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Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. Pavel Latushka on Whether the Donald Trump Administration Has Officially Recognized Lukashenko as President Is Lukashenko a president from a legal standpoint, and do the United States recognize him as president? Many will point to the fact that Donald Trump maintains personal communication with the dictator, that senior State Department officials and personal representatives of Donald Trump have met with Lukashenko, and that there are at least two letters addressed by President Trump to Lukashenko. Let us examine this carefully. On February 16, the Telegram channel "Pool Pervogo" published a video in which dictator Lukashenko began justifying himself regarding the reasons why he could not fly to the Peace Council meeting in Washington. In the video, Lukashenko stated: "Was I supposed to fly to Washington via South Africa because of these sanctions? If you wanted me there, resolve the issue so that I can freely fly in and out" . He added: "There's also the security question being raised. 'Ah, Lukashenko was scared...' — it's a security issue, they say. Listen, that's not Lukashenko's problem. I have never been afraid of anyone and I don't intend to start. That's utter nonsense. 'Someone will grab Lukashenko there and not let him go home.' Complete stupidity! I cannot even imagine such a thing happening to any other president or to me" . Let us examine what was said in greater detail and try to understand what truly motivated the refusal to travel to the U.S. capital. Essentially, three key issues raised by Lukashenko deserve attention, the first of which is: Were sanctions truly the main obstacle preventing Lukashenko from flying to Washington? In the current political realities of the White House, sanctions alone would not have been an insurmountable barrier to a Lukashenko visit to Washington. They create pressure, complicate procedures, and raise the political cost of such a visit — but they do not make it impossible. U.S. President Donald Trump has already demonstrated that sanctions are, for him, a tool of policy — and the meeting held with Putin in Anchorage against the backdrop of war, sanctions pressure, and an arrest warrant is a vivid example of this. The question then becomes a different one — it is not a matter of "whether it is possible", but of "whether they would want it". From a geographical standpoint, the flight was also entirely feasible. A polar route over the Kola Peninsula area allows one to bypass European airspace and is actually shorter in distance than the routes taken by the leaders of Kazakhstan and Pakistan. Their presence at the summit, therefore, is explained not by kilometers or logistics, but by something else entirely. Sanctions, then, serve as a convenient excuse for Lukashenko — a cover, as we shall see, for hidden fears hinted at by the dictator's own phrase: "Lukashenko was scared because someone would grab him". And that brings us to the second question. Could Lukashenko be arrested, even assuming someone regards him as a head of state? Let us begin with the fact that the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is right now investigating war crimes related to the deportation of Ukrainian children, including possibly to Belarus. The answer to this question is therefore unequivocal: in the case of the International Criminal Court, states parties to the Rome Statute not only may, but are obligated to arrest a head of state upon the Court's request. The International Criminal Court, unlike national jurisdictions, does not recognize head-of-state immunity from criminal prosecution. The reason is simple — already in 1998, when the Rome Statute was adopted, the states parties agreed that the ICC must be able to hold accountable those most responsible for the gravest crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. Accordingly, Article 27 of the Rome Statute is unambiguous: the official status of a head of state, and I quote, "shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility." If the ICC has opened an investigation and judges have issued an official arrest and surrender request, ICC member states are obligated to arrest and surrender that individual to The Hague. It is also important to note that since November 2025, ICC arrest warrants have been confidential. This means that, subjectively, the risk of arrest in the territories of Rome Statute member states arises for a potential perpetrator as soon as information about an investigation into a situation in which they are implicated becomes known. There are ample precedents for arrest warrants and surrender requests targeting heads of state — not only before the ICC, but before other international criminal tribunals as well. Consider: Omar al-Bashir, the dictator of Sudan and the first head of state against whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant; Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia, who was tried and convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity before the Special Court for Sierra Leone; Rodrigo Duterte, the former President of the Philippines, who was extradited to The Hague on charges of crimes against humanity committed against his own people, whose ICC hearing began just yesterday; And, of course, Vladimir Putin, against whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant in March 2023 for the deportation of Ukrainian children, and who faces arrest and extradition to The Hague. For those who have become the proud holders of an ICC arrest warrant or a warrant from another international tribunal, life changes instantly. They typically begin immediately avoiding jurisdictions where arrest may threaten them. They are effectively on the run for the rest of their lives or until their arrest, compelled to fly around or travel around jurisdictions that are dangerous to them during international travel. One may recall how al-Bashir fled South Africa in 2015 while still in the status of president. There is also always the risk that during flights a technical malfunction may occur, forcing the aircraft to land somewhere the wanted individual faces arrest. Lukashenko relies on his immunity, but evidently doubts its effectiveness himself. But even if any doubt remains regarding Lukashenko's perception of the risk of his own arrest — on the grounds that he is "a president" — let us pay attention to his following phrase: "I cannot even imagine such a thing happening to any other president or to me." Once more: "any other president or to me." I am convinced Lukashenko did not phrase it that way deliberately. What surfaced was his hidden, subconscious fear. And is he a president?... Of course, clearly he considers himself one... But is he a president from a legal standpoint, and does the inviting party recognize him as one? Because if not, then this citizen's flight to Washington could, with a high degree of probability, turn out to be one-way. No one doubts that he has mentally tried on Maduro's prison jumpsuit many times and imagined sharing his fate. And here, many may object, pointing to the fact that U.S. President Donald Trump's attitude toward Lukashenko is different. He maintains personal communication with the dictator; senior State Department officials and personal representatives of D. Trump have met with Lukashenko. Moreover, there are at least two letters addressed by President Trump to Lukashenko containing the phrase so coveted by the dictator: "President of the Republic of Belarus." Yet what does that phrase actually mean? It is interesting to note that prior to the operation in Caracas, President Trump referred to Nicolás Maduro as the "leader" of Venezuela. Does the phrase "President of the Republic of Belarus" in a letter's heading constitute recognition of Lukashenko as president from the standpoint of the United States of America? Because if not, Lukashenko cannot count on the personal immunity enjoyed