Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador I think everyone remembers how Lukashenko fed us fairy tales about the average salary of "five hundred bucks" for decades. There were years when Belarusians finally reached this cherished benchmark set by Lukashenko, although one may wonder why it was limited to 500. Why such a cap on dreams? But why be surprised when propagandists are seriously discussing how to convince Belarusians that a sack of potatoes is better than the Maldives. The period from 2010 to 2020 turned out to be a lost decade for the Belarusian economy. Unfortunately, even after 2020, things didn't improve; they got worse. The average economic growth rate from 2009 to 2013 was 3.2%, from 2014 to 2019 - only 0.4%, and from 2020 to 2023 - 0.2%. This can largely be attributed to the phenomenon known as the "middle-income trap." It is a situation in economic development where a country, after reaching a certain income level, becomes stuck and fails to progress towards becoming a fully developed country. The middle income trap occurs when a country's economic growth slows down and eventually stops after reaching a certain level. Countries trapped in the middle-income stage struggle to compete with both highly developed economies that have advanced technology and innovation, and low-income economies with low wages and low-cost manufacturing. Economists identify several reasons for falling into the middle-income trap, including low efficiency of investments, a lack of innovation, increasing prices for low-skilled labor in the face of a shortage of highly qualified workers, insufficient financial resources and modern infrastructure, and income inequality. Unfortunately, all these reasons are characteristic of the Belarusian economy. Despite attempts to increase investments, their effectiveness remains low. Billions of dollars have been poured into so-called modernization, breakthrough investment, innovation programs, and mega-projects like the Ostrovets NPP or the Svetlogorsk pulp and paper plant. However, none of these efforts have yielded positive results in terms of economic growth in the country. Investment efficiency is calculated by comparing the ratio of GDP growth to the volume of gross fixed capital formation with the previous period. That is, in simple terms, when we invest one dollar, we expect to receive two dollars in return, which translates to economic growth at the national level. However, when we end up getting, at best, 50 cents or no growth at all, it demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the invested funds. For a significant period of time, the share of fixed capital accumulation in GDP has been increasing on average, while the rate of GDP growth has remained almost stagnant or even decreased, indicating a decline in investment efficiency. Regarding innovation, over the past 13 years, there has been a rise in the proportion of low-value-added goods, such as agricultural or food products, and a decrease in the share of technically complex goods, such as machinery, equipment, and vehicles, in Belarusian exports to Russia. Similar trends can be observed in other trade directions as well. Even Belstat data reveals that the proportion of new goods in Belarusian exports remains relatively small. In the structure of shipped innovative products from 2010 to 2020, it did not exceed 2%, and in 2021, it accounted for only 0.6%. In the Global Innovation Index for 2023, Belarus ranked a distant 80th place, whereas in 2015, it held the 53rd position. Regarding the shortage of highly qualified personnel, we can observe this issue without resorting to statistics or various indices. We witness a significant outflow of such personnel abroad after 2020. Moreover, the illegitimate authorities themselves expel them due to political unreliability, further dooming the economy to new difficulties. According to official data, as of December 1, 2023, the number of unfilled vacancies in Belarus exceeded 137,000, and since the beginning of the previous year, the country's economy has lost over 58,000 workers. The problems are evident, but what can help Belarus break free from the middle-income trap? Are there any examples in global practice of overcoming it? Indeed, our closest neighbors, such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and several other Central European countries, have successfully escaped the middle-income trap. Russia, despite its abundance of natural resources, was also approaching this goal, but the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of Donbass, and the current full-scale aggression against Ukraine have undermined this prospect for Russia. So, what has helped Poland or Lithuania escape the middle-income trap, and why is it not possible under Lukashenko's dictatorship? Firstly, structural economic reforms play a crucial role in promoting the development of high-productivity industries, thereby increasing labor productivity. These reforms attract foreign investment into the country, providing effective financial resources that create new production infrastructure. But Lukashenko has consistently prevented any reforms and will continue to do so as long as everything is controlled by the invisible hand of the market, rather than his own grasp. Free market relations pose a threat to Lukashenko's current position as they would redistribute the national wealth of Belarus among all citizens as it should be, rather than solely benefiting the dictator's inner circle. Secondly, stimulating innovation is crucial for improving the efficiency of investments, labor, and financial resources, as well as creating more highly qualified job opportunities. However, the usurper resists innovation because it can only be fostered by free individuals who are economically independent from the regime. This poses the greatest danger to his unlimited power. Thirdly, and most importantly, the democratization of the country is the essential prerequisite for establishing a free and creative environment that fosters innovation. This involves strengthening institutions that ensure competition, uphold the rule of law, and protect property rights. Unfortunately, in modern-day Belarus, none of the aforementioned factors are being realized. On the contrary, the illegitimate regime, which unlawfully holds power in the country against the majority's will, has reversed all of these processes. Instead of democracy and progress, the regime is leading the nation towards totalitarianism, consigning millions of Belarusians to poverty and an ongoing struggle for survival. Thus, Lukashenko, like a villain from children's fairy tales, not only stole our votes, but he is also robbing us of our future and the future of our children. He is stealing our hope for a better life. The dictatorship condemns Belarusians to an endless pursuit of the elusive five hundred dollars, depriving them of any hope of breaking free from this vicious cycle. Only by rejecting dictatorship can Belarus have a chance at development, rather than descending into a state of degradation where Belarusians are forced to dream of a sack of potatoes instead of the Maldives.

