Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador March 5-17 this year, elections will be held in Russia, in which, naturally, Putin will participate. It is beyond doubt that Putin will be re-elected for a new term - I don't think anyone seriously doubts this. There will likely be falsification, although we are inclined to believe that in today's Russia, unfortunately, Putin would have been elected even without it. But that is not the topic of our discussion - there is already enough analysis of the Russian elections. As a Belarusian politician, I am puzzled by the parallels being drawn with Belarus in this context. No, we are not inclined to consider Belarus in isolation, as often happens when the geopolitical context is ignored. Naturally, political processes in Russia, unfortunately, have a significant impact on our country, which Lukashenko has placed in a deep and dangerous dependence. However, the electoral situations in Russia and Belarus are different. In the discussions we are increasingly seeing, whether the results of the elections in Russia will be recognized by the democratic world or not, and whether Putin will lose international recognition, as was the case with Lukashenko - in relation to the latter, for some reason, the principle of the electoral cycle is being applied again. As if his current illegitimacy could either persist or be nullified as a result of the elections. And it is suggested that this may also depend on how the world reacts to the elections in Russia. But such a connection to the Russian elections and drawing parallels is inappropriate. Lukashenko's case in terms of illegitimacy can be considered, to some extent, ordinary - disregarding, of course, all the terror and crimes he committed during the 2020 campaign and continues to commit to this day. Essentially, in 2020, Belarus witnessed an election overturned (which, by the way, has never happened in Russia). And when we say "overturning election," we certainly do not mean that the 2020 elections met international standards, were free, democratic, and fairly competitive. Absolutely not. From the beginning, they were elections with significant reservations since they took place in an authoritarian state, already amidst growing repression since the spring. By that time, Lukashenko's main competitors had already been imprisoned, political prisoners reappeared in prisons, and the regime had begun escalating violence against civilians who were attempting to defend their rights through legal means. However, the democratic forces and civil society were still able to achieve two very important things: Creating alternative election monitoring tools such as the Golos and Zubr platforms. These platforms played a crucial role in exposing massive and blatant falsifications and ensuring an accurate vote count. Despite the regime's preemptive imprisonment of Lukashenko's key competitors, their campaign headquarters managed to unite and put forward a single candidate, Svetlana Tsikhanovskaya. Although this occurred almost at the last moment, a majority of Belarusian citizens, mobilized and committed to democratic change, actively participated in the campaign. Tsikhanovskaya swiftly gathered a sufficient number of signatures and ultimately won the election against Lukashenko. The legitimacy of her victory was substantiated by alternative election monitoring platforms and vote counting. As a result, democratic countries not only rejected the election results manipulated by the Lukashenko regime but also recognized the legitimacy of Svetlana Tsikhanovskaya, thus refusing to recognize Alexander Lukashenko. Subsequently, Lukashenko further exacerbated his situation by unleashing brutal and widespread repressions, hijacking a plane, creating a migration crisis, and ultimately becoming an accomplice in Russia's war against Ukraine. However, returning to the matter of legitimacy and recognition, Lukashenko has lost them due to his defeat in the elections. He will be unable to restore them through a new electoral cycle since, starting from 2020, Lukashenko, who seized power by force, is nothing more than a usurper lacking the right to conduct any electoral campaigns. Furthermore, Lukashenko is currently facing a Communication at the International Criminal Court in The Hague prepared by the team of the National Anti-Crisis Management under Article 15 of the Rome Statute. The Communication pertains to the illegal deportation or transfer of Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied territories to Belarus. Consequently, Lukashenko also faces the possibility of being recognized as a war criminal with an arrest warrant from the ICC before the 2025 elections. This may be the only form of recognition he can expect. However, it should be understood that we will not simply stop at this point and allow Lukashenko to continue his "celebration" and the ritual of "re-election" undisturbed. Democratic forces, including the National Anti-Crisis Management, are already engaging in consultations with the goal of developing a unified campaign strategy for the 2025 “elections”. Unlike the so-called "Single Voting Day," which we advised ignoring in order to conserve the mobilization potential of Belarusian society, since it held no genuine interest for the people as demonstrated by their absence at polling stations, we plan to take a different approach in 2025. It is still too early to provide specific details, but I can affirm that our team envisions an active and unconventional campaign that will likely surprise not only the Lukashenko regime but also many others.