Pavel Pavlovich Latushko: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management Pavel Latushka on the Introduction of the EU’s 18th Sanctions Package “The EU just approved one of its strongest sanctions packages against Russia to date,” said Kaja Kallas , head of the European External Action Service, today. The new sanctions will target 105 vessels of the so-called “shadow fleet".  Additional restrictions will affect the Nord Stream infrastructure and banks involved in circumventing sanctions. The  price cap on Russian oil will be lowered from $60 to $47.6 per barrel, and this cap will be reviewed every six months to adapt to market conditions. The package also introduces further harmonization of sanctions between those imposed on the Lukashenko regime and on Russia. The previous ban on specialized financial messaging services (such as SWIFT) has been replaced by a full transaction ban , including the closure of correspondent accounts. An embargo on the import of weapons from Belarus has also been introduced. “The United Transitional Cabinet and the National Anti-Crisis Management have long pointed out that the Belarusian banking system is involved in circumventing sanctions.  We have emphasized that simply disconnecting banks from SWIFT is not enough—correspondent accounts of Belarusian banks facilitating aggression must be closed. Our position has been heard by the EU. These measures are included in the new sanctions package. The 18th sanctions package aims to reduce the revenues of the Russian budget, which will affect the capacity to export Belarusian goods to the Russian market and limit the Lukashenko regime’s ability to rely on financial support to continue its internal repressive and external aggressive policies.  Belarusian financial institutions that facilitate sanctions evasion and aggression are now also subject to EU sanctions. Europe has not forgotten the Lukashenko regime’s complicity in the aggression against Ukraine.  The 18th package of sanctions against Russia has added several enterprises from Belarus' military-industrial complex to the list of sanctioned entities. As a member of the United Transitional Cabinet, I express my gratitude to the European Union for its consistency and principled stance. The dictators’ hopes for Europe’s weakness have failed—Europe is demonstrating strength. It is crucial to continue increasing the pressure, using mechanisms that effectively target the financial and military machinery of dictatorial regimes,"  commented Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, on the EU’s adoption of the 18th sanctions package.

Theses of the speech by the Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Pavel Latushka , at the opening of the exhibition "Fragments" , an event marking the third anniversary of the Free Belarus Museum Dear friends, Ms. Jetske Klein, Dear Belarusians, Our Polish and European partners, Representatives of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,Representatives of the Embassy of Canada, Director of the National Centre for Culture, Heads and representatives of Polish institutions, Mr. Maciej Radziwiłł, It is my great pleasure to welcome you today to the space of the Free Belarus Museum—a project of the National Anti-Crisis Management. What began as an idea has, in just three years, become an institution with a clear mission and a distinct role in society. The Free Belarus Museum preserves and exhibits what often remains invisible yet is vitally important to Belarusians: personal belongings, documents, artistic gestures, materials from the streets, from demonstrations and marches, from prisons, and from the daily life of Belarusians since 2020. It tells the stories of heroes — political prisoners and of Belarusian heroes defending European security in Ukraine. The museum has become a place where the largest movement of Belarusians for freedom in modern history is not only documented—it continues to live. It is a space that unites Belarusians in exile and carries the truth about Belarus to Europe and to the entire world. To preserve this history today is not a right, but a duty—to the people and to their future. The work of the Museum refutes a widespread but mistaken notion—that Belarusians lack the character or the will to fight for freedom. Our history proves otherwise—a shared history that is part of the European heritage: from the times of the Principality of Polotsk, through the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Belarusian People’s Republic, both World Wars, the struggles for an independent Republic of Belarus, and today’s fight for its liberation. The Museum of Free Belarus ensures that we do not forget the sacrifices that have been made, and reminds us all: as long as memory lives, Belarus lives. Belarus lives and continues to fight. In my life, I have had the opportunity to open several museums: the Nesvizh Palace complex (the former residence of the Radziwiłł family), Mir Castle, the National Centre for Contemporary Art, and I have fought for the creation of the Vasyl Bykau Museum near Minsk, among many others. But this museum—Free Belarus Museum—holds a special significance for me, as someone who is both a witness to and a participant in these events. Every Belarusian man and woman who fights for freedom in Belarus has the right to consider this museum their own. We are deeply grateful to the City of Warsaw for supporting this project, as well as for providing the space where the museum was created and continues to develop. We also extend our thanks to the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Poland. Without your assistance, this museum and its mission would not have been possible. We also express our personal gratitude to the patron and great friend of the Museum, Mr. Maciej Radziwiłł, and his ‘Three Trumpets’ Foundation for many years of support not only to this institution but to Belarusian culture as a whole. Together, we preserve memory. Together, we fight for freedom. And together, we will prevail. Long live Belarus!

