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Photo: Ruslan Seradzyuk On 18 April, a press conference of the Coalition "Latushka and the 'For Freedom' Movement" was held at the Museum of Free Belarus in Warsaw, as part of the election campaign for the fourth convocation of the Coordination Council. During the event, the coalition's list of candidates was presented, and its official electoral programme was formally launched. Pavel Latushka presented the results of the coalition's work during the third convocation of the Coordination Council. The report covered six key pillars of the programme: Accountability, Independence, Solidarity and the Diaspora, Pressure, Foreign Policy, and the Future. Speakers at the press conference included members of the coalition: faction leader Pavel Latushka, chairman of the "For Freedom" Movement Yury Hubarevich, Coordination Council Speaker Artsiom Brukhan, head of the "Pritulai Miane" foundation Hanna Federonak, and head of the Coordination Council's Legal Commission Mikhail Kirylyuk. In his address, Pavel Latushka emphasised that in the fourth convocation of the Coordination Council, the coalition will continue its systematic work to hold representatives of the Lukashenko regime accountable. The faction leader stated that the goal is to secure 3 arrest warrants for Lukashenko: for crimes against humanity committed against the Belarusian people; for the war crime of deporting Ukrainian children; and for the act of aggression carried out against Ukraine. Latushka also noted that the coalition will continue to lobby for sanctions pressure on the regime in order to achieve a change in its internal repressive and external aggressive policies, as well as to pursue the release of all political prisoners. "The Coordination Council can and should be criticised — but one must not turn a blind eye to the fact that it operates on the front line of pressure from the regime's security services. A war is effectively being waged against us. The regime's goal, and that of its security services, is to destroy the representative body of the Belarusian people." "But despite this, we have achieved unprecedented results. Coordination Council delegates have held bilateral meetings with parliamentarians from dozens of democratic countries, lobbying on issues of accountability for representatives of the Lukashenko regime and sanctions pressure. Our representative body has been recognised by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe — in which, for the first time in the history of the democratic forces, our official delegations are working. The Coordination Council also has its own delegation in the Parliamentary Assembly of Euronest and a shadow delegation in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The Coordination Council has likewise been recognised by the European Parliament and the Senate of Poland." "We have successfully lobbied for a series of additions and amendments to European Parliament resolutionsconcerning sanctions pressure, accountability for the torture of political prisoners, international criminal responsibility for crimes against the Belarusian people, and for the aggression against Ukraine." "The House of Representatives or the Council of the Republic could not even have imagined what the Coordination Council has managed to achieve in just one year and ten months of work", said Pavel Latushka.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. On 16 April, Lukashenko signed a decree "On Simplifying the Procedure for Providing Property to Agricultural Organisations." In practice, this decree authorises the transfer of movable property — machinery and equipment — to agricultural organisations for free use, without the prior consent that was previously mandatory. If translated from official bureaucratic language into plain speech: the dictator has effectively legalised the forced seizure of assets from functioning enterprises for the benefit of a dying agricultural sector. Previously, transferring property — a tractor, a truck, spare parts — from a factory to a collective farm was a complex procedure: economic justification was required, depreciation had to be paid for, and a stack of permits obtained. Now all barriers have been removed. The most egregious provision is the right to transfer assistance "regardless of financial results." This means a factory may be running deep losses, have no money for wages, yet it is obliged — or "entitled," which in a dictatorship amounts to the same thing — to hand over its machinery to a collective farm. The permission to write off the value of transferred assets against "additional capital" or "retained earnings" is a mechanism for concealing the real losses of the donor enterprise. On paper the factory may appear stable, while its fixed assets — its actual property — simply evaporate. Lukashenko at the Nestanovichi-Agro MTC in the Logoisk District. Source: president.gov.by Free servicing: Agricultural organisations are no longer required to pay for the maintenance and repair of what they have been given to "use." In other words, the factory hands over a truck and is also obliged to repair and fuel it at its own expense, receiving nothing in return. What is the catch? This is legalised feudal tribute. The word "entitled" in the decree is a trap. In Lukashenko's system, it means that the chairman of any district executive committee will show up at the director of any halfway-viable enterprise and say: "The decree exists? It does. Got a spare MAZ truck sitting around? Hand it over to the 'Path to the Cliff' collective farm — or you'll have problems." This is voluntary-compulsory de-kulakisation of industry. This is economic cannibalism. Instead of reforming agriculture and making it profitable, the regime has begun devouring other sectors. Industrial enterprises — already suffering from constant interference by Lukashenko's officials and a chronic lack of investment — will now be stripped of their machinery and equipment. This is a path to the degradation of both the factory and the collective farm — which will quickly destroy the equipment anyway, since it is "someone else's and free." This is the destruction of shareholder rights. For joint-stock companies, this decree is a death sentence for whatever remains of corporate governance. The opinions of shareholders — where these are not the state — no longer mean anything. The assets of a company into which people invested money can be transferred free of charge to some loss-making state enterprise on a phone call from above. This is the final death of the investment climate. This is a direct road to corruption and mismanagement. Granting state bodies the authority to decide on "sponsorship assistance" without obtaining corresponding approval is a blank cheque for the uncontrolled squandering of state property. When the transfer of valuable assets requires no accountability and no approval, a bottomless pit opens up for grey schemes and falsified records. The result: agriculture on a ventilator. This decree confirms what we said in our analyses of BNBK and Bellakt: the agricultural sector of Belarus is bankrupt. There is no longer money in the budget for direct subsidies — it is being consumed by debts to China and the security apparatus — so the dictator has decided to switch to a system of "barter in kind." The debt burden is only intensifying: the country's external sovereign debt stands at around 17–18 billion dollars, while total external debt exceeds 38 billion dollars. 