Five-YearPath
- Admin of the NAM
- 3 days ago
- 10 min read
Updated: 19 hours ago
From a reactive approach to a sustainable strategy for national reconciliation and Belarus’s European future
2021 — Foundation and crisis response: Building the organization with a primarily reactive approach to the crisis in Belarus.
2022 — Capacity building and adaptation: Strengthening core areas of work and adapting operations to the realities of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.
2023 — Strategic consolidation (2023–2025): Development of a long-term strategy focused on sanctions measures, international justice mechanisms, and public-oriented media engagement.
2024 — Strategy implementation: Advancing the Belarusian situation before the International Criminal Court and achieving significant growth in media reach and impact.
2025 — Advancing national dialogue: Building on achieved results, transitioning toward the promotion of “national dialogue” concept. Achieving a significant increase in the effectiveness of sanctions measures.
International justice for Belarus
Amid the crisis in Belarus, marked by crimes against humanity and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine launched from Belarusian territory, NAM established a Legal Department in late 2022–early 2023 to focus on international criminal accountability issues.
Key objectives:
Build a systematic process for documenting international crimes
Use available accountability mechanisms to support efforts to hold the Lukashenka regime’s senior military and political leadership responsible for international crimes.
Achievements 2023
Belarusian context
International legal experts, including those associated with the NAM, have prepared the first comprehensive report on crimes against humanity in Belarus, published by the Law and Democracy Center “Justice Hub”.
Engaging with Lithuania's Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Prosecutor General’s Office on the possibility of applying Article 14 of the Rome Statute to the “Belarus situation,” resulting in the initiation of relevant domestic procedures in Lithuania.
Participation in the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Ukrainian context
Compilation of an archive documenting the unlawful mass transfer of Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus.
Submission of the collected materials to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC through two communications under Article 15 of the Rome Statute (June and November)
Submission of the collected materials to the Security Service of Ukraine, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Office of the Ukrainian Ombudsman (May and December)
Achievements 2024
Belarusian context
Provision of materials and advocacy support to the Ministry of Justice of Lithuania in preparing the Article 14 referral of the “Belarus situation” to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC
On 30 September, the “Belarus situation” was officially referred to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC
Development of a concept for launching the OSCE Moscow Mechanism regarding forced expulsion of “disloyals”
Participation in the first-ever side event dedicated to the “Belarus situation” at the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC
Ukrainian context
Submission of materials on deportation of Ukrainian children to UN Special Rapporteurs and Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine
Development of wording for PACE and European Parliament resolutions on accountability
Achievements 2025
Belarusian context
Compilation of a document package submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC
Submission of materials demonstrating state policy of deportation of “disloyal” Belarusians
Drafting materials for a potential case before the International Court of Justice
Ukrainian context
Draft wording ensuring tribunal jurisdiction over Belarus leadership for aggression
Submission of information on deportation of Ukrainian children within Lithuanian criminal case
Guiding principles of the long-term accountability strategy
Commitment to international accountability
Long-term engagement with ICC, ICJ, Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression
Adaptability to political uncertainty
Reliance on effective accountability mechanisms
Mobilization of stakeholders
Strategy within Belarus context
NAM expects the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC to decide on opening a full investigation into the Belarus situation by the end of 2026. In case of a positive decision, NAM will implement the following three-fold strategy:
Strategic advocacy and coalition-building
Intensify bilateral, regional, and international advocacy
Build a coalition of States to join Lithuania’s referral to the ICC
Using State referrals to broaden ICC jurisdiction, reinforcing investigative effectiveness, preventing fragmentation, and supporting victim participation.
Operational cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC
Collect and submit relevant evidence
Reinforce the work of Belarusian and international civil society
Support the Office of the Prosecutor throughout investigations and proceedings
Outreach to affected communities
Engage the Belarusian diaspora in Poland, Lithuania, and beyond
Share information on the investigation and manage survivors’ expectations
Ensure inclusive participation of affected communities
Accountability before the ICJ
Сontinue targeted advocacy to identify a State willing to bring a case against Belarus for breaching a UN multilateral Convention
Conduct strategic bilateral and multilateral meetings with potential applicant States
Convene stakeholders, legal experts, civil society, and survivors in regional and international fora
Strategy within Ukrainian context
Keeping focus on contributing to international accountabilityof Belarusian political and military leadership for the crime of aggression against Ukraine
Appealing to accountability mechanism of the Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine that has been already established but will become operational in 2029
Adhering to early preparation in collecting, analyse, and preservation of evidence
Further submission of consolidated evidence to relevant stakeholders and, once operational, to the Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal
Sanctions pressure
Sanctions as a tool of pressure
Sanctions are not merely a punitive tool, but a means to influence internal repression and external aggressive policies.
In modern Belarus, sanctions have already had tangible results:
Lukashenko was forced to release political prisoners
Partial liberalization of domestic policies
Addressing external problems created for partners
Sanctions remain a key instrument of pressure on the Lukashenko regime, targeting the entire system.