Pavel Latushka, Warsaw 2025. Photo: NAU‑media Original article : reform.news The release of Siarhei Tsikhanouski  has intensified the discussion about the possible change of strategy for the democratic forces. Reform.news turned to Pavel Latushka , Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of the National Anti‑Crisis Management , with a request to share his assessment of the proposed steps. — How do you assess Valery Kavaleuski's words about the need to abandon pressure on the Lukashenko regime and strive for the release of political prisoners? — I would like to start with a basic thesis — sanctions and pressure are not the goal, but the means. If there are no sanctions and pressure, there is no point for Lukashenko to start any negotiations or take any actions at all. As one of the participants in previous negotiations in 2015, I remember that the regime’s primary interest was lifting sanctions, while the EU conditioned that on the release of all political prisoners and liberalization of internal policy. The aim of the current sanctions (as reflected in the EU’s own decisions to impose them) is to change the regime's internal repressive and external aggressive policy. Only communication under pressure on the regime can yield results. This is not theory — it’s practice that I have personally witnessed. Lukashenko has no incentive to enter negotiations without pressure. And contacts with the regime in our situation, if we abandon pressure, are simply a call for capitulation. To shut up, tuck tails, sit on hind legs, raise hands and say: "We surrender, we agree with the continuation of state terror policy". Maybe someone agrees with that. I do not. — What do you see as the reason for the releases of political prisoners " by batches "  over the past year? — Lukashenko counted on gaining results in his interests through small concessions — lifting sanctions and regaining legitimacy. I assume that if he expects a serious response from the EU and the US, he must make a serious gesture. This is not my subjective position but that of the EU and the US, repeatedly voiced in meetings with them. — To what extent can democratic forces influence the actions of Western democracies toward the Lukashenko regime — visits, contacts, imposition or lifting of sanctions, appointment of ambassadors, and so on? — The general policy of the EU, as well as the US, is developed independently but taking our opinion into account. For this, relevant instruments have been created — a consultative group "Belarusian democratic forces — EU", strategic dialog with the UK, Canada, and the US. The Coordination Council has its official delegation in PACE, etc. External subjectivity of the democratic forces is rather high. But there are countries that do not share the general EU position. We have influence, but final decisions in any case lie with the partners. As for the US, before and during visits there was constant communication. The American side is fully aware of the position of the democratic forces. — Kavaleuski believes that softening rhetoric and active diplomacy led to prisoner releases over the past year while ultimatums and pressure are counterproductive, and emphasizing the role of democratic forces in exerting pressure is harmful to freeing political prisoners. What do you think about that? — We have a common strategic goal — an independent, free, democratic Belarus with no place for repression and political prisoners. It was not softening of rhetoric that led to releases over the last year (how was that expressed?), but significant changes in economic and foreign policy situations. Now the economic situation has changed in external markets and within Belarus itself. Sanctions have become more tangible for the regime. If after the 2020 events and immediately after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin largely compensated Lukashenko for his losses from sanctions, this past year it has become much harder for Russia to do so. Over the past few years, the total volume of sanctions against the Lukashenko regime has significantly increased, and bypassing them has become more complicated. Trading restrictions against Russia and Lukashenko’s regime have been harmonized almost 90%. And we see how sanctions reflect in economic statistics. Instead of artificially created economic growth driven by military orders, we now observe its gradual slowdown. Month by month, the deficit in foreign trade is growing. For goods it has already exceeded $2.6 billion; together with services it reached nearly $1 billion. The growing current account deficit means currency flows into the country are drying up, capital is leaving. All this creates real problems for the regime. Yes, the effect of sanctions could have been felt much sooner, and we shouldn’t have waited five years. We told our partners that sanctions should be large-scale and swift, literally knocking them off their feet, but that would have hit businesses and economies of the countries imposing them. So our partners seemingly chose a different strategy: gradual, consistent sanctions that allowed their businesses and economies to adapt. But at the same time the constant threat of increased sanctions would compel dictators to restrain further escalation. Unfortunately, this also gave the Lukashenko regime and the Kremlin time to adapt to restrictions. However, that adaptation too has limits, especially as the total volume of sanctions kept increasing. Now ignoring it, hiding problems behind false statistics is almost impossible. It’s time to start making concessions. I would like to remind that in 2020 the EU and US were ready to dialogue with Lukashenko, but he chose to refuse dialogue and chose maximum brutality. Now maximum levels of sanctions and the threat of criminal prosecution are in place, and now he is entering contacts and cosmetic steps. Let us not forget that sanctions were imposed on various grounds: for election falsification, human rights violations, migration war, hijacking of an airplane, and aggression. So there will be different grounds for their lifting. Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions, and I would ask not to simplify this question to a narrative of “they lift sanctions, he releases all.” There are still very clear demands on the regime formulated by the international community. As for contacts with the US, Lukashenko managed to start contacts when the US began open contacts with Russia. Thus the foreign policy situation changed. I would also note that the United Transitional Cabinet , including the National Anti‑Crisis Management , is not trying to score political points on such a sensitive topic as political prisoners, but some of our partners within democratic forces are trying to publicly rack up political capital on it. We are cautious in assessments and certainly do not hijack the spotlight. You cannot hide behind nice words about the fate of political prisoners, trying to argue that for the Cabinet it is not a priority. The thesis "if you don’t share my strategy, it means you don’t want political prisoners freed" is manipulative. — And yet, do you see anything rational in the proposals to change the strategy of the democratic forces? — Some representatives of the older generation of the opposition actually state that their interests coincide with Lukashenko’s and essentially propose following the path of the so‑called "Azerbaijanization" of Belarus — where human rights, repression, and a normal political process are simply not mentioned. In response to this thesis I would note that it resembles the "Makeevization of foreign policy" of Belarus, which was formed in 2015. Its main thesis: only Lukashenko is the guarantor of Belarus’s independence from Moscow. Then I ask: if tomorrow there is no Lukashenko, who will guarantee independence? Only the Belarusian people striving for an independent, free democratic Belarus can be the guarantor. It is easiest today for some politicians to stand next to Lukashenko and give him a crutch so he will not stumble. For a politician it is much harder to work with society and motivate it to defend the interests of the country. Simultaneously loud are the voices proposing the "new" strategy — "release of political prisoners". There is nothing new here. This demand and position have been voiced by the main structures of the democratic forces since 2020 and has never changed. The only thing different in the "new" strategy is the absence of the word "release all political prisoners". Much is said about diplomacy, and I, as a professional diplomat with the rank of Ambassador, having conducted a huge number of negotiations in my life, can say — it is wrong to give up your position before negotiations, trying to guess the expectations of the opposite side. Another point of the "new" strategy is "de‑isolation".  What’s new about this position? The theses of de‑isolation of Belarusians, their mobility, have sounded at meetings, speeches by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, representatives of the Cabinet, and the Coordination Council. The Coordination Council in 2024 adopted a resolution on simplifying visa regimes and improving cross‑border movement for Belarusians. If, however, we talk about de‑isolation of regime representatives, then it is again an attempt to meet the expectations of the opposite side? The alleged "new" strategy thesis — "restoration of a full‑value civil process" — so that the desire to participate in the country’s development ceases to be dangerous and punishable. An absolutely logical position already voiced by both the United Transitional Cabinet  and the Coordination Council . What’s the novelty? The main question is how to ensure these conditions are met, these goals achieved. Let us acknowledge that now, the ball is not on the side of the Cabinet or the Coordination Council, but on Lukashenko and his regime. It’s not that we are not ready to talk, but they are afraid to lose the ball and continue to play with the fates of people and the country on their half of the field.

