Pavel Latushka , Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. The working group created by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration of Poland, dealing with the legalization of Belarusians staying in Poland, has resumed its activities. The first meeting of the working group recently took place in Warsaw, led by Tomasz Cytrynowicz , Head of the Office for Foreigners of Poland. The Belarusian side was led by Pavel Latushka , Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet. The meeting was also attended by Vitaly Malchanau , Deputy for Social Policy of the Cabinet, Hanna Matyevska , Head of the Partyzanka initiative, and Olga Karpushonak , Delegate of the Coordination Council. Tomasz Cytrynowicz informed Pavel Latushka that, in the past year, over 48,000 Belarusian citizens had applied for legalization of their stay in Poland. In January 2025 alone, there were more than 4,000 such applications, which, as the Polish representative noted, demonstrates the continued flow of Belarusian citizens seeking to legalize their stay in Poland. During the meeting, several issues were discussed, including: Reducing the Processing Time for Legalization Cases for Belarusians in Poland. Tomasz Cytrynowicz reported that the Polish side is making efforts to shorten the processing time for legalization cases for Belarusians.  In the second half of 2025, changes are planned to be introduced to the foreigner law that will allow the introduction of an electronic system for submitting documents for foreigners as part of the legalization procedure . These changes are expected to accelerate the processing of cases, minimize the number of visits required for applicants to the Office for Foreigners of Poland and the Voivodeship Offices, and positively impact the issue of intermediaries. The procedure will involve an electronic form to fill out the application with an electronic signature, followed by submitting fingerprints, providing additional documents (if necessary), and receiving the documents. Issues Related to the Grounds for Issuing Travel Documents. The possibility of issuing travel documents to Belarusians was discussed not only in the case of an expired passport or lack of one, but also when the pages for visas and stamps are full or when the passport was issued more than 10 years ago. Tomasz Cytrynowicz supported the need to consider the interpretation of the current legislation that would expand the grounds for issuing travel documents to Belarusians. After analyzing Poland’s current legislation, the Cabinet will send an appropriate response. Issues Related to the Issuance Period of Travel Documents. Pavel Latushka suggested considering the possibility of issuing travel documents for more than 1 year, as is currently done . The Polish representative informed that there is an ongoing discussion about amending the legislation to extend the validity period of such documents, but it has not yet been determined how long these documents will be issued in the future. Issuance of Travel Documents to Belarusian Children. The issue of issuing travel documents to Belarusian children born in Poland was discussed, particularly when the parents are unable to go to Belarus to arrange a passport for the child. Tomasz Cytrynowicz stated that such cases would be considered individually by the Voivodeship Offices based on the parents' applications. We ask you to inform the Cabinet @belcabinet_bot  about any cases of refusal to issue documents for children so that we can monitor the situation and inform the Office for Foreigners of Poland.

Jeżeli masz możliwość, to prosimy ewentualnie o przekazanie 1,5% podatku na naszą działalność Białoruską Pavel Latushka , Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. On Lukashenko's "Brilliant" Economic Plans and Their Consequences for His Officials Imagine a country where a dictator demands the impossible: prices for potatoes and cucumbers must freeze, as if by magic, and officials and businessmen must turn the economic chaos into a perfect system of control within a month. Recently, Lukashenko gave another "scolding" to his government, setting a task that sounds like a challenge to the laws of reality. What lies behind this loud directive? Is Belarus really facing an economic breakthrough? Or is this just a prelude to a new wave of repression, where everyone will be blamed except the dictator himself? The unrealistic nature of Lukashenko’s directive to develop a price regulation system by April 2025 creates the groundwork for another round of repression, blame-shifting, and criminal cases, which has become a hallmark of governance in Belarus under the dictator’s rule. Lukashenko has long built a management system where failures to implement his orders are interpreted not as systemic errors or unrealistic tasks, but as personal faults of the officials. The example of the "scolding" of officials over potatoes and cucumbers at the February 28 meeting shows that he tends to look for "scapegoats" even in the smallest details. Lukashenko’s directives are populist in nature (such as ensuring "social standards" through price control) but do not take into account real economic limitations. His demand to finalize the system within a month, including the integration of complex IT platforms, ignores objective difficulties like staff shortages and financial issues. When the deadline is not met, or the system turns out to be unworkable, he will most likely blame officials and businesses for "not wanting to work" or "conspiring against the people". Regional executive committees, ministries, and businesses, as participants in the process, are under strict control and fear. They have no room for open discussions of problems or acknowledging the impossibility of fulfilling the task. Instead, they will try to "squirm" by presenting formal reports, which will only delay the inevitable moment when Lukashenko demands results. A past example: in 2022, after the failure of price regulation, several cases were opened against local officials and company managers for "abuse of power" and "negligence." A similar scenario is likely here. For instance, the First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Snopkov, despite his loyalty, may become a target if Lukashenko decides that the government "failed." If the system is not ready by April, which is likely given the rush, it could be classified as "treason" or "damaging economic security," which in Belarus is interpreted broadly and harshly.

