. In the near future, the special purpose detachment "Shtorm" in the Brest region will also be transformed into a military unit. The Minsk military unit 3310 will become a special purpose brigade, and the capital's unit 5448 will receive the status of an operational purpose unit. These units are being equipped with grenade launchers, anti-tank systems, flamethrowers, large-caliber machine guns, and BTR-82 armored personnel carriers. Special unmanned aviation centers are being created. There are already three such centers within the internal troops, and a fourth will be established specifically in the "Buran" detachment. What does this mean? It means the expansion and institutionalization of forces designed to suppress internal crisis. Moreover, the regime speaks about this completely openly. Karpenkov directly stated that the reforms of the special units are being carried out taking into account the experience of suppressing so-called "color revolutions" in other countries — in Georgia, Serbia, and Iran. And when we see how in Belarus the control over the economy and the special units for suppressing protests are being strengthened simultaneously, it becomes clear: the regime is not preparing for the development of the country — it is preparing to retain power at any cost. But such a system has a fundamental problem: it destroys the economy.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council.   We have repeatedly warned that helping Lukashenko circumvent sanctions can result in prosecution and even imprisonment. Among other things, we reported that the European Council and the European Parliament reached a political agreement on criminal liability for violations of EU sanctions. February 18, 2026 became a landmark date in the chronicle of the fight against sanctions evasion in Europe. A joint operation by Poland's National Tax Administration and the Internal Security Agency led to the detention of a group of six people — four Belarusian citizens and two Polish citizens. It is important to note that the issue is not the nationality of those detained, but the very fact of the law being broken. Officers of Poland's Internal Security Agency escorting a suspect in a espionage case. Photo: Leszek Szymanski/EPA/dpa/picture alliance The subject of the crime was a device for automating the production of integrated circuits intended for the assembly of combat drones. The route: Poland — Belarus — Russia. This is a signal that the grey zone of transit through Belarus has definitively become a zone of heightened risk and inevitable accountability. In this case, Polish law enforcement acted within the framework of an investigation linked to national security. This is not about a formal violation of export procedures, but an attempt to circumvent the sanctions regime in force against Russia and the Lukashenko regime that supports it. For a long time there existed an illusion that sanctions were merely "political declarations" that could be bypassed through complex logistics, shell companies, and the substitution of customs codes. However, by 2026, the EU and Polish control mechanisms had undergone a profound transformation.

Office for Foreigners. Warsaw, Poland. Photo: NAM Media Today a meeting took place between the Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and NAM leader Pavel Latushka and the Head of the Office for Foreigners Tomasz Cytrynowicz. The meeting was also attended by the head of the legal commission of the Coordination Council Mikhail Kirylyuk and representative of the Center for Belarusian Solidarity Volha Dobravolskaya. The meeting discussed the following issues: legalization in Poland of 83 political prisoners  who were released and deported to Ukraine in December 2025 and have decided to legalize their status in Poland. egalization of three released political prisoners  who were deported to Lithuania on March 19 of this year and on March 21, with the consent of Polish authorities, entered Poland for subsequent legalization. Tomasz Cytrynowicz informed Pavel Latushka that positive decisions on international protection in Poland have been issued for 17 released political prisoners , citizens of Belarus. The representative of the Polish agency also noted that efforts are being made to accelerate the legalization procedure for other released political prisoners whose documents are currently under review at the Office. During the meeting, agreements were also reached on the priority consideration of legalization for three Belarusians who were deported by the Lukashenko regime in a group of 15 people to Lithuania and are planning to legalize their status in Poland. Taking into account the problematic issues related to lengthy waiting times for legalization decisions and obtaining travel documents for Belarusian citizens, Tomasz Cytrynowicz noted that he constantly draws the attention of Polish regional governors to the particular situation of Belarusians who encounter problems with document validity periods while in Poland. The representative of the Office for Foreigners stated that he would send a request to the governors of Poland to provide information on the status of processing applications from Belarusian citizens. During the meeting it was also noted that the Office supports extending the validity period of travel documents to two years , though this matter falls within the competence of Polish legislators. The meeting also touched upon the problematic issue of opening bank accounts for Belarusian citizens . It is planned that on March 26 Pavel Latushka will meet with the leadership of Poland's Financial Supervision Commission, with the participation of representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Finance of Poland, to seek ways out of the difficult situation.