Source: “Wyborcza” According to Pavel Latushka, one of the leaders of the Belarusian opposition, the pressure on Lukashenko is coming from China, and the Chinese are not pleased with the current situation on the Polish-Belarusian border due to the potential disruption to their goods transit. Latushka states that even the closure of a single railway crossing would deal a significant blow to Lukashenko and Putin, as reported in an interview with Gazeta Wyborcza. Pavel Latushka, a Belarusian opposition figure and former Belarusian ambassador to Poland, as well as the deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, met with the Podlasie voivode on Tuesday (January 16). The day before, he had discussions with the Marshal of Podlasie, accompanied by representatives of the Belarusian diaspora and the Belarusian minority. Is Podlasie a frontline region? This time, Latushka visited Białystok after Belarusian President-elect Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's meeting with the Warsaw mayor, Rafał Trzaskowski, the Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs, President Andrzej Duda, and the Speaker of the Sejm, Szymon Hołownia, last week. Tsikhanouskaya also chaired a meeting of the United Transitional Cabinet in the Polish capital. Discussions were held regarding plans for 2024, including finding ways to release political prisoners and promoting the “European choice among Belarusians” in this year's campaign. In Warsaw, Tsikhanouskaya called on the new Polish authorities to “do everything possible so that Belarus does not become a consolation prize for the Kremlin.” After the meeting between Pavel Latushka and the Marshal of Podlasie, Artur Kosicki (PiS), on Monday (January 15), the Marshal's Office issued a statement: “Until recently, EU funds from cross-border programs allowed for the implementation of valuable but costly Polish-Belarusian projects. However, since Russia's aggression against Ukraine and Alexander Lukashenko's alignment with the aggressor, these funds have been suspended. This has resulted in losses not only for Belarus but also for Podlasie. Nevertheless, the voivodeship authorities see an opportunity for long-term financial assistance from the European Union, specifically for projects related to Poland's engagement with Belarus. Marshal Kosicki, who also chairs the Commission for Eastern Poland (an association of five voivodeships in the eastern region and the Masovian Voivodeship), presented this perspective.” “The point is to recognize these voivodeships [in eastern Poland] as frontline regions. If we were granted such status, we could expect systematic cooperation with the EU. The current financial programs aimed at national minorities are not the main issue here. What is needed is a larger scale of both funding and action. Furthermore, we should differentiate between national minorities and the diaspora as two distinct matters,” Marshal Kosicki stressed. It has been reported that the position regarding the recognition of the voivodeships in the eastern wall as frontline regions has already been prepared. This involves providing special support at the EU level for four Voivodeships in eastern Poland: Podlaskie, Lublin, Podkarpackie, and Warmia-Mazury. In this context, the announcement from the Marshal's Office after the meeting with Latushka stated: "The Marshal also received a promise from Pavel Latushka that the leaders of the Belarusian opposition will support these efforts with the EU authorities." Death of another political prisoner Meanwhile, last week, yet another political prisoner died in Belarus. Vadzim Khrasko, aged 50, passed away in the Vitebsk penitentiary facility. He was seriously ill and did not receive timely medical assistance while in prison. This marks the fourth known death of a political prisoner in Lukashenko's prisons. The Lukashenko regime currently holds around 1,500 political prisoners in inhumane conditions, subjecting them to daily torture and forced labor. Among them is Andrzej Poczobut, an activist of the Union of Poles in Belarus and correspondent for Gazeta Wyborcza, who was arrested in March 2021. In February of the previous year, he was sentenced by a court in Hrodna to eight years in a penal colony on charges of "inciting hatred" and "terrorist activities," despite the fact that his arrest and the subsequent political trial orchestrated by the Belarusian authorities were based on his journalistic and social activities. He is currently imprisoned in Navapolack, from where sporadic information about his situation, including his health, has been obtained. It is estimated that approximately 250,000 Belarusians currently reside in Poland, with nearly half of them employed under civil law contracts. Many Belarusians also own their own companies. Additionally, around 26,000 Belarusian children attend Polish schools, and over 20,000 Belarusian students study at Polish universities. The Podlaskie Voivodeship is home to a significant portion of Belarusian emigrants, housing the largest Belarusian minority in Poland. According to the latest census, a total of 54,300 individuals in Poland declared their Belarusian nationality. A specific action strategy is needed During our conversation with Pavel Latushka on Tuesday (January 16) regarding his meeting with the Podlasie Voivode, Jacek Brzozowski, we inquired about the specific actions that the United Transitional Cabinet is counting on in relation to Belarus and the new government in Poland. Maciej Chołodowski: What specific actions does the United Transitional Cabinet expect regarding Belarus from the new Polish government? Pavel Latushka:  “First and foremost, it is crucial to develop a specific action strategy. While support expressed through media statements