Pavel Latushka , Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. Achieving the goal of a future democratic Belarus was the main topic of discussion during a meeting between Deputy Head of the Cabinet Pavel Latushka and the Political Director of the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gerard Keown. In light of global security challenges and the war waged by Russia against Ukraine with the support of the Lukashenko regime, special attention was given to the necessity of considering support for Belarusian society in the development of Europe's future security strategy. Belarusian citizens oppose the war and aspire to live in a democratic, European, and independent state — the Republic of Belarus. Pavel Latushka requested support from the representative of the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specifically for: Independent media and bloggers, ensuring their ability to operate despite ongoing repression. Non-governmental organizations, particularly those focused on human rights protection. Additionally, the meeting covered: Strategies for pressuring the Lukashenko regime, including: Holding Lukashenko and his accomplices internationally accountable for aggression against Ukraine, war crimes related to the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children, and crimes against humanity against the Belarusian people. Expanding and harmonizing sanctions against the regime at the European level. The situation in Belarus: A significant number of political prisoners remain in the country, with repression continuing in full force. All independent political parties have been liquidated. More than 50% of non-governmental organizations have been shut down. Gerard Keown emphasized the need to continue pressure on the Lukashenko regime and to support Belarusian democratic forces. He condemned the brutality of the Lukashenko regime and expressed solidarity with the Belarusian people in their fight for democracy, confirming Ireland’s readiness to provide assistance. The representative of the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also supported further strengthening sanctions against the Lukashenko regime. Possible next steps to enhance and increase the effectiveness of sanction pressure were discussed during the meeting. Pavel Latushka stated: "Ireland has a completely realistic assessment of the Lukashenko regime, which is an ally of Russia in its aggression against Ukraine. Ireland supports and will continue to support stronger sanctions against the regime unless it stops backing the war against Ukraine. Ireland is also considering ways to support bringing Lukashenko to justice for the crimes he has committed against Belarusians and in relation to the aggression against Ukraine. We also discussed financial support and assistance for Belarusian civil society. Ireland fully understands the importance and priority of supporting independent media and bloggers. I requested that appropriate funds be allocated. Additionally, we talked about the need for financial support for civil initiatives and human rights organizations" . The representative of the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed interest in organizing a special conference in Ireland dedicated to Belarusian culture and its support.

Pavel Latushka , Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. Lukashenko is preparing a New Experiment on Belarusians What does "de-urbanization" mean according to Lukashenko? And how is his regime similar to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia? The Belarusian authorities have come up with yet another "brilliant" plan — this time, they have decided to de-urbanizethe country. In simple terms, this means moving people from cities to villages. According to Lukashenko’s so-called Minister of Architecture and Construction, Ruslan Parkhamovich, the concept of de-urbanization is already in its final stages of development. The regime claims that Belarus needs to be de-urbanized to reduce the outflow of labor to big cities and encourage people to return to villages and small towns. But in reality, behind these words about de-urbanization lies nothing more than Lukashenko’s attempt to turn the entire country into one giant collective farm, which is how he envisions his ideal Belarus. His so-called Minister of Architecture and Construction, Ruslan Parkhamovich, seriously claims that de-urbanization will create "comfortable living conditions" in small towns and villages. But what exactly does this mean? Moving people from cities to villages (but how exactly?). Revitalizing rural areas (but with what resources?). Renovating old houses (but with what funding?). So far, the authorities haven’t officially presented the de-urbanization concept. Should we worry? Yes, we should. We are not living in the Middle Ages. The whole world is moving toward urbanization, not the other way around, because cities are the centers of growth, innovation, and progress. In cities, people have better living conditions, better access to education, healthcare, jobs, technology, and culture. The success of countries like the USA, Germany, South Korea, and many others is largely built on the development of cities. Why? Because economies grow in cities. Cities concentrate enterprises, industries, startups, and financial centers. Small and medium-sized businesses thrive in cities because they have more customers and a higher-income population. Cities offer career growth because there are actual opportunities for it. Villages do not provide the same opportunities—not because rural life is inherently bad, but because progress is moving in a different direction, and fighting against it is simply irrational. Modern cities are hubs of science, technology, and innovation. Universities, research centers, and IT companies are all based in cities. The best hospitals, clinics, and highly qualified doctors are found in cities. The service sector in cities is significantly better than in rural areas. Even in Belarusian cities — despite mass repression and the exodus of professionals — the level of services, medicine, and opportunities is still higher than in rural areas. One could go on, but any rational person understands that de-urbanization is a step backward, both for the country’s development and for its people. And when dictatorships start talking about de-urbanization, what they really mean is: More control over society by isolating more people from quality education, technology, and career prospects. Cutting people off from social connections and access to information by limiting modern communication. Keeping citizens fully dependent on the regime by restricting their exposure to the outside world. This is exactly what Lukashenko is offering Belarusians.