by de jure recognized heads of state. Let us examine this. I will note that for the purposes of our analysis, only de jure recognition is relevant, as de facto recognition of control over a state without de jure legitimation does not unambiguously resolve the question of personal immunity for Lukashenko. The example of Maduro is instructive — the United States did not recognize him de jure as president. So how do the United States carry out de jure recognition of a foreign president? Under the U.S. Constitution (Article II, Section III), it is the President who holds exclusive authority to recognize a specific individual as the lawful president of a foreign state. These powers have been reflected in U.S. case law (Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015)). The U.S. President may issue an official statement — often through the Secretary of State — recognizing a specific individual as the lawful president of a foreign state. This may be done: first, through official White House press statements or communiqués; second, through diplomatic notes or official communications sent to U.S. embassies and the relevant foreign government; third, through the acceptance of credentials: the official reception of an ambassador appointed by the recognized president. These practices are formalized in the U.S. Foreign Affairs Manual (§ 102). Private letters or communications are not mentioned therein, as internal policy draws a distinction between official and informal communication. At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) establishes that the intent of the executive branch must be taken into account — meaning the actual substance of a communication matters, and that substance must unambiguously be directed toward recognizing an individual as the president of a foreign state. So has the President of the United States officially recognized Lukashenko as president? What is known is only Trump's address to Lukashenko as "Mr. President" on the Truth Social platform and two letters from the U.S. President addressed to the dictator on White House letterhead. Let us begin with the Truth Social post. The U.S. President used his personal social media account — unconnected to his official capacity — to address dictator Lukashenko in a form acceptable to the latter, for a humanitarian purpose: the release of political prisoners. This post, neither in its content nor in its form of communication, can constitute an official act of recognition of dictator Lukashenko as president. Let us turn to the letters. Here is the first of them. The letter's heading reads: Mr. Alexander Lukashenko. President of the Republic of Belarus. Minsk. And here many will say: there it is — an official letter on White House letterhead where, beneath the dictator's name, appear the words so coveted by him: "President of the Republic of Belarus". But there is a nuance. The standard protocol title used when addressing a head of state, "His Excellency", is absent before the name. Here, for comparison, is how it appears in President Trump's letter to the President of Kosovo. How ironic, is it not? The Lukashenko regime does not recognize Kosovo as a state at all. Yet the U.S. President uses "Her Excellency" when addressing Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu — but not when addressing him. Let us turn to the form of address. When addressing the dictator, the U.S. President writes "Mr. Lukashenko," explicitly omitting the title "President." You might point to the heading — but protocol is protocol, and when addressing a recognized head of state, the use of the title, not the surname, is obligatory. We can return again to the letter addressed to the President of Kosovo for reference. Now, the content, which briefly covers three points: the First Lady of the United States conveys her best wishes and congratulations on the occasion of a birthday; congratulations follow on Aryna Sabalenka's victory; the letter concludes with an expression of hope for progress toward shared goals. What we have, in the end, is a letter whose content is entirely personal in nature and, moreover, was delivered through John Cole, who was present in Minsk at the time in the capacity of Trump's personal lawyer and trusted associate. I emphasize: not an official representative of the White House or the State Department with a corresponding mandate. The U.S. President thus made it clear that this letter does not constitute an act of recognition of the dictator as the head of Belarus. At this point, some may raise the question of the peace summit invitation. Was there not an official letter, analogous to those sent to other heads of state? Does that not constitute an act of recognition? Lukashenko was invited to the summit in the same manner as other heads of state, some will say. Was it truly the same? Let us examine this. Here is the invitation from President Trump to the dictator, shown by Belarusian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Varankov. Let us look at it carefully. What do we see? Once again, the title "His Excellency" is absent; once again, the form of address is "Mr. Lukashenko." How does this compare to others? The letter to the President of Kosovo shown earlier is, in fact, the summit invitation. Here it is again. And here is the invitation to the President of Argentina. And here, to the Prime Minister of India. To the Prime Minister of Cambodia. Interesting, is it not? It is as though the U.S. President is making it clear: yes, I am inviting you — but not as an equal among other heads of state. And certainly not recognizing you as President. But that is not the final detail. Looking closely at the photograph with Varankov, one can clearly see that the invitation is being displayed in a folder belonging to the Lukashenko Administration. This leads to the conclusion that this invitation reached the Foreign Ministry not from the American side, but from the Lukashenko Administration itself. This allows for a well-founded assumption that the letter was transmitted through unofficial, non-diplomatic channels. This letter, too, therefore does not constitute an act of recognition of Lukashenko as president. One could deliberate at length on the advisability of such approaches by the American side. But it is important to understand that while both the letters and the social media post carry significant political weight, they in no way affect Lukashenko's current status as an unrecognized head of state. He remains politically and legally deficient, which creates direct threats of arrest for him in many countries — including the United States. It is not without reason that we recalled Nicolás Maduro. In January of this year, Nicolás Maduro appeared before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Manhattan). A fact that many have forgotten: it is this very court that is handling the case of "the unlawful forced landing of the Ryanair flight" — which, just as in Maduro's case, may be characterized as terrorism. And at that point, so to speak, it hit Lukashenko. He was seized by fear. What do we have in the end? It was not sanctions that stood in the way of Lukashenko's trip to Washington — they are merely being used by the dictator as a convenient pretext. Does Lukashenko have reason to be afraid? — Absolutely. We can reasonably suppose that even if not in the U.S. itself, then during a flight through international airspace, Lukashenko's aircraft could experience technical problems and be forced to land somewhere where an arrest warrant awaits him — where he is an ordinary criminal without immunity. Fear is the true motive behind the refusal to travel to Washington. Is he afraid? Well. He accuses everyone around him of stupidity — yet himself reveals to all that it is fear that governs his words. The psychology of the blind spot, live on air. On the video, with evident uncertainty, he himself made reference to fear, and even named a specific one: "someone will grab him and not let him go home".