The dictator seeks sanctions relief through numerous lobbyists.
Sanctions removal is now a central condition for political prisoner releases and resolving other urgent issues.
Sanctions are not applied in isolation:
Our work presents a coordinated approach at the “Belarus–EU Contact Group” meetings and strategic dialogue with the US
We coordinate supranational and national sanctions:
Supranational: EU sanctions
National: US, UK, Canada, Poland, Ukraine, and other countries
The beginning of the sanctions era (2020)
1st Package — 2 October 2020
3rd Package — December 2020
44 regime representatives targeted
Later expanded to include Alexander Lukashenko and members of his inner circle
First sanctions against economic actors
7 enterprises in the military-industrial sector
Trend: Shift from targeted personal sanctions to pressure on the regime's enterprises.
2021: transition to sectoral measures
4th Package — June 2021
(After the forced landing of a Ryanair flight)
5th Package — December 2021
(After the migration crisis)
78 individuals and 8 legal entities, including:
BelAZ
MAZ
First sectoral restrictions introduced:
Ban on certain dual-use goods
Potash and petroleum products
Restrictions on finance and securities
Coordinated measures adopted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada
Border authorities
Airlines and travel agencies
Major state-owned enterprises
Trend: Institutionalization of sectoral sanctions.
Post-2022 escalation and harmonization of trade sanctions with Russia
After the Start of the War in Ukraine (2022)
2023–2025: Harmonization of Trade Sanctions with Russia
Disconnection of banks from SWIFT
Ban on euro exports
Restrictions on cargo transit
Expanded trade sanctions on:
Oil
Potash
Timber
Metals
Dual-use technologies
Alignment of trade restrictions to prevent sanctions circumvention via Belarus
By 2025, approximately 90% of trade sanctions are harmonized against the Lukashenko regime and Russia
EU sanctions by year (individuals & entities listed)
US sanctions
Strict personal, financial, and sectoral sanctions targeting:
Officials
Banks
Petrochemical sector
Military-industrial complex
SDN List: 101 legal entities, 100+ individuals
By 2025, all of Lukashenko’s aircraft subject to US sanctions
Other countries’ sanctions
Canada
Targets: Judges, military, defense sector
United Kingdom
Targets: Banks and key economic sectors
Poland
365+ individuals under national sanctions
Other Countries Implementing Sanctions
Also applied by: Switzerland, Norway, Ukraine, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Moldova, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia
Proposed personal and enterprise sanctions
Personal Sanctions
(400+ Individuals)
Enterprise Sanctions
21 — Senior military and political leadership supporting Russia’s aggression in Ukraine
102 — Judges
17 — Prison and colony administration leadership
44 — Propagandists
172 — Members of the so-called National Assembly
36 — Sports officials
Banks: 19 institutions proposed for sanctions
Defense enterprises: 20 military-industrial enterprises
Media/Propaganda enterprises: Major organizations targeted, including:
ONT
STV
Publishing house “Belarus Today”
Sanctions Effectiveness and Next Steps
Key Principles of Sanctions
Must be timely, preventive, synchronized, comprehensive, and harmonized
Aim to force Lukashenko to change domestic and foreign policies
Secure release of political prisoners
Important Considerations
Sanctions do not encourage rapprochement with Russia — Lukashenko initially seeks integration with the Russian Federation
Ongoing work includes:
Preparation of new proposals for sanctions lists
Advocacy for maintaining and harmonizing restrictions
Development of guidance materials
Monitoring effectiveness of existing sanctions
Conclusion
Sanctions are a real and meaningful tool of influence on the Lukashenko regime
Goal: a free, independent, and democratic Belarus, without political prisoners and repression
Continued sanctions efforts remain a priority until the regime changes its policies
Media engagement
Scale-up
We have consistently expanded the social media presence of Pavel Latushka and the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM), adding the social media platforms of The Faction “Latushka’s Team and Movement for Freedom,” thereby increasing the number of channels from 11 to 21.
Sustainability
2021 — The figures were recorded inconsistently due to the lack of systematic analytics of media performance
2022 — 136M
2023 — 186M
2024 — 162M
2025 — 177M
Despite the overall trend of declining audience engagement and reduced viewership, our social media platforms continue to remain popular and to develop further.
Focus on Belarus
Priority area: ensuring sustainable reach and engagement with audiences inside belarus as a key vector of our activities.
