How Will the U.S. React to This Cooperation, and What Consequences Await Lukashenko?
In recent years, dictator Lukashenko has continued to build ties with autocratic regimes, turning Belarus into part of a global anti-democratic coalition. Among his partners are Libya, North Korea, Iran, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Syria, Venezuela, and, of course, Cuba.
How will Washington respond to Minsk and Havana's cooperation? How does the Trump administration view it? Will new U.S. sanctions target Lukashenko’s regime? The answers to these questions are in today’s report.
On January 1, 2025, Lukashenko stated that "Minsk has always been and remains a reliable ally of Havana, ready to lend a helping hand in difficult times". The two countries have maintained diplomatic relations for a long time, but the past two years have shown that their cooperation goes beyond traditional trade and humanitarian exchanges. At the core of this partnership, military cooperation is becoming increasingly evident, posing a serious threat to democratic nations, including the U.S. and its allies.
Let’s not forget that the current U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, is the son of Cuban immigrants and a fierce opponent of the communist regime of the Castro brothers.
Today, it became known that Lukashenko’s newly appointed ambassador to Cuba, Vitaly Borchuk, has presented his credentials to the Cuban president. Borchuk’s military background makes this appointment particularly noteworthy. From 1995 to 2013, he served in the Belarusian Armed Forces. Between 2013 and 2015, he worked for Beltechexport, one of Belarus's leading arms exporters, which is already under U.S. and EU sanctions.
By 2018, Borchuk was listed as the director of Innovative Company INTES LLC, a distributor and integrator of security, management, and automation systems. From 2021 to 2025, he worked at the Ministry of Industry and Lukashenko's government apparatus, overseeing foreign economic relations. Given his background, Borchuk’s appointment as ambassador to Cuba is no coincidence — and here’s why.
Military Contacts: What Lies Behind the Rhetoric of Friendship?
Officially, Lukashenko and Cuban authorities speak of strengthening economic cooperation and cultural exchange. However, real interactions reveal a different picture.
June 2023 — A Cuban military delegation visited Minsk for talks with the Belarusian Ministry of Defense. Among the topics discussed: technology exchange in the arms sector and joint projects to modernize military equipment.
January 2024 — Lukashenko’s Minister of Defense, Viktor Khrenin, visited Cuba. The official press was reserved, only reporting that Havana and Minsk had agreed on a "technical cooperation" program under which Belarus could supply military products to Cuba. The contents of this military cooperation agreement were not disclosed. However, Khrenin received an award from Cuban Defense Minister Álvaro López.
Shortly afterward, the ministry led by Khrenin announced that the Castro regime in Havana was interested in purchasing Polonez-M missile systems from Belarus, with a range of 300 km. The distance between Cuba and the U.S. at the narrowest point of the Florida Strait is just 180 km. This weapon is produced using Chinese rockets. At the time, BELTA confirmed that the arms deal was part of a broader bilateral plan between the dictatorial regimes in Cuba and Belarus.
April 2024 — The commander of the Cuban Air Force and Air Defense arrived in Minsk with a large military delegation. Cuban communists held talks with Andrei Lukyanovich, commander of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces. The Belarusian Defense Ministry vaguely stated that "a detailed exchange of views took place on the further development of cooperation".
July 2024 — Cuban Defense Minister Álvaro López paid a return visit to Minsk. At the military exhibition welcoming the Cuban delegation, the Belarusian Defense Ministry showcased Chinese-made Dajiang special forces jeeps equipped with machine guns, communication devices, and drones.
That same month, Lukashenko’s Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko visited Cuba, where he met with Raúl Castro. Cuban Defense Minister Álvaro López was present at the meeting.
Finally, in December 2024, a Belarusian military delegation led by General Lukyanovich paid a working visit to Cuba. "The parties discussed the state and prospects for the development of bilateral military cooperation, primarily in the field of the Air Force and Air Defense, and also noted the similarity of Belarus and Cuba's positions on key international security issues", the Belarusian Ministry of Defense's press service reported.