Pavel Latushka at the XI European Congress of Local Government. Mikołajki, Poland, 2026. Photo: NAM Media "At least 5 times the EU and the USA tried to reach an agreement with Lukashenko. What do we have today? We have the most large-scale repression in Europe in Belarus, more than 600,000 Belarusians were forced to leave the country, thousands of political prisoners, many killed, and torture has become an everyday reality in our country" , — stated Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the NAM, at the XI European Congress of Local Government, which took place on March 2–3 in Mikołajki, during the discussion panel "Europe Against Russia: What Will the Future Look Like?" The discussion also featured: Marek Dukaczewski  — General of the Polish Army, former Deputy Head of the National Security Bureau of Poland; Jędrzej Jachira — lawyer, Honorary Consul of Chile in Wrocław; Artur Jakubczyk  — General of the Polish Army; Olivier Védrine  — French professor, member of the board of the Jean Monnet Association. Pavel Latushka at the XI European Congress of Local Government. Mikołajki, Poland, 2026. Photo: NAM Media "Our European neighbors must make a choice: what kind of Belarus do they want to see? If Poland considers it important for Belarus to be independent and democratic, and I am convinced that this is the case, because only a democratic Belarus will not pose threats to its neighbors, then you must develop a certain strategy. What it should look like was rightly stated by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky: Europe's security border must run along the eastern border of Belarus . One can invest in this in various ways, but above all, the battle for society  is being fought right now. It is very important to invest in the information sphere. So that tomorrow it is not a Russian soldier standing at the border — or, worse still, a Belarusian in a Russian uniform. I believe that every European country that is currently investing in border security is acting correctly. However, the European Union is not investing enough in making Belarusians favorably disposed toward the EU, while at the same time Russia is actively investing hundreds of times more in turning them against Europe . It is necessary to invest in society, not in Lukashenko. One must talk to society . We must talk to society. Right now Lukashenko's economy is in very poor shape, he is looking for opportunities to make contact with Europe, but he must receive an unequivocal answer:  if you want to reach an agreement with Europe, you must first reach an agreement with the Belarusian people , sit down at a round table, as was done in Poland. We must compel him to make society a subject within the state.  If society does not become a subject, then place whatever bets you like on Lukashenko — he guarantees nothing; he will carry out orders from the Kremlin. Lukashenko is not a guarantor of Belarus's independence, because he has completely surrendered his foreign policy. Belarus no longer has an independent military policy, because supporting aggression against Ukraine or organizing a hybrid war against Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia is absolutely contrary to the interests of the Belarusian people", — Pavel Latushka stated. During the discussion, Pavel Latushka noted that Belarusians are a European people, and emphasized the importance of maintaining Belarusians' communication with Europe: more visas, the opening of border crossings, and more active implementation of various civil society support programs. Also during his address, Pavel Latushka highlighted the importance of efforts to hold the senior military and political leadership of the Lukashenko regime accountable for the crimes they have committed: the act of aggression against Ukraine, the deportation of Ukrainian children, and crimes against humanity committed against the Belarusian people. He gave a concrete account of what has been done and continues to be done toward this end by the NAM.

Illustrative photo Today the second session of the Electoral Commission of the Coordination Council took place. The event examined in detail the technical specifications for the digital voting platform. Particular attention was paid to the issue of restricting Electoral Commission members' access to voters' personal information. A decision has been taken that voting in the elections will be possible using the following documents: Passport of a citizen of Belarus (valid or expired). New Belarus passport. "We set ourselves the goal of ensuring that those Belarusians who are currently without passports are able to vote — because they were released from Belarusian prisons only very recently and were forcibly deported, most of them without documents,"  explained Electoral Commission Chair  Alena Prykhodzka , clarifying the decision to include the New Belarus passport in the list. Preliminary electoral campaign schedule: 5 March:  Signing of the trilateral Memorandum on interaction and delineation of responsibilities. 6 March:  The Electoral Commission officially announces the means of conducting the elections and the voting dates. 10–31 March:  Submission of documents and registration of electoral subjects. During the same period, the Commission takes decisions on registration or refusal thereof. 11–17 May:  Voting. Broadcast of the session — via the link .

Illustrative photo On 24 February 2026, on the anniversary of the start of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of NAM Pavel Latushka sent an address to the Authorised Representative of the President of Ukraine on Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasyuk. The document contains comprehensive proposals on strengthening sanctions pressure on the Lukashenko regime. Pavel Latushka thanked the Ukrainian leadership for the measures already taken: "This is an important political signal to the regime and a sign of support for the democratic forces of Belarus". Among the specific proposals are the introduction of blocking sanctions against banks connected to the Russian SPFS system, the expansion of restrictions on Belarusian exports of fertilisers, liquefied gas, rapeseed oil, and peat, as well as strengthened controls over "false transit" through Belarus. It is also proposed to expand personal sanctions to cover Lukashenko's inner circle, propagandists, and judges. The Deputy Head of the Cabinet separately emphasised the role of Union State structures in the Russian aggression and the unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children. "The United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and NAM confirm their readiness for further expert engagement with the Ukrainian side in order to develop effective solutions for strengthening pressure on the Lukashenko regime and for jointly lobbying for new sanctions decisions against the regime from both the EU and other democratic countries", the politician stated. Analytical materials with specific lists of enterprises and individuals against whom the introduction of sanctions is proposed are attached to the address.

Pavel Latushka with the Head of the Polish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, PACE Vice-President and Chair of the Committee on EU Affairs of the Polish Sejm Agnieszka Pomaska. Warsaw, Poland, 2026. Photo: NAM-media Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and delegate of the Coordination Council Pavel Latushka  met with the Head of the Polish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, PACE Vice-President and Chair of the Committee on EU Affairs of the Polish Sejm Agnieszka Pomaska . During the meeting, the parties discussed prospects for the further development of cooperation and interaction within the framework of PACE . Pavel Latushka, as a member of the Coordination Council delegation to PACE, thanked the Polish delegation for its support of representatives of the democratic forces of Belarus in the Assembly and expressed hope for the continuation of active cooperation, noting the leading role of the Polish delegation as one of the key partners in advancing the Belarusian agenda on the international platform. Pavel Latushka provided detailed information on the current work of the Coordination Council delegation to PACE, as well as on documents adopted at the initiative of the Belarusian side in PACE and on amendments submitted by representatives of the democratic forces of Belarus. Special attention was given to the discussion of the appointment of a new General Rapporteur on Belarus at PACE, to replace Polish Sejm deputy Ryszard Petru, whose mandate has concluded. The leader of the faction "Latushka's Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" also spoke about the activities of the Coordination Council, including preparations for the forthcoming elections to be held from 11 to 17 May of this year . As Chair of the Committee on European Union Affairs of the Polish Sejm, Pavel Latushka presented the strategy of the United Transitional Cabinet and the majority of the Coordination Council on matters of engagement with the European Union. He emphasised the importance of preserving and strengthening support from the European Union, as well as continuing the policy of pressure on the regime with the aim of achieving systemic, rather than cosmetic, changes in Belarus. During the meeting, information was presented on the ongoing repression by the Lukashenko regime against the Belarusian people both inside the country and beyond its borders. The importance of continued support for Belarusian civil society, which remains a key factor in democratic change in Belarus, was separately underscored. The parties confirmed their readiness for further strengthening of interaction and coordination of efforts at the international level in support of democratic transformation and the protection of human rights in Belarus.