A. Lukashenko at the “Mound of Glory” memorial complex on July 3, 2025. Source: president.gov.by Peace, freedom, and independence are the greatest values that must be cherished and protected. This is what Lukashenko declared on July 3 during a ceremony at the “Mound of Glory” memorial complex. But if we take a closer look, he has failed to defend a single one of these values. The remnants of freedom were trampled by the boots of his enforcers in 2020, peace was buried when he agreed to allow Russian troops to enter Ukraine, and as for the last of these values, independence, we will examine it in more detail. Today, as the dictator celebrates "independence", I suggest we talk not about dates and holidays, but about the real independence of our country. To do this, let’s compare Belarus with Azerbaijan — a country which, despite its authoritarian regime, conducts an independent policy. Belarus and Russia: Complete Dependence Under Lukashenko, Belarus is the most loyal ally of the Kremlin among all former Soviet republics. Russian troops are stationed on our territory — from military bases to missile systems. Our budget, economy, and energy supply depend on Russian subsidies and loans. In just the past couple of years, Moscow has forgiven or postponed billions in Minsk’s debt. In politics, Lukashenko practically mirrors Moscow’s course — whether it’s domestic repression or participation in aggressive actions against Ukraine. Any movement toward autonomy is harshly suppressed: freedom of speech is blocked, independent media have been destroyed, and anyone opposing Russia is labeled an enemy of the regime. Real independence? Nowhere in sight. Azerbaijan and Russia: A Struggle for Sovereignty V. Putin and I. Aliyev Photo: Kremlin.ru Azerbaijan is also not a democracy. It is a strict autocracy. But there is one important distinction—Baku pursues an independent foreign policy. What happened in recent months? Russian air defenses shot down an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft that crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan on December 24, 2024. Russian authorities refused to offer proper apologies or hold those responsible accountable, instead attempting to obstruct the investigation and cover up the truth. In response, Azerbaijan shut down the Russian media outlet Sputnik — Moscow’s largest propaganda tool. Offices of Rossotrudnichestvo,  Russia’s key soft power institution, were closed. Azerbaijan accused the FSB of torturing and detaining Azerbaijani citizens on Russian territory. This amounts to an open conflict between the two countries. In the military sphere, Baku has turned away from traditional Russian weapons, opting to purchase modern air defense systems and armaments from Israel, Turkey, and other countries, thus reducing its dependence on the Kremlin. For the first time in years, we are seeing open confrontation between Russia and a former ally that is asserting its sovereignty and demanding respect. What Does This Mean? Azerbaijan is a dictatorship, yes. But it is a dictatorship that is not afraid to say "no" to the Kremlin when doing so is in its national interest. Belarus is a dictatorship entirely dependent on Russia and unable to take even symbolic steps toward independence. Lukashenko lacks both the resources and the will to pursue an autonomous policy: Belarus’s economy and security depend on Russia, which means decisions are made there — in the Kremlin. Political and Military Consequences Belarus is a Russian military base used for the invasion of Ukraine. Azerbaijan is a country that opposes Russian interests in the region and builds alliances with Turkey and the West. This is a key difference — one that highlights the level of real independence. National Language as a Pillar of Sovereignty and Identity In Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani language has not only been preserved but actively developed: it is the language of education, culture, official documents, and daily communication. The President speaks his native language fluently, showing respect for national tradition and strengthening the connection between the government and the people. This is more than symbolism — the language unites society, fosters pride, and builds cohesion, which is especially vital amid global challenges. Azerbaijan, despite its complex geopolitical history, has built a language policy that emphasizes its sovereignty and cultural distinctiveness. In contrast, under the Lukashenko regime, the Belarusian language has been sidelined. Although officially recognized as a state language, it is in reality marginalized from public life: in schools, media, and government institutions, Russian dominates, while Belarusian is often portrayed as “rural” or secondary. Lukashenko himself, who presents himself as a defender of independence, does not speak Belarusian and uses only Russian in public, highlighting his disconnection from national roots. This policy not only weakens cultural identity but also undermines the proclaimed independence: a country in which its native language is marginalized, and the leader ignores it, loses a vital part of its sovereignty. Lukashenko’s illusion of "stability" is built on cultural assimilation, not on the strengthening of national spirit, making his version of independence fragile and subject to external influence. Conclusion Azerbaijan is an autocracy, but one that controls its foreign policy and does not allow the Kremlin to dictate terms. Belarus is a regime that does not even pretend to be independent. It is a Kremlin satellite, entirely subject to its will. What Does This Mean for Belarus? A. Lukashenko and V. Putin. Photo: Getty Images True independence is impossible without an autonomous policy, without the native language, without control over the economy, and without limiting the influence of neighboring powers over our country. As long as Lukashenko is in power, Belarus will remain a vassal, a tool for the Kremlin’s geopolitical ambitions. Azerbaijan has shown that even under dictatorship, it is possible to play one’s own game — the question is one of will and strategy. We do not see a celebration of real independence in Belarus today. Today is a time to reflect on why we are trailing even Azerbaijan when it comes to the freedom to choose our own path of development. Domestic Politics Azerbaijan cannot today serve as a model for the democratic movement in Belarus, but its independent foreign policy toward Russia certainly does not serve as a model for the autocrat and Kremlin vassal Lukashenko either. The views expressed in this material should not necessarily be interpreted as the official position of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus.