The Treaty between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees within the Union State  was signed in Minsk on December 6, 2024, by Putin and Lukashenko and was ratified almost simultaneously by the parliaments of both Belarus and Russia on February 26, 2025. The Union agreements oblige Minsk to coordinate its foreign and defense policies with Russia. The signed treaty on security guarantees formalizes mutual defense obligations but, de facto, grants Moscow the right to intervene if the regime in Belarus is under threat. A closer analysis of this treaty reveals its significant implications: Article 2, Paragraph 1,  establishes the integrity of the defense space of the Union State, effectively reducing Belarus’ military sovereignty to a minimum and integrating it as an element in the realization of Russia’s geopolitical military objectives. Article 2, Paragraph 2, states that "the parties undertake... to take appropriate actions in the political, military, and other spheres in cases of encroachments on the security of either party or the Union State as a whole" . Such encroachments include "the creation or implementation of a threat to the sovereignty, independence, and/or constitutional order of the Parties" , and those responsible for such threats include terrorist and extremist organizations and groups.  Given the regime’s broad interpretation of any political, social, or informational activity that does not align with its policies as extremist, this clause effectively allows Russia to interfere in Belarus’ domestic political affairs. As a result, Belarus risks losing control even over internal aspects of its national security. Article 4, Paragraph 2 , lays the groundwork for justifying aggressive actions against other states. It states that "in the event of an act of aggression... against one of the Parties or an imminent threat thereof, the other Party guarantees... the immediate provision of necessary military, military-technical, and other assistance, upon agreement between the heads of state and following an official request from the affected Party". The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2024 was justified on the grounds of an alleged imminent threat from Ukraine. A similar scenario could now be repeated, potentially not only against Ukraine but also against EU and NATO member states. A key article  in terms of creating threats to Belarus’ and Russia’s neighbors is Article 5 , which states that "in accordance with separate agreements... military and other facilities of the Russian Federation may be established on the territory of the Republic of Belarus, and Russian military formations may also be deployed there" . This means that Russia can ensure a unilateral and extensive (without reciprocal obligations from Russia) military presence in Belarus on a permanent basis, effectively establishing a western front along Belarus’ borders with the EU and Ukraine. For example, after the "Zapad-2025" exercises, part of the Russian armed forces could remain in Belarus under the provisions of Articles 5 and/or 4 of the treaty. Article 6  addresses the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, including those deployed on Belarusian territory. Paragraph 2  states that "nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation may be used in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against either Party, as well as in the event of aggression against either Party with conventional weapons that create a critical threat to its sovereignty or territorial integrity" . Russian tactical nuclear warheads are already stationed in Belarus by mutual agreement, and in the future, Moscow could increase their number or deploy new delivery systems (for example, the "Oreshnik" missile complexes that Lukashenko has publicly requested). Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine has already extended the "nuclear umbrella" to Belarus, equating an attack on Belarus to an attack on Russia with the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike. Thus, this treaty aligns with Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine. The provisions of this article potentially create the risk of a retaliatory nuclear strike against Belarusian territory. It is important to note that Article 7  pays special attention to one of the most effective non-military measures against dictators and aggressors—sanctions. The treaty states that "any Party may initiate the consideration of collective countermeasures against such restrictive measures, including mutual support in implementing state economic policies..." This suggests that Lukashenko may once again seek additional resources from the Kremlin, citing sanctions pressure and the provisions of this treaty. Conclusion The military-political integration of Belarus and Russia has fundamentally changed the regional security landscape. Belarus, once a relatively neutral neighbor to Europe, has become an accomplice in Russia’s military policies , contributing to regional instability. Its participation in the aggression against Ukraine serves as a clear example. Strengthening military ties with Moscow has provided Lukashenko’s regime with security guarantees on Kremlin’s terms, but in return, Belarus has become even more dependent on assisting Russia in achieving its geopolitical objectives. The country’s military sovereignty has significantly weakened to the point where Belarus can no longer conduct an independent foreign and defense policy. Russia’s military border has effectively moved closer to NATO’s borders . The military-political integration of Russia and Belarus has led to the creation of a unified defense architecture covering much of Eastern Europe, increasing potential threats to NATO and exacerbating tensions around Ukraine. The continuation of this course risks further escalation — from the deployment of new weapons systems (including nuclear) to the possible complete loss of Belarus’ sovereignty. This is an extremely concerning trend for regional stability. The international community, including European states, will have to contend with a new level of military cohesion between Belarus and Russia, necessitating the development of measures to prevent further potential acts of aggression. In this context, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s  statement at the Munich Security Conference about the need to establish a security line in Europe, including along Belarus’ eastern border, is particularly significant. It is crucial for the EU and Belarus’ neighboring countries to develop a strategy aimed at supporting anti-war sentiment within Belarusian society and fostering its democratic aspirations.