Meeting of Pavel Latushka with the Director of the Consular Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Justyna Chrzanowska. Warsaw, Poland, 2026. Photo: NAM-media At the initiative of the Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of NAM Pavel Latushka, a meeting took place with the Director of the Consular Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Justyna Chrzanowska and the department's leadership. The meeting was also attended by the Head of the Legal Commission of the Coordination Council Mikhail Kirylyuk  and the coordinator of the "Volnyya" ("Free") initiative Veranika Stankevich . During the meeting, Pavel Latushka expressed gratitude to the Polish government and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the support being provided to released political prisoners and other Belarusian citizens forced to leave Belarus, as well as those deported from its territory. Issues relating to the legalisation of released political prisoners were discussed. Mechanisms for providing assistance to Belarusians in resolving humanitarian situations were examined at the same time. Following the meeting, positive decisions were taken by the Polish side. A number of specific, most complex situations requiring individual solutions were also considered. An agreement was reached to maintain systematic and prompt contact for resolving problematic issues. Pavel Latushka thanked the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its constructive position and readiness to provide assistance to those who have suffered from repression.

Illustrative photo On 24 February 2026, on the anniversary of the start of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of NAM Pavel Latushka sent an address to the Authorised Representative of the President of Ukraine on Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasyuk , containing comprehensive proposals on strengthening sanctions pressure on the Lukashenko regime. In the address, Pavel Latushka expressed gratitude to the leadership of Ukraine and personally to President Volodymyr Zelensky  for the introduction of personal sanctions against dictator Lukashenko.  "This is an important political signal to the regime and a sign of support for the democratic forces of Belarus,"  the politician noted. The National Anti-Crisis Management has proposed concrete steps both for improving existing restrictions and for further strengthening sanctions pressure on the Lukashenko regime. In particular, it is proposed to expand the practice of applying manufacturer certificates to prevent the circumvention of restrictions; to strengthen controls and restrictions on the movement through Belarus of goods used in "false transit" schemes; to introduce blocking sanctions against banks connected to the Bank of Russia's SPFS system. It is also proposed to expand sanctions to cover supplies from Belarus of all types of fertilisers and liquefied gas, and other significant export commodities (rapeseed oil, peat); to introduce restrictions against specific enterprises of the military-industrial complex not yet covered by sanctions. Separately, it is proposed to expand personal sanctions, including against Lukashenko's inner circle and enterprise management; propagandists; judges and officials involved in the aggression, as well as in repression and persecution for solidarity with Ukraine. The address notes that the structures of the so-called Union State facilitate Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children and their subsequent ideological indoctrination, as well as the undermining of Belarus's sovereignty, which may be reflected in the sanctions policy of Ukraine and its allies in democratic countries. Attached to the address is a series of analytical and factual materials with specific lists of enterprises, institutions, and individuals against whom the introduction of sanctions is proposed by both Ukraine and its allies. As Pavel Latushka stated: "The United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and NAM confirm their readiness for further expert engagement with the Ukrainian side in order to develop effective solutions for strengthening pressure on the Lukashenko regime and for jointly lobbying for new sanctions against the regime from both the EU and other democratic countries."

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. Lukashenko mobilises the army? Conscription across the country In recent times, the regime is openly doing what it previously tried to do quietly — psychologically preparing the country for war. Not for an abstract threat or "possible risks," but for the idea that war is supposedly an inevitability that people must simply accept as fact. Combat readiness inspection of the Belarusian army. Photo: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Belarus On 17 February, the dictator's Ministry of Defence announced mobilisation readiness exercises across the entire country, in every district. This is a large-scale test of how quickly the country can be put on a war footing. This was followed by a new announcement: these call-ups are special. Summonses are being issued urgently, and the call-ups themselves may last up to two months. This resembles a test of real mobilisation. And here a simple question arises. Why such haste? Why are people being summoned as though war begins tomorrow? The regime is attempting to accustom the country to a new reality. Army inspections. Mobilisation. Talk of enemies. Combat readiness inspection of the Belarusian army. Photo: BelTA As early as 13 February, Lukashenko arrived at a military training ground near Barysaw for a surprise army inspection. He also wants to assess all military personnel for professional fitness due to the "difficult" international situation. In his congratulatory address on 23 February, the dictator claimed that an "armoured fist of the heirs of the Nazis" is allegedly being formed at Belarus's borders. What for? This is an old formula. When there are problems at home — an external enemy must be created.

Illustrative photo You can donate part of your taxes when completing your annual tax return (PIT). PIT-37 Field 151  — enter the KRS number: 0000507234 Field 152  — enter the amount (not more than 1.5% of the amount from field 141) or leave it blank — 1.5% will be calculated automatically Field 153  — enter the purpose: 107614 Field 154  — tick the consent for the transfer If you run a business (self-employment), received income from abroad, or other types of income, the transfer method depends on the type of tax return: PIT-28 Field 253  — enter the KRS number: 0000507234 Field 254  — enter the amount (not more than 1.5% of the amount from field 232) or leave it blank — 1.5% will be calculated automatically Field 255  — enter the purpose: 107614 Field 256  — tick the consent for the transfer PIT-36 Field 510  — enter the KRS number: 0000507234 Field 511  — enter the amount (not more than 1.5% of the amount from field 306) or leave it blank — 1.5% will be calculated automatically Field 512  — enter the purpose: 107614 Field 513  — tick the consent for the transfer PIT-36L Field 172  — enter the KRS number: 0000507234 Field 173  — enter the amount (not more than 1.5% of the amount from field 81) or leave it blank — 1.5% will be calculated automatically Field 174  — enter the purpose: 107614 Field 175  — tick the consent for the transfer PIT-38 Field 66  — enter the KRS number: 0000507234 Field 67  — enter the amount (not more than 1.5% of the amount from fields 35 and 45) or leave it blank — 1.5% will be calculated automatically Field 68  — enter the purpose: 107614 Field 69  — tick the consent for the transfer PIT-39 Field 48  — enter the KRS number: 0000507234 Field 49  — enter the amount (not more than 1.5% of the amount from field 29) or leave it blank — 1.5% will be calculated automatically Field 50  — enter the purpose: 107614 Field 51  — tick the consent for the transfer Your support is our shared step toward democratic change in Belarus. Thank you for your support!