On July 3, 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union issued a decision in the case of “Grodno Azot” (C-610/23), concerning the appeal by “Grodno Azot” and the Khimvolokno plant against the Council of the EU (T-117/22), related to EU sanctions imposed on OJSC “Grodno Azot” and its Khimvolokno plant. Pavel Latushka commented on the decision as follows: “Grodno Azot” is not just an industrial giant — it is, unfortunately, a financial lifeline for the repression against the Belarusian people. Revenue from its operations is also used to fund punitive structures and new prison cells for political prisoners. Lukashenko likes to blackmail the West with so-called labor collectives — claiming that sanctions hurt ordinary workers. But let’s be honest: who really profits from these enterprises? The regime’s oligarchs and security elites. Meanwhile, people in Grodno or Novopolotsk work without decent wages, stripped of basic rights and prospects. Today’s decision by the EU Court shows: there will be no support or legitimization of Lukashenko’s dictatorship. The economy of repression must remain under sanctions until all political prisoners in Belarus are freed, torture is ended, and the people gain the right to choose their government” . It is worth recalling that since 2020, and even earlier, the EU has repeatedly imposed sanctions against the Lukashenko regime due to the suppression of democracy, rule of law, and human rights violations. In accordance with the Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2021/2125 (implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP) and the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2124 (implementing Regulation (EU) No 765/2006), the EU froze funds and economic resources of individuals and entities responsible for repression or supporting the Lukashenko regime. Among them were the mentioned enterprises. These companies had previously attempted to overturn the sanctions but failed. The Court found that they indeed provided financial support to the Lukashenko regime in the form of dividend payments. In the new appellate proceedings, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the sanctions were imposed merely due to the companies’ state ownership rather than for supporting the Lukashenko regime. The Court also rightly noted that the main objective of the sanctions is to increase pressure on the Lukashenko regime to end the serious and ongoing violations of human rights, the suppression of democracy and rule of law, and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Belarus. As a result, the EU Court dismissed the appeal by OJSC “Grodno Azot” and the Khimvolokno plant, upheld the sanctions against them, and ordered them to reimburse the costs incurred by the EU Council. “This EU Court decision is not just a legal formality — it is a clear and unequivocal signal: financial support for repression will have consequences. The rejection of Grodno Azot’s appeal once again underlines the EU’s determination to use economic levers to defend human rights and democracy in Belarus. This is not just the freezing of cooperation — it is the freezing of illusions of impunity, and a vivid confirmation that the international community continues to stand with the Belarusian people in their pursuit of freedom and justice. The Lukashenko regime is driving itself into deeper financial isolation, and its actions in suppressing citizens’ rights are resulting in increasingly significant losses” , noted Pavel Latushka .

Cooperation with the democratic forces of Belarus, the situation on the Belarusian-Polish border, and the release of political prisoners were the key topics discussed during the meeting between Pavel Latushka , Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of the People’s Anti-Crisis Administration, and Grzegorz Schetyna , Chairman of the Parliamentary Group of the Sejm and Senate of Poland "For a Free Belarus", held at 11:00 in the Senate of Poland. During the meeting, the following points were discussed: Issues of further cooperation with the Coordination Council  as a representative body of Belarusian society; The possibility of holding a meeting between the "For a Free Belarus" group and members of the Coordination Council ; Participation of Coordination Council  representatives in an international meeting of MPs from parliamentary groups cooperating with democratic Belarus, to be held in October in Paris . Grzegorz Schetyna  confirmed his willingness and readiness to participate in this meeting as the head of the parliamentary group of the Polish Sejm and Senate "For a Free Belarus". The meeting also addressed issues related to further steps aimed at the release of political prisoners in Belarus , as well as the potential release of one of the leaders of the Polish minority in Belarus, Andrzej Poczobut . In light of the growing tensions on the Belarusian-Polish border , Latushka  appealed to Grzegorz Schetyna , head of the parliamentary group, to ensure that any possible restrictions announced yesterday by the Polish government  do not apply to the passenger movement of Belarusian citizens . Latushka  emphasized the importance of maintaining mobility for Belarusians when visiting EU member states. A special focus during the meeting was placed on the extraterritorial crimes committed by representatives of the Lukashenko regime  against members of democratic institutions and initiatives operating on the territory of Poland , and the importance of an international legal response  to these crimes by Lukashenko . Pavel Latushka  noted that the Lukashenko regime  has intensified its information war and pressure campaign  against democratic institutions and activists in the run-up to the fifth anniversary of the 2020 protests , once again highlighting the importance of the existing institutions and civil initiatives  working to change the situation in the country.