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador Directors-General of factories are speaking out against Lukashenko one by one, recognizing the toxicity of their relationship with the regime. This has become a positive trend among them. The reason behind this shift is the sanctions, which, contrary to regime propaganda, are actually having a stimulating effect on the Belarusian economy. The regime's attempts to defend the notion that sanctions have little impact on the Belarusian economy have been in vain. Both representatives of Belarusian society and directors of sensitive enterprises understand the opposite to be true. So, what do these directors think about Lukashenko's policies, and how are they fighting to have the sanctions lifted? On March 2, 2022, sectoral sanctions were imposed, affecting large enterprises such as the Mostovdrev joint-stock company and the Belarusian Metallurgical Plant (BMP) joint-stock company. These restrictions have impacted various sources of income, including imports, purchases, transportation of Belarusian timber products, as well as ferrous metallurgy products, and the provision of services in specialized sectors. The lifting of sanctions, which supposedly "stimulate the Belarusian economy," is advocated not only by lobbyists working for Lukashenko but also by lawyers who are attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to file lawsuits in court for the lifting of sanctions. Just last week, a decision was announced on one of these cases. On March 6, the Court of the European Union dismissed the claim from Mostovdrev and BMP and upheld the sectoral sanctions. Sergey Ososov, the director-general of Mostovdrev, and Dmitry Korchik, the director-general of BMP, made almost identical demands and received similar decisions. The EU Court rejected their claims based on their merits. The business leaders had two demands: the invalidation of the sectoral sanctions affecting their enterprises and the obligation for the EU to cover the costs incurred by the applicants. However, special attention should be given to the arguments presented by these enterprises, namely: "...The applicant claims that they have never had any connection with the Belarusian army, did not participate in the conflict in Ukraine, and did not benefit from it. The applicant asserts that they have nothing to do with the events in Ukraine or the Belarusian regime." By making such statements, the management of Mostovdrev and BMP is effectively acknowledging their stance on supporting the Lukashenko regime, in other words, they recognize the existence of a regime in Belarus. The same applies to the issue of their lack of support for the war in Ukraine. In response, the EU Court of Justice clearly and comprehensively explained in its decision that the reason for imposing sectoral sanctions is the Republic of Belarus's participation in Russia's unacceptable and illegal military aggression against Ukraine. Under international law, this qualifies as an act of aggression, and the European Union has the authority to impose restrictions on specific sectors of the economy if it deems it appropriate. In refusing the demands put forth, the court stated that the statements made by representatives of these enterprises, claiming that their activities are not connected to the actions of the Belarusian government or army, are insufficient grounds for lifting the sanctions. The Lukashenko regime actively supports the war against Ukraine, violating international law and the obligations outlined in the UN Charter. The purpose of these sectoral sanctions is to exert pressure on the Lukashenko regime, urging it to refrain from participating in aggression. They aim to maintain peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security. All sanctions, restrictions, and damage to the country's reputation are solely a consequence of Lukashenko's paranoid desire to cling to power, his willingness to commit further crimes, and his support for the war.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador Maxim Bahdanovich could have been reburied in Minsk. During my tenure as Minister of Culture, this was a topic that we made a sincere effort to address. But first, let me share how Bahdanovich influenced me. I vividly recall my days as a first-year student at the Faculty of History of the Belarusian State University, strolling along Masherov Avenue in Minsk, now known as Peramozhcau Avenue. I frequently visited a bookstore located in the Ministry of Culture building, where I eventually had the opportunity to work as a minister. It was there that I often purchased Belarusian-language literature. I particularly remember coming across a three-volume collection of poems by Maxim Bahdanovich. Bahdanovich’s legacy, as a poet who lived only 25 years yet managed to become a true literary classic, is a remarkable phenomenon in Belarusian literature. Maxim Bahdanovich passed away in Yalta, which is in Ukraine. One of my esteemed predecessors as minister, a well-respected figure in cultural circles, approached me with the idea of reburial for Maxim Bahdanovich. We engaged in discussions and agreed that the reburial could serve as a restoration of historical justice and a significant, uplifting event for Belarusian society. There were numerous arguments both in favor and against the idea, and I believe that representatives of both opinions still exist today. However, this presented an opportunity for Belarusian culture to lay Bahdanovich to rest in his homeland, a place he wrote so passionately about. I recall raising this topic during negotiations with Ukrainian ministers. Unfortunately, it proved to be a complex process that couldn't be realized at that time. Preserving national culture within Lukashenko's system has always been a challenge. It's hard to fathom, but even the esteemed classics included in the conventional "star five" of Belarusian literature, which personally includes Kupala, Kolas, Bahdanovich, Karatkevich, and Bykau, faced difficulties in being included in government events. Even their works required defending and significant efforts to ensure their inclusion in such occasions. This struggle was not uncommon. What was once inconceivable for the Minister of Culture during the times of the BSSR became a reality for the Minister of Culture in an independent Belarus.