Statistics for 2025:
Total views: 17.3M with 67.7% from Belarus
Total views: 28.8M around 80% from Belarus
Total views: 10.2M more than 50% from Belarus
International influence
Our voice on the global stage:
Interviews with leading international media outlets:
BBC, Le Monde, Gazeta Wyborcza, Reuters, Der Spiegel, Associated Press, Euronews
X (Twitter): Over 5.5 million views per year
Two dedicated channels for Polish audiences: YouTube and TikTok
Selected Outputs
Campaigns
Conferences and Round Tables
Campaign “Putin’s Puppet, Alexander Lukashenko, Must Be Punished”
Campaign “Belarus — an Occupied Country”
Campaign “Not a Cent for War”
Conference “Universal Jurisdiction Mechanisms: General Approaches and Application in the Republic of Poland”
Round table “Paths Out of the Political Crisis in Belarus: Lessons from the Polish Round Table”
Round table “Polish-Belarusian Dialogue on Solidarity: Historical Traditions and Contemporary Challenges of Polish Migration Policy”
Film
Feature-length documentary film “The Belarusian Trial”
An original documentary produced by the National Anti-Crisis Management.
New formats
“The Regime’s Shapeshifters” — a video investigation series exposing the crimes of Aliaksandr Lukashenko and his inner circle across various sectors.
Shapeshifters in Robes.” Film One
The Central Election Circus: Lukashenko Gets Another Term
“Belarus in the Grip of War” — a three-part documentary exploring the systematic preparations by the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenko for potential entry into the war on Russia’s side.
Entering the Kremlin’s Orbit:
Militarization and Integration
The Transformation of Society: Preparing for War at Every Level
The Price of Silence: Preventing a Catastrophe
NAM Analytical Center
The uniqueness of NAM's expertise lies in the fact that we employ specialists who have extensive experience working within the public administration system, including various ministries and departments of Belarus, as well as local governments. This allows them to possess insider knowledge of the regime system.
We have prepared the following reports:
“The Role of the Lukashenko Regime and the Union State in the Program for the Illegal Deportation and Re-education of Children from Ukraine.”
“The Union State as a Cover Instrument for Russia's Imperial Policy.” (link to the document)
“Systemic Discrimination, Human Rights Violations, and Political Repression by the Lukashenko Regime Against Belarusian Citizens Living Abroad and Ways to Overcome it.”
“Sanctions Pressure on the Lukashenko Regime (2020-2023)“ (link to the document)
Analytical Report "Systematic Preparation by the Lukashenko Regime for Possible Entry into the War on Russia’s Side and Recommendations for Preventing This Scenario" (link to the document)
Joint report of BELPOL and the National Anti-Crisis Management “Children without a future: the militarization of childhood in Belarus” (link to the document)
The regime’s reaction
How the Regime Reacts: Designation of Pages as “Extremist,” Blockades, and Shadow Restrictions
Examples (over the past year):
YouTube channel repeatedly added to the list of extremist materials;
Facebook page twice designated as “extremist”;
Telegram channel of the faction in the Coordination Council “Team Latushka & Movement for Freedom” blocked
Availability of the TikTok channel in Belarus has been temporarily blocked.
Why the regime reacts: They see a threat in the truth and an alternative perspective.
Conclusion: The harder they fight us, the clearer it becomes: we are doing the right thing.
Future
We plan to further strengthen and expand our media operations. A key priority is increasing our reach among Belarusians inside Belarus by at least 5%, despite the highly restrictive and repressive information environment.
We will invest in new formats and forms of engagement to better reach and involve our audience. This includes the production of short documentary-style videos and films exposing regime propaganda, documenting human rights violations, and highlighting Aliaksandr Lukashenko’s actions aimed at preparing Belarus for participation in war.
Through these efforts, we aim to deepen audience engagement, strengthen resilience against disinformation, and reinforce understanding of democratic change inside Belarus and internationally.
Sustainable strategy
Lobbying for the legalisation of Belarusians in forced exile(visas, identity documents, access to education, pensions, bank accounts, access to professions, and related issues)
Support for cultural and social initiatives
The National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM) as a driving force of the institutionalisation of Belarusian democratic forces
Vision of the Future Belarus: reforms, talent pool for a future democratic Belarus, and international partners
Working environment and risks
Family members and close relatives of all NAM participants are subjected to persecution by the Lukashenko regime
The majority of team members face in absentia criminal cases and regular threats
Multiple criminal investigations in Poland have been initiated related to:
attempted assassination of Pavel Latushka
attempted recruitment and attacks against NAM members
A continuous disinformation and discreditation campaign is conducted against the team
Despite these conditions, all NAM members work on a full-time, professional basis
NAM activities are not voluntary side engagement, but a mission grounded in responsibility and belief in democratic change
Strategic path forward
Members of the NAM team prepare:
Draft decisions of the Cabinet and oversee their implementation;
Draft resolutions of the Coordination Council and manage their execution;
Amendments to relevant resolutions and additions to documents adopted by the PACE and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe.
The National Anti-Crisis Management is a unique expert team that makes a significant contribution to the activities of Belarusian democratic forces.
We don’t just talk — we take action.
Structure
The structure of the democratic forces is built on the principles of trust, transparency, and mutual accountability. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, as the national leader, appoints representatives to the Cabinet and coordinates these appointments with the Coordination Council. Cabinet representatives carry out their duties through sectoral representations. The Coordination Council is elected through direct elections based on a proportional system. It elects a speaker from among its members and establishes commissions.
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