2026 is one of the peak repayment years: in this year alone, the authorities plan to draw up to 4 billion dollars from reserves to service and repay debts — with no possibility of refinancing through new loans. Lukashenko has simply permitted one group of drowning people — the factories — to hand their life jackets to another group of drowning people — the collective farms. In the end, everyone goes to the bottom. But in the short term, it will allow the fields to be "sown" and a picture created for television. This is not "simplification of procedures" — it is legalised looting that delivers the final blow to the country's industrial capacity in order to sustain an agrarian myth. To this looting is added a bitter irony: the country that the dictator calls "the breadbasket of the region" is rapidly losing its food sovereignty. While factories surrender their last assets, Belarus is increasingly purchasing from Russia what it is supposed to produce itself. In 2025, imports of Russian pork into Belarus reached a record 131,000 tonnes — up 32.4% — covering nearly half of all Russian exports of this meat. The pig population in Belarus itself fell by 3.4% over the past year, and in the Vitebsk region it collapsed by a factor of one and a half. The situation with vegetables is no better: in 2025 Belarus became the largest buyer of Russian cucumbers, purchasing more than 17,000 tonnes — nearly 70% of all Russian exports — and leads in purchases of canned vegetables. In the first months of 2025 alone, imports of agricultural products from Russia grew by 20%, exceeding 1.1 billion dollars. This is the true outcome of "simplification decrees": domestic production is being hollowed out, while the "agrarian myth" is sustained on imported crutches — paid for out of Belarusians' own pockets, while their factories are stripped of machinery for the benefit of empty collective farm hangars.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. Pavel Latushka on the situation in the Belarusian economy as a result of the "brilliant" policies of the Lukashenko regime. Belstat data for the first quarter of 2026 paints a classic picture of an economy under severe external pressure, where the government is attempting to compensate for the decline in production by pumping up consumer demand. A "scissors effect" is emerging: household incomes are rising while the real sector is contracting. Household incomes grew by 7.2%, retail turnover by 6%. Meanwhile, GDP is falling (-1.2% for January–February 2026), and industry is in negative territory (-3.4% for Q1 2026). This means wages are growing faster than labour productivity and goods output. Money unbacked by any real value is being pumped into the economy. For now, inflation is being held back through rigid administrative price controls — but this "inflationary overhang" will sooner or later burst through either a sharp price spike or a weakening of the Belarusian rouble. A record high in warehouse stockpiles — 12 billion roubles as of 1 April 2026, equivalent to 90% of average monthly output — is a troubling indicator. The manufacturing industry (-5.7% in Q1 2026) has nowhere to sell its products. Sanctions have closed off premium Western markets and Ukraine, while the reorientation toward the East — Russia and Asia — has either reached its ceiling or is running into logistical obstacles. Belarus's main export market, Russia, is also in crisis: GDP contracted by 1.4% in the first two months of 2026, and the budget deficit exceeded 4.5 trillion Russian roubles in Q1 alone. In Belarus, factories are now producing goods simply to keep the conveyor belt running and avoid laying people off — but these goods are not converting into money. The decline in wholesale trade turnover (-3.8% in Q1 2026) is a vivid illustration of the consequences of Lukashenko's economic isolation. Belarus has historically earned its living from transit and wholesale re-export of goods. The closure of borders and logistical restrictions — caused by the repression and Belarus's participation in the actual aggression against Ukraine and the hybrid war against the EU — have destroyed this business model entirely. In the near term, the Belarusian economy faces stagnation with a high risk of financial destabilisation. The current standard of living and wage growth are being maintained artificially — through borrowing or drawing down reserves — while the foundation of the economy — production and exports — is cracking under the weight of inefficiency and sanctions.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. How the Regime is Turning Belarus's Lakes into Family Assets The dictator's helicopter over the Mogilev region in these April days of 2026 is not simply a routine working trip by a "hands-on manager" to the Paluzh fish farm. It is a signal that the final stage of carving up yet another sector of the country's economy has begun. While propaganda paints pictures of "restocking the nation's waters with fish," a large-scale operation is unfolding behind the scenes — transforming state losses into the personal income of one family. The last few years in Belarusian fish farming are a textbook example of how glossy presentations shatter against the iron logic of inefficiency. Lukashenko planned a trout paradise — in reality, he is presenting a "goldfish" in a broken trough. An ambitious target was set earlier: to bring trout production to 5,000–7,000 tonnes. In practice, as of April 2026, output barely reaches 1,000–1,500 tonnes. Why? Because trout is not carp — it requires expensive imported feed, clean water, and high-tech equipment. Belarusian shelves are 90% stocked with imported saltwater fish, while the domestic share of carp and trout in citizens' diets does not exceed 12%. The majority of state fish farms have become financial "zombies." They exist only on paper and on subsidies that are instantly swallowed up by debts for electricity and feed. Many ask: if the industry is loss-making, why has Lukashenko taken it on? The answer lies in a sophisticated asset management scheme. This is not mere mismanagement — it is a strategy. First, the state uses taxpayer money and crushing loans to build high-tech complexes (such as Paluzh itself). Then a situation of artificial bankruptcy is engineered: enterprises are forced to purchase overpriced and dubious-quality feed from BNBK, direct sales channels are cut off, and social debts are loaded onto them. Once the enterprise has been driven into "financial coma," the "saviours" appear — management structures linked to the Presidential Property Management Directorate or to the family's wallets. The result: the people pay for the construction and the debts, while the family receives a ready-made operation, export flows to Russia, and foreign currency revenue from fish product sales. Aleksander Lukashenko visited the Krasnopolsky District on a working visit. Source: ont.by A fish processing plant has already been opened near Minsk as part of the takeover of the fishing industry. Its owner, Lyudmila Neronskaya, is a close friend of Lukashenko's daughter-in-law and is connected to the dictator's eldest son, Viktor. Their children attended the same prestigious Minsk gymnasium together. Neronskaya flies