Deputy Head of the Cabinet, Pavel Latushka, met with the Ambassador of France to Poland, Étienne de Poncins. Photo: NAU Media In recent days, the Deputy Head of the Cabinet has held meetings with the ambassadors of Latvia, Lithuania, and France. The main objectives of these meetings: Support from the EU for independent Belarusian media and bloggers who counteract propaganda in Belarus; Consideration of the interests of Belarusian civil society in the development of the European security strategy; Support for Belarusian democratic institutions as a real alternative to the Lukashenko regime. Pavel Latushka stated: "A strong Europe will be able to speak to Lukashenko’s regime in the language of power—the only language he understands. A strong Europe is additional support for Belarusians fighting for democracy and freedom. In the context of the suspension of U.S. support, it is particularly important to keep assistance to Belarusian society among the key priorities of European policy. Given the plans to develop a European security strategy, it is crucial to include in this document support for democratic institutions, media, bloggers, and, in general, Belarusian civil society, which seeks to restore democracy and freedom in Belarus and continues to fight for the country's independence". Pavel Latushka thanked the EU ambassadors for adopting a strong sanctions package, emphasizing that sanctions are one of the pressure tools aimed at forcing the regime to make changes in its domestic and foreign policy, specifically: Ending mass repression and releasing political prisoners; Ceasing support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; Halting the hybrid war against the EU using illegal migrants. During the meetings, the Joint Transitional Cabinet’s statement on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine was also presented. The importance of further assistance to Ukraine and support for the Belarusian people’s aspirations for a free and independent Belarus was emphasized.

Pavel Pavlovich Latushka:  Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the UTC for the Transfer of Power. Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the faction "Latushka Team and Movement 'For Freedom'" within the 3rd Convocation of the Coordination Council. How Will the U.S. React to This Cooperation, and What Consequences Await Lukashenko? In recent years, dictator Lukashenko has continued to build ties with autocratic regimes, turning Belarus into part of a global anti-democratic coalition. Among his partners are Libya, North Korea, Iran, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Syria, Venezuela, and, of course, Cuba. How will Washington respond to Minsk and Havana's cooperation? How does the Trump administration view it? Will new U.S. sanctions target Lukashenko’s regime? The answers to these questions are in today’s report. Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State On January 1, 2025, Lukashenko stated that "Minsk has always been and remains a reliable ally of Havana, ready to lend a helping hand in difficult times" . The two countries have maintained diplomatic relations for a long time, but the past two years have shown that their cooperation goes beyond traditional trade and humanitarian exchanges. At the core of this partnership, military cooperation is becoming increasingly evident, posing a serious threat to democratic nations, including the U.S. and its allies. Let’s not forget that the current U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, is the son of Cuban immigrants and a fierce opponent of the communist regime of the Castro brothers. Vitaly Borchuk, Lukashenko’s Ambassador to Cuba Today, it became known that Lukashenko’s newly appointed ambassador to Cuba, Vitaly Borchuk, has presented his credentials to the Cuban president. Borchuk’s military background makes this appointment particularly noteworthy. From 1995 to 2013, he served in the Belarusian Armed Forces. Between 2013 and 2015, he worked for Beltechexport, one of Belarus's leading arms exporters, which is already under U.S. and EU sanctions. By 2018, Borchuk was listed as the director of Innovative Company INTES LLC , a distributor and integrator of security, management, and automation systems. From 2021 to 2025, he worked at the Ministry of Industry and Lukashenko's government apparatus, overseeing foreign economic relations. Given his background, Borchuk’s appointment as ambassador to Cuba is no coincidence — and here’s why. Military Contacts: What Lies Behind the Rhetoric of Friendship? Officially, Lukashenko and Cuban authorities speak of strengthening economic cooperation and cultural exchange. However, real interactions reveal a different picture. June 2023 — A Cuban military delegation visited Minsk for talks with the Belarusian Ministry of Defense. Among the topics discussed: technology exchange in the arms sector and joint projects to modernize military equipment. January 2024 — Lukashenko’s Minister of Defense, Viktor Khrenin, visited Cuba. The official press was reserved, only reporting that Havana and Minsk had agreed on a "technical cooperation" program under which Belarus could supply military products to Cuba. The contents of this military cooperation agreement were not disclosed. However, Khrenin received an award from Cuban Defense Minister Álvaro López. Shortly afterward, the ministry led by Khrenin announced that the Castro regime in Havana was interested in purchasing Polonez-M  missile systems from Belarus, with a range of 300 km. The distance between Cuba and the U.S. at the narrowest point of the Florida Strait is just 180 km . This weapon is produced using Chinese rockets. At the time, BELTA  confirmed that the arms deal was part of a broader bilateral plan between the dictatorial regimes in Cuba and Belarus. April 2024 — The commander of the Cuban Air Force and Air Defense arrived in Minsk with a large military delegation. Cuban communists held talks with Andrei Lukyanovich, commander