or the adoption of resolutions is important, concrete actions carry the most weight. This strategy should prioritize holding Lukashenko accountable for his criminal actions. Throughout his thirty-year rule, he has been responsible for numerous crimes for which he has not faced charges. Following the events of 2020 [referring to the rigged presidential elections], he should be held accountable primarily for the crimes committed as a result of his actions, numbering at least 136,000. These include cases of rape and political murders. We have provided evidence that Lukashenko has committed war crimes, such as the deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied territories. He must be brought before the International Criminal Court in The Hague for these crimes, and the actions that the Polish government, which can act as our legal representative if necessary, can take are of great importance. An arrest warrant is necessary. Furthermore, we expect the implementation of severe sanctions against Lukashenko's Belarus. The current sanctions have been mild and prolonged, allowing Lukashenko to adapt and even profit from loopholes. Given the human rights violations in Belarus, it is imperative to impose a comprehensive package of sanctions, including on all products manufactured in Belarusian prisons, where political prisoners, among others, are dying. In the 21st century, Lukashenko is allowing prisoners to work as slaves in prisons, and the goods produced from such labor are also sold in the EU. Proposals for a sanctions package in this regard have already been submitted to the Polish side. It is also crucial to support independent Belarusian media operating outside of Belarus, which are currently lacking funds. Additionally, sanctions should be imposed in relation to the union state, meaning the Union of Belarus and Russia, with Lukashenko as chairman and Putin as his deputy. This is important to us because the union state is being exploited to undermine the independence of Belarus.” What should Poland do to free political prisoners in Belarus, including Andrzej Poczobut? “First and foremost, Poland should lead a group of lobbyists within the EU to push for sanctions against Belarus. Talks are currently underway regarding the post-war situation in Ukraine, and the idea is that the United Transitional Cabinet should be recognized as a party in these discussions, or else, represented by our partners like Poland. Otherwise, Belarus will be sold to Russia. Regarding the release of political prisoners, Lukashenko has shown no intention of freeing them. Every day, more people are being sent to prison. Their release can only be achieved through confidential talks with intermediaries to establish a humanitarian list, prioritizing seriously ill prisoners, including those with cancer, women, and minors. Additionally, pressure on Lukashenko needs to be increased to make it hurt him. The current sanctions do not match the scale of the repression. It is important to remember that Lukashenko cannot be relied upon as a guarantor of Belarus's independence. Official talks with him at this stage would likely result in betrayal and would demotivate Belarusians who are against him, currently in prison, and experiencing torture. This could hinder their willingness to take to the streets again when needed.” Apparently, there are issues with legalizing the stay of Belarusians in Poland. Could you elaborate? “We have discussed this matter with the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, as well as with voivodes, including the Podlaskie voivodeship. The most significant problem concerns passports. Lukashenko has prohibited Belarusians from extending the validity of their passports outside the country. Consequently, people are left without documents or are forced to return to Belarus, where they face detention and prison sentences upon arrival. Lukashenko wants to isolate and reject this segment of society, signaling that he does not need them and that they have betrayed him. To address this, three-year travel documents should be issued to Belarusians residing in Poland, as well as appropriate documents for children born outside Belarus. Visa facilitation should be introduced for those wanting to leave Belarus, while assistance should be provided to those who want to reach Poland, such as individuals from Georgia whose legal stay is expiring, potentially leading to their deportation to Belarus. We have established a working group with the Ministry of the Interior and Administration to address these problems. The new head of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, has also offered assistance. Poland can play a leading role in developing a new strategy towards Belarus, given Sikorski's extensive experience in European and Eastern policy.” In your opinion, how will Lukashenko continue to play the card of the migration crisis on the border with Poland? “Lukashenko is facing pressure from China, and the Chinese are displeased with the current situation on the Polish-Belarusian border as it poses a threat to the transit of their goods, particularly to Germany, with the China-Germany trade estimated in the hundreds of billions of euros annually. Continuous pressure must be exerted from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and even Finland in this regard. The ultimate decision regarding the situation on the border rests with Putin. If he wishes to escalate the situation further, Lukashenko will continue to act as his puppet. Closing road and railway border crossings with Belarus, even if it's just one crossing, would strike a blow against Lukashenko and Putin. Imposing sanctions on the trade of goods, rather than restricting the movement of ordinary citizens, is crucial.”