to Dubai on a private business jet with Viktor's wife and children. She serves as director of the company "Morskaya Gavan" ("Sea Harbour"), which runs the "Morskiye Sezony" ("Sea Seasons") project in the Vitebsk region and the recently opened complex in Kolyadichi. It has recently emerged that "Morskaya Gavan" has purchased the "Belryba" fish complex in Minsk — 24,000 square metres — along with refrigeration and administrative buildings on Radialnaya Street. Lukashenko's interest in fish is not about phosphorus in Belarusians' diets. Three factors converge here. First, currency hunger: premium fish is "living currency" on the Russian market. Second, opacity: accounting for fish in closed tanks is an ideal environment for black cash. Third, feudal instinct: in his home region of Mogilev, he wants to create a personal fiefdom where, eventually, every fish will belong to "the clan." Meanwhile, the industry is suffocating — literally and figuratively. Modern fish farming cannot function without European water purification systems and sensors. Import substitution has failed here completely: Belarusian alternatives work intermittently, and spare parts must be sourced through grey schemes at a 300% markup. As for fish feed, BNBK has never managed to produce a feed on which trout grows as fast as on Danish feed. The result is Belarusian fish that is "gold-plated" in terms of cost price and uncompetitive without budget subsidies. Where there are state subsidies and murky waters, corruption always flourishes. In recent years the industry has been rocked by scandals exposing the main schemes: premium feed purchased on paper, cheap mixture delivered in practice; mass falsification of stocking volumes; sale of the best fish for cash, off the books. The meeting at Paluzh is a death sentence for initiative. When handcuffs are threatened for fish die-offs, professionals leave. Only those eager to perform remain — people who understand that the dictator does not need the truth, he needs victory reports. In a system where a mistake is equated with sabotage, no one will introduce new technologies. Loyalty has become more important than competence. And while Lukashenko holds forth about the bright prospects of Belarusian fish farming, the industry continues to rot from the head down. Paluzh and the other fish farms today are not national assets. They are future branches of the Lukashenko family business — ones that we have already paid for in full, but whose profits the people of this country will never be allowed near. Fish in Belarus today swims only for those who sit at the top. When Lukashenko says "We must feed the people fish," what he means is: the people will pay for the factory's construction, then cover its losses through taxes, while the profits from selling caviar and trout flow offshore or into new residences. The situation at Paluzh is not a managerial approach. It is looting elevated to the status of state policy. The dictator does not engage with loss-making industries to save people — he engages with them only when he smells money. In Belarus today, that smell is fishy. The dictator has driven fish farming into the same trap as all of agriculture: agrarian feudalism, where a bad harvest earns you prison, and success earns you the attention of the regime's money men, eager to seize a profitable asset. The result: expensive imported fish on the shelves, and plundered fish farms across a country known as "the land of lakes." This is not an economy — it is a simulation of life under the watchful eye of an overseer.

Illustrated photo Recently, debates have grown louder over the blocking of Belarusian state media resources on Western platforms. Some call it a restriction of free speech — but a look at the facts makes one thing clear: this is a classic case of violating the rules of civilised coexistence and international law. Let us go through the reasons why the removal of ONT, STV, and BELTA channels is a logical and entirely justified step on YouTube's part. 1. A Toxic Asset: Sanctions Compliance YouTube is a global platform operating within the framework of international law. When executives, key figures, and entire organisations fall under serious international sanctions, their presence on commercial platforms becomes legally untenable. The list of sanctioned propagandists working within these structures is extensive: BELTA: The news agency was run by individuals directly responsible for supporting repression. Former agency heads Irina Akulovich and Dmitry Zhuk are under EU and UK sanctions. ZAO Stolichnoye Televideniye (STV): The outlet employs notorious figures such as Grigory Azarenok and Yevgeny Pustovoy — both under EU, UK, and Ukrainian sanctions. The EU list also includes Nikita Rachilovsky, host of the programme "Senat" on STV. ZAO Vtoroy Natsionalny Telekanal (ONT) and affiliated resources: Former board chairman Marat Markov and presenter Igor Tur appear on the sanctions lists of the EU, Canada, and Switzerland. Using YouTube to monetise or promote individuals recognised by the international community as accomplices of a dictatorship is a direct violation of the platform's own rules. 2. Disinformation and the Fabrication of Reality Freedom of speech ends where deliberate falsehood, manipulation, and incitement to aggression begin. These outlets ceased to be "media" long ago — they have become combat leaflets in an information war: Justifying foreign aggression: Systematic and aggressive support for the war against Ukraine, amplifying Russian narratives, and spreading claims about a "Nazi regime." Broadcasting fabrications: BELTA and the TV channels deliberately propagate the claim that the tragedy in Bucha is a "fake," cynically devaluing human lives. The migration crisis: Active participation in constructing a false narrative around the crisis at EU borders — artificially engineered by the regime — while simultaneously blaming Western countries. 3. Complicity in Repression and the Destruction of Independent Media The central cynicism of the situation is this: these very propaganda structures had a direct hand in destroying genuine, independent journalism in Belarus — and are now demanding "democratic treatment" for themselves. The BELTA Case: In 2018, the state agency served as the primary instrument for fabricated criminal prosecutions against journalists from TUT.BY, BelaPA, and other honest outlets. UN Special Rapporteur Miklós Haraszti explicitly described this at the time as a flagrant violation of human rights. Denial of torture and violence: Publications in which testimony about torture at Okrestina is dismissed as "fabrication" are not an alternative viewpoint. They are direct informational complicity in concealing crimes against the regime's own people. The blocking of ONT, STV, and BELTA channels is not an attempt to "silence" anyone. It is basic digital hygiene — protection of the information space from: the incitement of hatred and international hostility; the promotion of individuals directly linked to the repressive apparatus; the use of the technological achievements and platforms of the democratic world to undermine the very foundations of democracy. When a media outlet becomes a tool of repression, it forfeits the moral and legal right to call itself press. Removing such channels from global platforms is not censorship — it is a necessary act of sanitation.