of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces. The Belarusian Defense Ministry vaguely stated that "a detailed exchange of views took place on the further development of cooperation" . July 2024 — Cuban Defense Minister Álvaro López paid a return visit to Minsk. At the military exhibition welcoming the Cuban delegation, the Belarusian Defense Ministry showcased Chinese-made Dajiang special forces jeeps equipped with machine guns, communication devices, and drones. That same month, Lukashenko’s Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko visited Cuba, where he met with Raúl Castro. Cuban Defense Minister Álvaro López was present at the meeting. Finally, in December 2024, a Belarusian military delegation led by General Lukyanovich paid a working visit to Cuba. "The parties discussed the state and prospects for the development of bilateral military cooperation, primarily in the field of the Air Force and Air Defense, and also noted the similarity of Belarus and Cuba's positions on key international security issues" , the Belarusian Ministry of Defense's press service reported. January 2025 – The Head of the Department of International Military Cooperation of the Belarusian Defense Ministry, Major General Valery Revenko, met with Cuban Ambassador Santiago Pérez Benítez. The meeting resulted in the accreditation of Cuba’s military, naval, and air attachés in Belarus. For the first time, Cuba has established a military attaché office in Minsk. How Will the U.S. React? The United States has traditionally viewed Cuba as a source of threat in the Western Hemisphere. After the fall of the USSR, Cuba reduced its military ambitions, but now, with the support of regimes like Lukashenko's, it may once again pose a danger. Washington has long kept Belarus on its sanctions list, but Lukashenko’s new military cooperation with Cuba could lead to tighter American restrictions. On January 30, 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, stated: "Mass migration has destabilized our entire region… The illegitimate regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are deliberately fueling chaos. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party is using diplomatic and economic leverage, such as in the Panama Canal, to counter the U.S. and turn sovereign nations into vassal states". It is worth noting that the Lukashenko regime has been using migration warfare against Europe as a weapon for several years now. The U.S. has also faced similar issues in recent years. Why Is Cooperation with Cuba Beneficial for Lukashenko? For Lukashenko, this partnership brings several advantages: Sanctions Evasion: Cuba has long specialized in shadow financial schemes, which could help Minsk acquire restricted technologies or even export Belarusian goods through third countries. Political Legitimization: Lukashenko seeks to show that he is not isolated but is instead "strengthening international cooperation" — even if it is with countries like Cuba. Support from the Kremlin or even Beijing: Russia actively encourages the Belarus-Cuba alliance, as it opens new channels for Moscow’s influence in Latin America. Meanwhile, China, through Lukashenko’s regime, may quietly expand its presence in Cuba. What Does Russia Gain from This? Russia views Cuba as a key element in its regional strategy. Strengthening ties between Belarus and Cuba provides Moscow with: Additional logistical channels: Cuba could become another hub for shipping Russian and Belarusian goods in defiance of Western sanctions. Expanded military presence: Russia could use Cuba for intelligence operations and to increase pressure on the U.S. A political comeback: Moscow is eager to restore its influence in Latin America, and Belarus serves as a convenient tool for this. Finally, Russia has been recruiting Cubans to fight in Ukraine since the spring of 2023. In the fall of that year, Cuban authorities announced that they had uncovered a recruitment network on the island. Researchers estimate that around 5,000 Cubans may currently be fighting on Russia’s side. Why Is This Bad for Belarusians? Unlike Lukashenko, the Belarusian people gain nothing from this cooperation. For example, in 2022, trade turnover with Cuba amounted to just under $13 million. Instead, the consequences for Belarus could be catastrophic: Even greater isolation: Western sanctions will only intensify. Increased military spending: Lukashenko is willing to allocate state resources to dubious military projects instead of investing in the economy and social services. Risk of involvement in geopolitical conflicts: If Belarus assists Cuba militarily, it could provoke retaliatory measures from the U.S., further escalating tensions. Which Countries Will Take Notice and React to Lukashenko's Partnership with Cuba? The U.S. — As Cuba’s main opponent, Washington should increase scrutiny of Minsk-Havana ties, expand sanctions, and block any military cooperation attempts. China — Beijing has traditionally supported Cuba but prioritizes stability and control over its partners. Excessive Russian influence on the island might eventually displease China, creating opportunities for diplomatic maneuvering. Latin American countries — Democratic governments in the region should recognize that the Cuba-Belarus-Russia alliance threatens regional stability. The Threat to Democracy Demands a Strong Response Lukashenko’s cooperation with Cuba is not just a diplomatic formality. It is part of a global alliance of dictatorships that threatens the security of the democratic world. The deeper Lukashenko entangles Belarus in a military-political partnership with Cuba, the greater the risks for stability not only in Europe but also in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S., its allies, and the democratic nations of Latin America must act now to disrupt the Kremlin’s plans and its puppet, Lukashenko. Belarus must not become another launchpad for anti-democratic regimes or a facilitator of global instability.

