Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador On May 30th, the EU Council in Brussels adopted a resolution to introduce additional duties on imports of certain Belarusian and Russian agricultural products into the European Union. These measures, which will take effect on July 1st, 2024, increase duties on grains, oilseeds, and their derivatives from Russia and Belarus to a level that will effectively halt imports of these products. This includes wheat, corn, sunflower meal, beet pulp pellets, and dried peas. What makes these sanctions innovations significant for the Lukashenko regime? First, this is an example of sanctions harmonization between Russia and the Lukashenko regime being implemented immediately. This is a crucial development. We have consistently emphasized to our partners that aligning sanctions against both regimes is key to their effectiveness. Second, these sanctions restrictions were imposed for aiding and abetting the Russian regime – essentially, sanctions "for supporting the aggressor." The EU Council states that the Russian Federation is currently "illegally appropriating large quantities of such products from the territories of Ukraine, which it illegally occupies, and exporting them as purportedly Russian products." Sanctions restrictions are also being imposed on the Lukashenko regime for the reasons stated above. The new tariffs aim to effectively stop grain imports from both Russia and Belarus into the EU. These measures will prevent destabilization of the EU grain market, block Russian exports of misappropriated Ukrainian grain, prevent Russia from using export revenues to the EU to finance its war of aggression against Ukraine, and stop the Lukashenko regime from helping Russia circumvent these restrictions.

At the NAM's proposal, the EU introduced sanctions against the Lukashenko regime for the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children to Belarus and support for Russian aggression against Ukraine. According to the rationale, the Belarusian Republican Youth Union (BRSM) is one of the main entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children from illegally occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus. The BRSM engages in the re-education, political, and ideological indoctrination of children. It also coordinates practical aspects, such as the placement of children within Belarus. Therefore, the BRSM financially supports actions that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine. The head of the BRSM, Alexander Lukyanov, is also included in the EU's 14th sanctions package against Russia. Additionally, Dmitri Mezentsev, Secretary of the so-called Union State of Russia and Belarus, was placed under EU sanctions for the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children to Belarus. By imposing sanctions for the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children, the EU is again acknowledging the violation of Ukrainian legislation and administrative procedures for the transfer of Ukrainian children. This, in turn, constitutes a violation of international law and underscores the importance of the NAM's work to hold Lukashenko accountable. Also subject to sanctions were the Belarusian military-industrial complex entity OJSC Belarusian Optical-Mechanical Association (BelOMO) and its director, Alexander Moroz. BelOMO supplies components for Russian army weapons used in the aggression against Ukraine. At the NAM's proposal, the EU also introduced sanctions against the Bank of Russia Financial Messaging System (SPFS). Along with the justification for sanctions on Belarusian military-industrial complex enterprises and other proposals, including those concerning personal restrictions, Pavel Latushka submitted proposals to David O'Sullivan, EU Sanctions Envoy, on December 11, 2023, to impose sanctions on SPFS. These proposals included a justification and a description of SPFS's role in circumventing previously imposed restrictions. Our work investigating the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children, as well as other sanctions proposals, is reflected in the new sanctions package against Russia. We will continue our efforts to apply sanctions pressure and hold violators of international law accountable. Pavel Latushka is scheduled to meet with David O'Sullivan, EU Special Representative for Sanctions Policy, in Brussels on Wednesday to discuss further steps to increase sanctions pressure on the Lukashenko regime.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador In September 2022, with support from the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM), three Belarusians who had experienced torture back in Belarus filed statements to initiate criminal cases against representatives of the Lukashenko regime's security apparatus, prison officials, and police officers responsible for torture. The applications were submitted to the Polish prosecutor's office in accordance with the principles of universal jurisdiction. These actions are possible under the norms of the 1984 International Convention against Torture, to which both Poland and Belarus are parties. After reviewing the victims' appeals, the prosecutor's office initially declined to initiate criminal cases, citing a lack of Polish jurisdiction over crimes committed in Belarus. Since 2022, the NAM team has been collaborating with the law firm “Kopeć & Zaborowski”. During a meeting on May 28, 2024, with Polish lawyers, further steps to hold representatives of the Lukashenko regime accountable under universal jurisdiction were discussed. The law firm appealed the prosecutor's office's decision in court. This week, after considering the complaint, the Warsaw District Court ruled in favor of the Belarusians: it overturned the refusal to initiate criminal cases and returned the cases to the Polish prosecutor's office for further proceedings. The prosecutor now has not only the arguments presented by the NAU and the law firm but also the court's decision. This represents a significant procedural step towards issuing arrest warrants and ultimately holding representatives of the Lukashenko regime accountable under universal jurisdiction. As reported by the NAM, Poland issued six arrest warrants in 2023 for representatives of the regime: Yevgeni Shapestko and Gleb Dril (heads of the Akrestsina detention center), Dmitri Strebkov (head of the detention center in Zhodino), and Yevgeni Savich, Yulia Sokolova, and Karina Valuyskaya (department heads within the Ministry of Internal Affairs). In these cases, the basis for prosecution was the perpetration of torture against Polish citizens in Belarus. It is important to acknowledge other international precedents. For example, the New York prosecutor's office opened a criminal case against two Belaeronavigation officials—General Director Leonid Churo and his deputy, Oleg Kaziuchits — as well as two KGB officers in connection with the hijacking and forced landing of a Ryanair civilian aircraft in Minsk. On May 18, 2024, Pavel Latushka met with Adam Bodnar, the Polish Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General, to discuss holding representatives of the Lukashenko regime legally accountable. The Minister of Justice announced a reform of Polish legislation that “will influence the possibility of wider application of the principle of universal jurisdiction in Poland,” including in relation to those who commit crimes in Belarus. “We expect that the Polish prosecutor's office will pave the way for legal proceedings against the regime's security forces responsible for torturing Belarusians and will issue warrants for their arrest. This could become an effective lever of pressure on representatives of the regime and Lukashenko himself. Those responsible for torture will be held accountable. The NAM team continues to work towards this goal,” stated Pavel Latushka.