Meeting on measures to eliminate unjustified and unfair brokering. Source: president.gov.by Lukashenko decided to eliminate his family's competitors On March 12, at a meeting on combating "unjustified intermediation," Lukashenko demanded drawing a "clear line" between intermediaries that are allegedly necessary for the economy and those who, in his words, profit at the people's expense. Every economy has intermediaries — logistics companies, trade agents, distributors. Sometimes it is impossible to organize supplies without them, especially to distant markets. The problem is that in Belarus this "line" does not follow economic logic. It follows the principle of loyalty to the regime and closeness to the Lukashenko family. In other words,  a "justified intermediary" in Lukashenko's system is one connected to his illegitimate power . An "unjustified" one is anyone outside that circle. Let us look at specific examples. BelAZ production. Source: autonews.ru The first example is BelAZ. It is one of the symbols of Belarusian industry. Enormous quarry dump trucks operating worldwide — from Africa to Latin America. The cost of a single such truck can range from two to seven million dollars. But an investigation by the organization BELPOL shows that due to intermediary schemes, the enterprise may be losing up to half the value of each machine. How does this happen? BelAZ sells its equipment not directly to the buyer, but through a so-called general distributor — the BelAZ Trading House. This trading house is registered in Russia. It purchases equipment at a reduced price and then sells it at market price. As a result, the profit ends up not at the factory itself or in the Belarusian budget, but in the intermediary structure. In 2023, the revenue of the BelAZ Trading House amounted to approximately 700 million dollars. Meanwhile, the net profit of BelAZ itself in its best years was only around 80 million dollars. A logical question arises: who is actually earning from Belarusian equipment? The Belarusian people — or the intermediary structures? But most importantly — taxes. They are paid not in Belarus but in Russia, because that is where the distributor (the BelAZ Trading House) is registered. According to investigators, a portion of the funds from it is directed to structures connected to the so-called Presidential Sports Club, which is headed by Dmitry Lukashenko. That is how the BelAZ scheme works. And here the central question arises. If intermediaries are evil, as Lukashenko says, why does the largest intermediary scheme exist precisely around state enterprises? Why has it been operating for years? The answer is obvious. Because these are the "right" intermediaries. Because they are inside the system. Let us look at another example — the export of potash fertilizers. Belarus is one of the world's largest potassium producers. After sanctions were introduced, logistics changed. Previously, fertilizers were shipped through the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda; now they go through Russia's Saint Petersburg. The main markets today are China, Brazil, and Indonesia. And here again an intermediary appears. According to the Belarusian Investigative Center and international journalistic organizations, Belaruskali signed a contract with the Cypriot firm Dimikandom Invest Holding. The transshipment rate is approximately 20 dollars per ton. But the real market price is around 11 dollars. The difference is almost twofold. That means millions of dollars go to the intermediary. And this intermediary then pays the port the actual cost of the service. And again the question: who stands behind this scheme? Investigators point to Lukashenko's closest associate — Viktor Sheiman. Once again we see a familiar picture: the intermediary is connected to Lukashenko. And therefore he is "justified." Aftrade DMCC at a meeting during the 55th International Trade Fair "FACIM" in Marracuene, Mozambique, 2019. Source: rsa.mfa.gov.by The same schemes operate in other sectors as well. The export of equipment to Africa goes through the company Aftrade DMCC, registered in the United Arab Emirates. This company buys Belarusian buses for approximately 50,000 dollars and sells them for nearly 100,000 . The markup on spare parts reaches 250 percent. To conceal the origin of the goods, the MAZ marking is even erased from some parts. Yet the regime continues to talk about fighting intermediaries. Why? Because the fight is not against intermediation. The fight is against those who do not belong to the system. Lukashenko says that intermediaries raise prices and deceive consumers. He cites the example of a cardan shaft that rose in price from 140 to 935 rubles. Minsk Automobile Plant (MAZ). Source: logist.today But the problem is that the largest markups arise precisely in schemes connected to the dictator's inner circle. There the figures are not hundreds of rubles, but hundreds of millions of dollars. For thirty years Lukashenko has regularly declared war on "unjustified intermediation." But every new round of this fight ends the same way: the redistribution of financial flows in favor of a narrow circle of insiders. This is not a fight against corruption. This is the management of corruption. This is a system in which state enterprises operate, produce goods, and create value — while profits are extracted by private structures connected to the regime. In such a system, economic development is impossible.  Because the key principle of business is efficiency and competition. But in Belarus a different principle operates — access to power. That is precisely why state enterprises fall short of profit. That is precisely why the budget loses millions of dollars in taxes. That is precisely why the country remains economically dependent and weak. Belarus needs a different model. A model in which state enterprises operate transparently. A model in which there are no "right" and "wrong" intermediaries. A model in which profits from Belarusian resources and labor remain in the country rather than settling in offshore accounts and foreign shell structures. This is possible. But only in a state governed by rule of law. Only in a country where an independent judiciary exists, and where business develops according to transparent and stable rules that are the same for everyone and are not rewritten "on the fly" by decree from above. True stability is not a frozen command economy, but predictability and protected property rights, without which the arrival of real capital cannot be expected. This is possible in a country where journalists can freely investigate corruption. Where power is accountable to society. Belarus will certainly become such a country. And then we will finally draw the real line — not between "justified" and "unjustified" intermediaries, but between corruption and the law.