Lukashenko wants to preserve his political "course" even after his departure or death Deputy Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Artsiom Brukhan , discussed the changes in the power system that Lukashenko plans to implement during a broadcast on the "Svaboda Premium" channel. Belarus's political system remains super-presidential: although Lukashenko introduced constitutional amendments in 2022 that created formal checks and balances, the role of the "president" remains decisive. On the surface, the system appears to be becoming more collective, but in practice, everything remains under Lukashenko’s strict control. Granting the so-called "All-Belarusian People's Assembly" the status of a constitutional body and expanding the powers of local authorities seem more like an effort to strengthen the authoritarian structure rather than a genuine attempt to delegate power to real collegial bodies. The idea of "collective governance" and increasing the role of new "collective" institutions, such as the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, remains purely symbolic for now. This is not about a real separation of powers but rather about reinforcing the power vertical, as Lukashenko continues to combine two positions.  Theoretically, these new bodies could influence politics, but in reality, they remain under Lukashenko’s direct control. As long as he is alive and occupies the usurped presidency, no real changes can be expected. At the same time, the creation of structures intended to ensure the continuation of power after Lukashenko’s departure represents an attempt to guarantee the preservation of his internal and external political course and maintain elite unity around the regime. Lukashenko is essentially laying the groundwork for a system that could carry on his policies even in his absence. However, it is unlikely that such pseudo-institutions would be able to function without his direct involvement.  Lukashenko's vision of institutionalizing power boils down to creating a more complex governance system that remains entirely dependent on his personal rule. Elite competition could only emerge if he were to leave the scene, raising doubts about the sustainability of his institutional framework. The fundamental issue lies in the lack of genuine democratic competition and institutional independence. All attempts to create "collective" structures today remain, in essence, mere tools for strengthening his personalist system. At the same time, the foundation is being laid for preserving Lukashenko's political course even after his departure.

Pavel Pavlovich Latushka:  Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for Power Transition, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, and Leader of the "Latushka Team and Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. How the West Can Counteract Lukashenko’s Regime Cooperation with Iran Under the rule of dictator Lukashenko, Belarus has long ceased to be merely a satellite of Russia. Now, the dictatorial regime is rapidly integrating into the global club of autocracies, including Iran – a state that finances terrorism and supplies Russia with deadly drones. While Lukashenko once merely followed Putin's orders, he is now becoming an active participant in a global alliance of democracy's enemies. Recent facts presented in an article by Jack Rush in the American publication War on the Rocks , which specializes in security issues, prove that Belarus is pursuing close military-technical cooperation with Tehran. Minsk is not only ready to supply drones to the Russian army but may also become a key hub in the production of Iranian Shahed-136 drones. This makes Belarus not just a war accomplice but a real factor in global destabilization. The Belarus-Iran Partnership Has Been Decades in the Making After Lukashenko found himself isolated internationally in 1997, he sought to build warmer relations with regimes that had been isolated for decades, including Iran. The particularly close ties between the regimes in Minsk and Tehran began when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran's president in 2005. In the second half of the 2000s, cooperation between the regimes strengthened and became more ideological, based on mutual hostility toward the West, as well as shared concerns about the political stability and survival of both dictatorships. At that time, in exchange for promises of participation in oil development and investments, Lukashenko supported Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Lukashenko's attempt to support research and development of Iran’s ballistic missile program in 2011 ultimately led to international sanctions against Belarus. However, military cooperation between Iran and Belarus has only strengthened, particularly through their shared support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the start of the war, both regimes have become two of Moscow’s most loyal allies. Belarus Became a Mediator in Military Cooperation Between Russia and Iran In particular, Jack Rush’s article mentions that the 2023 bilateral agreement between Belarus and Iran includes provisions for Belarus to begin producing Shahed-136 drones, a model that is crucial for Russia’s battlefield capabilities in Ukraine. In July 2024, Belarusian military officials presented the “Nomad” drone, which is ostensibly a local development but strikingly similar to the Shahed-136. According to the author of the article, Russia may soon exert pressure on Iran to accelerate drone production in Belarus. In November 2024, a high-ranking Belarusian military delegation visited an Iranian military university that conducts research and development of unmanned aerial vehicles. Further military cooperation between Tehran and Minsk is expected later this year. This makes Belarus not just an accomplice in war but a real factor in global destabilization. How the West Can Counter the Growing Partnership Between Iran and Lukashenko’s Regime To counter the growing partnership between Iran and Lukashenko’s regime, Western countries need to contain these developments. One important tool for such containment, according to the