Belarusians residing in Poland have encountered a new requirement from Santander Bank: clients must now possess a residence permit valid for at least 12 months in any EU country. These new rules apply to both new and existing customers. If a client does not meet this requirement, the bank blocks access to their mobile banking app and online banking services. On May 28, 2024, Pavel Latushka contacted the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) to address concerns regarding account closures for Belarusians at Santander Bank. The official letter received by the NAM on June 21, 2024, from the KNF clarifies that the bank's actions are not mandated by Polish authorities or European sanctions. Decisions regarding additional requirements for clients were made solely at the bank's discretion. The KNF explains that establishing or terminating individual contractual relationships between a bank and its clients is an independent decision made by the bank. Such decisions depend on various factors based on risk management and assessment principles. Measures taken may be related to financial security, including combating money laundering or terrorist financing. The KNF advises that customers can file complaints with the bank directly, seek advice from the Financial Ombudsman or regional Consumer Ombudsmen, or consult with non-governmental consumer protection organizations. Organizations authorized to protect consumer rights offer free consultations, act on behalf of and in the interests of consumers, and assist them in bringing cases to court. The Financial Ombudsman can file claims on behalf of clients in cases related to unfair market practices by banks. With the complainant's consent, they can also participate in ongoing proceedings.

Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management Pavel Latushka met today with Sebastian Gajewski, Deputy Minister of Family, Labor and Social Policy of Poland, to address the pressing issue of pension payments for Belarusians who have international protection status in Poland. With over 310,000 Belarusians residing in Poland – the second largest foreign national group – ensuring access to pensions for those eligible is crucial. Many of these individuals, unable to safely return home, face significant hurdles in accessing their rightful pensions. While Polish law allows for pension calculations based on local work history, navigating the system presents numerous obstacles. During the meeting, Mr. Latushka presented key challenges encountered by Belarusian pensioners in Poland. The challenges had been analyzed by representatives of the United Transitional Cabinet and the National Anti-Crisis Management team. Deputy Minister Gajewski expressed his willingness to thoroughly analyze these issues and collaborate on solutions. The following agreements during the meeting were reached: During the meeting, the following agreements between the parties were reached: The Ministry expressed its readiness to consider all individual cases of Belarusians experiencing difficulties receiving pensions in Poland; The Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy of Poland will provide a detailed response addressing problematic issues related to pension provisions for Belarusians in Poland; The Department of Social Payments of the Ministry will prepare a "road map" of social assistance, which the National Anti-Crisis Management will disseminate through social networks to inform Belarusian citizens living in Poland about available opportunities for receiving social payments. What solutions are possible for those Belarusians who cannot receive pensions in Poland? One possible solution is to access social payments, which are available through local administrations at the place of residence. However, these payments have eligibility conditions and are not guaranteed. If one has the opportunity to find employment in Poland, even for a short period (e.g., one day or one month), they will accrue pension rights based on their length of service in Poland. Additionally, one will become eligible to receive the 13th and 14th pensions (each amounting to PLN 1,780.96 before taxes) from the Polish Social Insurance Administration (ZUS). To effectively address pension-related challenges faced by Belarusians in Poland, an agreement was reached during the meeting to provide the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy of Poland with specific cases that illustrate problematic situations with pension payments to Belarusians in Poland.

The Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration is committed to addressing the challenges faced by Belarusian citizens seeking legal status in Poland, assured Deputy Minister Maciej Duszczyk during a meeting with Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of UTC and Head of NAM Pavel Latushka presented concerns raised by the Belarusian diaspora during meetings held in May across Polish cities, emphasizing the issue of prolonged waiting times for documents in Wrocław and the Lower Silesian Voivodeship. He highlighted his discussion with Lower Silesian Voivode Maciej Awiżeń, where they explored solutions to expedite document issuance for Belarusians. Pavel Latushka further drew attention to the difficulties faced by Belarusians regarding legal employment, travel outside Poland, and the risk of detention and potential deportation due to lack of documentation. Duszczyk confirmed receiving Latushka's appeal regarding the situation in the Lower Silesian Voivodeship and acknowledged the urgency of finding solutions. The Deputy Minister explained that delays in document processing for Belarusians are primarily attributed to staff shortages within voivodeship civil affairs departments, a consequence of the significant influx of refugees into Poland. Maciej Duszczyk assured Pavel Latushka that he would re-examine potential solutions to these challenges in the coming days. Both parties agreed to maintain close communication between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration and the Voivodeship Office in Wrocław.

“Citizens of Belarus who visit Latvia in personal cars with Belarusian registration will be able to continue to enter the territory of Latvia,” noted Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže during the meeting with the deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, head of the National Anti-Crisis Management Pavel Latushka, in response to the corresponding appeal from the representative of the democratic forces of Belarus. Pavel Latushka informed the Latvian Foreign Minister about the results of the elections to the Coordination Council and about the actions of the democratic forces of Belarus aimed at strengthening the three institutions of democratic forces: the President-Elect, the United Transitional Cabinet, and the Coordination Council. Pavel Latushka outlined the importance of achieving accountability, both for Lukashenko personally and for his representatives, for the illegal displacement of Ukrainian children and for the ongoing crimes against humanity committed against the Belarusian people. He presented detailed information about the work of the NAM team in these areas. Ms Braže emphasized the importance of holding “the Lukashenko regime accountable for atrocities against the Belarusian people and joint aggression against Ukraine.” Latvia also advocates increasing EU sanctions pressure on the Lukashenko regime to “limit the possibility of circumventing sanctions against Russia” by limiting the transit of goods passing through Belarus into the Russian Federation when Belarus is used to circumvent European sanctions imposed on Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. The Latvian Foreign Minister noted her readiness to consider NAM proposals to introduce Latvian national personal and economic sanctions. During the discussion of increasing sanctions pressure on the Lukashenko regime, Ms Braže informed Pavel Latushka that a sanctions package against Russia had been agreed upon, which opens up opportunities for further coordination of the sanctions package against the Lukashenko regime. This package should be aimed at harmonizing sanctions against Russia and the Lukashenko regime. They discussed the existing challenges for agreeing on this package and possible assistance from the democratic forces of Belarus for its adoption. In connection with an appeal from Belarusian citizens, who note the visits of European countries by representatives of Belarusian propaganda, as well as persons who are a potential threat to national security, the NAM team will prepare proposals for introducing personal sanctions against these representatives and transfer them to Latvia. The topic related to the legalization of Belarusian citizens located in Latvia was also raised. The Foreign Minister informed Mr. Latushka that Belarusians would have the opportunity to apply for refugee status or international protection and subsequently receive an international travel document. Ms Braže emphasized that possible restrictions on Belarusian vehicles will not apply to personal cars of Belarusian citizens with Belarusian registration.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador A phone call. I'm picking up. It's Ural Latypov, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, calling me – at that time, in 2000, I was Head of the Information Department and Press Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He says, "We need to help Vasil Bykov get a passport so he can be received at the embassy. Do you think it's worth doing?" I replied, "Absolutely, he's a giant, a man deserving of honor – and much more." – "Okay," he said, "call Vladimir Skvortsov, our ambassador in Germany, and sort it out." Vasil Bykov was invited to the Belarusian Embassy in Germany – and that's how my correspondence with the renowned Belarusian writer began. It was always conducted remotely, except for our very first encounter in Minsk. As a young man, I was walking along Maxim Tank Street in Minsk. Remember that red building where Vasil Bykov lived? His apartment is still there, at 10 Maxim Tank Street. And as I walked, I saw Vasil Bykov, the Nationanl Writer of Belarus, walking towards me. I remember that moment vividly, the look in his eyes as we drew closer. I was just a young man, a student at Belarusian State University... and here was the celebrated writer, Vasil Bykov, approaching. The