Employees of the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW). Source: onet.pl 18 February 2026 became an important date in the chronicle of the fight against sanctions circumvention in Europe. A joint operation  by Poland's National Revenue Administration (KAS) and the Internal Security Agency (ABW) resulted in the detention of a group of six people — four Belarusian nationals and two Polish nationals. The subject of the crime was a device for automating the production of integrated circuits, intended for the assembly of combat drones. The route: Poland — Belarus — Russia. This case is not merely a law enforcement result — it is a signal: the grey zone of transit through Belarus has definitively become a zone of heightened risk and inevitable accountability. Video: KAS / still frame: NAM For a long time, the illusion persisted that sanctions were "political declarations" that could be circumvented through complex logistics, shell companies, and the substitution of customs codes. However, by 2026, the EU's and Poland's control mechanisms have undergone a profound transformation. In this case, Polish law enforcement acted within the framework of an investigation linked to national security. This is not a matter of formal violation of export procedures — it is an attempt to circumvent the sanctions regime in force against Russia and the Lukashenko regime that supports it. Sanctions are not a declaration. They are a legal regime backed by investigation, operational work, financial monitoring, and criminal liability.  And in 2025–2026, it is becoming clear that enforcement is reaching a qualitatively new level. Whereas previously the security services concentrated on gathering information, the emphasis has now shifted to pre-emptive action. The Łódź case  clearly demonstrates that the security services (ABW) work in close coordination with financial regulators (KAS). Every transaction, every suspicious piece of equipment crossing the border, falls under the microscope of monitoring and inter-agency data exchange. Illustrative photo After 2022, sanctions restrictions against Russia and the Lukashenko regime became part of the architecture of European security. They are aimed at restricting access to dual-use technologies, blocking supply channels for components destined for the military industry, disrupting financial schemes serving military and repressive structures, and preventing the use of third countries as transit corridors. Belarus in this context is regarded as a transit and logistics territory through which prohibited goods are re-exported to Russia. Therefore, control over exports to Belarus and transit through it is not a matter of economics — it is a matter of security. The attempted transfer of equipment for automating integrated circuit production is not a commercial transaction. It is a potential contribution to the production of drones used in war.  That is precisely why the investigation is being conducted through the national security channel. And that is precisely why the new reality represents a shift from abstract restrictions to personal accountability. Previously, sanctions were often perceived as an economic measure. Today they are accompanied by criminal cases, asset freezes, international data exchange, financial monitoring of operations, and joint investigations by multiple countries. In the case under review, charges have been brought for violation of, among other provisions, Poland's Act of 13 April 2022 on special measures to counter support for aggression against Ukraine and to protect national security, fraud charges, and criminal tax law charges related to foreign currency operations. The minimum sentence is 3 years' imprisonment. This is no longer an administrative matter — it is full-scale criminal prosecution. The signal is clear: participation in sanctions circumvention is equated with participation in undermining state security. And the Lukashenko regime is unable to protect its "helpers" on EU territory. For Polish justice, such individuals are not "business intermediaries" — they are accomplices in aggression. There are several objective reasons why sanctions enforcement will continue to expand. Modern conflicts depend on electronics, microchips, and dual-use components — even civilian equipment can be used for military purposes, making export control a priority. After direct sanctions were imposed against Russia, many schemes began routing supplies through third countries, including Belarus, which led European states to intensify monitoring of all related supply chains. As a result, sanctions compliance has become part of pan-European policy, violations are increasingly classified as crimes against EU interests, and financial services, customs authorities, and security services across different countries are exchanging data. This means that schemes that previously may have operated locally are now being detected at the transnational level. The participation of Belarusian nationals in such schemes deserves separate attention. It is important to emphasise: responsibility attaches not to nationality, but to actions. However, participation in sanctions circumvention — regardless of motivation — objectively serves the interests of the Lukashenko regime and the Russian war machine. Some may justify their participation by citing financial hardship, the need to "earn money," "help a business," or "fulfil a contract." But it must be understood that supplying dual-use technologies is a contribution to military infrastructure; financial operations circumventing sanctions constitute support for a regime subject to international restrictions; and participation in such schemes is a criminal offence in the majority of EU countries.  Any assistance to sanctioned entities is legally classified as complicity. This is not a political assessment — it is a legal reality. Illustrative photo A common argument is: "I won't be found," "it's a minor operation," "everyone does it." However, the practice of recent years shows that schemes dating back many years are being uncovered; intermediaries, logisticians, accountants, and carriers are being prosecuted; investigations target not only organisers but also those who carry out the operations; and assets are confiscated, accounts frozen, and freedom of movement restricted. For example, at the end of last year in Poland, officers of the Maritime Division of the Border Guard and the National Revenue Administration dismantled a criminal group that traded with Russian and Belarusian companies in circumvention of EU sanctions — specifically the supply of plywood and timber prohibited after the start of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Those charged face sentences of between 3 and 30 years' imprisonment. A high-profile case was that of Belarusian national Kirill Gordey, president of a freight forwarding company, against whom the US Department of Commerce imposed a temporary denial of export privileges in February 2025. He was charged with organising the supply of American goods in circumvention of controls, resulting in the immediate blocking of not only his principal firm but also six associated companies. For those counting on leniency from European courts, the German example is instructive: in July 2025, the Marburg Regional Court sentenced an entrepreneur to 5 years' imprisonment for exporting luxury vehicles in circumvention of sanctions against Russia, and confiscated 5 million euros — the entire gross revenue from the unlawful transactions  — demonstrating clearly that the price of a "minor operation" can cost a person their liberty and all their accumulated capital. Investigators from the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), together with Lithuanian Customs (MKT), conducted a successful operation to detain employees of a company suspected of violating EU sanctions. Source: anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu Another example is the seizure in Lithuania by OLAF (the European Anti-Fraud Office) investigators and Lithuanian customs (MKT) of dual-use goods worth 1.5 million euros destined for Russia and the Lukashenko regime. The firm officially purchased high-technology goods in EU countries for delivery to Central Asian countries, but "along the way" the shipments mysteriously dissolved into Russia and Belarus. The sanctions regime does not operate instantaneously, but it operates systematically.  Over time, the number of detected episodes will grow. And the consequences of participating in sanctions circumvention extend beyond court judgments — they include bans on entry to EU countries, the impossibility of conducting business on European markets, blocked bank accounts, reputational damage, and restrictions on international professional activity. For young professionals, entrepreneurs, and IT engineers, participation in such schemes may mean the permanent closure of access to an international career. The Lukashenko regime systematically uses economic schemes to circumvent restrictions. But every participant in such schemes is not a "neutral intermediary" — they are an element of the infrastructure. It is important to understand the principle: assisting in sanctions circumvention means assisting the political system of the Lukashenko regime , which represses the Belarusian people through numerous and inhumane methods, and supports Russia's military operations. From a moral standpoint — this is a matter of personal choice. From a legal standpoint — it is a matter of criminal liability. And that choice is becoming ever more risky. Sanctions enforcement in Europe will be systematic, technologically equipped, internationally coordinated, and criminally backed. Any attempt to use Belarus as a transit platform for prohibited supplies will be detected and stopped. The Lukashenko regime is a historical dead end. Attempting to lend a hand to a criminal will not save him — but it will inevitably drag the helper down with him. The future of Belarus and its citizens lies in the realm of legality, morality, and integration into the world community — not in servicing the militarist ambitions of a dictator.