Representatives of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus. Warsaw, Poland, 2026. Photo: NAM-media The Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Deputy Head Pavel Latushka, Representative for National Revival Pavel Barkouski, Representative for Youth Policy and Students Marharyta Vorykhava, and Chief of Staff of the Cabinet Valery Matskevich laid flowers at the monument to Taras Shevchenko in Warsaw on the day of the fourth anniversary of the start of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine. Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Warsaw, Poland, 2026. Photo: UTC-media On this occasion, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said: "First of all, I want to express great gratitude to Ukrainians for the fact that they are defending not only Ukraine, not only Belarus — they are defending all of Europe. Through their self-sacrifice and dedication to their country, they are setting an example for democratic nations of how important it is to preserve independence and resist Russian aggression. They have finally shown the whole world what the 'Russian world', 'Russkiy mir', truly means. And I would like to address the Belarusians who have stood on the side of Ukraine throughout these four years. These are our fighters from the Kalinouski Regiment and other units. These are our Belarusian volunteers who are helping civilians and who established the Point of Invincibility in Kyiv. They are the true ambassadors of Belarus in Ukraine right now. Of course, I want to thank the entire Belarusian diaspora, which throughout these four years has been supporting both the Ukrainian army and our fighters in Ukraine. We, Belarusians and Ukrainians, see our future together in Europe. I am deeply grateful to President Zelensky for sharing this vision. As he has said: 'The eastern border of Europe runs along the eastern border of Belarus.'"

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. Dear Belarusians! Dear Ukrainians! Today marks the fourth anniversary of the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine . Four years ago, the aggressors — Russia and the Lukashenko regime — planned to seize Kyiv in three days and eliminate Ukrainian statehood. Yet today we see: Ukraine has held firm and continues its heroic struggle. The main lesson of these four years for all of us is to never surrender, never lose heart, and never for a moment succumb to lying propaganda. At the same time, we must recognise: the scale of this war and the advance on Kyiv were made possible precisely through the complicity of the Lukashenko regime. Even before the invasion began, he cynically lied to the Ukrainian side, claiming that Belarus had nothing to do with the concentration of troops. In reality, he had already deliberately granted the Kremlin the right to use our territory, our infrastructure, and our airspace for military purposes. In doing so, he painted a target on our country with his own hands, making every Belarusian a hostage to his betrayal. Today this threat is only growing. In his recent interview, President Zelensky stated directly: Belarus is at serious risk. The deployment on our soil of Russian relay stations for guiding Shaheds, the operation of Belarusian factories supplying the Russian military machine, and the preparation of sites for Oreshnik missile systems — these are steps that are turning Belarus into a direct military target. Lukashenko has definitively stripped himself of agency: he no longer makes decisions in the interests of the Belarusian people, but merely executes Kremlin orders without thought. Lukashenko will inevitably be held accountable for his crimes. The National Anti-Crisis Management is conducting systematic work to ensure that every fact is documented: from the crime of aggression through the provision of territory for the attack, to complicity in the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied territories. We will do everything to ensure that Lukashenko is held accountable for his crimes. This is the path to justice, without which genuine peace is impossible. Through his actions, Lukashenko is attempting to destroy permanently the relationship between the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples, and is turning Belarus into an isolated military appendage of the Russian empire. We must therefore understand: genuine and lasting peace between Belarus and Ukraine is possible only without Lukashenko. True peace means relations between two sovereign, democratic states that respect each other's independence. Lukashenko is incapable of ensuring this, because he himself is an instrument of the destruction of Belarusian sovereignty and security. His policy leads us all into a dead end — toward a future without statehood, without security, into isolation and poverty. President Zelensky rightly observed: had the Belarusian people's protest prevailed in 2020, our entire region would be safe today. This is a bitter but important shared conclusion: lack of freedom and dictatorship inevitably lead to aggression. The connection between our freedom and the security of the entire region has never been clearer than it is today. That is precisely why we speak with particular respect of every Belarusian who has chosen the path of resistance. We are proud of our volunteers who are defending Ukrainian soil with arms in hand, and of our volunteers who are bringing the moment of justice closer. We remember the heroes held in Lukashenko's prisons for resisting this bloody war. Your courage is proof that Belarus is not Lukashenko. You are the real Belarus, which has the right to a future. Ukraine continues to fight, showing the whole world an example of indomitability. So too our path remains unchanged: it is the struggle against dictatorship, for democratic change, and for the return of a free Belarus to the European family of nations. Only a democratic Belarus will become a reliable guarantee that rockets will never again fly from our soil toward the cities of our neighbours. Glory to Ukraine! Long live Belarus!