Pavel Latushka: Deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador Like any dictator, convinced of the grandeur and exclusivity of his personality, Lukashenko undoubtedly contemplates what will happen after him and how to commemorate his name, as well as to solidify his legacy. However, Lukashenko's actions, particularly since 2020, demonstrate his rapid destruction of Belarusian sovereignty through the so-called Union State project. Paradoxically, in the dictator's mind, this project to dismantle the Belarusian state coexists with his belief that he, as the first president, is the creator of the state and that this constitutes his primary legacy. This mindset fuels his unhealthy megalomania, leading to the pursuit of grandiose projects such as the BelNPP, nuclear weapons, dreams of nuclear power, and the construction of palaces and residences that serve as monuments to himself during his lifetime. Rewriting the Constitution, manipulating laws, and securing personal guarantees are all part of the same narrative. This is also where his admiration for Hitler stems from. Historian Alexander Friedman has drawn attention to Lukashenko's sudden use of the term "living space," which has historical associations with the Nazis' concept of "Lebensraum". However, Belarusians remain unconvinced by these endeavors. The "people's love" that Lukashenko yearns for is enforced through the brutality of security forces, mass terror, and torture in prisons. Regardless of how long Lukashenko plans to cling to power or merely survive, he can be certain of two things: first, he will face persecution until the end of his life, whether political or biological, for the crimes he has committed, which have no statute of limitations; second, he will undoubtedly be remembered as the most despised figure in the eyes of the Belarusian people. This will be the sole legacy he leaves behind. Rest assured, we will exert every effort to ensure that Lukashenko wakes up each day with the realization of his fate — confined within a prison cell, where he and his "legacy" rightfully belong. *We recommend reading the report prepared by NAM analytics titled "The Union State as a Cover Up Instrument for imperial policy of Russia" for further insights.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador After the New Year, it appears that the dictator has chosen to dedicate more time to alcohol. This conclusion can be drawn from the new amendments to the law on advertising. These amendments, signed by the dictator himself, increase the amount of time allocated to advertising beer, low-alcohol drinks, gambling establishments, and gambling. Interestingly, advertising for education and employment abroad is now prohibited. This raises questions about the dictator's sudden interest in alcohol and simultaneous aversion to education. Who are these amendments targeting, and who stands to benefit from them? In our investigation of Lukashenko's amendments, we will also shed light on the consequences of the dictator's “excessive alcohol consumption”. Lukashenko has clearly gone too far this time. He is now actively suppressing knowledge and education. It is not difficult to guess why education abroad doesn't please the dictator. Limiting Belarusians’ access to knowledge has become a disturbing trend. For instance, the recent designation of the European Humanities University as an “extremist organization” and the current restrictions on advertising education abroad depict the regime’s stance on the education of its citizens. Investing in education is not profitable for Lukashenko. Educated individuals tend to have a better understanding of economics, law, sociology, and public administration, which exposes the failures of the regime’s policies. Convincing educated people of the regime’s narratives becomes an uphill battle. This brings to mind a personal story from my school days. I received an invitation from San Francisco College to enroll in the United States. I managed to deliver a letter to the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, who was leading the country at the time — Comrade Sokolov, if I recall correctly. Subsequently, I was summoned to the head of the International Relations Department of the Central Committee. I distinctly remember an elderly man with glasses sitting across from me, asking with curiosity but a hint of negativity, “Why do you need to study in the United States? I believe that in our country, you can receive a decent education.” Naturally, my request to study in the United States was denied. History seems to be repeating itself during the reign of the Lukashenko regime. The regime is well aware that foreign countries are interested in highly qualified personnel from Belarus. This presents a significant challenge for the regime. However, instead of investing in experience and education to retain these skilled individuals, the regime resorts to its usual approach: bans, limitations, and closures. Unfortunately, this fundamental mistake fails to increase the country’s attractiveness to specialists; rather, it diminishes it. Restrictions do not inspire motivation to remain in the country; they dampen it. The attack on the realm of knowledge has extended to other areas as well. According to media reports, approximately 10 Polish language schools in Belarus were closed down in December and January. Security forces conducted searches and detained several teachers and school directors. This widespread assault on foreign language schools is a concerning trend, leading to questions about the legal basis for these closures and the underlying reasons behind them. Speaking of such incidents, I recall a story from my time as the Ambassador of Belarus to France. There was an initiative, primarily from the French side, to establish a French institute in Minsk. This institute would have represented French culture in foreign countries, but at that time, there was neither a French institute nor a representative office of this important organization in Belarus. However, Lukashenko responded negatively to two reports on this matter. Subsequently, a meeting was convened by Andrei Kobyakov, who was the head of the administration at the time. The meeting included the Minister of Education, the Minister of Culture, the Chairman of the KGB, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and several other officials, including myself. During the discussion on the feasibility of opening a representative office of the French Institute in Minsk, one high-ranking official, Mr. Baranovsky, the former Ambassador of Belarus to Lithuania, said, “So, in a nutshell, the plan is like this: the French will open French language courses for Belarusians, and later Belarusians