A. Lukashenko and V. Putin. Source: minval.az Theses of the speech by Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, at the College of Europe Dear friends, ladies and gentlemen, The purpose of my speech today is to raise the issue of serious security challenges in Europe, which are emerging right on the borders of the European Union. These challenges come from the Lukashenko regime, which acts as a systematic and willing ally of Putin’s Russia. Many still believe that Lukashenko is a “hostage of the Kremlin,” that he acts under pressure. This is a dangerous misconception . It not only falsifies the reality but also prevents a proper assessment of the risks, paving the way for repeating past mistakes. The facts gathered and analyzed by the analytical team of the National Anti-Crisis Management in their reports clearly show: Lukashenko is not a victim. He is a full-acting, deliberate partner and active accomplice in the Kremlin’s aggression, voluntarily providing Belarusian territory and resources for the war. “The Union State”: A Tool of Imperial Policy, Not an Equal Partnership of Sovereign Nations First of all, it is important to understand the true nature of the so-called "Union State." It is not an equal partnership between two sovereign countries.  The analytical team of the National Anti-Crisis Management prepared a report titled “The Union State as a tool to cover up Russia's imperial policy” , which clearly outlines that this project is only a facade — a legal cover for Russia’s imperial strategy.  Its true goal is the de facto absorption of Belarus and the erosion of its sovereignty and independence. It was Lukashenko himself — the author  and driving force behind the idea of creating the Union State — who deliberately drew Belarus into this dependency. The timeline of integration reflects this trend, initiated by him from his earliest years in power: In 1995,  Lukashenko initiated a referendum, one of the questions of which was: “Do you support the actions of the President of the Republic of Belarus aimed at economic integration with the Russian Federation?”  This showed his early and active orientation toward Russia. In 1996 , the Treaty on the Establishment of the Community of Belarus and Russia was signed.–  In 1997, the Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia was adopted. On December 8, 1999 , was an important step when the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State was signed, legally formalising the project. In the following years, active work began to form joint governing bodies and deeply unify legislation across various sectors—from the economy and social policy to defense and security. A new, more intensive stage of integration began with the signing of 28 Union Programs on November 4, 2021 . These programs consolidated the close integration of the economies, tax systems, and customs services. In the same period, in November 2021, the Supreme State Council of the Union State approved a new Military Doctrine , which legally prepared the ground for aggressive actions and the use of the Belarusian territory for military purposes. Lukashenko actively facilitated the transformation of this project into a tool for dismantling Belarusian sovereignty , step by step giving up national interests under Kremlin control in exchange for preserving his personal power. And now we see that the Lukashenko regime has become a tool of aggression . It was also from Belarus that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine started in February 2022. Since 2022, under Lukashenko's leadership, Belarus has been undergoing a deep and deliberate transformation. The goal of these changes is to prepare the country for possible full participation in the war on the side of the Russian Federation.  This is not a hypothesis. This is not a conspiracy theory. It is a systematic militarization of all key sectors of Belarusian society — from the legal system and armed forces to the economy, infrastructure, and even the education system. Let me present the reality of the situation based on our analyses. The role of the Union State in the war The military doctrine of the Union State, signed by Lukashenko and Putin on 4 November 2021, spelled out in more detail the system of functioning of the Regional Grouping of Troops (Forces). A month after the adoption of the Military Doctrine of the Union State, in December 2021, Putin and Lukashenko decided to hold a joint exercise "Union Resolve -2022". The exercise was scheduled to end on 20 February. However, Putin and Lukashenko decided to continue testing the reaction forces within the framework of the exercise "Union Resolve – 2022”. This was reported in the Belarusian Defence Ministry: "In connection with the growing military activity near the external borders of the Union State and the escalation of the situation in Donbas, the Presidents of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation have decided to continue testing the reaction forces of the Union State". Thus, it was under the cover of these exercises that the Russian attack group was deployed in Belarus, and 4 days after the end of the exercises, the invasion of Ukraine from the territory of Belarus took place. Despite the fact that Putin and Lukashenko's plans to "seize Kyiv in 3 days" failed, they did not give up the main goal — the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and inclusion of its territories into the Union State in the future.  Lukashenko's further actions of complicity in the aggression against Ukraine were implemented within the framework of the military doctrine of the Union State. Belarus' transfer of military equipment and ammunition to Russia, training of Russian mobilized personnel on the territory of Belarus, and expansion of cooperation in the sphere of the military-industrial complex with Russia's allies also took place within the framework of contacts within the Union State. Special Tribunal and War Crimes Here, it’s important to highlight some recent and very significant developments that are the result of our consistent work. The adoption of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine on June 25, 2025 means that an official indictment will be prepared against the Belarusian dictator for committing the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The main thing is that this Tribunal will not recognize Lukashenko’s “functional immunity”  — and that’s a real achievement. The Tribunal will follow international law, and the National Anti-Crisis Management worked hard to ensure that it includes jurisdiction over Lukashenko. At the April session of PACE, following my initiative, an amendment was included in the PACE resolution that provides for the need to extend the jurisdiction  of the Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine to cover the relevant actions of the highest military and political leadership of the Lukashenko regime. It’s also important that the Statute of the Tribunal makes a direct reference to UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 . This means the Tribunal is required to use it when deciding what counts as an act of aggression. Lukashenko’s actions — allowing Belarusian territory to be used for Russia’s attack on Ukraine — clearly fall under the definition of aggression in Article 3 of that Resolution. In addition, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recently recognized not only Lukashenko’s role in the aggression, but also his direct responsibility for a war crime — the deportation of Ukrainian children. At my initiative,  as a member of the Belarusian Coordination Council and a delegate to PACE, an important addition was included in the Assembly’s final resolution.  It addresses Lukashenko’s responsibility for the transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus and, through its territory, to Russia. This addition was based on evidence collected by the National Anti-Crisis Management and presented by us to PACE. We are working consistently to bring accountability for the illegal relocation of thousands of Ukrainian children  — and these efforts are already showing results at the international level. We would like to see the Lukashenko regime held accountable for its crimes, and that is a critically important part of our strategy. Systematic Preparation for War: A Fact-Based Analysis Today, in 2025, the Lukashenko regime continues to deepen its systematic preparation for war. The scale and details of this preparation have been studied and presented in the second analytical report by the National Anti-Crisis Management, titled “Systematic Preparation by the Lukashenko Regime for Possible Entry into the War on Russia’s Side and Recommendations for Preventing This Scenario” At the end of April 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed concern over Russia’s activities in Belarus. He stated that, under the pretext of military exercises, Russia may be preparing offensive operations while concealing its specific objectives and plans. Zelensky emphasized that such actions could pose a threat not only to Ukraine but also to other countries, such as Lithuania and Poland, and called on the international community to be prepared for any scenario . Since 2022, the Republic of Belarus under Lukashenko’s leadership has entered a phase of large-scale transformation aimed at preparing for a potential armed conflict on the side of the Russian Federation.  