sun was shining, and as Bykov looked at me, he said hello. He even seemed to smile. And you know, it was the inherent intelligence of a man who, despite not knowing you, still politely acknowledges a stranger. Years after that encounter, I became Belarus's Minister of Culture. I remember the evening of my appointment. A friend – I won't mention his name – and I were celebrating at a cafe, also on Maxim Tank Street. That street holds so many memories: my daughter's apartment, now seized by the regime, and my parents' former apartment, where I lived from 1986 onwards. We sat down in the cafe, and I asked my friend, "What's the first thing I should do as Minister of Culture?" He replied, "Honor Bykov's memory and fire Zametalin." I did, in fact, fire Zametalin shortly thereafter – but that's another story. The first letter I sent to Lukashenko's administration, however, was about commemorating Bykov. The response was negative, but I couldn't let the matter go. In 2009, the director of the Belarusian State Literary Museum approached me. He asked if the Ministry of Culture could support an exhibition for the 85th anniversary of Vasil Bykov, the National Writer of Belarus. I believe it cost around 65 million non-denominated rubles. But the key decision wasn't financial; it was political. Bykov was Lukashenko's personal enemy. Organizing an exhibition under the Ministry of Culture's patronage, funded by the Ministry's budget, could be perceived as a provocation. The exhibition went ahead at the Belarusian State Literary Museum. I even spoke at the opening. Lukashenko's administration, represented by the notorious Irina Driga, monitored the event closely to ensure nothing negative was said about Lukashenko. They were afraid of Bykov, both when he was alive and now, after his passing. Lukashenko is still afraid of him. Even though Bykov no longer lives on Tank Street in Minsk, he remains a threat to Lukashenko. That is the power of the man. This outstanding Belarusian writer left such a mark that Lukashenko remains fearful to this day. After the exhibition, I kept a reminder of Bykov on my desk in the Minister of Culture's office: an invitation to the exhibition at the Belarusian State Literary Museum, with a photograph of the renowned Belarusian writer. For over three years, throughout my tenure as Minister of Culture, it remained on my desk in my office. Some people display photos of Lukashenko, others of loved ones... I had a picture of my daughter, but it wasn't for public display. It was kept to the right side, out of sight. I didn't feel the need to share my daughter's picture with everyone; it was personal. But Bykov's photograph was front and center, on the left side of my desk, so that everyone entering the Minister of Culture's office would see it – a picture of the renowned writer, Vasil Bykov, on the desk of the Minister of Culture of the Republic of Belarus. It was my signal, a political message, if you will, much like the painting of Kastus Kalinouski, the fighter for our independence, that I later hung on the office wall. My successor removed that artwork within days of taking office. I recall speaking in Belarusian at the opening of Belarus Day at the Slavic Bazaar music festival in Vitebsk. There were 6,000-7,000 people in the audience, and it was broadcast live. I spoke about the cultural richness of Ushachchyna, the region that birthed many Belarusian poets and writers. And, of course, I spoke about Bykov. He will be remembered historically as a significant figure. Both then and now, uttering the name of the National Writer of Belarus in public is a risk. Imagine that – the National Writer of Belarus, a renowned Belarusian, a celebrated Belarusian author, a war veteran... Yet, to even mention Bykov or Hilevich is considered risky. It's absurd, barbaric even, but that's how a dictatorship operates. It instills fear, forcing people to reject aspects of their culture that don't align with the regime's ideology. On June 22, 2003, Vasil Bykov passed away. I was serving as Belarus's ambassador to Poland at the time. I couldn't publicly express the grief I felt, so I told my driver not to fly the flag on the ambassador's car for three days. When I attended receptions, the car would be without a flag. That was my way of mourning, because I knew we had lost an exceptional individual, a towering figure in Belarus, whose legacy would be analyzed and debated for years to come. Sadly, I believe most Belarusians will only come to fully appreciate his significance in time. Bykov was laid to rest in Minsk's Eastern Cemetery. A vast procession followed his coffin, draped in our national white-red-white flag, many carrying their own white-red-white flags. Towards the end of my time as Minister of Culture, I revisited the idea of establishing a Vasil Bykov Museum. It was something I remained passionate about. I had a conversation with Alexander Lukashenko in his office, where I discussed my meetings with Irina Bykova, Vasil Bykov's widow, and what was happening with the Belarusian National Writer's legacy. You see, I believe I managed to pique Lukashenko's interest when I told him that people were coming from Russia, offering exorbitant sums to buy anything and everything from Bykov's apartment. That people were coming and simply taking things. I told him that we were at risk of losing this important heritage. Lukashenko, being the "owner" that he is, wants to possess everything himself. So the idea of losing something caught his attention. We spoke for an hour – a full hour discussing Bykov. Lukashenko brought up the white-red-white flag, the coffin, the funeral. I don't believe it's worth repeating what he said about Bykov – he's not worthy of speaking about him, of passing judgment. But during our conversation, I made three requests: first, we needed to catalogue Bykov's entire estate; second, we needed to transfer it to the