Illustrated photo On 9 April 2026, a working meeting took place between Pavel Latushka — Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and delegate of the Coordination Council — and Mikhail Kirylyuk, Head of the Coordination Council's Legal Commission, and the leadership of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF). A representative of the General Inspector of Financial Information of the Polish Ministry of Finance also participated. The central topic of the meeting was the problem of banking access for Belarusian citizens residing in Poland, specifically concerning: former political prisoners and others awaiting international protection; persons undergoing legalisation of their stay (awaiting a residence permit, including its renewal); citizens with expired passports — whose renewal is objectively impossible — and those with no passport at all; other categories of Belarusian citizens. Pavel Latushka informed the Polish financial supervisory authorities that Belarusians frequently face: refusals to open accounts in Polish banks; restrictions on the use of mobile banking; freezing of funds in accounts; and other related difficulties. Concrete cases of Belarusians who encountered difficulties with banking services were presented to the Polish side. These cases were collected in part through the NAU chatbot, and also submitted by the Belarusian Association of Political Prisoners "Da Voli" — totalling more than 40 cases. Representatives of the KNF and the General Inspector of Financial Information stated that they would initiate internal procedures to coordinate possible solutions — which could lead to the removal of some of the obstacles to opening and operating bank accounts — with the Office for Foreigners, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the National Tax Administration of Poland. The KNF reported that, following prior communication between NAU and KNF, Polish banks have already been informed of the requirement to recognise the Temporary Identity Document for Foreigners (TZTC) as a valid identity document. Banks are currently completing the adaptation of their internal procedures, including software, for practical application when serving Belarusian citizens. According to available information, some banks have already begun opening accounts on the basis of the TZTC. "In connection with the problem of interpreting EU restrictions that affect the use of mobile banking by Belarusian citizens on EU territory, we will submit relevant requests to the National Tax Administration — which, like the KNF, has the authority to interpret legal norms in the financial sphere — as well as a further request to the European Commission. Work to protect the rights of Belarusians abroad will continue. We remain open to your appeals and problems, and are ready to work toward their resolution. We will keep you informed of decisions taken by the Polish side," said Pavel Latushka.

Artsiom Brukhan and Pavel Latushka. Photo: NAM Media Theses of the speech by Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Member of the Coordination Council, at the Council of Europe Conference “Embedding European Non-discrimination Principles in the Policies and Practices of Belarusian Democratic Forces and Civil Society” 8 April 2026 Dear Mr. Director, Dear Mr. Speaker, Dear Representative of the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, Dear colleagues, It is an honor to address you on behalf of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, as a member of the Coordination Council of Belarus and a member of the delegation of the Coordination Council to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Thank you for your solidarity and your firm stance with all of us who continue to defend human dignity and fundamental rights under the most difficult circumstances. For decades, the people of Belarus have lived in a system where equality is systematically denied, discrimination is institutionalized, and repression based on discriminatory grounds is used as a tool of governance. Independent voices are being silenced, civil society is being persecuted, and entire communities have been subject to a State-sponsored campaign of discrimination. Arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, judicial harassment, unlawful imprisonment and other repressive measures based solely on real or perceived political beliefs have become part of a sustained, violent and widespread campaign of repression that continues until today, and that has forced so many of us to flee Belarus. As recently concluded by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court when announcing its decision to open a full investigation into the Situation in Lithuania/Belarus, the coercive environment allegedly created by the Belarusian authorities has resulted in the crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution (through deportation) of hundreds of thousands of Belarusians. Yet, even those in exile are consistently targeted by the Belarusian authorities through in absentia prosecution, searches and raids of their property, threats, intimidation and publicly disseminated hate speech. Only a few days ago, the Belarusian authorities designated the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, a leading human rights organization in exile working  inter alia on anti-discrimination, as an “extremist formation” – only one of many cynical examples illustrating the scale of the escalating repressions. In today’s Belarus, discrimination targets not only real and perceived political opponents of Aliaksandr Lukashenko and his regime: it also targets women, ethnic and national minorities, religious groups, as well as the LGBTQ+ community. While disguising discrimination as so-called “Slavic” or “traditional” values, the Belarusian authorities continue to blatantly and persistently disregard its international obligations to ensure equality. Yet, with the support of our partners, we have a chance to do better than this: with your support, I believe that we can build a democratic Belarus where legislation, public policies and institutions fully share European human rights standards, ensuring equality and protection for all  The first breaks of this foundation have been already laid: The Belarusian democratic forces, including the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the United Transitional Cabinet, and the Coordination Council, have endorsed a joint declaration that enshrines the principles of equality and non-discrimination as a foundation for future reforms and as guiding standards for their current work. This declaration is our shared vision and a unified commitment to building a new democratic Belarus. Moreover, we, as part of the European family, are actively adopting European values and approaches. We are thankful that representatives of the democratic forces had a chance to undergo training within the Council of Europe to learn from the best practices of its Member States, and to translate them into our day-to-day activities.  