Source: reform.by Pavel Latushka, on behalf of the United Transitional Cabinet and the National Anti-Crisis Management, has brought to the attention of the Irish Ambassador to Poland, Patrick Gerard Haughey, the activities of the St. Elizabeth Covenant. “I kindly request that the Irish Embassy in Poland, through your esteemed office, take note of this matter and consider bringing it to the attention of relevant authorities in Ireland,” Pavel Latushko wrote in his official letter to Patrick Gerard Haughey. The focus of concern is on two sisters from the St. Elizabeth Covenant, Helen Volynets and Veronica Vasilyeva, who have arrived in Ireland to sell icons under the pretext of funding their work "with the mentally ill, homeless, former prisoners, and drug addicts in Minsk." An article about their activities was published in Global Sisters Report. Pavel Latushka also highlighted in his letter that “one of the most alarming aspects of the St. Elizabeth Covenant's activities is its financial support provided to the Russian military. The monastery organizes concerts in support of the Russian army and collects supplies and funds for the Russian military engaged in the war against Ukraine. These funds are used to purchase various items, including radios, copters, thermal imagers, body armor, helmets and even a car.”

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador Renovating the office is traditionally the first task undertaken by every new minister. This informal tradition has been followed by ministers in Belarus since Soviet times. When I became Minister of Culture, my predecessor, Vladimir Matveychuk, even allocated a budget of approximately 11 thousand euros for this purpose. The office was truly in need of renovation. It was uncomfortable, with outdated Soviet-era cabinets that had worn out over time. Many of the interior items in the office dated back to the time of Yuri Mikhnevich, the Minister of Culture of the BSSR, who held the position for almost 20 years. In this regard, I made a fundamental decision: I would not start my work as minister by renovating the office. It was not the office itself that needed renovation, but rather the approach to financing the entire cultural sphere. This is where the focus of our financial resources needed to be directed. Therefore, the office repairs were postponed and only took place after two and a half years. During that time, we initiated innovative funding for culture. We implemented the state program "Castles of Belarus," which involved the restoration of more than 30 palaces and castles throughout our country. We also launched a program for the restoration, reconstruction, and repair of all 27 state theaters in the country. This program was part of the new state initiative, "Culture of Belarus 2010-2015," which significantly increased additional funding for culture in the regions. Furthermore, we reimbursed the debt owed to Belarusian artists, quadrupled additional funding for premier theater productions, and successfully implemented many other vital projects. During the renovation, the old furniture and Soviet lacquered cabinets were removed, reminiscent of scenes from Soviet films. This left a large empty space on the wall that needed to be filled. I decided to find something iconic and symbolic, representing our national understanding of culture. It was a conscious decision to place the painting "Kastus Kalinouski" by Gugel and Kudrevich (1958) in the minister's office. When the painting was displayed in the office, I told my team that after such an update, any foreign ambassador could be received there with dignity. And indeed, when visitors came to the Ministry, to the minister's office, they paid genuine attention to this artwork. There were numerous foreign guests, including ambassadors from China, Palestine, Ukraine, Lithuania, fellow ministers from around the world, as well as partners and philanthropists. However, I remember remarking to my colleagues at the Ministry that while any foreign ambassador could be received with dignity in this setting, it was unlikely that the Russian ambassador would visit the minister's office after the painting was installed. And so it happened: the Russian ambassador never had an opportunity to see the artwork. The figure of Kastus Kalinouski holds special significance in Belarusian history and culture. The uprising led by Kastus Kalinouski serves as a testament to the strength of the Belarusian people, their ability to fight for their rights and advocate for the freedom and independence of their country. Belarus has faced difficult moments in its history, but we have reclaimed our independence and become a sovereign nation. Yes, history played a cruel trick on us in 1994, but that does not signify the end. It signifies that the Belarusian spirit needs to rise once again, just as it did in 1863, to confront and resolve this issue once and for all.