Ebrahim Raisi and Alexander Lukashenko. Source: aa.com.tr *IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — an elite military-political formation in Iran, established after the 1979 revolution, tasked with protecting the regime and participating in military operations.) Recently, Alexander Lukashenko announced that the Presidential Administration would shortly be verifying whether his decree — requiring the heads of private companies to be approved by local authorities — is being enforced. Think about that. The heads of private companies must be cleared by state officials.  This is not a recommendation. This is not a consultation. This is a system of control. Lukashenko stated it plainly: a private business owner must have their managers approved by the district, city, or regional executive committee. And he explained why. So that they are, in essence, state-controlled. Not in terms of ownership. But in terms of their activities and dependence. This means one simple thing: an illegitimate authority wants every director of a private company to be dependent on the regime.  So that every entrepreneur understands — your career, your contracts, your business depend not on the market, not on your clients, but on loyalty to the Lukashenko regime. Back in February 2025, a decree was adopted strengthening the role of executive committees. District and city executive committee chairmen were granted the right to approve the appointment of heads of private organisations located on their territory. In practice, this means the following. If you are an entrepreneur and wish to appoint a director of your enterprise — you must obtain the approval of an official appointed by Lukashenko. A meeting on improving the legal regulation of the status of the chairperson of a base-level executive committee. Source: president.gov.by If the official decides that a person is "not the right fit" — the appointment will not happen. If a businessman behaves "incorrectly" — his personnel decisions will simply be blocked. This is how a system is created in which private business ceases to be private. It becomes administratively managed. But this is only part of the picture. Looking more broadly, it becomes clear: Belarus is beginning to replicate the economic model long employed by harsh autocratic regimes — most strikingly, Iran. In Iran, a significant share of the economy is controlled by structures linked to the regime — the so-called charitable foundations known as bonyads. Formally established to support war veterans and social programmes, they have over time transformed into colossal economic structures. Today these foundations own thousands of companies across sectors ranging from construction and energy to banking and transport. They are, in effect, a parallel economy subordinated to the authorities. This economy operates on the principle of patronage. Contracts go to those loyal to the regime. Jobs go to those loyal to the regime. Financial resources are distributed among those who support the regime. Those who are not loyal are simply denied access to the market. In Iran, this system is reinforced by the IRGC. Over the years of the ayatollahs' rule, this structure has become not only a military force but a vast business empire. Through the Khatam al-Anbiya conglomerate and other companies, it controls infrastructure, construction, energy, and transport. It has its own banks, its own airline, and enormous financial resources. It is effectively a state within a state — and the entire system serves one purpose: to maintain political power through the economy. But any regime economy has one further essential component — a coercive foundation. A loyalty-based economic system cannot sustain itself alone. It is always underpinned by an apparatus of compulsion. And we can see how this apparatus in Belarus is being deliberately strengthened. Recently, Deputy Interior Minister and Commander of the Internal Troops Nikolai Karpenko announced a major reorganisation of special units. The "Buran" special operations detachment in the Gomel region has been converted into a separate military unit. The "Shtorm" detachment in the Brest region is to follow. The Minsk military unit 3310 will become a special operations brigade. The capital's unit 5448 will receive operational status. The Buran special forces unit of the internal troops. Source: sb.by What does this mean? It means the expansion and institutionalisation of forces designed to suppress internal unrest.  And the authorities speak of this entirely openly. Karpenko stated directly that the reforms are being carried out drawing on the experience of suppressing so-called "colour revolutions" in Georgia, Serbia, and Iran. He emphasised that special operations units — professional, well-armed, mobile — produce the best results in suppressing protests, and that they are capable of conducting special operations to neutralise the leaders and organisers of mass protests. Note, too, how their armament is being upgraded. These units are receiving grenade launchers, anti-tank systems, flamethrowers, heavy machine guns, and BTR-82 armoured personnel carriers. Dedicated drone aviation centres are being established — three already exist within the internal troops, with a fourth to be created within the "Buran" detachment. In effect, this is the creation of a force for internal military operations — not against an external enemy, but against the regime's own society. And when all of this is combined, the regime's logic becomes clear. On one side, an economy of loyalty is being constructed : business depends on the authorities, contracts are distributed according to political proximity, directors are cleared by officials. On the other side, a coercive infrastructure of suppression is being built : special units, modern weaponry, drone surveillance, operations against protest leaders. These are two sides of the same system. And here the parallel with Iran becomes unmistakable. The IRGC serves simultaneously as economic and coercive backbone.  When we see Belarus simultaneously tightening control over the economy and expanding units for suppressing protests, the conclusion is plain: the regime is not preparing for the country's development. It is preparing to retain power at any cost. But such a system carries a fundamental flaw. It destroys the economy.   Growing warehouse stocks at Belarusian enterprises. Source: euroradio.fm Because economies develop where there is competition, entrepreneurial freedom, and protection of property — not where the primary factor of success is political loyalty. When directors are appointed through executive committees, the most convenient are chosen, not the most capable. When contracts are distributed by loyalty, efficiency disappears. When business fears the authorities, it stops investing and developing. The country ends up trapped. The economy stagnates. Innovation disappears. Talented people leave. Young people see no future. And we are already witnessing these processes. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians have left. Many entrepreneurs have relocated their businesses abroad. Investment is falling. The economy is growing ever more dependent on the state and on external resources. But the most dangerous consequence is not economic — it is the institutional destruction of the country.  When an economy is built on loyalty to a regime, the state ceases to serve society. It serves a narrow group of people in power. The country becomes not an economy of opportunity, but a system for distributing privileges. History shows: economies built on fear and regime loyalty are never sustainable.  Sooner or later they face crisis. But countries that restore entrepreneurial freedom and fair rules begin to grow. And Belarus will become such a country.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. How Lukashenko's regime decided to circumvent sanctions using cryptocurrency The crypto economy was conceived as an instrument of technological progress, financial innovation, and decentralisation. However, in the hands of dictatorial regimes, it becomes a tool for circumventing sanctions and financing aggressive policy. And the Lukashenko regime understands this perfectly.  Lukashenko himself speaks about it directly. In September 2025, he stated: "Today, cryptocurrency-based transactions are more active than ever, and their role in facilitating payments is growing." But behind that formulation lies an entirely different meaning. This is not simply about technological development. It is about building an alternative financial infrastructure designed to circumvent sanctions. Regime representatives openly declare their intention to turn the country into a hub for cryptocurrency operations. The First Deputy Chairman of the National Bank, Alexander Yegorov, recently stated on state television that Belarus supposedly "approaches the development of the crypto sphere more intelligently than Switzerland and the United States, and knows better how it should be regulated." This sounds like propaganda. But in reality it is a political statement. It means the regime is deliberately constructing its own model of crypto market regulation — not to protect investors, but to bypass international restrictions. That is precisely why the country is already discussing the creation of the first crypto bank. According to the same National Bank representative, it could appear in Belarus within six months. This project is enshrined in Lukashenko's Decree No. 19 "On Crypto Banks and Certain Issues of Control in the Sphere of Digital Tokens." Translated from bureaucratic language into reality — this is the creation of an institutional channel for cryptocurrency settlements. Why does the regime need this? Because it is subject to sweeping international sanctions — for repression against its own people and for complicity in aggression. That is why cryptocurrencies are viewed by the regime as a means of circumventing financial isolation. Lukashenko himself cites the figures. In the first seven months of 2025, the volume of external payments via cryptocurrency exchanges amounted to 1.7 billion dollars. By the end of the year, that figure could have reached 3 billion dollars. These are enormous figures for the Belarusian economy. The regime also claims that international crypto exchanges operating in the country could double the volume of external payments. However, it is important to understand: in reality, cryptocurrency in Belarus is used not by citizens, but by the state. Lukashenko proposed mining cryptocurrency in Petrikov. Source: reform.news Last year, Lukashenko signed a law prohibiting private individuals from buying and selling cryptocurrency outside Belarusian exchanges. This means one thing: the cryptocurrency infrastructure is being centralised by the state. In other words — crypto is not for the people, but for the regime. Moreover, the Belarusian authorities do not even conceal their intentions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus prepared a document that effectively constitutes an instruction manual for circumventing sanctions. It explicitly proposes the use of: barter schemes, abandonment of Western currencies, and cryptocurrency as a settlement instrument. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly states that such methods are widely used by, for example, Iran. In other words, the state is consciously studying the experience of other sanctioned regimes.  Furthermore, the document even proposes seeking consultations from specialists in EU, US, and Canadian countries — because they are better placed to identify loopholes in legislation. The authors of the document themselves acknowledge: such consultations are unlawful and may entail criminal liability. This is an unprecedented case. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs is effectively developing recommendations for violating the legal norms of other countries. We must also understand the scale of what is happening. According to a report by the analytics firm Chainalysis, the volume of cryptocurrency transactions linked to the circumvention of international sanctions rose sharply in 2025. Illustrative photo Addresses associated with sanctioned entities received approximately 154 billion dollars in cryptocurrency — a increase of 700 percent compared to the previous year.  That is nearly a sevenfold increase in illicit activity. And a significant share of these operations is linked to a new instrument — the A7A5 stablecoin, pegged to the Russian ruble. According to analysts: approximately 72 billion dollars in transactions involved this token, which processed more than 93 billion dollars in operations in less than a year. This token is used as a payment channel for sanctioned Russian companies. It is linked to the Grinex and Meer crypto exchanges, through which billions of dollars in transactions passed before US and European Union sanctions were imposed. In addition, the A7A5 Instant Swapper service was discovered, enabling rapid conversion of this token into dollar-denominated stablecoins, with user verification procedures that are either minimal or entirely absent. More than 2.2 billion dollars has already passed through this service. This is effectively a mechanism that allows sanctioned entities to embed themselves into the global crypto economy. It is crucial to understand that the Lukashenko regime is not acting alone here. It is part of a broader system — the Russian sanctions economy.  