will leave for France?” In response to this argument, I suggested, “Let's ban the study of English, otherwise, everyone will leave for the United States of America.” This anecdote highlights how absurd the regime’s thinking can be, even today. The regime's battle against “brain drain” is being waged on multiple fronts, ironically by the regime itself. Propaganda plays a significant role in this endeavor. A systematic information campaign against Poland, where a significant portion of the Belarusian IT sector has relocated, has been initiated by the regime. Take a look at how regime propaganda portrays Poland. Representatives of the regime believe that launching a propaganda offensive against Western countries will improve the situation of education in Belarus and make it more attractive. However, this assumption is far from the truth. While discouraging Belarusians from seeking education abroad, the regime shows little concern for improving the quality of education within the country. Evidence of this can be seen in recent years. The Belarusian State University (BSU), the largest university in Belarus, proudly mentioned its inclusion in the list of the top 300 universities in the world, specifically the authoritative QS World University Rankings. However, in 2023, BSU experienced a significant decline, dropping 100 positions from 288th to 387th. This decline can be attributed, among other factors, to the decrease in international scientific cooperation—an obstacle created by the Lukashenko regime within the Belarusian higher education system. The increase in alcohol advertising appears particularly ironic in this situation. It is evident that the regime is desperately in need of money in the year leading up to the elections. Regime representatives understand that advertising stimulates demand for products, thereby contributing to increased revenue for companies that pay excise taxes to the country's budget. Since January 1, 2024, Belarus has raised excise taxes, which are included in the price of goods. Consequently, it is expected that these goods will become more expensive, serving as another source of budget replenishment for the regime. The decision to intensify advertising aims to boost demand for these products. To be fair, it is common for any state to replenish its budget through excise taxes. However, there is a crucial nuance. Not every state inflates its security apparatus by allocating substantial budgets solely to ensure the retention of power for an illegitimate dictator. Not every state needs to finance lobbyists to evade sanctions because, at minimum, not every state faces sanctions. Not every state allocates substantial funds to support a repressive machinery's operation. The money added to Belarus’ budget will not go to help needy, low-income families as the regime does not care about them. There are numerous examples that support this claim. A clear illustration is the abrupt termination of funding for the Belarusian Red Cross by foreign donors, which the regime calmly accepted. The Belarusian branch of the largest international humanitarian organization lost its funding due to Secretary General Shevtsov’s refusal to step down following a gross violation of the movement’s principles. It is astonishing that a single regime representative, Mr. Shevtsov, cost Belarusians millions of dollars in foreign aid for humanitarian purposes. Meanwhile, the same regime is shutting down civil society organizations, including charities and humanitarian groups. The cost of maintaining the repressive apparatus and the regime itself, as well as the havoc and terror inflicted by the security forces on hundreds of thousands of Belarusians, is also worth considering. How much does it cost to maintain the regime and the repressive apparatus? How much does Lukashenko cost us? The answer is clear: Lukashenko costs Belarusians far too much. In such circumstances, how can the regime explain to Belarusians that these expenses are made with “good” intentions? The answer lies in further increasing the state budget expenditure on propaganda costs. Consequently, we, the Belarusian people, will have to contribute to anti-Polish narratives on television, the PR campaign advocating for the placement of nuclear weapons in the country, and the restoration of the dictator's image. Even Azarenok, who utters offensive remarks on state television, needs to be sustained. Propaganda serves as a tool employed by the regime to prevent people from noticing the evident and unequivocal events unfolding in the country. It is propaganda that is prepared to justify the killing of peaceful protesters in 2020, the closure of schools, the branding of universities as extremist, and Lukashenko’s war crimes. However, the regime must remember that propaganda justifications do not absolve Lukashenko himself of responsibility for his actions and his accomplices. Regime propaganda often accuses the Belarusian democratic forces of engaging in destructive activities. This is a classic propaganda technique — to accuse one’s opponent of actions in which you are deeply involved, effectively launching a “pre-emptive strike”. Meanwhile, as Belarusian-language publishing houses are closing and the Belarusian language and culture face oppression, at a time when the Belarusian language and culture are being oppressed, after 7 people were fired from the Braslav Museum of Traditional Culture, the Free Belarus Museum, a project of the National Anti-Crisis Management team, continues its active work in Warsaw. In 2023, the Museum hosted over 150 cultural and educational events, with more than 8,500 participants involved. While private schools are being shut down in Belarus and the promotion of foreign education is prohibited, the “Personnel Reserve for New Belarus” program operates abroad, preparing educated and experienced professionals to contribute to the development of New Belarus. Despite the regime labeling higher education institutions as “extremist”, the democratic forces of Belarus are working on a project for the Belarusian National University in Warsaw. So, who are the real extremists? Who is carrying out destructive activities? While Lukashenko expands alcohol advertising and raises excise taxes to replenish his budget, we aspire for our children to receive quality education, for Belarusians to become skilled professionals, and for Belarusian universities to be recognized worldwide. Millions of Belarusians desire the restoration of the rule of law in the country and the release of political prisoners — thousands of innocent individuals who spoke out against violence and injustice in Belarus. This represents our positive agenda. What does the regime offer to the Belarusian people?