These are the first bricks of the society we are building, a society and institutions grounded in dignity, equality, inclusion and the rule of law. Accountability still remains at the core of our activities and commitment to non-discrimination. We do believe that without justice, there can be no genuine change, and without accountability, discrimination will continue to reproduce itself in new forms. I would like to reaffirm that we do everything possible to ensure that those responsible for politically motivated persecution, systemic discrimination, and other acts that amount to crimes against humanity will be held to account through fair and transparent international and national mechanisms. This is not only about addressing past violations - it is about restoring justice and trust, and ensuring a new path for a free,democratic and just Belarus. Thank you, and I look forward to the important and enriching discussions today.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. The system that Lukashenko — a dictator who has latched onto our country like a tick — spent decades building now resembles a building with a freshly painted façade concealing load-bearing structures eaten through by corrosion. What we are witnessing is not an explosion, but structural erosion. Let us break this process down into concrete pressure points — concrete cracks. 1. The bureaucratic apparatus — the people on whom day-to-day governance depends. Their loyalty today has become purely formal, and even toxic. The dictator demands a surge in GDP and exports, but logistics chains through the Baltics are blocked despite all the regime's efforts to push through potash transit, while the Russian market demands below-cost pricing. The bureaucrat is caught between a hammer — an impossible order from above — and an anvil — criminal prosecution for mismanagement. This has produced a paralysis of initiative, and micromanagement has been taken to the point of absurdity. Subordinates are afraid to make even minor decisions, since any of them can be interpreted as sabotage. The first crack: silent sabotage is forming within the system. Officials are not openly betraying the regime — they have simply stopped working toward results, shifting into a mode of self-preservation and paper-pushing. 2. Mid-sized and export businesses — the budget's donors, today held hostage. The exit from European markets has made business entirely dependent on Russian orders. But the Russian market in 2026 is a high-risk zone where the rules change at the Kremlin's whim. Business owners understand: they are losing agency. No one is investing in development. All available funds are being withdrawn or mothballed. Businesses are running down their old capacity. The second crack: a complete loss of trust in the state as an institution. A businessman in Belarus today is a temporary occupant waiting for the moment to shut up shop and leave as soon as the pressure becomes unbearable. 3. The security bloc — the regime's pillar — is also subject to erosion. Propaganda portrays them as a monolith, but reality is different. The system of permanent repression, mass prosecutions, constant monitoring, and total surveillance has turned service into a dreary conveyor belt. Officers have become database operators. This flushes the "ideologically committed" out of the system and leaves only "functionaries." The career ladder is clogged with loyalists from the dictator's inner circle. Young majors and lieutenant colonels can see that their dedication does not convert into status or real power. The third crack: an accumulation of psychological exhaustion. The loyalty of the security forces today is held together by fear of accountability for what was done in 2020. But the moment the system falters, that fear will transform into a readiness to hand over the leadership in exchange for amnesty. 4. The population is no longer taking to the streets — but they have "left" the state. Rising prices on basic food and medicine are hitting the once-loyal electorate — pensioners and workers. The illusion of stability is shattered at the checkout. Living under conditions of constant background anxiety and surveillance produces not submission, but deep alienation. People have stopped perceiving this state as their own. The fourth crack: the social contract has been torn up. The state demands obedience but delivers neither security nor prosperity. This is forming a vast layer of the population that will support any change the moment it becomes possible. 5. Within the dictator's inner circle, contradictions between factions are sharpening — and rising to the level of a battle over the future. The economic bloc understands that without normalising relations with the EU, the country is heading toward default. The security bloc demands intensified repression to preserve its positions. These are two mutually exclusive strategies.At the same time, dependence on Russia frightens even the most loyal cronies. They understand that if Belarus is absorbed by Russia, the local elite will be replaced by imported Russian officials — as ultimately happened in occupied Crimea and the Donbas. The fifth crack: the absence of any vision of the future. No one in Lukashenko's circle knows what comes "after." This is pushing them to seek back-channel contacts with the West and prepare exit strategies. None of these cracks, taken individually, represents a critical tipping point for the collapse of Lukashenko's regime. But we are witnessing an accumulation of structural tension — a situation in which each group endures its discomfort separately, while the total energy of discontent grows without finding an outlet. And any external trigger — a sharp deterioration in the dictator's health, an economic shock, or a Russian military defeat — will instantly turn these hidden cracks into the collapse of the entire structure. The dictator believes he controls the situation through violence. But violence is a glue that dries out over time and begins to crumble. Our task is to map these cracks clearly — and to be ready for the moment when quantity transforms into quality.