State Literary Museum for preservation; and third, we needed to create a Vasil Bykov museum. At the end of our conversation, Lukashenko said, "Okay, write to me again." I drafted a concise report, just three sentences. Next to the third sentence, he wrote, "We'll revisit this later." I immediately instructed the General Director of the National Library of Belarus at that time– Roman Motulsky – to purchase computers and laptops. I wanted him to send National Library staff to work with Bykov's widow, to catalogue everything comprising the Belarusian people's heritage: the manuscripts, the books with Bykov's inscriptions – a wealth of literary treasures. They diligently documented everything, securing this legacy for the Belarusian people. I later brought up the issue of the museum again, and eventually, Lukashenko agreed. I remember visiting Bykov's summer house. We'd arranged to meet with his widow and drove out to Zhdanovichi. As I arrived, I noticed a large, imposing building to the left, clad in green tiles. It was quite grand – almost excessively so, I thought. But then, Bykov was a National Writer, a Hero of Socialist Labor, a laureate of USSR prizes. His books had sold millions of copies. Perhaps this was his house? But I was mistaken. "No, Mr. Latushka," they said, "look to the right." And there, behind a simple wire fence – the kind you see around gardens and cottages – stood Bykov's summer house. It was a modest, single-story building made of sand-lime brick. This was the home of Vasil Bykov, a man who lived a simple life. We stepped inside, and Irina Bykova showed us around, sharing Bykov's belongings with us. There was even a car, a Volga – but that's another story. At one point, she handed me a book to hold. It had belonged to Uladzimir Karatkevich, another giant of our culture, and had been given to Vasil Bykov. Inside, Karatkevich had inscribed a handwritten message to Bykov. Holding that book, I realized that I was touching something that both Karatkevich and Bykov had held. It was a powerful feeling. At that moment, I understood the privilege of being Minister of Culture. It wasn't just about the honor of holding such a book; it was about being connected to these remarkable individuals who had touched it before me. "We'll create this museum," Irina Bykova said. She donated the summer house to the Belarusian State Literary Museum to serve as a branch dedicated to Vasil Bykov. "But there's one thing you probably won't be able to include in the museum's exhibition," she added. "What's that?" I asked. She looked at me and said, "The white-red-white flag that draped Vasily's coffin." I paused and replied, "You're right, that flag is unlikely to be displayed in the museum today. But as they say, manuscripts don't burn, and neither do artifacts. Preserve that flag. Perhaps the time will come when it can take its rightful place in the museum." It was a somber conversation. Lukashenko's administration insisted that no public funds be used for the museum. I'll admit, I bent the rules a little. We did use some public funds. Finding sponsors was challenging, although some were willing to take the risk and support us. But it was always a risk, even for those genuinely committed to supporting our culture. Nevertheless, the museum was established. Sadly, it's not open year-round. And while I believe a more comprehensive museum dedicated to Vasil Bykov is needed, I had fulfilled the promises I made to my friend and myself on that first evening as Minister of Culture. My final memory of Bykov's legacy takes me back to my time as general director of the Yanka Kupala National Academic Theater. On Bykov's birthday, we went to his summer house and planted cornflowers – Kupala Theater members, cultural professionals, all of us together. We planted cornflowers and shared a cup of tea. And you know, no matter how difficult things are today, no matter how disheartened we may feel, I believe those of us who carry the pain for our country, those who believe in a vibrant future for Belarus, those who cherish our culture, our heritage, our literature, those who recognize Bykov's importance in Belarusian culture and history – we will gather again at Bykov's summer house in Zhdanovichi. We will remember these dark times and celebrate our eventual triumph. We will plant cornflowers, Vasil Bykov's favorite flowers. Long live Belarus!

On June 16, 2024, the "Latushka’s Team and Movement 'For Freedom'" coalition presented a draft Declaration on the inadmissibility of extraditing Andrei Gnyot to Belarus. The declaration has already garnered support from a majority of members of the Coordination Council. In this Declaration, the Coordinating Council appeals to the European Parliament, its members, the Serbian authorities and public, and partners of the Coordinating Council to employ all available diplomatic and interstate channels to prevent Andrei Gnyot's extradition to Belarus. They emphasize that in Belarus, Gnyot would face torture and inhumane treatment, jeopardizing his life and health. The Coordination Council called upon European Union countries and the international community to protect the rights and safety of Belarusians facing persecution for their political beliefs. The appeal states, "Together, we can demonstrate that Lukashenko's demands and his punitive policies hold no sway in European, democratic countries." The declaration will be sent to the European Parliament, its members, the European Parliament's representation in Warsaw, and other partners of the Coordination Council to inform them of the situation surrounding the illegal persecution of Andrei Gnyot by Alexander Lukashenko's regime and to convey the Coordination Council's position. The United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus will also be informed about the adoption of the Declaration for potential use in their efforts to secure the release of Andrei Gnyot.