Pavel Latushka: Deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador Solving the pressing problems of Belarusians abroad is the focus of the democratic forces in Belarus. The working trip of the deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, the head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Pavel Latushka, to the Podlaskie Voivodeship continues. On January 16, a meeting took place with the new Head of the Podlaskie Voivodeship, Jacek Brzozowski, who is the representative of the Polish government in this region. During the meeting, Pavel Latushka initiated a discussion of the problematic issues concerning the legalization of Belarusians who were forced to leave the territory of Belarus and now live in Poland. These issues have been raised by Belarusians during meetings with representatives of the United Transitional Cabinet and the NAM team. During the meeting, the following issues were highlighted: Issues related to the apostille of documents, including the possibility of using a contract on legal assistance to avoid the need for an apostille on documents submitted to the authorities of Poland. Problems with issuing Polish travel document (dokument podróży) and extending it validity to up to 3 years, as well as the possibility of issuing this document for Belarusian children born on Polish territory. The process of issuing invitations from Belarusian citizens residing in Poland to obtain Polish visas. Concerns regarding Belarusian-language education in the voivodeship for the Belarusian ethnic minority and the diaspora, the functioning of lyceums with additional study of the Belarusian language in Hajnówka and Bielsko-Biała, and the possibility of establishing Belarusian-language weekend schools for Belarusian children. The establishment of the Center of Belarusian Culture in Bialystok. Issues related to the functioning of the Polish-Belarusian border, particularly in the context of the Lukashenka regime conducting a hybrid war using illegal migrants against European Union member states neighboring Belarus. An agreement was reached with the Head of the Podlaskie Voivodeship to take necessary actions at his level to address the problems faced by Belarusians. Additionally, the summarized material will be sent to the working group created between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Poland and the United Transitional Cabinet to develop solutions for these problematic issues. During the meeting, Pavel Latushka expressed gratitude to the regional authorities for their constructive attitude towards the problems of Belarusians and their support for the Belarusian ethnic minority. He also noted the readiness of the United Transitional Cabinet to continue cooperation. Pavel Latushka emphasized that the new democratic authorities in Belarus will do everything possible to ensure the rights of the Polish ethnic minority in Belarus, including their right to study the Polish language and develop Polish culture in accordance with international standards. Pavel Latushka also held meetings with Archbishop Jacob of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Białystok and Gdansk, the leadership of the Belarusian Union in Poland representing the Belarusian ethnic minority, the management of "Radio Racyja" and the "Niva" weekly publication for Belarusians in Poland, as well as well-known representatives of the Belarusian ethnic minority, including Yauhien Wap, Aleh Latyshonak, the organizer of the "Tutaka" festival, Pavel Stankevich, and the director of the Center of Belarusian Culture, Anatol Wap. The day before, a two-hour meeting was held with representatives of the Belarusian diaspora in Bialystok at the Belarusian hub Novaya Ziamlia. During the meeting, Pavel Latushka addressed questions regarding the internal situation in Belarus, elections to the Coordination Council, aid and release of political prisoners, sanctions pressure, and other issues. It is important to note that during the meeting, the Belarusians primarily discussed possible actions they can take to change the situation inside Belarus and facilitate a faster return to their homeland. This emphasizes the motivation of the Belarusian diaspora residing in the Podlaskie region to promote democratic changes in Belarus.

The legalization of Belarusian businesses, the establishment of the Center for Belarusian Culture in Bialystok, and addressing the issues faced by the Belarusian diaspora in Poland –these were the main topics  discussed during a meeting held on January 15 in Bialystok between Pavel Latushka, the Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, and Artur Kosicki, the Marshal of Podlaskie Voivodeship. During the meeting, Pavel Latushka expressed gratitude for the decision to open the Center for Belarusian Culture in Bialystok and emphasized the significance of such an organization's activities. The Polish authorities' decision to establish a Belarusian cultural institute in the region was acknowledged as an important step that will contribute to the further development of Belarusian culture in Podlaskie Voivodeship. The voivodeship is home to a historically large population of ethnic Belarusians, which has grown in recent years due to the influx of tens of thousands of Belarusians forced to leave their country. Pavel Latushka, who served as the Ambassador of Belarus to Poland, initially opened the cultural center in Bialystok as a diplomatic institution in 2008. However, the Lukashenko regime subsequently decided to relocate the center to Warsaw, rendering it practically non-functional. Currently, the cultural center has been established as a legal entity, and a bank account has been opened. The Marshal of Podlaskie Voivodeship revealed plans to allocate over 340 thousand euros from the voivodeship budget for the center's activities. Anatol Vap, a representative of the Belarusian ethnic minority in Poland, will lead the center. Pavel Latushka shared information that, according to Polish statistics, there are 731 companies with Belarusian participation in Podlaskie Voivodeship, making it the second-largest region in Poland in this regard. In response to Pavel Latushka's proposal, the Marshal expressed interest in organizing a separate event focused on small businesses in the region to address issues related to business legalization, interactions with banking institutions, and other concerns. The meeting also addressed the matter of European Union funds that were previously allocated for cross-border cooperation between Belarus and Poland. Due to the actions of the Lukashenko regime, this financial support was halted. The voivodeship has approached the European Commission with a proposal to amend legislation so that the funds can be utilized for the region's needs, particularly for the benefit of the Belarusian ethnic minority and diaspora residing there, as well as to support cultural, economic, social, and community projects. It was agreed that the United Transitional Cabinet would propose supporting this initiative of the local authorities within the framework of the Belarus-EU advisory group. Education in the Belarusian language and scholarships for prominent figures in Belarusian culture, which could be funded by the Podlaskie Voivodeship, were also discussed during the meeting. The Marshal expressed preliminary consent to allocate funds for these purposes, taking into account the repressive conditions faced by Belarusian cultural figures. Pavel Latushka, along with Alina Koushyk, the representative of the United Transitional Cabinet for National Revival, will continue to advocate for this issue. Furthermore, it was agreed that the Marshal would consider a proposal to provide internships within the Marshal's Department as part of the "Personnel Reserve for New Belarus" project.