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador The Court of the European Union has rejected the claim and declined to lift sanctions against OJSC Grodno Azot and its subsidiary Khimvolokno. These companies were included in the fifth EU sanctions package against the Lukashenko regime in December 2021. Similar refusals were previously received by Minsk Automobile Plant OJSC, BELAZ OJSC, and Belaeronavigatsia. Despite Lukashenko's attempts at various platforms and meetings to convince the Belarusian nomenklatura that "yes, we have a dictatorship, but we are united and glad that everyone supports the chosen course, and we don't care about any sanctions, they only make us stronger," the leaders of the sanctioned enterprises hold a different opinion. This time, the director of Grodno Azot OJSC, Igor Lyashenko, showcased his feigned loyalty to the dictator by requesting the Court of the European Union to lift the imposed sanctions on both the parent company, OJSC Grodno Azot, and its branch, Khimvolokno. In his application to the EU Court of Justice, Lyashenko argued that paying dividends to the state “should not be considered as support for the Lukashenko regime”. He emphasized that “state ownership does not compel enterprises to engage in political activities or endorse a particular regime, as their main objective is to run a profitable business”. Bravo, Mr. Lyashenko. By acknowledging and officially documenting in the lawsuit that there is a regime in Belarus and that you are compelled to finance it, you have exposed the incorrect assessment made by the EU Council regarding who supports and finances the regime. Also, you provided justifications indicating that you do not support or finance Lukashenko's regime. In his written statement, Lyashenko revealed that dividends were paid to the state budget in the amounts of “8,481,000 rubles in 2018, 34,200,000 rubles in 2019, and 6,835,000 rubles in 2020. However, no dividends were paid in 2021”, which conveniently coincided with the year sanctions were imposed on the company. They attempted to deceive by withholding dividends for the year of sanctions and used this as a basis to challenge the imposed sanctions. They promptly filed a lawsuit with the Court of Justice of the European Union on March 2, 2022. It is worth noting that shortly after the imposition of sanctions in December 2021, the management of OJSC Grodno Azot initiated efforts to have the EU sanctions lifted. They organized a forced collection of signatures from the company's employees to appeal to the International Labor Organization, seeking the removal of Western sanctions. Not only did the EU impose sanctions on OJSC Grodno Azot, but the United States also reinstated previously suspended sanctions against the enterprise in April 2021. Additionally, in August 2021, Grodno Azot's director, Igor Lyashenko, became subject to American sanctions. Once again, the director of OJSC Grodno Azot, Igor Lyashenko, appointed by Lukashenko, argued through his representatives in court that the company neither supports nor finances the regime. Their argument is based on the claim that despite being forced to pay dividends to the state, they are not responsible for how these funds are utilized, even if they are used to violate citizens' rights. The statement emphasizes that the company "has no control over the use of the funds it pays to the state." Lyashenko does not dispute the existence of an undemocratic regime in Belarus. Furthermore, the management of OJSC Grodno Azot acknowledged the violation of citizens' rights in Belarus. In their arguments before the European Court, the applicants asserted that “they are not responsible for the Lukashenko regime's violations of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the repression of civil society and the democratic opposition in Belarus.” Regarding the issue of the management of Grodno Azot's non-involvement in the repressions, the facts indicate otherwise. The court ruling stated that employees of Grodno Azot, including workers from the Khimvolokno plant, who participated in peaceful protests against the regime and engaged in strikes, faced dismissals, intimidation, and threats from both the management of Grodno Azot and regime representatives. Thus, the management of Grodno Azot bears responsibility for the repression of the company's employees. Similar to the management of MAZ and BELAZ, the management of OJSC Grodno Azot is attempting to prove its non-involvement with the regime. However, they are doing so outside