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. How the Regime Wages War on the Future, Common Sense, and Its Own People Recently, Alexander Lukashenko visited North Korea. We all saw the footage. But it seems he brought back more than just impressions. He brought back blueprints. Blueprints for building "North Korea 2.0" in the very heart of Europe. What is happening in our country today is no longer simply a dictatorship. It is a methodical, daily slide into total absurdity, where the state declares war on everything alive: children, culture, digital progress — and even spring itself. Let us look at the facts. At what our country is living through in the spring of 2026. Let us begin with the most horrifying and cynical — the regime's treatment of children. In March, the authorities liquidated the KinderVita charitable foundation. For five years, these people helped children with cancer. For five years, they gave children and their families what the state is incapable of providing — human compassion and hope. And what does the illegitimate authority do? It does not simply shut the foundation down. The propaganda machine unleashes utterly inhuman lies against the volunteers. Simply because in North Korea 2.0, there can be no independent acts of mercy. Kindness must come only from Lukashenko — and only under duress. The regime is in a panic whenever Belarusians gather together. It fears our smiles and our joy. That is why culture in Belarus is being methodically destroyed. The FESTIWOW, Lidbeer, and WOSTRAU festivals have been cancelled. Because the Council of Ministers invented a "registry of cultural and entertainment event organisers." One step out of line — and you are banned. But the absurdity has reached the point where the system has begun to devour its own. In Gomel, riot police storm a restaurant where people are celebrating the traditional folk festival "Hukanne Viasny" — the Calling of Spring. People are given detention and fines of 1,500 to 2,000 dollars for singing. And do you know who was among those detained? A police major. A man the propaganda held up as a role model for years. A man to whom Minister Kubrakow personally gave a watch, and whom the state awarded the prize "For Spiritual Revival" for preserving traditions. And now this major receives a citation under the "people's" Article 24.23. Because in North Korea 2.0, even spring must be cleared with the ideologists. Meanwhile, when Russian football fans march through Gomel with smoke flares, the authorities call it "a procession from fraternal Russia." Their own people — into the police van for singing. Outsiders — a green light. Look at our streets. They are plastered with billboards featuring security forces and soldiers. Total militarisation is underway. The regime is trying to convince us that we are surrounded by enemies. But the real tragedy is unfolding not on posters — but in barracks. At Pechи, in military unit 3214 overseen by Karpenkow, a conscript soldier took his own life. A strong young man who dreamed of becoming a pilot. He was sent "on exercises" to special forces, and the system broke him. The regime does not need citizens, does not need individuals — it needs cannon fodder and blind obedience. A human life, in their calculus, is worth nothing. And yet look at how these "valiant," heavily armed security forces respond to phantoms. A blogger uses a neural network to generate an image — four people holding red-and-white flags in the centre of Minsk. And what happens? Three vehicles with flashing lights arrive instantly, armed men jump out... to arrest pixels. They are mortally afraid even of artificial intelligence, because they know: the real people hate them. To keep people from knowing the truth, a digital iron curtain is being erected. The regime is blocking access to websites hosted abroad. The tax authority prohibits receiving notifications to @tut.by email addresses because the domain is deemed "extremist." The foreign websites of the BBC and Novaya Gazeta Europa have been declared "extremist" in their entirety. And how are ordinary Belarusians living inside this isolation? I read interviews with our people from within the country, and it is heartbreaking. A 57-year-old woman says that mobile internet has become capped — watch one film, and the whole family loses connection. Stairwells go uncleaned, outages leave people without water for days. A 46-year-old Belarusian woman says that free healthcare no longer exists. Mammography machines in clinics are broken, and doctors openly redirect patients to private centres. Taxes for sole traders have multiplied — any initiative is being strangled. A pensioner admits through tears that buying a banana and an avocado on pension day is a celebration. Apples cost 5 roubles. She lives in a state of fear that has enslaved her. A construction worker notes: there are no Belarusians on building sites anymore. Migrants from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh have taken their place. Belarusian workers have simply vanished — some emigrated, some drank themselves into despair. And our famous MAZ trucks have disappeared — only Chinese lorries are seen on the roads now. People live with a sense of "countdown." Parents want only one thing: to get their children out of the country, because education is deteriorating, places on state-sponsored programmes are filled regardless of grades, and there are no prospects. Instead of dog parks, the authorities invent new levies, and janitors have simply ceased to exist as a profession. Dear Belarusians. What we are witnessing today is the death throes of a system that has chosen to freeze time.Lukashenko is building his Pyongyang because it is the only model in which he can hold onto power: isolate, intimidate, cut off access, ban celebrations, and march everyone in formation beneath military billboards. But they are forgetting one thing. We are not North Korea. We are a European nation at the heart of the continent.Freedom is in our blood, we have access to technology, and most importantly — we have a solidarity that cannot be crushed by detention, or fines, or any decree. Spring will come — to nature, and to Belarus. And no enforcers, no internet decrees, and no trips to Pyongyang will stop it.