Illustrative photo From a reactive approach to a sustainable strategy for national reconciliation and Belarus’s European future 2021 — Foundation and crisis response: Building the organization with a primarily reactive approach to the crisis in Belarus. 2022 — Capacity building and adaptation: Strengthening core areas of work and adapting operations to the realities of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. 2023 — Strategic consolidation (2023–2025): Development of a long-term strategy focused on sanctions measures, international justice mechanisms, and public-oriented media engagement. 2024 — Strategy implementation: Advancing the Belarusian situation before the International Criminal Court and achieving significant growth in media reach and impact. 2025 — Advancing national dialogue: Building on achieved results, transitioning toward the promotion of “national dialogue” concept. Achieving a significant increase in the effectiveness of sanctions measures. International justice for Belarus Illustrative photo Amid the crisis in Belarus, marked by crimes against humanity and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine launched from Belarusian territory, NAM established a Legal Department in late 2022–early 2023 to focus on international criminal accountability issues. Key objectives: Build a systematic process for documenting international crimes Use available accountability mechanisms to support efforts to hold the Lukashenka regime’s senior military and political leadership responsible for international crimes. Achievements 2023 Illustrative photo Belarusian context International legal experts, including those associated with the NAM, have prepared the first comprehensive report on crimes against humanity in Belarus, published by the Law and Democracy Center “Justice Hub”. Engaging with Lithuania's Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Prosecutor General’s Office on the possibility of applying Article 14 of the Rome Statute to the “Belarus situation,” resulting in the initiation of relevant domestic procedures in Lithuania. Participation in the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Illustrative photo Ukrainian context Compilation of an archive documenting the unlawful mass transfer of Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus. Submission of the collected materials to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC through two communications under Article 15 of the Rome Statute (June and November) Submission of the collected materials to the Security Service of Ukraine, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Office of the Ukrainian Ombudsman (May and December) Achievements 2024 Illustrative photo Belarusian context Provision of materials and advocacy support to the Ministry of Justice of Lithuania in preparing the Article 14 referral of the “Belarus situation” to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC On 30 September, the “Belarus situation” was officially referred to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC Development of a concept for launching the OSCE Moscow Mechanism regarding forced expulsion of “disloyals” Participation in the first-ever side event dedicated to the “Belarus situation” at the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC Illustrative photo Ukrainian context Submission of materials on deportation of Ukrainian children to UN Special Rapporteurs and Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine Development of wording for PACE and European Parliament resolutions on accountability Achievements 2025 Illustrative photo Belarusian context Compilation of a document package submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC Submission of materials demonstrating state policy of deportation of “disloyal” Belarusians Drafting materials for a potential case before the International Court of Justice Illustrative photo Ukrainian context Draft wording ensuring tribunal jurisdiction over Belarus leadership for aggression Submission of information on deportation of Ukrainian children within Lithuanian criminal case Guiding principles of the long-term accountability strategy Illustrative photo Commitment to international accountability Long-term engagement with ICC, ICJ, Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Adaptability to political uncertainty Reliance on effective accountability mechanisms Mobilization of stakeholders Strategy within Belarus context NAM expects the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC to decide on opening a full investigation into the Belarus situation by the end of 2026. In case of a positive decision, NAM will implement the following three-fold strategy:  Strategic advocacy and coalition-building Intensify bilateral, regional, and international advocacy Build a coalition of States to join Lithuania’s referral to the ICC Using State referrals to broaden ICC jurisdiction, reinforcing investigative effectiveness, preventing fragmentation, and supporting victim participation. Operational cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC Collect and submit relevant evidence Reinforce the work of Belarusian and international civil society Support the Office of the Prosecutor throughout investigations and proceedings Outreach to affected communities Engage the Belarusian diaspora in Poland, Lithuania, and beyond Share information on the investigation and manage survivors’ expectations Ensure inclusive participation of affected communities Accountability before the ICJ Сontinue targeted advocacy to identify a State willing to bring a case against Belarus for breaching a UN multilateral Convention Conduct strategic bilateral and multilateral meetings with potential applicant States Convene stakeholders, legal experts, civil society, and survivors in regional and international fora Strategy within Ukrainian context Keeping focus on contributing to international accountabilityof Belarusian political and military leadership for the crime of aggression against Ukraine Appealing to accountability mechanism of the Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine that has been already established but will become operational in 2029 Adhering to early preparation in collecting, analyse, and preservation of evidence  Further submission of consolidated evidence to relevant stakeholders and, once operational, to the Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal Sanctions pressure Illustrative photo Sanctions as a tool of pressure Sanctions  are not merely a tool of accountability; they are one of the instruments to compel a change in policy —in our context, the regime’s internal repressive and external aggressive policies. Sanctions in the recent history of Belarus have yielded tangible results. Lukashenko was forced to release political prisoners and undertake some liberalization of his domestic policies, as well as to address external issues that he had created for partners. We work with both supranational and national sanctions. Supranational sanctions refer to those imposed by the European Union. National sanctions are prioritized in coordination with the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Ukraine, and several other countries. Overall, between 2020 and 2025, a total of 14 packages of EU economic, personal, or mixed sanctions were adopted . The EU sanctions regulation was amended and supplemented 21 times. The EU’s sanctioning framework on Belarus has existed since 2006 and has evolved over time. We can divide the sanctions into several stages. The first EU package was adopted on October 2, 2020, targeting 44 representatives of the regime. Later, Lukashenko and part of his inner circle were added to the list. The third package, in December 2020, for the first time targeted seven military-related enterprises and major companies associated with the regime. The goal was to pressure the regime to end repressions and begin dialogue. Ryanair aircraft at Minsk airport in May 2021. Photo source: delfi.lt After the forced landing of the Ryanair plane in June 2021, the EU introduced a fourth package . In addition to expanding personal sanctions to 78 individuals, the first sectoral measures were introduced: restrictions on dual-use goods, potash, oil products, financial transactions, and securities. At the same time, eight additional legal entities were sanctioned, including BelAZ and MAZ. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada simultaneously introduced restrictive measures. Migrant attack on the Polish border, 2021. Photo source: bbc.com Subsequent packages expanded both personal and sectoral sanctions. In December 2021, the fifth package was adopted following the onset of the migration crisis , targeting the border command, airlines, travel agencies, and large state-owned enterprises. With the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the EU strengthened measures: Belarusian banks were disconnected from SWIFT, the import of euros was banned, cargo transit restricted, and trade restrictions expanded on oil, potash, timber, metals, and dual-use technologies. Illustrative photo In 2023, a period began for harmonizing trade sanctions against the Lukashenko regime and Russia to close the “loophole”  that allowed the Kremlin to bypass restrictions imposed on Russia due to its aggression against Ukraine via Belarus at minimal cost. This process began in August 2023, when the EU adopted a package of sectoral economic sanctions. The EU prohibited the export of certain goods and technologies contributing to the country’s military-technical development. New personal sanctions were also imposed, affecting 38 individuals, including security officials and propagandists, as well as three Belarusian companies: Belneftekhim, BMZ Holding Company (management company of BMK), and Minsk Electrical Engineering Plant named after V. I. Kozlov. The next step was the package of July 1, 2024, which further expanded the harmonization of trade restrictions. By early 2025, nearly 90% of trade sanctions between the Lukashenko regime and Russia were harmonized. At the same time, the EU adopted several packages of personal sanctions against judges, officials, and propagandists of the regime—in August and December 2024. The last package of EU personal sanctions was adopted in March 2025. Over the past two years, we have regularly submitted proposals for improving sanctions and expanding sanction lists both to EU supranational bodies and to the governments of EU member states , as well as to the governments of other democratic countries (USA, UK, Canada, Ukraine, etc.). These proposals were sent to the EU’s authorized bodies (both the European Commission and the Directorate-General for External Relations), the UK, USA, Canada, all EU countries, Ukraine, and others—over 100 letters in total. These proposals were communicated in writing, and our joint positions were presented during in-person meetings and visits, including during the Belarus–USA Strategic Dialogue, the Belarus–EU Advisory Group , meetings with the EU Special Representative on Sanctions David O’Sullivan, and with ambassadors and representatives of the foreign ministries of the EU, USA, Canada, Ukraine, etc. We formulated a position on the need to harmonize sanctions regarding Russia and Belarus, which was sent to EU leadership, as well as to all foreign ministers of EU member states and their representatives in Brussels. This position was also communicated to the US Secretary of State. Sanctions for political prisoners and EU personal sanctions were also introduced based on our proposals in August 2023 and 2024, and in March 2025. Dozens of judges  (August 2023—19 judges; August 2024—13 judges; March 2025—another 9 judges), heads of the regime’s prisons  (9 in August 2023; 5 in August 2024), and propagandists  (4 in August 2023—Gigin, Lebedeva, Pustovoy—and 4 in August 2024, including Akulovich and Zhuk) were added to the lists. We prepared these proposals. Based on our proposals, part of the regime’s Central Election Commission leadership  (7 individuals) was sanctioned by the EU in March 2025. In March 2025, Oleg Romanov, a prominent supporter of the “Russian World” ideology in Belarus and former leader of the “Belaya Rus” party, was also sanctioned. To date, the EU has sanctioned 314 individuals and 58 legal entities . During a meeting with EU Special Representative on Sanctions David O’Sullivan in Brussels on December 11, 2023,  we raised the issue of evasion of existing sanctions, including those related to Russia via Belarusian banks and other banks in third countries, as well as through the Bank of Russia’s Financial Messaging System (SPFS) . Mr. O’Sullivan expressed interest in this aspect of sanction evasion, and on January 11, 2024, we sent him analytical materials on this payment system, its role in sanction evasion, and a list of banks using it in Belarus. We also communicated our position on this issue to our European partners in Germany, France, Poland, and other EU countries. As a result, in June 2024, the Russian SWIFT analogue, SPFS, was included under EU anti-Russian sanctions. For its use in evading sanctions, Belgazprombank and Bank BelVEB were included under European restrictions in February 2025. Besides the EU, from 2020 to 2024, the USA imposed strict personal, financial, and sectoral sanctions against the Lukashenko regime: officials, banks, petrochemical and defense enterprises, the dictator’s private aircraft, and other key sectors were blocked . The US SDN list currently includes 105 legal entities and over 100 individuals. After the war in Ukraine began, measures were intensified, with large banks, security structures, and hundreds of goods and companies added to export controls. We also ensured that all of Lukashenko’s aircraft were sanctioned. Formally state-owned, they are used personally by Lukashenko. His aircraft were added to the US SDN list (the second-to-last was sanctioned in August 2024, and the final one—plane No. 1—on August 9, 2024). Additional sanctions were adopted by allies based on our proposals: Canada targeted judges, banks, military, and defense enterprises; the UK targeted banks and certain economic sectors. A key priority for us was sanctions related to the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children . Based on collected evidence of specific individuals’ involvement, the EU, USA, and Canada imposed sanctions on Aleksey Talay (February 23, 2024—EU) and his foundation, BRSM and its leader Alexander Lukyanov (14th Russian sanctions package), and the State Secretary of the Union State of Belarus and Russia Dmitry Mezentsev (EU—June 2024)—all implicated in the war crime of illegally transferring Ukrainian children. Besides the USA and EU, 18 other countries, including the UK, Canada, Japan, and Australia, imposed sanctions . Nearly all export sectors, over 200 individuals, and major state enterprises were targeted. The World Bank and EBRD also suspended financing for Belarus. Overall, for the EU, USA, Canada, and Ukraine, we proposed personal sanctions against 360 individuals , including senior military-political leaders of the Lukashenko regime who facilitated Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (21), judges issuing illegal sentences  (102 ), heads of colonies and prisons  holding political prisoners (17), propagandists  inciting interethnic hostility and spreading disinformation (44), members of the so-called National Assembly  passing discriminatory and unlawful legislation (172), sports officials  persecuting athletes (36), and others. We also prepared a list with justification for 13 Belarusian defense enterprises, 19 banks, and major propaganda outlets  (ONT, STV, Belarus Segodnya publishing house), which was sent to the EU and the vast majority of EU, US, UK, Canada, and other countries. We prepared and proposed sanctions to our partners against officials and institutions of the Union State , which act as instruments of Russia’s imperial policy toward Belarus. For the migration crisis, we developed sanctions proposals targeting the leadership of the Border Committee and restricting supplies of goods produced by political prisoners. Analytical notes were prepared analyzing the effects of current sanctions and proposals with minimal side effects. We do not idealize or exaggerate the sanctions tool, but it is a real, substantial, and serious factor affecting the regime, which works and should work to compel Lukashenko to partially change his policies. Our priority in sanctions policy is to continue this work until Lukashenko changes his internal repressive and external aggressive policies. Our main goal is an independent, free, democratic Belarus, without political prisoners or political repression. We will continue our