of Belarus, in Europe. Therefore, it is natural that in February, the Court of the European Union in Luxembourg rejected the claim of OJSC Grodno Azot and Khimvolokno, seeking the lifting of EU sanctions. The Court acknowledged that the EU Council's assessment of the important and strategic position of Grodno Azot in the Belarusian economy, its status as a state-owned company, and its support for the Lukashenko regime was correct. Grodno Azot represents a significant source of income for the regime. Lukashenko's associates failed to achieve the lifting of sanctions and will be required to cover all legal costs. Cooperation with these enterprises will remain prohibited for European companies, and their assets will be frozen. Any involvement with the Lukashenko regime is considered toxic, and the consequences of such involvement are evident. It would be easier to reinstate those who were fired and provide dividends to those who have been repressed and to the employees of the enterprise, rather than transferring funds to the treasury of the Lukashenko regime. Did Mr. Lyashenko believe that he would become an "persona non-grata" and prove to European authorities that he was not involved in numerous violations, thereby distancing himself from Lukashenko, who not only appointed him as the director of OJSC Grodno Azot but also as the chairman of the concern Belneftekhim and the Deputy Prime Minister? I think not. Perhaps he was more concerned about ending his career with dignity and respect. However, it appears that fate had other plans. Each person is the architect of their own happiness. Perhaps the director of OJSC Grodno Azot, Igor Lyashenko, simply harbors a common grudge against Lukashenko. A resentment that stems from being placed lower in the financial hierarchy and receiving a significantly lower monetary reward compared to his colleagues. In 2022, Lyashenko's income amounted to 127,831 rubles, despite holding the position of director in a strategically important enterprise in the Belarusian economy and being a former deputy prime minister. In contrast, Dmitry Korchik, the director of the management company OJSC Belarusian Metallurgical Plant, received 231,033 rubles in 2022. Even Alexander Novikov, the director of Gomselmash OJSC, earned 199,104 rubles in the same year. However, neither Korchik nor Novikov have disassociated themselves from Lukashenko's regime, at least not yet. But, as they say, better late than never. Presenting facts that prove non-involvement in the regime and actually rejecting Lukashenko, especially outside of Belarus, is the right approach to regain lost markets, open new markets, ensure the efficient operation of their enterprises, and improve the well-being of workers. To be heard and accepted, it is best to take concrete steps to remove Lukashenko from power and avoid involvement in his criminal schemes. Do you agree with this, Mr. Lyashenko, Mr. Korchik, Mr. Novikov, and others?

Pavel Latushka, deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, ambassador The Lukashenko regime, fearing new sanctions, does not always want to advertise its cooperation with the administration of the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, as well as the development of all kinds of ties and contacts with them: economic, informational and ideological, political and others. Such ties and contacts began even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops on 24 February 2022. Trade between Belarus and the occupied territories of Ukraine took place in an unlawful format at the level of separate legal entities with the mediation of Russian companies. After February 2022, the Lukashenko regime's contacts with the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine became more intensive and reached the official political level. For example, on 18 April 2023, Lukashenko held a meeting with the so-called "acting head of the DPR" Denis Pushilin as a person in the status of the head of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation, during which he offered assistance in the restoration and development of this Russian-occupied territory. In addition to cooperation with the "LPR" and "DPR", the illegitimate authorities of Belarus are developing official relations with occupied Crimea. In early March 2023, the leadership of the Vitebsk Regional Executive Committee and the Crimean authorities signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation. The head of the occupation administration of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, and the chairman of the Vitebsk regional executive committee, Alexander Subbotin, agreed to strengthen relations between the regions and outlined the prospects for joint work. Aksyonov then stressed that "Belarusian enterprises are always welcome on the Crimean land. In addition, the illegitimate authorities of Belarus decided to open the Consulate General of the Republic of Belarus in Rostov-on-Don no later than 1 July 2024. This consular district will include the regions of Ukraine occupied by Russia.