Russia is actively seeking alternative financial channels to fund its war against Ukraine. And the Lukashenko regime provides the infrastructure for this. This is yet another example of Belarus being used by the Kremlin as a platform for circumventing sanctions. The European Union has already begun to respond. Under new sanctions packages, additional restrictions have been introduced. Belarusian residents are prohibited from opening crypto wallets and holding crypto assets on Western exchanges, and from holding management positions in companies providing such services. Furthermore, under the latest EU sanctions package, sanctions were imposed against the developer of the A7A5 stablecoin, its issuer, and the platform on which this asset is traded. Transactions involving this token are prohibited throughout the European Union. In November 2025, Poland imposed sanctions against the company "ERPBEL" — the operator of the Belarusian cryptocurrency exchange BYNEX. This is an important step. But it is only the beginning. It is now becoming clear: sanctions regimes must adapt to the new reality of digital finance.  The following are necessary: Strengthening monitoring of cryptocurrency transactions linked to sanctioned regimes. Expanding sanctions against cryptocurrency platforms that help circumvent restrictions. Strengthening cooperation between states and blockchain analytics firms. Introducing additional measures against state cryptocurrency projects of authoritarian regimes. Because if this is not done, cryptocurrencies could become the largest instrument for circumventing sanctions in the twenty-first century. The Lukashenko regime attempts to present its cryptocurrency policy as innovation. But in reality this is not innovation. It is an instrument of regime survival. An instrument for circumventing sanctions. An instrument for supporting Russian aggression.  And that is precisely why the international community must closely monitor the development of this infrastructure. The Belarus of the future — a democratic Belarus — will be part of a transparent global economy. But for as long as the country remains a hostage of a regime that uses any technology — even the most advanced — to preserve illegitimate and unlawful power.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council Lukashenko's propaganda constantly speaks of stability. Regime media report that the economy is holding up, that the banking system is strong, that reserves exist. The dictator's representatives declare from high platforms: we will support exporters, we will finance promising projects, we are entering new markets. But where does the money actually go? And why is capital leaving Belarus instead of flowing in? That is precisely what is happening today. Any normal economy operates on a straightforward principle. A country creates conditions for investment. Investors arrive. Jobs are created. Industry develops. People's incomes grow. But Belarus operates on the opposite model. Today, the Lukashenko regime is exporting capital from the country, investing it abroad, while simultaneously telling Belarusians that there is no money for domestic development.  Consider the real examples. Lukashenko announces projects in Oman — worth hundreds of millions of dollars. He personally thanks the Omani authorities for a plot of land in an exotic oasis with a comfortable climate. And a question arises: why is Belarusian money being invested in tourist facilities in the Middle East? Why is that money not going into Belarus's regions? Why is it not going into modernizing enterprises? Why is it not going into creating new industries? But this is only a small part of it. Lukashenko speaks of establishing fertilizer production in Oman. He speaks of projects in Algeria. He speaks of building a seaport in southeastern Africa together with Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In addition, he plans to build a port terminal in the Murmansk region and offers to participate in modernizing a port on Sakhalin. And again the question arises. Why is Belarusian money being invested in other countries' ports? Yes, Belarus has no ports of its own. But instead of creating logistics centers, industrial clusters, and infrastructure within the country, the regime is trying to build infrastructure in Russia and Africa. This is not investment policy. This is capital flight. Another telling example. Recently, licensed assembly of motorcycles under the "Minsk" brand was launched in the Smolensk region of Russia. A Belarusian brand. Belarusian history. Belarusian industrial tradition. But production is being launched in Russia.  Why? Because investors are not prepared to work in Belarus. Because business has no faith in the stability of the rules. Because the regime has destroyed trust. The head of the National Bank, Roman Golovchenko, recently stated plainly: "Nobody is prepared to buy finished products — everyone wants a certain degree of localisation." That is, partners demand that production be relocated to their territory. But the most striking thing is something else. Golovchenko says: "Belarus's financial system is doing reasonably well… the banking system has sufficient assets… we are ready to provide financial support to exporters." What does this mean in practice? State banks will extend credit to projects abroad and to Belarusian enterprises to support exports. In other words, Belarusian taxpayers' money is going not toward modernizing the domestic economy, but toward financing external projects. Meanwhile, warehouse inventories are growing. Their level has reached 80% of average monthly output (a year ago it did not exceed 60%). At the same time, domestic industry is declining. In 2025, industrial output fell by 1.8% year-on-year. In January 2026, industrial production contracted by a further 3.4%, and freight turnover fell by 0.5%. The facts are stark.  