Anzhalika Melnikava. Photo: belsat.eu   Original article: belsat.eu Original article: belsat.eu Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet Pavel Latushka, in a conversation with our colleagues from Centrum Europy, answered questions concerning the disappearance of former Coordination Council speaker Anzhalika Melnikava and the appearance of photographs allegedly showing her in Minsk. Pavel Latushka emphasised that at present there is no unambiguous information regarding the disappearance of Anzhalika Melnikava. Therefore, one can only "draw conclusions based on facts." The politician noted that Poland's Internal Security Agency is still investigating the criminal case initiated by the prosecutor's office on the grounds of Melnikava's violent deprivation of liberty. Within the framework of this case, the missing speaker holds the status of victim. "Everything else may be assessment, speculation," said Latushka. She did not work in the interests of the secret services According to Pavel Latushka, the known facts show that Melnikava  "always held a very concrete and open position against the regime of [Alexander] Lukashenko." He emphasised that it was thanks to her personal efforts that the Polish Senate in January 2025 recognised the Coordination Council as the Belarusian parliament in exile; that a PACE resolution was adopted on the non-recognition of Lukashenko as President of Belarus following the "elections" of 2025 and on the recognition of the Coordination Council, the United Transitional Cabinet, and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya . She also paid out of her own money for a conference on holding Lukashenko accountable for crimes, when the United States refused to provide funding. Therefore, in Latushka's view, Melnikava's activities "clearly did not correspond" to the interests of Belarusian secret services. "I cannot assert who she was. I exclude nothing. I will only state the facts. She was a member of our team, which is working effectively on holding Lukashenko accountable and for the first time in history brought about the launch of an investigation by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court," said Latushka. According to him, she could theoretically have halted or obstructed many initiatives that were contrary to the interests of the Lukashenko and Putin secret services, but she did not do so. "Moving from facts to speculation, I cannot exclude that at some point she may have fallen into a trap set by the secret services. What happened next, I do not know. The investigation is being conducted by the official authorities of Poland, who may know more about this," he said. And what about the photographs? Regarding the appearance of photographs of Melnikava from Minsk, Latushka does not exclude the possibility that this was done deliberately ahead of the visit to Minsk by US Presidential Special Envoy John Cole. At the same time, according to him, the photographs show only "a person very similar to Anzhalika," who may have been photographed in Belarus, while "everything else is conjecture." Overall, the politician does not exclude the possibility of propagandists also producing an interview with Melnikava, with the aim, among other things, of discrediting the elections to the Coordination Council. Unprecedented pressure Overall, Latushka noted that the Belarusian democratic forces have no right to conduct their own counter-intelligence activities on the territory of EU countries — this is the exclusive competence of local secret services. Nevertheless, Melnikava's identity was verified with the assistance of BYPOL and the Cyber Partisans. Furthermore, she underwent vetting by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration and the intelligence services of Poland prior to receiving Polish citizenship. According to him, the Belarusian democratic forces "are facing the greatest resistance in their history and actions aimed at destabilising and discrediting our work on the part of the secret services of the Lukashenko regime." Latushka cited "one Polish minister" who told him that "80% of the efforts of Lukashenko's secret services are directed precisely at the destruction and destabilisation of the democratic forces of Belarus." It is impossible to counter this independently, the politician said. The story of the disappearance As a reminder: during March 2025, Anzhalika Melnikava, through several transactions, transferred to her personal account the entire amount of the grant transferred to the Coordination Council (approximately $107,000), as well as all remaining funds in the account, including those designated for the projects of "Partisan Telegram" and support for journalistic investigations (approximately $30,000). In total, Melnikava withdrew more than $150,000 from the account; the last transaction was made on 24 March 2024. The following day, the 25th, she ceased all communication. It later became known that the former CR speaker had left the territory of Poland and the European Union on 26 February 2025 — travelling via the United Kingdom and Sri Lanka, she arrived in the United Arab Emirates, where her trail went cold. Prior to this, she had been in contact with Coordination Council colleagues via video link, and had not attended in-person meetings, saying she was ill. Investigators also report on possible connections between Melnikava and KGB of Belarus officer Alexei Labeev. As far back as 2022, she allegedly failed the first polygraph test conducted by the BYPOL initiative, but was accepted after a second test. Former Polish counter-intelligence officer Anna Grabowska-Sivets suggests that Melnikava may have been recruited while still in Belarus. A reward of €10,000 is now being offered for information about her whereabouts. Almost a year later, on 19 March 2026, photographs appeared of a woman resembling Melnikava at one of the Minsk gyms, which had only begun operating in January 2025. It is difficult to say whether these are genuine photographs or a deepfake, which is not particularly difficult to create under present-day conditions. However, following their publication, journalists from Nasha Niva managed to reach Melnikava's relatives by telephone. The father of the former CR speaker assured them that she has "been living in Belarus for quite some time," that "she has not disappeared, she is alive and well." According to the man, his daughter asked not to be called and always calls herself, but from a hidden number. Their last conversation took place in winter.

A. Lukashenko. Photo: AP Based on an analysis of macroeconomic data for 2025 — early 2026, the state of global commodity markets, and logistics reporting, a conclusion can be drawn: sanctions pressure on the Lukashenko regime continues to work effectively.  The reorientation of cargo flows to Russian infrastructure has not led to a full recovery of export revenues. On the contrary, it has created a critical dependency on Russian ports, which are currently vulnerable to attacks by Ukrainian UAVs. This is compounded by unfavourable conditions on the global fertiliser market and Belarus's growing foreign trade deficit. 1. Blockade of Traditional Logistics and Dependency on Russian Ports Illustrative image. Photo: pexels.com European sanctions, in particular EU Regulation No. 765/2006 (Article 1i), have erected a rigid legal barrier. The European Commission's interpretation of the concept of "transfer" has completely deprived the Lukashenko regime of access to transit through the ports of the Baltic states (primarily Klaipėda) and the services of Lithuanian Railways. In response, Belarus was forced to reorient its cargo flows to 20 Russian ports (Baltic, Azov, Caspian, and Black Sea basins). The key hub became the Grand Port of Saint Petersburg and especially Ust-Luga , where by the end of 2025 the volumes of transshipment of Belarusian petroleum products had grown several times over, and structures such as "Belbudtsentr" are investing in the reconstruction of terminals. Analysis of transshipment dynamics:  Despite the manifold increase in the use of Russian ports, the overall freight turnover statistics of Belarus show a decline: minus 2.6%  at the end of 2025 and a continued fall of minus 0.9% in January–February 2026 (Belstat data). This means that Russian infrastructure has been unable to physically and economically compensate for the loss of the short and inexpensive Baltic route. 