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador NAM emphasizes the importance of the International Athletics Federation making a decisive ruling to suspend Yuri Moisevich, the former head coach of the Belarusian athletics team, from participating in sports for a period of five years. Since 2021, NAM legal team has been supporting the consideration of a disciplinary case in order to protect the rights of Belarusian athlete Kristina Timanovskaya and to hold the sports official accountable for violating the athlete's rights before the Athletics Integrity Unit (AIU) and the Disciplinary Tribunal of the International Athletics Federation. The Disciplinary Tribunal found Yuri Moisevich in breach of the standards of conduct outlined in the Code of Conduct, as his actions were deemed to be "a clear violation of the athlete's dignity and an abuse of [...] power." AIU’s Chairman David Howman stated, “This decision signifies a significant step forward for athlete rights in athletics and serves as a clear indication that the AIU will do everything in its power to safeguard those rights and the fundamental values of the sport.” The National Anti-Crisis Management underscores the importance of concluding the disciplinary proceedings and issuing a specific disciplinary decision. NAM has provided assistance in matters concerning the evacuation of Kristina Timanovskaya from Tokyo, her legalization in Poland, and subsequent legal support before international sports authorities. Pavel Latushka, the Head of NAM and deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet, commented: “Despite the fact that the case to protect the rights of athlete Kristina Timanovskaya has been ongoing since 2021, the International Athletics Federation has reached a decision to suspend Yuri Moisevich for a period of five years, which means that justice is inevitable.” As we approach the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris, I would like to once again draw the attention of the international sports community to the widespread repression against civil society in Belarus. Among the 1,400 political prisoners languishing in the dungeons of the Lukashenko regime, there are approximately 30 Belarusian athletes and sports professionals who are subjected to constant torture. Under such circumstances, I consider the participation of regime-affiliated athletes in the 2024 Olympics to be unacceptable."

Pavel Latushka, deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, ambassador Lukashenko said that he will run for election in 2025. He asked his propagandists to tell us so. And at the same time he accused us of it. They say that if we keep "pushing" him, he will go even faster. My answer to that is that we will. And he will run. But not for the elections. We will do everything to put Lukashenko on the international criminal wanted list and bring him to justice. For war crimes for the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children. For crimes against humanity against Belarusian men and women. We will continue to seek new sanctions. We will continue the process of harmonizing anti-war sanctions. We will continue to build and strengthen our alternative authorities, to prepare our personnel reserve. We will continue to involve acting officials, those who have not stained themselves with crimes and know that even in the situation of no-choice elections Belarus has a choice. A choice of values, civilisation, and Europe. This is the choice that really faces us, Belarusans. And Belarusians will be able to make it, because Belarusians will always agree with Belarusians. Without Lukashenko. Yes, the system is not stable and not ready for his leaving. It is monolithic only as long as there is a "monolith" in its center. But the monolith made of Lukashenko, an old and sick dictator, is like a child's sand dolly. The system is trying to invent some schemes, some superstructures, "collective Lukashenko" in the form of the National Assembly or the Security Council, is trying to rewrite the Constitution in case the sandy "monolith" suddenly crumbles. And it is sure to crumble. And all these artificial solutions, all these "crutches" that the system puts under itself will not work. It will fall with it. And we will help it. And no matter how Lukashenko tries to deprive Belarusians of choice — we have a choice. We will finish what we started in 2020.