author, is sanctions, particularly those targeting Iran and Lukashenko’s regime by cutting off key resources and financial assets. It is also necessary to improve existing sanctions by closing loopholes and ensuring that violations of restrictions do not go unchecked. In addition to sanctions, another way to limit the production of Iranian drones in Belarus would be a clear warning from Ukraine regarding Lukashenko. These actions should be taken “in conjunction with efforts to assist the Belarusian people in opposing Lukashenko’s regime by revoking international recognition of his presidency and supporting activities among NGOs and the Belarusian diaspora,” writes the author. Conclusion: The Regimes in Minsk and Tehran Are Cut from the Same Cloth Against this backdrop, in early February, U.S. President Donald Trump decided to resume the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. As explained by a representative of the Trump administration and U.S. ambassador to the UN, America will work with key allies to reinstate international sanctions and restrictions on Iran. It is believed that Lukashenko is likely to face new sanctions for his cooperation with Iran if he does not cease his dangerous dealings. According to The Wall Street Journal , even before his election, Donald Trump planned to drastically tighten sanctions against Iran after taking office and limit Iranian oil sales. Just recently, the U.S. president stated that countries like Iran should not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons. He emphasized, “We cannot allow other countries to get nuclear weapons, not just Iran.” And we remember that just recently, Lukashenko boasted about the "red nuclear button" he received from Putin, while military officials in his regime said they were ready to host the so-called “Nutshell” missile. How to Stop the Threat? The World Must Act Decisively In our opinion, ignoring the “Moscow – Minsk – Tehran” axis is fraught with catastrophic consequences. The West must intensify sanctions, fully cutting off financial and technological pathways through which Lukashenko’s regime receives resources. Only strict measures, including international isolation and non-recognition of his rule, can limit the dictator’s ability to contribute to global destabilization. Furthermore, it is important that Ukraine and its allies send a clear message to Lukashenko: assisting Moscow and Iran in the war will lead to consequences not only economically but also militarily. Lukashenko is betting on cooperation with terrorist regimes — therefore, the world must treat him accordingly.

Pavel Pavlovich Latushka:  Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for Power Transition, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, and Leader of the "Latushka Team and Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. Have you noticed how housing and utility costs keep rising? Have you seen how much heavier your utility bills have become? Every year, the so-called "authorities" claim that Belarusians cover only a small portion of housing and utility service costs, while the vast majority of expenses are generously compensated by the "state" — almost as if Lukashenko himself is paying from his own pocket. It’s a clever trick: they constantly raise the prices but present it as if they’re doing us a "favor," a "gesture of goodwill." They make it seem as if we should be "grateful" — after all, they "could have" raised the prices even higher. This is nothing but manipulation. Over the past ten years, statements from the "dictator" and his "associates" suggest that the percentage of housing and utility service costs allegedly covered by the "state" is constantly increasing — sometimes "52%", sometimes "30%," then "20%," then "18%" — yet at the same time, people are paying more and more. How is this possible? Let’s look at this from another angle. Who exactly is this "state" that so generously covers our bills? The answer is simple: the "state" is us, and the money it uses comes from our "taxes." "Taxes" are the main source of revenue for the Belarusian "budget," from which utility expenses are paid. This means that it is our money — our own contributions to the "state treasury" — funding these so-called "compensations." No matter how much Lukashenko tries to take credit for it, we are the ones footing the bill. So, in the end, what exactly is "state propaganda" selling when it praises this supposedly "efficient state" that covers our costs? The answer is simple: "propaganda" is selling us "air". It’s selling us "nothing". Even the "cheap energy resources" from the dictator’s "main partner" — Russia — haven’t stopped prices from rising, despite Lukashenko plunging the country deeper into "dependence" on Putin. Where is the promised "benefit" of the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant ("BelNPP"), which was supposed to reduce energy costs for the population? We’ve already inherited all the "risks" of having a "nuclear station" on our territory, but where are the "savings"? The conclusion is clear: Lukashenko is becoming more and more "expensive" for Belarusians. The next time you pay your "utility bills" and take money out of your wallet, remember this: at that very moment, Lukashenko is "relaxing" in one of his "18 luxurious residences." At the same time, another "apartment" is being built for someone in his vast "security apparatus," and more funds are being allocated for "state propaganda" — propaganda that will continue to sell "empty promises," insisting that you are the one "not paying enough". This raises a rhetorical question: are "we" really "underpaying", or is it the "state" that is failing to do its "job"? The reality is that Lukashenko is the one "failing" — and he is also the one "not paying his fair share". Yet, through his controlled "propaganda machine", he continues to push the narrative of a "social state". But the truth is undeniable: every year, more and more "money" is being taken from the "pockets of Belarusians" for "utility payments". And everyone in Belarus must remember who is truly responsible for this. The blame lies squarely with the "dictator himself".