MAZ truck production before Lukashenko came to power stood at around 50,000 vehicles per year. Today it is around 7,000. By comparison, Poland alone produces around 70,000 MAN trucks per year from a single company — ten times more than the entire Belarusian industry. Thanks to Lukashenko, we have lost markets, brands, and technological development. At the same time, opaque financial schemes flourish inside Belarus. The government recently decided to extend loans to the Belarusian National Biotechnology Corporation — but the official documents classify the amounts allocated and the purposes for which the funds are to be used. The state issues loans, but citizens are not told how much money or for what. Another important point — integration with Russia. For years we were told that the EAEU represented enormous opportunities. That a single economic space would open up markets. That Belarusian industry would gain advantages. But what is happening now? Russia plans to introduce permanent customs controls on its border with Belarus and Kazakhstan — effectively restoring internal customs barriers, with requirements stricter than those applied to goods from third countries. This means only one thing: even within allied integration projects, Belarus gains no advantage. And yet Lukashenko himself acknowledges: "We are weighed down by the loans we have taken. We need to sort this out." So state debt is growing. The economy is stagnating. In January 2026, GDP contracted by 1.2%. But instead of creating conditions for investment, the regime is exporting capital abroad. The reason is very simple. Investors do not go where there are no independent courts, no protection of property, no transparent rules. Belarus today is a country with thousands of political prisoners and repression of business. No investor will put money into such a system. An economy is, above all, a matter of trust — the trust of investors, of business, of citizens. But the Lukashenko regime has destroyed that trust.  And now Belarus is losing investments, technology, markets, and people. Today Belarus faces a simple choice. Either we continue living in a system where taxpayers' money is exported abroad — including for the personal projects and personal accounts of the dictator's circle — while industry degrades and the economy depends on the political decisions of one man.  Or we build a country where investment flows into Belarus, enterprises are modernised, and the economy becomes modern and competitive. Belarus deserves an economy of growth, not an economy of survival. That requires economic freedom. And above all — political change.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council Today, March 12, 2026,  the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court announced the opening of an investigation into the "Belarus situation,"  having concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity — deportation and persecution — may have been committed by representatives of the Belarusian authorities, at least in part, on the territory of Lithuania. The basis for initiating the proceedings was a referral submitted by Lithuania to the Office of the Prosecutor on September 30, 2024. What is the decision about? In its statement, the Office of the Prosecutor concluded that the Belarusian authorities created an atmosphere of coercion that compelled both actual and perceived opponents of the Belarusian government to leave the country. In the assessment of the Office of the Prosecutor, these coercive acts form part of a state policy of the Belarusian authorities: the repeated attacks by the authorities on government opponents, the use of laws to suppress dissent, and the absence of accountability for crimes allegedly committed by representatives of the authorities, in the view of the Office of the Prosecutor, "support the conclusion that crimes committed by the authorities were encouraged or condoned at the highest levels of the Government." On this basis, the Office of the Prosecutor concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that representatives of the Belarusian authorities committed crimes against humanity in the form of deportation, as well as persecution. What does the transition to the investigation stage mean? At the investigation stage, the Office of the Prosecutor collects and analyses evidence, identifies those bearing the greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes — effectively building cases against specific individuals — and assesses whether the legal threshold has been met to apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for the issuance of arrest warrants or summonses to appear before the Court. We express our gratitude to the Government of Lithuania, which referred the situation concerning these crimes to the Office of the Prosecutor, and without which today's decision would not have been possible. For reference:  In 2023, the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus approached the Lithuanian Ministry of Justice with a request to initiate proceedings under Article 14 of the Rome Statute. Exactly one year later, in September 2024, the Government of Lithuania referred the "Belarus situation" to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. It is now critically important that other countries follow the example of the Government of Lithuania, affording victims of crimes against humanity in Belarus equal access to justice. This decision by the Office of the Prosecutor demonstrates that there are no legal obstacles to joining Lithuania's referral.

Illustrative photo If Lukashenko does not release political prisoners, does not stop the repression, and does not cease assisting the aggressor, Belarus may face a full trade embargo. On March 11, 2026 , the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a resolution appealing to the governments of Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to introduce a complete ban on export-import operations  (trade and transit of goods) with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus (reg. No. 14324). In the appeal, the Ukrainian parliament thanked these countries for their comprehensive support of Ukraine in countering Russian aggression, as well as for their key role in economic and military assistance and in consolidating international efforts to restore stability in Europe. It was also noted that EU trade with Russia and Belarus still remains a significant source of revenue for these regimes, effectively helping to finance their military-industrial complexes. The resolution emphasizes that the introduction of a full trade embargo on the eastern borders of the EU will constitute an important step in intensifying economic pressure on the aggressor states and will contribute to strengthening the security of both Ukraine and Europe. "The issue of trade restrictions is directly linked to the behavior of the Lukashenko regime. The release of political prisoners, the cessation of repression, and the ending of support for Russian aggression are the key conditions for changing European countries' attitude toward economic contacts with Belarus. Otherwise, pressure on the regime will only intensify — including the expansion of sanctions and a possible trade embargo," — stated Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the NAM Pavel Latushka , commenting on the adopted resolution.