1. The role of Belarus in war crimes and the kidnapping of Ukrainian children? When we speak about the role of Belarus in the war crime of unlawful displacement of the Ukrainian children we speak about the role of Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his accomplices. As the findings of the National Anti-Crisis Management show, the decision to bring the children – among them are orphans and children from other vulnerable groups – to Belarus was explicitly agreed upon by Aliaksandr Lukashenka and Russian President Vladimir Putin.On the day when the National Anti-Crisis Management submitted the first Communication to the ICC, Aliaksandr Lukashenka publicly declared his key role in these displacements. He literally said: I contacted Putin and asked: ‘Listen, let's spend a part of the Union budget on those kids.’ That's how they started bringing them in'. Later he also confirmed this publicly, I quote: 'we agreed with Putin that we would finance these trips from the Union State budget. We did and will do this, regardless of any reproaches'. The transfers were implemented by Aliaksei Talai, a Belarusian Paralympic athlete known as a confidant of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, and his Talai Foundation, in cooperation with Olga Volkova and her Donetsk-based organization “Dolphins”, as well as the local Russian occupation authorities. Additionally, Belarus’s largest potash fertilizer producer, Belaruskali, and its Director General, Ivan Halavaty, have been involved in the displacements, as he ordered to host the children in the Dubrava Camp, located in the Minsk Region and belonging to Belaruskali. We documented that since August 2021, several groups of children, including orphans, have periodically been transferred from the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus, with some of the children taken to Russia and appearing in a publicly available Russian adoption database. However, since September 2022, a systematic campaign to bring Ukrainian children to the Belarusian Dubrava Camp was initiated. In the period between September 2022 and May 2023, about 2.100 children aged 6 to 15 years, including orphans and children from other vulnerable groups from at least 15 Ukrainian towns under Russian occupation, were brought to the Dubrava Camp, allegedly for “rehabilitation”. The children were subjected to pro-regime and anti-Ukrainian re-education aimed at erasing their Ukrainian identity. This included meetings with Russian and Belarusian State representatives, pro-regime artists, representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, and paramilitary patriotic organizations. For instance, in October 2022, a Belarusian duo, the Gruzdev Sisters, expressed their desire that “Biden dies, God forgive us, Zelensky dies, too, and that Putin prospers and takes control of all of Ukraine.” Thus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka and persons subordinate to him have organized and are implementing a large-scale program of illegal displacement of minors from Ukraine to Belarus. 2. What can be done to keep Lukashenko to account? What would be the best route, in your opinion, to pursue accountability? Transfers of the Ukrainian children to Belarus amount to the war crime of unlawful deportation or transfer under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. Aliaksandr Lukashenka is individually criminally responsible, not only for directly committing this crime but also for his involvement with others under Article 25 of the Rome Statute and based on superior responsibility under Article 28 of the Rome Statute. To address these serious allegations, the National Anti-Crisis Management submitted an Article 15 Communication in June and a complementary submission in November 2023 to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. It is necessary to conduct further documentation of these crimes, using all available practices. This is what the National Anti-Crisis Management does. Having certain capabilities and expertise in Belarus, we are trying to complement the work of international mechanisms and law enforcement in Ukraine. We believe it is important to simultaneously actively advocate for the accountability of those responsible for these war crimes, primarily Aliaksandr Lukashenka, in order to give greater relevance to these crimes in the eyes of the international community and the International Criminal Court. 3. With your experience of working both on the events in Belarus in 2020 and now the war in Ukraine, what are the biggest problems that you see in the current international mechanisms? In what ways can they be improved? I must start with the fact that these two contexts are very different in nature, in the attention of the international community, and in the capabilities that Ukraine has in comparison with Belarusian democratic civil society. Therefore, the vector of problems that need to be solved is very different, although there are certainly common things. I cannot assess the capabilities of our Ukrainian colleagues, but I regret to state that our civil society was not ready to confront the scale and nature of the crimes that have been occurring in Belarus since May 2020. We were faced from the outset with a lack of personnel who could adequately lead the accountability strategy for core international crimes in the Belarusian context. Belarusian civil society was not represented in the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, one of the key platforms for civil society to promote ideas of accountability before the ICC. The sphere of international criminal law turned out to be simply an undeveloped area of law in Belarus. We had to learn everything on the fly, we attracted Belarusian experts who worked abroad as well as our foreign colleagues in order to build our strategy for achieving justice and implement it properly. So, to achieve justice in Belarus, we were forced to start from the basics, we needed appropriate personnel and the creation of organizations that could solve these challenges. We need investments in this sphere. Secondly, to work in new contexts, the ICC needs an appropriate budget and the formation of a sufficient number of personnel staff. Finally, I would like to note, that we must honestly say that international criminal justice has problems relating to the politicization of specific processes. In order to begin an investigation into the Belarusian situation, it is necessary to use mechanisms (Article 14 of the Rome Statute, for example), which in practice largely depend on political conditions rather than the interests of justice.