"Canada does not perceive Lukashenko as a guarantor of the independence of Belarus," stated Canadian Ambassador to Poland, Catherine Godin, during a meeting with Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management. The meeting, held in Warsaw on June 14, addressed several key issues: The Coordination Council election campaign and its results The need to harmonize and expand sanctions against the Lukashenko regime The situation of political prisoners in Belarus and specific approaches to secure their release. Ambassador Godin expressed her support for Belarusian activist Andrei Gnyot. The campaign and results of the Coordination Council elections were among the topics proactively raised by the Ambassador. She noted that in Canada, the government is formed by Parliament, and cabinet members retain their parliamentary mandates. Canada believes it is crucial to harmonize sanctions against Russia and the Lukashenko regime and is actively engaging in mediation with other countries to achieve this. During the meeting, the Ambassador was presented with proposals, prepared by the NAM team, for imposing sanctions against military-industrial complex enterprises, propaganda television channels STV and ONT, the publishing house "Belarus Today", BELTA, regime propagandists, judges, Katerina Krutalevich (a journalist with "Belarus 1" who interviewed Daria Losik), Andrey Korol (rector of Belarusian State University), and others. Pavel Latushka acknowledged the Canadian government's proactive stance in applying sanctions pressure on the Lukashenko regime. Catherine Godin, in turn, emphasized that the materials provided by the NAM team have practical implications for shaping sanctions decisions. In response to a request from NAM lawyers, the Ambassador pledged to facilitate communication with Canadian lawyers involved in the case brought by Canada against Syria for violations of the Convention against Torture. This exchange is crucial for the NAM's ongoing work on materials documenting the Lukashenko regime's crimes against the Belarusian people. The Canadian Ambassador promised to promptly relay updated information regarding Andrei Gnyot's situation to the Canadian Embassy in Serbia. "It is important for us that Canada consistently supports the Belarusian people in their pursuit of a free and democratic Belarus, and that cooperation between Canada and Belarusian democratic institutions remains substantive and effective," remarked Pavel Latushka during the meeting.

Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador Deputy Prime Minister Piotr Parkhomchik recently admitted at a recent meeting with Lukashenko that sanctions, which are supposedly making Lukashenko’s regime stronger, have actually hurt wood pellet production in Belarus. Before 2020, Belarus had established approximately 60 pellet production facilities, with a total capacity of about a million tons per year. Parkhomchik noted that these enterprises were created to meet the high demand for these products in Europe. However, according to the Deputy Prime Minister, supplies to Europe have been suspended. Unsurprisingly, Parkhomchik fails to explain the reasons behind this suspension or who is responsible. He conveniently overlooks the mass repressions in Belarus, the migration crisis on the EU borders, and the Lukashenko regime's complicity in Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Sanctions are also impacting cross-border payments processed by banks. This information comes not from Parkhomchik, but from a recent report by National Bank. Specifically, at the National Bank's initiative, commercial banks have begun advising corporate clients on navigating international settlements. To facilitate the evasion of financial sanctions, the National Bank has even established a dedicated working group to coordinate foreign economic settlements. Banks have also taken steps “to clear suspended payments, including using alternative systems for transmitting financial information or clearing mechanisms.” One such system employed for conducting transactions is the Financial Message System of the Bank of Russia (SPFS). We have brought this to the attention of David O’Sullivan, the EU Special Representative for Sanctions, as a means of circumventing the imposed restrictions. Consequently, the EU, along with the G7 countries, is prepared to implement restrictions against SPFS in upcoming sanctions packages. Chairman of the State Customs Committee, Vladimir Orlovsky, has gone even further by exposing all of Lukashenko’s schemes for illegally circumventing the existing sanctions. While Lukashenko and his officials claim they can do without trade with the West and will simply reorient towards the East, it appears they still heavily rely on Western goods and are willing to go to any lengths to obtain them. Orlovsky revealed at a meeting of the Council of the Republic on April 10 that Lukashenko was compelled to sign a document implementing a series of anti-sanctions measures. This document "creates conditions for the possibility of selling goods, exported from the European Union to third countries in transit through Belarus, from temporary storage warehouses to Belarusian enterprises." Orlovsky explains that, for instance, equipment is documented as being in transit from Europe to Asia but is then sold to a Belarusian enterprise within Belarus. He admits that current legislation does not allow for such sales, effectively acknowledging that Lukashenko’s regime is engaging in state-sponsored sanctions evasion, even violating its own laws. Orlovsky also shared that to circumvent sanctions, equipment is often imported in parts, utilizing complex, multi-stage logistics chains. However, the most striking admission that sanctions are impacting the regime came from Lukashenko’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Valentin Rybakov. He labeled the sanctions against the Lukashenko regime as nothing short of an act of terrorism! Despite the rhetoric from Lukashenko’s administration about the severe impact of sanctions, some so-called experts are attempting to argue that these sanctions are ineffective and should be abandoned altogether. The louder the regime officials complain about sanctions, the louder the calls to end them become. We, however, will continue to collaborate with our international partners to strengthen sanctions pressure on Lukashenko’s criminal regime.