2. The Ukrainian Drone Factor: New Risks for Petroleum Products Ukrainian military adjusting a Poseidon drone before directing it towards Russian troop positions at an undisclosed location near the front line in the Donetsk direction, Ukraine. Photo: Yevhen Titov / Abaca Press / East News The reorientation towards Ust-Luga and other Russian ports has made Belarusian exports (primarily petroleum products) hostage to the military situation. Ukrainian drone strikes on terminals create a direct threat of physical destruction of cargo and infrastructure. Even with Russian authorities' claims of "timely extinguishing" and no casualties, the Ukrainian side records a slowdown or halt in shipments following strikes. Price and margin dynamics:  On the global market, petroleum product prices are subject to fluctuations; however, for Belarus the main problem is not the global price but the discount and logistics costs. The increase in transportation distance along Russian railways, transshipment at Russian ports, and rising vessel insurance costs due to UAV strikes are critically reducing the profitability of Belarusian petroleum exports. 3. Stagnation in the Potash Market: The Failure of Attempts at Price Dictation Illustrative image. Source: zviestki.info The Belarusian potash sector has found itself in a trap. Despite artificial attempts to restrict supply, global potash prices are stagnating. The market is oversaturated. Competitors are actively expanding capacity: production growth is expected in Canada, Russia, and Laos (through Chinese investment). Dynamics:  In conditions of global supply surplus, Belarus cannot compensate for the decline in export volumes through price increases. Sanctions force the sale of fertilisers at a discount through complex logistics chains, while competitors (such as Nutrien, with 20% of the market) are capturing market share. 4. Trade with the EU: Asymmetry and Growing Deficit Empty shelves in Minsk shops. Minsk. 2020. Source: udf.name Sanctions have led to a sharp deformation of Belarus's trade balance, confirmed by 2025 data: The trade deficit is breaking records:  in 2025, the goods deficit reached nearly $7 billion (Belstat), while the overall goods and services deficit stood at $1.8 billion (National Bank). Imbalance in growth rates:  in the same year of 2025, imports grew by 5.8%, while exports grew by only 2.6%. Decline and structural shift in trade with the EU:  In 2025 (based on Comext / UN Comtrade data), a precipitous fall in key indicators was recorded. Export from the EU to Belarus: a fall of nearly 1.6 times; imports from Belarus to the EU: a fall of more than 3 times. Total trade turnover declined. Imports of Belarusian goods into the EU have been almost entirely eliminated (reduction from €1.3 billion to €0.4 billion), indicating a near-complete blockage of supplies of sanctioned products (potash, timber, metals, petroleum products). Meanwhile, imports from the EU continue, but are of a critical consumption character: Belarus is purchasing medicines, medical devices, automobiles, agrochemicals, and seeds. Analysis:  Export sanctions are working to deplete foreign currency earnings. Belarus cannot sell its main goods on the premium markets of Europe, but is forced to spend foreign currency on purchasing critically important European imports. 5. The US Sanctions Factor: Why Their Hypothetical Removal Would Not Change the Picture Illustrative image. Source: aa.com.tr Even if the United States fully or partially lifts its sanctions, the overall situation for the Lukashenko regime will not improve. There are three key reasons for this: The primacy of the European logistics blockade:  The main barrier to exports is not the closure of the American market, but the physical impossibility of transporting goods through the nearest Baltic ports. As long as the European ban on transit (transfer) through EU territory remains in force, Washington's permission will not give Belarusian potash a short route to the sea. The "over-compliance" effect:  The global financial and transport systems are deeply integrated. International banks, major maritime carriers, and ship mutual insurance clubs (P&I) will continue to avoid handling Belarusian cargo for fear of violating European sanctions or suffering reputational damage. The lifting of US sanctions will not cancel the toxicity of these cargoes. Market specifics:  For Belarusian petroleum products, the United States was never the primary market (that was Europe and Ukraine). As for potash, over the period sanctions have been in effect, global consumers have restructured their supply chains. Regaining lost positions on the global market, having at one's disposal only expensive and dangerous logistics through Russian ports, will be virtually impossible even in the absence of an American embargo. Conclusions and Forecast Logistics deadlock:  The bet on constructing one's own terminals at Ust-Luga requires long-term investments whose payback period is in question due to systematic UAV strikes on Russian port infrastructure. The ineffectiveness of half-measures:  A weakening of US sanctions is incapable of reviving exports, since physical access to optimal logistics is reliably blocked by European regulations, and global insurance and logistics companies avoid such risks. Loss of market power:  In the potash market, Belarus has lost the ability to influence global prices. Reductions in production volumes no longer lead to price increases due to the commissioning of new capacity by competitors. Deterioration of macroeconomic indicators:  The growing goods deficit of nearly $7 billion and the decline in overall freight turnover are direct mathematical proof that "sanctions work." The Belarusian economy is falling short of export revenues while maintaining a high dependency on imported technologies and goods, which in the medium term will exert enormous pressure on the national currency exchange rate and foreign currency reserves.

Illustrative photo Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management Pavel Latushka held a meeting with the Special Envoy on the Return of Ukrainian Children of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Karina Odebrink. The meeting took place at the initiative of the member of the Swedish Parliament and Special Envoy on the Return of Ukrainian Children of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Assistance in organising the meeting was provided by the Head of the Coordination Council delegation to PACE, Coordination Council delegate Aleksandra Mamaeva. Pavel Latushka presented information gathered by the National Anti-Crisis Management: more than 3,500 Ukrainian children were forcibly transferred to Belarus from the occupied territories of Ukraine — the Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia regions. These actions were carried out on the basis of a personal written decision by Lukashenko, taken within the framework of the so-called Union State. The report is planned to be presented at the upcoming session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The member of the Swedish Parliament noted the importance of reflecting the role of the Lukashenko regime in the commission of this war crime. Karina Odebrink emphasised that the materials of her report will include information transmitted by the National Anti-Crisis Management regarding the commission of this crime by representatives of the Lukashenko regime.