Lukashenko has repeatedly emphasized the need to prepare for a possible war. In September 2024, he stated: “We must prepare for war.” These processes have affected key areas of state and public life, including legislation, the armed forces, the economy, education, the ideological sphere, and infrastructure. As a strategic ally of Russia, Belarus under Lukashenko’s regime is becoming increasingly integrated into the sphere of its military interests, establishing a comprehensive military, political, and legal foundation for entering the war. Let me now present the key facts and conclusions from this study.  Transformation of the Political and Legal System: – The new 2022 Constitution gave the All-Belarusian People's Assembly — a body fully controlled by the regime — the power to approve the use of armed forces outside the country. This eliminates any real democratic control over military decisions.– The updated Military Doctrine of Belarus and National Security Concept now officially allow sending Belarusian troops abroad and using “preemptive strikes.”  This marks a shift away from a defensive strategy and is a clear legal step toward possible aggressive actions.– Laws on martial law and states of emergency significantly expand the powers of the state to restrict the rights of citizens, while allowing persons with criminal records to be recruited for service indicates a shortage of personnel and intensive mobilisation training. Modernization of the Armed Forces: – The size of the army is growing, and the number of contract soldiers has increased by 1.5 times — a clear sign of readiness for possible combat operations.– Plans are in place to expand the army’s size to 80,000 personnel, particularly in connection with the creation of a Southern Operational Command — a formation directly tied to the Ukrainian front. At the same time, the reserve of the Armed Forces is estimated at 289,000, providing significant potential for mobilization.– A new People’s Militia is being formed, which could reach up to 150,000 members. These forces are meant not only for territorial defense but also for internal control and suppression of any resistance. – Mobilization procedures have been made much simpler: draft notices sent by SMS now have legal force, and penalties for draft evasion have become tougher. The regime is preparing for fast and large-scale mobilization of the population. An Economy on a War Footing: – Military spending has sharply increased — by 32% in 2025.  The Ministry of Economy now directly coordinates mobilization efforts, showing that the civilian economy is being shifted toward military needs. Decree No. 29 of 2025 granted the Ministry of Economy the authority to coordinate mobilization activities,  signaling a shift toward centralized resource management under emergency conditions.– The Belarusian military-industrial complex is deeply integrated with Russia’s defense industry. Belarusian factories play a critical role in supporting Russia’s war machine — supplying chassis for strategic missile systems, optical equipment, electronics, and aircraft components. Without these supplies, the Russian defense sector would face serious difficulties. Military Cooperation with Russia: – Based on intergovernmental agreements between Belarus and Russia, a Regional Grouping of Forces has been established. As part of this, Russian military units are regularly stationed in Belarus.  Their numbers differ, but during active phases of the war in Ukraine, there were over 9,000 troops at times. At the time, before the full-scale aggression began, there were over 30,000 Russian soldiers stationed on the territory of Belarus. – The deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, along with statements about being ready to host the "Oreshnik" system, greatly increases strategic risks for all of Europe.– Members of the Wagner Group  have taken part in training Belarusian troops, teaching assault tactics — a clear sign of preparation for real combat.– Joint military exercises, such as  “West-2025,” with their clear offensive nature , are deeply concerning. We remember how the “Union Resolve” exercises were held right before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and served as cover for it. “West-2025” could easily be used in the same way — as a cover for new escalation. War Infrastructure: – The construction of the so-called “Khrenin Line” — a series of defensive fortifications along the borders with Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania — shows that the regime is preparing for potential conflicts on multiple strategic fronts.– The modernization of airfields, bridges, and roads, along with increased secrecy on the Belarusian railway system, points to large-scale logistical preparations for receiving and moving major military forces. Ideological Mobilization and Total Control: – The Lukashenko regime is heavily militarizing public opinion, especially among young people.  Military-patriotic camps and mandatory pre-conscription training are aimed at creating total loyalty and building an image of the West and Ukraine as enemies.– At the same time, the regime is cracking down hard on the opposition.  Dozens of criminal cases have been opened for things like “discrediting the army,” evading conscription, and spreading so-called “fake news.” Human rights organisations report around 1,200 political prisoners. Administrative arrests, job dismissals, and expulsions from universities are common. The regime targets alternative centers of power — such as the United Transitional Cabinet and the Coordination Council — labeling them “extremist” and “terrorist” groups. This shows a clear attempt to crush all dissent and prevent any possible resistance inside the country in the context of a potential war. The Belarusian People: Your First Line of Defense It is critically important to understand:  this preparation for war is not the choice of the Belarusian people.  Independent sociological research shows that the majority of Belarusians do not support deep political integration with Russia. Only about 4% are in favor of fully joining the Russian Federation.  Our people want Belarus to be an independent, sovereign, and peaceful country — one that is part of the European community, not involved in someone else’s wars. The Lukashenko regime is acting against the will of the Belarusian people, forcing this “integration” and preparation for war through repression and violence. It is crucial to understand: Europe’s first line of defense does not lie at the EU’s border with Belarus. It lies within Belarusian society itself — a society which strives for freedom, democracy, and peace. Belarus must not become a new staging ground for war in Europe. It must become part of a free, peaceful European family. The decision to adopt this preventive strategy — to increase pressure on Lukashenko’s aggressive dictatorship now — should be taken before the price of delay becomes too high. Thank you for your attention.

On June 26 , I had the honor, together with President-elect Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya  and Siarhei Tsikhanouski , to take part in a meeting with the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda . This meeting lasted more than an hour and took place at the Presidential Palace in Warsaw . First , I thanked the President of Poland for five years of unwavering support for Belarusians who were forced to leave their country. This will remain in the historical memory of the Belarusian people — the moment when Poland  extended its hand and came to our aid, while hundreds of thousands of Belarusians, driven out by the most severe wave of repression Europe  has seen in decades, had to flee Belarus . Second , I expressed my gratitude to the President for the words he once said to me — that he would always raise the Belarusian  issue on international platforms and draw attention to the importance of remembering the situation in Belarus . And I thanked him for keeping his word — for consistently speaking in support of democratic Belarus  and for not recognizing Lukashenko  as the legitimate president of Belarus . Third , I asked the President of Poland  not to forget about Belarusians and Belarus  in his future public and political activities, and to continue supporting us in achieving our common goal. It was especially important for me to tell the President of Poland  that the first line of the European Union’s security does not lie along the state borders of Poland , Lithuania , and Latvia  with Belarus  — but within Belarusian society itself. That is why it is crucial to support Belarusians who stand for independence, oppose war, and fight for freedom in our country. It is essential to support independent media, bloggers, and all active individuals who continue to deliver the truth and independent perspectives into Belarus  for Belarusians . President Duda  emphasized that his vision  for European security strategy is one where four countries — Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, and Lithuania — as allies, are free and democratic . This, he said, would create a strong buffer zone of security for the broader democratic European space. President Duda  is truly an ally  — an ally of Belarusians  who want to live in democracy and freedom.