" For the first time in modern history, we have created a fully-fledged system of political institutions. This is a proactive political alternative to the Lukashenko regime today. And it is absolutely necessary for the political transformation of Belarus tomorrow. We have not dissolved into a network of fragmented initiatives. We have built a political subject abroad. The political influence of our institutions is confirmed by the regime's reaction. It has recognized our institutions as extremist and terrorist organizations. It employs extraterritorial persecution through trials held in absentia  and active operations by the security services against us. The regime uses disinformation and discrediting campaigns, and creates threats to our lives. This is unprecedented pressure. The regime expends enormous resources in its fight against us. They want to destroy this political alternative. All of this proves: we are a real factor and a political subject that cannot be ignored ", — Pavel Latushka stated. Pavel Latushka also emphasized that the Cabinet regards economic and personal sanctions not as a formality, but as a powerful and pragmatic lever. The goal is to compel the regime to change its policy: "In this way we create conditions under which the search for a political way out becomes the only rational scenario for the regime" . Pavel Latushka separately highlighted the importance of the Round Table concept as a means of resolving the deep crisis in Belarus: "We are convinced that direct negotiations between the international community and the regime will not work.  Attempts to bypass Belarusian society and the democratic forces will not resolve the crisis . Internal transformation is impossible without internal dialogue and the inclusion of society." Pavel Latushka placed particular emphasis during his address on the importance of participation in the elections to the Coordination Council: "Politics is accountability to society and a legitimate mandate. We cannot play a serious role in Belarus's future without the confirmed will of its citizens. An electoral mandate gives us the right to represent Belarusian society — both at this table today, and at the Round Table tomorrow" .

Illustrative photo News has emerged that draniki are being proposed for inclusion in the UNESCO cultural heritage list. Italian pizza or the French baguette — we all know these dishes. Both are world-famous, and the techniques for their preparation have been inscribed on the UNESCO List of Intangible Cultural Heritage — a list of objects that constitute the common heritage of humanity. Alongside them, Belarusian draniki could also find their place on the world cultural heritage list. Who among us has not tasted draniki, right? It turns out that potato dishes are a broad and popular subject. Moreover, equivalents of draniki — different, and yet equivalents nonetheless — exist in the cuisines of many countries. In Poland, for example, there are placki ziemniaczane ; in Lithuania, bulviniai blynai  ("potato pancakes"); in Ukraine, deruny . Similar potato dishes exist even in German and Swedish cuisine. However, Belarusian draniki are something special. They are distinguished not only by their name, but also by the traditions associated with their preparation — and this makes them one of the central elements of Belarusian national cuisine. In Belarus, there are no fewer than 200 folk recipes, and the dish gained widespread popularity in the late nineteenth century. When I was serving as the Permanent Representative of Belarus to UNESCO, I had an idea: to inscribe the national Belarusian dish — draniki — on the UNESCO List of Intangible Cultural Heritage. UNESCO is engaged in the preservation and development of the richness of global cultural diversity. The wealth of world culture lies precisely in the fact that it has many colors. And Belarusian culture is one of those colors. I prepared letters substantiating the expansion of cultural heritage objects in Belarus, including at the regional level. Among other things, those letters addressed the subject of Belarusian draniki. I sent the relevant letters both to Vice Prime Minister Anatol Tozik and to First Deputy Head of the Administration Aleksandr Radzkov. Later, I also wrote to Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makei. At that time, Makei had become Chairman of the National Commission for UNESCO — and he asked me then whether it was worth taking on that position. Makei received a positive answer. I was convinced that this was extremely important, as cooperation with UNESCO would help underscore the weight that our state carries in the field of culture and cultural cooperation. And Makei agreed with that thesis. On his initiative as Chairman of the National Commission, we held two meetings at the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to advance cooperation with UNESCO on both tangible and intangible heritage objects in Belarus. Today, for example, the cultural heritage list includes the well-known Mir Castle, Nesvizh Castle, and the Struve Geodetic Arc. But there could be significantly more such objects — we have valuable historical and cultural assets of which we can be proud, and which could become not only national but world heritage. But let us return to draniki. As Permanent Representative of Belarus to UNESCO and Ambassador of Belarus to France, I also approached the then Minister of Culture, Barys Sviatlov, with a proposal to initiate the inscription of draniki on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage. The matter was entrusted to Deputy Minister of Culture Aleksandr Yatsko. I remember waiting a very long time for a response to that letter. And it was strange: the former Minister of Culture was trying to get through by phone, to prod the ministry into taking some action — while they resisted. For months, Yatsko could not bring himself to pick up the phone when the former minister, Belarus's representative to UNESCO, called him. I could reach any minister in the country, the Prime Minister or a Vice Prime Minister. But the Deputy Minister of Culture — there was simply no way to speak with him, to make contact. And only after a prolonged period did he finally summon the courage to provide a written response. And do you know what it said? It turned out that draniki exist in other countries too, and therefore the dish does not belong exclusively to Belarusians and should not be included in our heritage list. Such reasoning angered me: what is this — are we Belarusians here too ready to renounce what is our own, what is national? It was an approach I could not understand, and the matter could not be moved forward at the time. But I do hope that the time will yet come when Belarusian draniki appear alongside Italian pizza and the French baguette on the UNESCO List of Intangible Cultural Heritage. We have a wonderful dish of our national cuisine — draniki. And there is no reason to renounce what is ours. We are rich in our heritage, our culture, and our traditions. And that is what makes us, Belarusians, distinctive.