Lukashenko Has a Money Problem
- Pavel Latushka

- Jan 13
- 4 min read
For years, the regime’s propaganda has insisted that sanctions are "empty noise", "symbolic gestures" that supposedly do not work. Today, reality itself — and even representatives of the system — are disproving this propaganda.
Look at a telling, almost symbolic example. Aleksei Talai, a person implicated in the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children, publicly admitted that after sanctions were imposed, friends, partners, and sponsors began turning away from him. People refuse to cooperate not only in business, but even in charitable projects — because they fear the consequences. And Talai openly said: sanctions work. Lukashenko himself has said this repeatedly.
This is an important point. Sanctions are not just prohibitions on paper. They mean broken ties, loss of trust, and the toxicity of any contact with representatives of the regime and its beneficiaries.
But this is not about individual figures. It is about the country’s economy as a whole.
According to the National Bank, in January–October 2025 the deficit of foreign trade in goods and services amounted to USD 1.2 billion. According to Belstat, the deficit in trade in goods for January–November reached nearly USD 6 billion. Exports grew by only 0.1%, while imports increased by 4.2%. This is precisely how sanctions work: export restrictions are effective, while import dependence has not disappeared.
What does this mean in plain terms?The economy is not earning foreign currency — it is losing it. The regime is forced to purchase imports at higher prices, through circumvention schemes, via third countries, losing time and money. It is unable to compensate for this through exports either to Russia or to so-called "friendly countries", because they themselves are under sanctions pressure and in stagnation.
We are told: "But GDP is growing". Let us face the facts. In January–November 2025, GDP growth amounted to 1.3%, against an official forecast of 4.1%. The plan was underfulfilled by more than three times. And even this weak growth is ensured not by development, but by budget injections, administrative pressure, and the redistribution of resources.
This is fundamentally important: sanctions do not cause a collapse "overnight". They work differently — systemically and cumulatively. They deprive the regime of the ability to achieve sustainable growth.
Let us look at the real sectors of the economy. Industrial production — a decline of 1.7%. Agriculture — stagnation, while livestock losses in 2025 reached 111,000 head of cattle. The number of pigs decreased by 70,000. Freight turnover — the bloodstream of the economy — down by 3%.
Freight turnover is the key indicator. It reflects not reports, but the real movement of goods. Its decline means there is no export growth, the country is losing its transit role, and production chains are being disrupted. Sanctions are particularly visible precisely here — in logistics.
Another alarming signal is inventories. Today they have reached 83.6% of average monthly production, whereas a year ago they were around 60%. This means products are not being sold, enterprises are producing "for stock", working capital is frozen, and financial pressure is mounting. This is one of the most reliable indicators of an economic dead end.
The reasons are obvious: loss of external markets due to sanctions, low competitiveness of products, and a limited and shrinking Russian market.
Here is a concrete example — the Belarusian Steel Works. Planned exports: 240,000 tonnes. Actual sales: 35,000 tonnes(a shortfall of seven times). The plant is loss-making, dependent on subsidies, and its director has received an official reprimand. Similar problems exist at MTZ, MAZ, BELAZ, Mogilevliftmash, and Belkommunmash. These are no longer isolated failures — this is a systemic crisis of heavy industry.
Against this backdrop, regime representatives claim they have "built mechanisms of preventive adaptation", "neutralized the effects of sanctions", and "restructured logistics". But if everything is so successful — why are exports falling? Why are inventories growing? Why is industry unprofitable? Why does GDP fail to reach even the lowered targets?
The answer is obvious: these statements are an attempt to save face. In reality, resources are being burned, reserves are being consumed, and costs are being shifted onto the population. At the same time, money continues to be directed toward repression and support for war. In 2026, law enforcement agencies and courts will receive just over BYN 6.7 billion from the republican budget. This is almost BYN 1.4 billion more than last year — an increase of 25.4%. In 2025, spending on the army was increased by BYN 1.1 billion, or nearly one third.
That is why the key conclusion is simple and fundamental: sanctions are not symbolic — they undermine the regime’s economic base. They deprive it of foreign currency revenues, make sustainable growth unattainable, and increase the internal vulnerability of the authorities.
Weakening or lifting sanctions today would mean only one thing — stabilizing Lukashenko’s regime, providing new resources for repression, and sending a signal of impunity.
The Belarusian economy is entering a phase of prolonged stagnation. This pressure is systemic and cumulative, aimed at the key sources of the regime’s resilience. Therefore, sanctions must not only be maintained, but strengthened — until the dictatorship no longer has the resources for self-preservation.
This is not punishment. It is a chance for liberation.
Our proposal to the regime — what must be done to lift sanctions:
End repression and release all political prisoners;
Conduct a general political amnesty, decriminalize political and civic activity as well as the work of independent media in Belarus;
Repeal repressive legislation;
Finally resolve the migration crisis, stop hybrid attacks on neighboring countries, and cease participation in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.










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