The commission includes representatives of the Ministry of Sport, the National Olympic and Paralympic Committees of Poland, the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and the National Anti-Crisis Management. It is planned that the commission will meet once a month. At the first meeting of the commission chaired by the First Deputy Minister of Sport and Tourism of Poland Ireneusz Ras and with the participation of the Deputy Head of the Cabinet Pavel Latushka, the issues of supporting Belarusian dissident athletes were raised. They discussed: cooperation on possible admission of Belarusian dissident athletes in athletics and biathlon to the qualification competitions of the 2024 Olympics and the 2026 Olympics. possibilities of financial and technical support of Belarusian athletes in the training process at the expense of scholarships of the Ministry and Olympic Solidarity in Poland. issues of verification of Belarusian athletes in accordance with the recommendations of the International Olympic Committee to exclude the possibility of participation of Lukashenko's officials and pro-regime athletes in international competitions, first of all in the Olympics-2024 in Paris. Chairman of the National Paralympic Committee of Poland Lukasz Szeliga expressed readiness to assist the Belarusian Paralympians, who suffered from repression, and to promote the issue of bringing Aleksei Talai to responsibility within the framework of sports law for participation in a war crime and damaging the reputation of the Olympic movement. The Commission is open to suggestions from Belarusian athletes and sports professionals who have faced discrimination or have relevant information. You can send suggestions to the NAM chatbot: @nau_by_bot

All those mentioned in the NAM communication to the ICC as persons involved in the illegal transfer of children from the occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus have been placed on the EU and US sanctions lists Today the European Union published a 13th package of sanctions against Russia. The EU sanctions include the NGO "Dolphins," Aleksei Talai Foundation, as well as the leaders of these organisations - Olga Volkova and Aleksei Talai, and Dmitri Shevtsov - general secretary of the Belarusian Red Cross Society, as well as Dmitri Demidov - chairman of Navapolatsk City Executive Committee. Recall that in June 2022, Belaruskali CEO Ivan Golovatii fell under the EU sanctions. Aleksei Talai, as well as State Secretary of the Union State of Belarus and Russia Dmitri Mezentsev, is now also under U.S. sanctions. The imposition of sanctions actually fixes the unlawfulness of the transfer of children from the occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus, while we, in turn, continue to seek an ICC warrant. Lukashenko is not on this sanctions list only because something more is being prepared for him. The EU has also adopted blocking restrictions against Lukashenko's military-industrial complex: JSC Peleng, JSC "2566 plant for repair of radio-electronic weapons" and director of this enterprise Valery Shatilo, JSC "Orsha Aircraft Repair Plant" and director of this plant Pavel Sluchak are under sanctions. Earlier, we sent our European partners proposals on a number of Belarusian military-industrial complex enterprises, which work for the needs of the Russian army, with justifications for imposing restrictions. Among them, for example, was Orsha Aircraft Repair Plant, which is now included in the 13 EU sanctions package against Russia, as well as 558 Aircraft Repair Plant in Baranavichy, which, like its director Pavel Pinigin, is now under U.S. sanctions. Unfortunately, these sanctions do not include a complete ban or restriction on the transit of sanctioned goods through Belarus and Russia, nor do they include significant financial and sectoral sanctions, which are the most effective among other sanctions instruments. Thus, we have repeatedly informed our European partners about the need to harmonize trade sanctions against Russia and the Lukashenko regime, as the difference in these restrictions allows both regimes, both in Minsk and Moscow, to successfully evade the adopted sanctions measures. Lukashenko's regime is 12 times less restricted than Russia's, making it a huge window for the Kremlin to evade sanctions. We gave examples of such evasion in our mini-investigation "What do EU statistics reveal or what is the purpose of sanctions harmonization?". Another problem is "false" transit. For example, in 2022-2023, goods worth more than 10 billion euros passed through Belarus to Russia. Examples of "false" transit to Russia with the help of intermediaries from Belarus and Kazakhstan were uncovered in a joint investigation by "The Bureau", "Verstka" and the international Centre for Corruption and Organised Crime Research (OCCRP). In order to stop circumventing sanctions through third countries, transit through Belarus and Russia to third countries should be either completely stopped (at least for critical goods for the military-industrial complex) or restricted through trade quotas.