work to maximize sanctions effectiveness and minimize side effects. Our future plans include: continuing preparation of justifications for including enterprise leaders, judges, propagandists, and so-called “deputies” in sanction lists; advocating for the maintenance and further harmonization of existing restrictions to promote political change in Belarus and prevent the regime from supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; preparing video materials and explanatory texts about judges, propagandists, individuals, and organizations supporting repression in Belarus and aggression in Ukraine, as well as the harm of counter-sanctions to Belarusian society; monitoring the effectiveness of implemented measures and regularly submitting proposals to adjust sanctions. Media engagement Scale-up We have consistently expanded the social media presence of Pavel Latushka and the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM), adding the social media platforms of The Faction “Latushka’s Team and Movement for Freedom,” thereby increasing the number of channels from 11 to 21. Sustainability 2021 — The figures were recorded inconsistently due to the lack of systematic analytics of media performance 2022 — 136M 2023 — 186M 2024 — 162M 2025 — 177M Despite the overall trend of declining audience engagement and reduced viewership, our social media platforms continue to remain popular and to develop further. Focus on Belarus Priority area: ensuring sustainable reach and engagement with audiences inside belarus as a key vector of our activities. Statistics for 2025: Total views: 17.3M with 67.7% from Belarus Total views: 28.8M around 80% from Belarus Total views: 10.2M more than 50% from Belarus International influence Our voice on the global stage: Interviews with leading international media outlets: BBC, Le Monde, Gazeta Wyborcza, Reuters, Der Spiegel, Associated Press, Euronews X (Twitter): Over 5.5 million views per year Two dedicated channels for Polish audiences: YouTube and TikTok Selected Outputs Campaigns Campaign “Putin’s Puppet, Alexander Lukashenko, Must Be Punished” Campaign “Belarus — an Occupied Country” Campaign “Not a Cent for War” Conferences and Round Tables Conference “Universal Jurisdiction Mechanisms: General Approaches and Application in the Republic of Poland” Round table “Paths Out of the Political Crisis in Belarus: Lessons from the Polish Round Table” Round table “Polish-Belarusian Dialogue on Solidarity: Historical Traditions and Contemporary Challenges of Polish Migration Policy” Film Feature-length documentary film “The Belarusian Trial” An original documentary produced by the National Anti-Crisis Management. New formats “The Regime’s Shapeshifters”  — a video investigation series exposing the crimes of Aliaksandr Lukashenko and his inner circle across various sectors. Shapeshifters in Robes.” Film One The Central Election Circus: Lukashenko Gets Another Term “Shapeshifters in Robes.” Film Two “Belarus in the Grip of War”  — a three-part documentary exploring the systematic preparations by the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenko for potential entry into the war on Russia’s side. Entering the Kremlin’s Orbit:  Militarization and Integration The Transformation of Society: Preparing for War at Every Level The Price of Silence: Preventing a Catastrophe NAM Analytical Center The uniqueness of NAM's expertise lies in the fact that we employ specialists who have extensive experience working within the public administration system, including various ministries and departments of Belarus, as well as local governments. This allows them to possess insider knowledge of the regime system. We have prepared the following reports: “The Role of the Lukashenko Regime and the Union State in the Program for the Illegal Deportation and Re-education of Children from Ukraine.” “The Union State as a Cover Instrument for Russia's Imperial Policy.” ( link to the document ) “Systemic Discrimination, Human Rights Violations, and Political Repression by the Lukashenko Regime Against Belarusian Citizens Living Abroad and Ways to Overcome it.”  “Sanctions Pressure on the Lukashenko Regime (2020-2023)“ ( link to the document ) Analytical Report "Systematic Preparation by the Lukashenko Regime for Possible Entry into the War on Russia’s Side and Recommendations for Preventing This Scenario" ( link to the document ) Joint report of BELPOL and the National Anti-Crisis Management “Children without a future: the militarization of childhood in Belarus” ( link to the document ) The regime’s reaction Cybersecurity center of the Republican Unitary Enterprise “NCOT”. Photo: ntec.by How the Regime Reacts: Designation of Pages as “Extremist,” Blockades, and Shadow Restrictions Examples (over the past year): YouTube channel repeatedly added to the list of extremist materials; Facebook page twice designated as “extremist”; Telegram channel of the faction in the Coordination Council “Team Latushka & Movement for Freedom” blocked Availability of the TikTok channel in Belarus has been temporarily blocked. Why the regime reacts: They see a threat in the truth and an alternative perspective. Conclusion: The harder they fight us, the clearer it becomes: we are doing the right thing. Future We plan to further strengthen and expand our media operations. A key priority is increasing our reach among Belarusians inside Belarus by at least 5% , despite the highly restrictive and repressive information environment. We will invest in new formats and forms of engagement to better reach and involve our audience. This includes the production of short documentary-style videos and films  exposing regime propaganda, documenting human rights violations, and highlighting Aliaksandr Lukashenko’s actions aimed at preparing Belarus for participation in war. Through these efforts, we aim to deepen audience engagement, strengthen resilience against disinformation, and reinforce understanding of democratic change inside Belarus and internationally. Sustainable strategy Lobbying for the legalisation of Belarusians in forced exile (visas, identity documents, access to education, pensions, bank accounts, access to professions, and related issues) Support for cultural and social initiatives The National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM) as a driving force of the institutionalisation of Belarusian democratic forces Vision of the Future Belarus:  reforms, talent pool for a future democratic Belarus,  and international partners Working environment and risks Family members and close relatives of all NAM participants  are subjected to persecution by the Lukashenko regime The majority of team members face in absentia criminal cases  and regular threats Multiple criminal investigations in Poland  have been initiated related to: attempted assassination of Pavel Latushka attempted recruitment and attacks against NAM members A continuous disinformation and discreditation campaign  is conducted against the team Despite these conditions, all NAM members work on a full-time, professional basis  NAM activities are not voluntary side engagement , but a mission grounded in responsibility and belief in democratic change Strategic path forward Members of the NAM team prepare: Draft decisions of the Cabinet and oversee their implementation; Draft resolutions of the Coordination Council and manage their execution; Amendments to relevant resolutions and additions to documents adopted by the PACE and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. The National Anti-Crisis Management is a unique expert team that makes a significant contribution to the activities of Belarusian democratic forces. We don’t just talk — we take action. Structure Document on the Structure of Democratic Forces of Belarus / The Structure of Democratic Forces of Belarus. Source: tsikhanouskaya.org The structure of the democratic forces is built on the principles of trust, transparency, and mutual accountability. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, as the national leader, appoints representatives to the Cabinet and coordinates these appointments with the Coordination Council. Cabinet representatives carry out their duties through sectoral representations. The Coordination Council is elected through direct elections based on a proportional system. It elects a speaker from among its members and establishes commissions.