The Lukashenko regime continues to pay a high price for its loyalty to the Kremlin. Belarus, which has become a gray area for Russia to bypass sanctions and a military foothold, is once again at the center of tough economic restrictions. The new EU sanctions package sends a clear message: support for Russian aggression, involvement in military supplies, and the intensification of internal repression will not go unanswered. Lukashenko has chosen the path of isolation and dependence on Moscow. The new sanctions package  targets key areas of the economy, trade, and industry and strengthens the control over the enforcement of existing restrictions. The new package further harmonizes trade sanctions against Lukashenko's regime and Russia . One of the central elements of the new sanctions package is the expansion of the list of goods banned for export and import. Specifically, the EU now bans the supply of goods to Belarus that contribute to military and technological development, including components used by Russia in its war against Ukraine. The following items are now under sanctions: Chemical precursors used in riot control agents, Software for numerical control equipment, Controllers used in drones, Chemical elements, pyrotechnic products, and flammable materials. To minimize the risk of circumventing the sanctions, the list of goods and technologies prohibited for transit through Belarus has also been expanded , particularly those that could strengthen Belarus' military-industrial capabilities. The EU has also introduced a new criterion for inclusion in the sanctions list: supporting or benefiting from Belarus' defense industry. The EU has imposed strict limitations on the development of Belarus' energy sector. The sale, supply, transfer, and export of software related to oil and gas exploration are now prohibited. This will significantly hinder the regime's capabilities in mineral extraction and exploration, while minimizing the risk of circumventing the sanctions via Belarus. Sanctions have also targeted software that could be used for enterprise management and industrial design. This means that the regime will no longer be able to obtain: Enterprise management systems, Software for industrial design and production. Moreover, the transfer of intellectual property and commercial secrets related to these programs is now prohibited. This will seriously limit the technological development of the regime's defense industry, its manufacturing sector, and the government apparatus. The new sanctions package also affects the import of primary aluminum. This is important because Belarus was used as a transit point for Russia to bypass sanctions on this metal. The EU is taking decisive steps to eliminate the possibility of sanction evasion, including through the use of crypto assets. Under the new package, stringent requirements are being introduced for companies, which now must: Report suspicious transactions to financial intelligence units, Provide any information about potential sanctions violations within two weeks of receiving it. Additionally, liability is being established for European companies operating outside the EU, including subsidiaries in Belarus. This means that the Belarusian regime will not be able to use foreign companies to circumvent sanctions. Despite the tough economic restrictions, the EU is taking steps to support Belarus' civil society. In particular, the possibility of transporting cash for personal needs remains. There are also exemptions for humanitarian and medical purposes. "The new sanctions show that Belarus, because of Lukashenko, is turning into an appendage of Russia's military machine. The EU aims to close the loopholes for sanctions evasion and stop fueling the dictators' military economies. It is important to understand that all these sanctions were imposed because Lukashenko supports Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Europe will not turn a blind eye to the crimes of Lukashenko's regime, its support for Russian aggression, and internal repression.  However, despite the tough measures, Europe continues to support Belarus' civil society, showing that the country's future should not depend on the Kremlin and its puppets. All restrictions will remain in place and will only intensify until democratic changes occur in Belarus" , said Pavel Latushka.

"We strongly recommend all Belarusian banks disconnect from the Russian Bank’s Financial Messaging System (SPFS) to avoid secondary EU sanctions and focus their efforts not on supporting Lukashenko's dictatorial regime and its repressive policies, but on working in the interests of Belarusian citizens and the national economy. Continuing to assist in sanctions evasion brings Belarusian banks closer to restrictive measures that could affect the stability of Belarus’s financial system. I appeal to you, Pavel Vladimirovich Kallaur, as the head of the National Bank of Belarus: You can change course. Refuse to support a regime that places Lukashenko’s personal ambitions above national interests and focus on the real protection of Belarus’s financial and economic independence" , urged Pavel Latushka . On December 11, 2023, Pavel Latushka met in Brussels with the EU Special Representative for Sanctions, David O'Sullivan . The parties discussed a range of issues related to sanctions pressure on Lukashenko's regime. During the meeting, the need for the isolation of the SPFS, which is the Russian equivalent of SWIFT, was voiced. Subsequently, the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAU) provided a detailed justification for the necessity of imposing sanctions on SPFS and its role in circumventing already imposed restrictions. As a result, the EU, in its next sanctions package on June 24, 2024, introduced a ban for European banks outside of Russia to use SPFS. The new package also set conditions for creating a list of third-country banks connected to this system. These banks were then prohibited from conducting transactions with EU residents. Thus, the EU effectively introduced a mechanism for applying secondary sanctions for using SPFS. On October 11, 2024, the NAU sent a letter to Klaus Vedder , the head of the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and the Capital Markets Union (FISMA) of the European Commission, with information on Belarusian banks connected to SPFS and suspected of evading sanctions. The 16th sanctions package against Russia, adopted today, further tightened restrictions in the financial sector. In particular, the EU has, for the first time, imposed a ban on transactions involving specific credit or financial institutions established outside Russia that use SPFS. Specifically, three banks fell under secondary EU sanctions for using the Russian equivalent of SWIFT to circumvent EU sanctions. Two of these organizations were registered in Belarus and connected to SPFS, using it to bypass EU restrictive measures . It is worth recalling that by the end of 2021, almost all Belarusian banks were connected to SPFS. On December 9, 2021, the Central Bank of Russia announced that 23 Belarusian banks (including the Development Bank), as well as the National Bank, the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange, and the Belarusian Interbank Settlement Center, were included in the list of those connected to the system.