Crimes against humanity committed by the authorities of Belarus: legal qualification and accountability mechanisms

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Introduction: The legal nature of “crimes against humanity”

In public discourse, the term “crimes against humanity” (CAH) is often used as an emotional assessment of acts of cruelty. However, in international law it is one of the most serious categories of crimes, clearly codified in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The key distinction between CAH and everyday abuse of power or even mass human rights violations lies in two elements:

Contextual element: The crimes must be committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.”

Element of state-directed policy: This attack must be carried out “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack.”

In simpler terms, these crimes are not excesses of individual perpetrators but part of a deliberate state policy of repression. This is exactly what numerous reports of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) insist upon, noting that violations in Belarus are not random but systematic and coordinated at a high level.

Qualification of events in Belarus as CAH

Analysis of events after August 2020, conducted by Belarusian and international human rights organizations and international missions (e.g., within the UN and the OSCE Moscow Mechanism), allows qualifying the actions of the authorities under specific points of Article 7:

Torture (Art. 7(1)(f)): Systematic use of torture and inhumane treatment in the Okrestina Detention Centre, KGB pre-trial detention, GUBOPiK units, and police departments was documented by thousands of testimonies. This was not “rogue behaviour” — identical methods (overcrowded “boxes”, chlorine pouring, beatings in “corridors”, extension of detention, restriction of medical care, forcing heavy labour regardless of health, sex, or age) were applied synchronously in different cities, indicating a single instruction.

Persecution (Art. 7(1)(h)): Destruction of more than 1,000 NGOs, the crushing of all independent media, thousands of criminal cases for comments or likes — this is deliberate persecution of an identifiable group for political reasons.

Imprisonment (Art. 7(1)(e)): Tens of thousands of arbitrary detentions and thousands of political prisoners are not “administration of justice” but a widespread deprivation of liberty in violation of fundamental norms of international law.

Other inhumane acts (Art. 7(1)(k)): Forced recording of “confession” videos, creation of unbearable conditions in punishment cells, denial of medical care and communication (incommunicado), which led to deaths in detention (Vitold Ashurak, Ales Pushkin).

Counterarguments: position of official Minsk

Official Minsk categorically rejects all accusations. Its position is based on the following arguments:

“This is an internal matter”: The regime insists on the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference. The late Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei repeatedly claimed that international mechanisms are used for “political pressure” and “regime change.” This argument is still promoted by the authorities at the UN Human Rights Council.

“Maintaining order”: Authorities claim that law enforcement acted lawfully, defending the constitutional order from “foreign-sponsored extremists” and an “attempted coup.”

“All of this is fake”: Alexander Lukashenko personally claimed that the footage of beatings at Okrestina was “staged,” and the bruises “painted with makeup.”

However, this argument collapses before the findings of international bodies. For example, the 2023 OHCHR Report concluded directly that “the scale and nature of violations … may amount to crimes against humanity.”

Accountability mechanisms: successes and failures of history

How can justice be achieved if the national judicial system (courts, investigative committee, prosecutor’s office, bar) has itself become part of the repressive apparatus?

A. International Criminal Court (ICC)

Obstacle: Belarus is not a party to the Rome Statute. The ICC lacks jurisdiction and therefore cannot initiate an investigation on its own regarding crimes committed solely on the territory of Belarus. A UN Security Council referral is impossible due to Russia’s veto.

Nevertheless, the top leadership of Belarus can be held accountable for crimes against humanity before the ICC even though Belarus is not a party to the Rome Statute — in cases where such crimes acquire a cross-border character. This means that part of the unlawful actions or their consequences affect the territory of a state recognized under ICC jurisdiction. This is the reasoning behind Lithuania’s move in 2024 to submit to the ICC materials on persecution, torture and forced displacement of Belarusian citizens, arguing that part of these acts — in particular, forced flight of victims and persecution of activists — occurred on Lithuanian territory.

Practical example: The case of Omar al-Bashir (Sudan). The ICC issued a warrant for his arrest for genocide in Darfur back in 2009. Despite this, he ruled the country for years and freely traveled to states that do not recognize ICC jurisdiction. Even after his overthrow, Sudanese authorities are reluctant to hand him over. This proves that an ICC warrant is not automatically equal to arrest.

B. Universal jurisdiction

This principle allows any state that recognizes it to investigate and prosecute individuals accused of committing serious international crimes (including torture), regardless of where they were committed or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. It is based on the recognition that such crimes affect the entire international community.

Historical success: The case of Augusto Pinochet (Chile). In 1998 the former dictator was arrested in London under a warrant issued by Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón, based on universal jurisdiction. Although Pinochet was ultimately not extradited to Spain (due to health reasons), the fact of his arrest was revolutionary. It broke the wall of sovereignty behind which dictators hid.

Historical success-2: The case of Hissène Habré (Chad). The “African Pinochet” was convicted in 2016 in Senegal by a Special African Tribunal for crimes against humanity.

Current practice regarding Belarus: This mechanism is already in operation. In Lithuania, Poland, and Germany criminal cases have been opened based on complaints from Belarusians who suffered torture. The German Federal Prosecutor is investigating cases related to crimes against humanity.

The case of Yury Garavsky is one of the significant examples of universal jurisdiction applied to alleged crimes committed in Belarus. In 2023, former Belarusian SOBR operative Yury Garavsky, who publicly admitted participating in abductions and killings of opposition politicians in the late 1990s, was detained in Switzerland. Swiss authorities initiated a criminal case against him under charges of crimes against humanity, relying on universal jurisdiction. This precedent sent a strong signal: even if the state where crimes occurred does not provide justice, other states can take responsibility for prosecuting the perpetrators.

Conclusion

National justice in Belarus is impossible today. The ICC path is politically blocked. Therefore, universal jurisdiction becomes the main and most realistic tool. It does not promise quick punishment, but as the Pinochet case shows, it creates a “legal noose” that gradually tightens, making perpetrators non-travelable and toxic to any country in the world.

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