The topic was discussed by Deputy Head of NAM, Artsiom Brukhan, during a conversation with Yury Hubarevich, responsible for regional development at NAM, on the "Personnel Reserve" channel. They addressed the peculiarities of working in local authorities and highlighted some concerning aspects. During my work there, I noticed that the regional Council of Deputies often functions as an extension of the regional executive committee. In what sense? For instance, when it comes to approving the budget, it is not the deputies who create and schedule the budget. The various departments, such as the culture department, are responsible for crafting their respective budgets. Once these budgets are finalized, they are then submitted to the financial department for approval. Only after that can the decision be brought to the Council of Deputies. Essentially, the executive authority prepares the draft decision for the Council of Deputies. This situation is absurd, yet sadly true. While there may be individuals brave enough to voice their concerns and call for change, they are not primarily there for such purposes. Instead, they often find themselves in a position where they simply sign, wave, vote, and press a button. So, what needs to be changed? The key transformation should be that the regional Council of Deputies becomes a genuinely elected body that holds influence over the executive branch's work. The regional executive committee, as the executive body of power, will not alter its nature until the deputies are elected by the people, accountable to the people, and fulfill their roles as representatives rather than mere "yes-men."

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador The year 2024 holds immense significance in the political calendar for both dictator Lukashenko and Belarusians who advocate for democracy. After the illegal referendum of 2022, the All-Belarusian People's Assembly was granted the status of a constitutional body. According to Lukashenko's constitution, the Supreme Council is required to convene for its inaugural meeting within 60 days following the election of "deputies." Therefore, the actual "elections" themselves hold no significance. However, considering the growing importance of the All-Belarusian People's Assembly, it becomes evident why it is crucial for the regime to conduct the February "election" campaign in a controlled manner, devoid of any alternatives. Once the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly is convened, which must occur no later than 60 days after the "non-elections" as per the constitution, the Presidium of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly and, most importantly, the Chairman of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly will be elected. In our case, there is no doubt that Lukashenko will assume these positions. It is highly likely that on April 20, the first All-Belarusian People’s Assembly in Belarusian history, which holds constitutional status, will be convened. Subsequently, Lukashenko will assume the role of its chairman, simultaneously combining two positions. Considering the dictator's emphasis on the importance of this year and the heightened mention of the presidential elections, it is plausible to speculate that the dictator's presidential campaign may commence after the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly. Although he can legally hold both positions until July 2025, the specter of August 2020 will likely push him to hold the presidential elections earlier than the summer of 2025. A well-developed scheme involving a single day of voting in February seems logical, as society would adjust to the idea of winter elections when people are less inclined to go out and prefer to wait for spring. As a result, two realistic scenarios can be envisioned regarding how Lukashenko might address the issue of preventing dual power: He combines both positions and runs for presidential elections in the winter of 2025. In this case, since everything revolves around a single individual, no alternative center of power would be created. The dictator assumes the role of the chairman of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, and someone who is incredibly loyal to Lukashenko runs in the presidential elections without attempting to establish any alternative. In our view, the only individual who fits this description would be a member of the dictator's family, specifically Viktor Lukashenko. A scenario is also conceivable in which Lukashenko assumes the role of chairman of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, while a person who aligns with the Kremlin runs in the presidential elections. This individual would function within the system established by the dictator. However, this scenario is likely to result in a power struggle, causing Lukashenko to lose whatever remnants of his diminished authority remain. Operational control will shift away from his hands, allowing Moscow to exert a more active influence on internal political processes in Belarus. Belarus has entered an election cycle that spans one and a half years. To determine the appropriate course of action, it is crucial to analyze the situation and devise solutions for implementation. We will present our proposed options for action.