Pavel Latushka , Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. On June 26-27, Minsk is preparing to host the 4th Eurasian Economic Forum (EEF-2025). Representatives of the so-called "axis of evil" — Iran, Myanmar, Cuba, Nicaragua, autocracies of Central Asia, and some aligned countries — plan to attend. The main declared theme is "Strategy of Eurasian Economic Integration: Results and Prospects." Usually, these platforms feature loud statements about "achievements" and "unity." But what really stands behind these declarations? Are there any real "results" for the people, or is it just another attempt to create an illusion of success? It sounds like a dream: a union of countries where goods, money, and ideas flow freely, and millions enjoy an economic boom. But what if behind this bright facade hides a grim world of dictatorships, sanctions, and empty promises? The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), led by the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (SEEC) and promoted through the Eurasian Economic Forum (EEF), was supposed to unite the post-Soviet space into a prosperous economic bloc. Instead, it became a hostage of repressive regimes in Russia and Belarus, where politics stifles business, and hopes for a better future drown in a swamp of bureaucracy and fear. Let’s analyze why this project, conceived as a bridge to prosperity, ended up on the verge of collapse. We are often told about the grand plans of the Eurasian Economic Union — a common market, free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. The SEEC and EEF are positioned as powerful mechanisms supposed to drive this integration forward. Sounds promising, doesn’t it? But if you look closer at what’s going on behind the scenes, especially now, it becomes clear: most of these promises are just pretty words. Instead of being a locomotive of economic growth, the EAEU increasingly turns into a project frozen in time, burdened with political ambitions and internal contradictions. These ambitions are so great that sometimes political quarrels within the union overshadow any economic successes — which are already few. Take Armenia, for example, which, due to the inactivity of the CSTO (the military analogue of the EAEU, also under Russia’s aegis) during conflicts with Azerbaijan, has begun to openly express dissatisfaction and even flirt with the West. Armenia has repeatedly hinted at the possibility of leaving both unions, and Prime Minister Pashinyan did not shy away from publicly criticizing his "allies" for failing to meet their obligations. Regarding Lukashenko, he even stated that he would never again visit Belarus while Lukashenko is in power. Thus, he plans to participate in the forum via videoconference. Lukashenko, in turn, threatened to create communication problems for Pashinyan. "We will consider it. Maybe there will be no TV so that you can only speak remotely," he said at the EAEU summit in December 2024. "No problem," Pashinyan concluded the discussion. Thus, Armenia’s position is not just words — it is a blow to the image of the bloc’s unity. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, though a close ally of Russia, constantly balances between Moscow and Beijing, striving to diversify its ties and actively developing alternative routes for oil and gas shipments bypassing Russian territory. President Tokayev — an experienced diplomat who knows Chinese and once worked in China — prefers friendship with China and outcasts like Lukashenko. Tokayev also actively develops cooperation with Turkey. Unlike Lukashenko, European leaders visit him, and he pragmatically approaches his country’s foreign policy, demonstrating true multi-vector diplomacy. He has repeatedly shown independence, for example, by refusing to recognize Russia’s "new territories," and by demonstratively supporting the Kazakh language both domestically and at international meetings. Remember when he started speaking Kazakh at one of the meetings with Putin, forcing the Russian delegation to wear headphones for translation. Even Kyrgyzstan occasionally complains about barriers to its goods within the EAEU, pointing to "grey" schemes and protectionism from larger players. Notably, none of the EAEU countries allow the kind of humiliation before the Kremlin that Lukashenko regularly endures. The tensions within the union are not accidents but symptoms of a deep crisis of trust and lack of real equality. The SEEC and EEF forums and summits increasingly resemble empty rituals where politicians demonstrate a fictitious unity while there are no real economic breakthroughs. It is also telling how Central Asian countries, including EAEU members, are actively pivoting towards other influential players. For example, on June 17, 2025, the "China – Central Asia" summit took place in Astana in the "5+1" format. This was not just a meeting but a clear signal: the region’s countries — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — see China as a key partner. For them, it is not only a way to strengthen trade and economic ties and attract investments in infrastructure, transport, and energy but also an opportunity to become a real bridge between East and West. This multi-vector aspiration is nothing but an active attempt to break free from Russia’s dominant influence, especially given Moscow’s geopolitical isolation and aggressive foreign policy. Central Asia is seeking more reliable and profitable development paths, and Beijing offers such prospects, causing tangible concern in the Kremlin, which is losing its traditional foothold of influence. Let’s be honest: the EAEU is, first and foremost, a project tightly controlled by Moscow. With more than 80% of the union’s GDP, Russia sets the rules of the game. Although other countries like Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia formally have a say, in practice their interests often take a back seat. All important decisions are made to favor the Kremlin, and the Eurasian Economic Commission, which should be an independent executive body, essentially remains under Moscow’s political influence. Internal disputes and disagreements are not resolved by clear rules but by manual management, often under Russia’s guidance, killing transparency and fairness. There is no strong, independent arbitration court that could judge fairly. The biggest blow to the EAEU was dealt by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The war not only undermined Russia’s trust on the global stage but also cast a shadow over the entire EAEU, now seen as a club of authoritarian states. Central Asian countries, fearing Western sanctions, actively distance themselves from Moscow. This "friendship" within the union costs them dearly: many companies fear working with EAEU partners due to reputational risks. The common economy is stalling because of anti-Russian sanctions — Russia, the main player, has lost access to technologies, investments, and markets. Contrary to all declarations, mutual trade within the union is shrinking because businesses seek new, safer routes. Each member state pulls the blanket over itself. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan actively seek new trading partners in China and South Asia. Belarus, on the contrary, sinks deeper into dependence on Russia. Armenia is mired in its own geopolitical problems. Everyone has their own interests, and there is no common development strategy. Instead of diversifying economies and fostering innovation, the EAEU remains a raw-material appendage, fully dependent on global prices for oil, gas, and metals. SEEC and EEF forums increasingly resemble empty rituals where politicians show fake unity, but there are no real economic breakthroughs. As of mid-2025, the EAEU’s prospects look bleak. Instead of the declared convergence, the economies of member states are increasingly diverging. The union does not attract new members; on the contrary, they try to stay away from geopolitical risks. Central Asian countries actively build alternative transport corridors bypassing Russia, confirming their lack of faith in the EAEU’s future. In essence, today the EAEU is not a tool of deep economic integration but rather a mechanism to mitigate the consequences of Russia’s isolation and maintain its influence in the region. This burdens other participants and prevents their development. Imagine for a second: if this union were built not on dictatorship and aggression — as is the case with Russian and Belarusian regimes — but on principles of democracy, transparency, mutual respect, and rule of law. If economies aimed at real integration, not just fulfilling the political ambitions of one country. If the EAEU were a union of free and equal partners, respecting human rights and international law. In that case, it could really become an interesting and mutually beneficial platform for economic cooperation, bringing prosperity to all its members and contributing to regional stability. But for now, it is just a distant dream.