The answer, according to an expert, is simple: "This is the Kremlin's strategy." Source: Gazeta Wyborcza "Lukashenko holds weekly meetings with around 40 military personnel, including representatives from six different special agencies. We know that in a recent meeting, he issued orders to escalate operations on the Polish border," Pavel Latushka, the former Belarusian Ambassador in Poland, states. This article delves into the crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border with insights from Pavel Latushka, a leading Belarusian opposition figure. Anna Mikulska: Let's start from the beginning, back in August 2021, when people began appearing at the border, specifically in Usnarz Górny, seeking international protection. It's crucial to acknowledge that migration is a natural phenomenon; people are trying to reach Europe through various means, primarily across the Mediterranean. However, the migration route along our eastern border is distinct—it was artificially engineered by Alexander Lukashenko, who exploited this inherent human need to migrate. Why did he choose this course of action? Pavel Latushka: Lukashenko, in concert with Putin, made a calculated decision to exert pressure not solely on the Belarusian-Polish border, but on the broader Belarusian-European border. Lukashenko sought retribution for Europe's refusal to recognize the results of the fraudulent 2020 presidential election. Putin, on the other hand, aimed to gauge NATO's response to a crisis unfolding on its periphery. Today, we understand that this was merely the first phase of the Kremlin's strategy, a strategy that already encompassed plans for an offensive against Ukraine. Anna Mikulska: We'll delve into that strategy in more detail later, but first, let's clarify how these foreign nationals were transported to Belarus. Pavel Latushka: Russia provided the financial backing for the infrastructure that facilitated the sale of visas, airline tickets, and air transportation to Minsk. Designated Belarusian consulates and embassies were tasked with issuing visas. This entire operation unfolded with the full knowledge and consent of both dictators. Migrants arriving in Minsk were granted Belarusian visas upon arrival, thanks to a dedicated consular office operating at the airport. To streamline this process, travel agencies were established, profiting from these foreigners while channeling funds into the coffers of Lukashenko's regime. Anna Mikulska: In the early days of the crisis, there was talk of "Operation Lockdown." Is this still relevant? Pavel Latushka: The operation's codename has evolved alongside the nationalities of the migrants and the shifting objectives of Russia and Belarus. Today, we refer to it as "Operation Tide." However, the underlying actions remain unchanged—funneling foreign nationals toward the EU's external borders. Anna Mikulska: So, let's get back to the Kremlin's strategy. Pavel Latushka: Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the migration crisis assumed a new and distinct purpose. The initial phase, as we discussed, has run its course. Today, the escalation in migration is designed to strain the resources of Belarus' neighboring countries—nations that are also NATO members—forcing them to divert resources away from aiding Ukraine and toward bolstering their own defenses and border security. This deliberate stimulation of activity along the migration route also aims to sow discord within Western societies and erode their support for Ukraine. Anna Mikulska: It's not just the migrants' roles that have shifted, but their routes as well. We're seeing them arrive not just from the Middle East, but also from African countries like Eritrea and Ethiopia. It seems Putin and Lukashenko have shifted their focus for issuing visas. And instead of flying directly to Minsk, these individuals are now routed through Russia. What does their route look like next? Pavel Latushka: Migrants reach the border with Belarus, and that’s when Lukashenko assumes responsibility for them. They're then transported by bus to the borders of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. Anna Mikulska: So, to be clear, Lukashenko and his special forces are directly responsible for these migrants. But what specific roles do they play? Pavel Latushka: The State Border Committee's OSAM special unit is tasked with transporting migrants to the border. Lukashenko issues orders directly to this unit, sometimes through his son, Viktor. They organize the logistics, force migrants across the border, and create diversions to distract Polish authorities. OSAM personnel are also in contact with their counterparts across the border, who facilitate the migrants' onward journey westward and even provide them with tools to breach border barriers. Overseeing this entire operation is the Belarusian KGB. Anna Mikulska: The KGB, which is currently headed by Ivan Tertel, a staunch Lukashenko loyalist. Pavel Latushka: Tertel ensures the smooth and uninterrupted flow of migrants, shielding them from interference, even from the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs. He unquestioningly carries out Lukashenko's directives, regardless of their legality. And legality is a bit of a moot point in Belarus these days. But it's interesting that Lukashenko avoids formally signing any decrees related to the border migrants. There's no paper trail directly linking him to these actions, despite his public endorsement of them. Instead of official documentation, Lukashenko relies on near-weekly meetings with representatives from the special services. In a recent meeting, he ordered an intensification of pressure on the border with Poland. Anna Mikulska: Why now? Pavel Latushka: There are likely two key reasons. Firstly, Lukashenko is averse to deploying the Belarusian army into Ukraine. By instigating a border conflict, he serves his own interests, demonstrating his value to Putin and positioning his forces as a necessary bulwark against a potential NATO counteroffensive—a highly unlikely scenario. Secondly, Russia has escalated its offensive in Ukraine. As we've discussed, Russia seeks to destabilize Europe, diverting resources away from Ukraine and towards internal security concerns. Anna Mikulska: And we are seeing the effects of this heightened activity in the increasing frequency of attacks launched from Belarusian territory. One such attack tragically claimed the life of a young Polish soldier, 21-year-old Mateusz Sitek. Do we know who was behind this attack? Pavel Latushka: It's important to recognize that we're dealing with a mix of individuals at