January 2025 – The Head of the Department of International Military Cooperation of the Belarusian Defense Ministry, Major General Valery Revenko, met with Cuban Ambassador Santiago Pérez Benítez. The meeting resulted in the accreditation of Cuba’s military, naval, and air attachés in Belarus. For the first time, Cuba has established a military attaché office in Minsk.
How Will the U.S. React?
The United States has traditionally viewed Cuba as a source of threat in the Western Hemisphere. After the fall of the USSR, Cuba reduced its military ambitions, but now, with the support of regimes like Lukashenko's, it may once again pose a danger. Washington has long kept Belarus on its sanctions list, but Lukashenko’s new military cooperation with Cuba could lead to tighter American restrictions.
On January 30, 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, stated:
"Mass migration has destabilized our entire region… The illegitimate regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are deliberately fueling chaos. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party is using diplomatic and economic leverage, such as in the Panama Canal, to counter the U.S. and turn sovereign nations into vassal states".
It is worth noting that the Lukashenko regime has been using migration warfare against Europe as a weapon for several years now. The U.S. has also faced similar issues in recent years.
Why Is Cooperation with Cuba Beneficial for Lukashenko?
For Lukashenko, this partnership brings several advantages:
Sanctions Evasion: Cuba has long specialized in shadow financial schemes, which could help Minsk acquire restricted technologies or even export Belarusian goods through third countries.
Political Legitimization: Lukashenko seeks to show that he is not isolated but is instead "strengthening international cooperation" — even if it is with countries like Cuba.
Support from the Kremlin or even Beijing: Russia actively encourages the Belarus-Cuba alliance, as it opens new channels for Moscow’s influence in Latin America. Meanwhile, China, through Lukashenko’s regime, may quietly expand its presence in Cuba.
What Does Russia Gain from This?
Russia views Cuba as a key element in its regional strategy. Strengthening ties between Belarus and Cuba provides Moscow with:
Additional logistical channels: Cuba could become another hub for shipping Russian and Belarusian goods in defiance of Western sanctions.
Expanded military presence: Russia could use Cuba for intelligence operations and to increase pressure on the U.S.
A political comeback: Moscow is eager to restore its influence in Latin America, and Belarus serves as a convenient tool for this.
Finally, Russia has been recruiting Cubans to fight in Ukraine since the spring of 2023. In the fall of that year, Cuban authorities announced that they had uncovered a recruitment network on the island. Researchers estimate that around 5,000 Cubans may currently be fighting on Russia’s side.
Why Is This Bad for Belarusians?
Unlike Lukashenko, the Belarusian people gain nothing from this cooperation. For example, in 2022, trade turnover with Cuba amounted to just under $13 million. Instead, the consequences for Belarus could be catastrophic:
Even greater isolation: Western sanctions will only intensify.
Increased military spending: Lukashenko is willing to allocate state resources to dubious military projects instead of investing in the economy and social services.
Risk of involvement in geopolitical conflicts: If Belarus assists Cuba militarily, it could provoke retaliatory measures from the U.S., further escalating tensions.
Which Countries Will Take Notice and React to Lukashenko's Partnership with Cuba?
The U.S. — As Cuba’s main opponent, Washington should increase scrutiny of Minsk-Havana ties, expand sanctions, and block any military cooperation attempts.
China — Beijing has traditionally supported Cuba but prioritizes stability and control over its partners. Excessive Russian influence on the island might eventually displease China, creating opportunities for diplomatic maneuvering.
Latin American countries — Democratic governments in the region should recognize that the Cuba-Belarus-Russia alliance threatens regional stability.
The Threat to Democracy Demands a Strong Response
Lukashenko’s cooperation with Cuba is not just a diplomatic formality. It is part of a global alliance of dictatorships that threatens the security of the democratic world. The deeper Lukashenko entangles Belarus in a military-political partnership with Cuba, the greater the risks for stability not only in Europe but also in the Western Hemisphere.
The U.S., its allies, and the democratic nations of Latin America must act now to disrupt the Kremlin’s plans and its puppet, Lukashenko. Belarus must not become another launchpad for anti-democratic regimes or a facilitator of global instability.
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