Pavel Latushka. Photo: NAM-media Pavel Latushka on Lukashenko’s role in negotiations on the situation in Ukraine Full interview text in the publication Le Monde "Lukashenko is Putin’s puppet. He cannot negotiate with the United States without Putin’s consent, nor act as a mediator. He can make promises, but in reality, his master is in Moscow",  said Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Administration, in an interview with Le Monde . The issue of the Belarusian situation continues to be in the spotlight of international, foreign, and Belarusian independent media. In the interview with the French newspaper Le Monde , Pavel Latushka noted that the regime has not changed its repressive policies and expressed concerns that Putin and Lukashenko might use Belarus for new aggressive actions against Ukraine. Putin and Lukashenko hope to return the war negotiations on Ukraine to Minsk, as was the case in 2014 and 2015 with the signing of the so-called "Minsk I" and "Minsk II" agreements. "Some are already talking about 'Minsk III'",  said Pavel Latushka. "In Lukashenko’s eyes, this would strengthen his role and relevance regarding Western countries. As for Putin, against whom there is an international arrest warrant from the ICC [for the war crime of illegal deportation of Ukrainian children], he would feel at home in Belarus, where he can move freely without risk of arrest. But I believe this is unacceptable for Ukrainians. They [Putin and Lukashenko] want to humiliate Zelensky" .

"The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), by an overwhelming majority, has adopted the resolution ‘Legal and Human Rights Aspects of the Russian Federation’s Aggression against Ukraine’, which strongly condemns Russia’s aggression and calls for concrete actions to restore justice. The resolution also highlights the actions of Lukashenko’s regime, which constitute an act of aggression against the sovereign state of Ukraine" , stated Pavel Latushka , member of the Coordination Council and delegate to PACE. The resolution draws attention to three key aspects concerning Belarus . First, PACE acknowledges Lukashenko’s involvement in the aggression against Ukraine : "Belarus allowed the Russian Federation to use its territory to commit an act of aggression against Ukraine, which in itself constitutes an act of aggression". "The political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and Belarus committed the crime of aggression against Ukraine, which entails individual criminal responsibility for the respective leaders, regardless of their official position, including heads of state and government". Second, the resolution points to Lukashenko’s role in the war crime  of deporting Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus: "The Assembly has repeatedly condemned the deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation and Belarus". According to an amendment introduced by Pavel Latushka, the resolution emphasizes  that  this crime was carried out under Lukashenko’s direct order . Third, PACE calls on member states and the international community to: "…impose additional sanctions and ensure the enforcement of existing sanctions against the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, North Korea, and other states involved in violations of international law, as well as include in sanction lists individuals responsible for committing international crimes in Ukraine". According to the results of the vote, 87 PACE delegates supported the resolution, 3 abstained, and none voted against.

"The adopted Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine contains provisions granting the tribunal jurisdiction over the crime of aggression against Ukraine committed by Lukashenko. The tribunal does not recognize the functional immunity of the Belarusian dictator, nor any possible amnesties related to this crime. Importantly, the tribunal will primarily be guided by the norms of international law, under which the fact of Lukashenko's commission of the crime of aggression is indisputable" , stated Pavel Latushka , Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM) . The Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine was developed on the basis of an agreement to be signed this evening by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy  and Secretary General of the Council of Europe Alain Berset  at the Council of Europe headquarters. " Today, it can be unequivocally stated: an indictment will be prepared against the Belarusian dictator for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. It is important to underline that the Special Tribunal is an international tribunal, not a Ukrainian one. This means that it will apply Ukrainian national law only in cases where a specific matter cannot be resolved based on the provisions of the Statute, the rules of procedure and evidence, customary international law, international treaties, or general principles of international law. In other words, international law will take precedence. In addition, the Statute includes a reference to UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 , which the tribunal must consider when determining the gravity and scale of actions falling under the definition of an “act of aggression.” Lukashenko’s actions in providing Belarusian territory for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine meet these criteria — especially given that this is explicitly defined as an act of aggression in Article 3 of UNGA Resolution 3314. Judges and prosecutors will be international.  All proceedings against Lukashenko may be conducted in absentia . A prison sentence will be served in a state that signs an agreement with the Special Tribunal. If no country signs such an agreement, the sentence may be served in Ukraine ", added Pavel Latushka , following a preliminary analysis of the published Statute. It should be recalled that earlier, at the April PACE session, on the initiative of Pavel Latushka , an amendment was included in another PACE resolution, which provides for the extension of the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine to include the relevant actions of the highest military and political leadership of the Lukashenko regime.