the border. There are those who are completely unaware of what awaits them, simply seeking a new life in Europe... Anna Mikulska: It's crucial to remember that these individuals retain the right to seek international protection. However, the EU's restrictive visa policies often deny them legal avenues to reach safety, essentially closing off those pathways. Pavel Latushka: We're seeing a range of actors involved in this situation. There are those desperate enough to risk the journey despite the dangers. Then there are individuals recruited and paid by Russia and the Lukashenko regime specifically to sow chaos at the border. Furthermore, we cannot discount the potential involvement of intelligence operatives from both countries, including elements of the Wagner Group still operating in Belarus. Regarding the tragic death of the Polish soldier, our sources indicate that the KGB has a specialized unit known as "Alpha" trained in knife combat. OSAM, too, has a similarly trained unit called "Division C." The nature of the attack points to a professionally executed operation. However, we cannot yet definitively identify the individual responsible. Anna Mikulska: Humanitarian groups often reference a "system" operating within this border zone. Could you shed light on the nature of this zone and the situation of migrants in this zone? Pavel Latushka: This so-called "system," the border zone controlled by Belarus, is a remnant of the Soviet era. While originally intended as a fortified boundary, it has been effectively repurposed by the Lukashenko regime into a corridor for human smuggling. Rather than securing the border, Belarusian border guards facilitate the movement of migrants towards Poland, enabling them to violate it. This is not simply a failure of border security but a deliberate policy orchestrated by Lukashenko and his enablers. We also know that migrants are often beaten on the Belarusian side and forced to cross the border. While some are persistent in their attempts to cross, others simply want to escape the situation, only to be coerced into further attempts by the Belarusian special services. Anna Mikulska: What solutions do you see to resolve the crisis at the border? Pavel Latushka: There are no easy answers. However, we know that dictators respond to displays of strength. While a military intervention is out of the question, we must consider impactful measures. Closing the railway crossings with Belarus, for instance, would directly impact the financial interests of both Lukashenko and China, potentially destabilizing his regime. This would be a difficult decision, but it could force China to exert pressure on Lukashenko to change his tactics. Secondly, the EU must strengthen and harmonize sanctions against both Belarus and Russia. Currently, the existing sanctions are porous, allowing Putin to circumvent them by funneling goods through Belarus. Poland also has tools at its disposal. National sanctions could target businesses and individuals complicit in Lukashenko's regime. It is deeply concerning that Polish banks continue to conduct business with Belarusian entities while ordinary Belarusian citizens face account closures in Poland. Furthermore, it's important to remember that a criminal case has been underway in Lublin since 2021, investigating the Lukashenko regime's role in orchestrating this hybrid attack. Arrest warrants could be issued for those responsible for manufacturing this migration crisis. Finally, Poland should formally request that the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate Alexander Lukashenko for crimes against humanity and issue a warrant for his arrest. Our team has compiled substantial evidence; what is needed now is decisive action. Anna Mikulska: Despite the crisis at the border, Poland has not ceased economic relations with Belarus. Polish exports to its eastern neighbor in 2023 reached a staggering 2.7 billion euros, primarily comprising vehicles, machinery, and imported wood. While financial turnover has decreased, it still amounts to millions. Pavel Latushka: This is precisely why we advocate for halting trade with Lukashenko's regime. Instead, Poland should impose targeted sanctions on members of his inner circle. As for the dictator himself, the evidence clearly indicates that he should be held accountable by the International Criminal Court. Anna Mikulska: Although it receives less attention now, Belarusian citizens continue to face daily detentions and politically motivated prosecutions. Pavel Latushka: We consistently raise awareness about these human rights violations within the international community. We accuse the Belarusian dictator of crimes against humanity. The current wave of repression is the most severe in the past 50 years, reaching appalling levels. We recently held elections to the Belarusian proto-parliament in exile. All 257 individuals who ran for this body in exile were subsequently charged under the Criminal Code, their property confiscated, and in some cases, family members detained. We are witnessing torture in prisons, total censorship, and over 1,400 individuals designated as political prisoners, though the actual number is likely far higher. These political prisoners are subjected to solitary confinement in inhumane conditions, deprived of basic necessities and contact with the outside world. Even the elderly and individuals battling cancer are not spared this cruelty. Anna Mikulska: How can persecuted Belarusians escape the country? Pavel Latushka: The border with Ukraine is currently sealed, rendering that route impassable. Fortunately, due to the diplomatic efforts of Lithuania, Poland, and other nations, Belarusians can seek humanitarian visas, though they risk retaliation from the regime. It's crucial to understand that Belarus is rapidly descending into an isolated state, akin to North Korea, and this is unfolding within Europe, right next to Poland. Russia aims to reshape Belarusian society. However, recent studies reveal that 66 percent of Belarusian citizens support democracy, and a resounding 98 percent desire to live in an independent nation. Therefore, a unified and multifaceted strategy between the EU and Poland is essential, one that distinguishes between the Lukashenko regime and the Belarusian people. Failure to do so risks replacing the border with Belarus with a border with Russia. Pavel Latushka is a Belarusian politician, diplomat, former Ambassador of Belarus to Poland, and former Minister of Culture. He is a prominent leader of the Belarusian opposition and a leading voice against the regime of Alexander Lukashenko.