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador On January 10th, a briefing was held at the Canadian Embassy in Warsaw by the United Transitional Cabinet for ambassadors, chargé d'affaires, deputy ambassadors of all EU member states, as well as Argentina, Great Britain, Canada, Chile, Japan, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Australia, and New Zealand. The video showcases the points that were raised to foreign diplomats. I am often asked about my motivation to persist and continue fighting, despite the worsening situation in Belarus every day. I could provide a detailed and grim account of it, but instead, I will present a few numbers that speak for themselves. According to the human rights center "Viasna," by the end of 2023, there were officially 1,430 recognized political prisoners in custody in Belarus. Additionally, there are 745 former political prisoners who have served their entire sentences. At least 48 political prisoners are pensioners, and at least 42 are people with disabilities and serious illnesses. Over the past year, two political prisoners, Ales Pushkin and Nikolai Klimovich, died in prison, and earlier, Witold Ashurok also died in custody. Tragically, there have also been cases of suicide. However, that is not all. According to a report by the Justice Hub Center for Law and Democracy, from May 2020 to May 2023, at least 136,000 people fell victim to crimes against humanity in Belarus. These crimes include illegal imprisonment, torture, murder, rape, and other forms of serious sexual violence, including against minors, as well as forced disappearances and deportations. These atrocities occur on a daily basis. Given that these numbers continue to rise and that crimes against the Belarusian people persist without respite, what do I believe in? My answer is that I believe in international law and accountability. This belief forms the foundation of the strategy we have been operating within and have been offering to our international partners throughout these years. Lukashenko and his accomplices must be held accountable, not only to deliver long-awaited justice but also to provide an alternative to the state into which Lukashenko has plunged the country. This alternative must stand against the regime's total arbitrariness, dictatorship, lawlessness, and disregard for the rule of law. How can we create such an alternative and make it the cornerstone of the West's comprehensive strategy for Belarus? International prosecution: It is crucial to issue an arrest warrant for Lukashenko. The International Criminal Court can base this warrant on two types of crimes committed by the dictator: crimes against humanity targeting Belarusians and war crimes. Sanctions as a means of accountability: Sanctions against the Lukashenko regime need to be tightened, with strict monitoring of their enforcement. One proposed measure is the adoption of a robust human rights package that targets sectors of the economy and goods produced using the labor of political prisoners. Furthermore, it is important to align economic sanctions against Russia and the Lukashenko regime concerning the war against Ukraine. International recognition of the United Transitional Cabinet: Supporting a political alternative to the illegitimate Lukashenko regime is imperative. Non-recognition and isolation of Lukashenko and his government should persist. An alternative to the "Russian world": Offering a European perspective for Belarus serves as an alternative to the current geopolitical climate. The European Union is the chosen path for democratic forces, and support for this choice should be extended by expanding and strengthening cooperation between EU institutions and democratic forces.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador At the beginning of the year, Lukashenko signed amendments to the Law on the President of the Republic of Belarus, which, among other benefits, prioritized the immunity of the dictator and his family members. However, it's important to note that we are not discussing the health of the aging Lukashenko. Rather, Lukashenko is aware that the customary immunity granted to heads of state may not be sufficient to shield him from the consequences of his actions over the past three and a half years. Consequently, the dictator has opted to address this issue in the only way he knows – by inventing a law that guarantees him the desired protection if it does not already exist. While this method may be effective within the confines of Belarus, where people are held hostage by the dictator and the system itself, unfortunately, can outlive the dictator, its power beyond the country's borders is questionable. State officials' immunity primarily exists as a legal concept that governs the relationships between states. Let's examine the effectiveness of such a measure. According to customary international law, immunity is derived from the principle of sovereign equality among states and aims to define the limits of jurisdiction exercised by states in their interactions with one another. State immunity extends to individuals in different forms based on their relationship to the represented state, primarily to ensure their immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of other states. Individuals representing a state may enjoy two types of immunity: personal and functional. Functional immunity generally applies to all government agents acting in an official capacity. However, this immunity does not cover actions committed by individuals in their personal capacity (private actions). Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that international law has developed exceptions to functional immunity, particularly in cases involving the prosecution of the most serious international crimes, such as crimes against humanity and war crimes. Various theories and rationales support this exception. For instance, some scholars argue that the duty to prosecute and prevent the commission of international crimes represents mandatory rules that take precedence over other rules of international law. Moreover, a widely held view among experts is that by accepting international treaties that impose obligations to prosecute crimes in accordance with international law, states implicitly waive the immunity of their officials who commit such crimes. This line of reasoning was the foundation of the Pinochet case before the UK House of Lords, which determined that functional immunity for the crime of torture was effectively abolished by states that ratified the 1984 Convention against Torture. The most progressive position, enjoying broad support within the expert community, is that an exception has emerged within customary international law. This exception stipulates that functional immunity does not extend to the jurisdiction over the most serious international crimes, such as crimes against humanity. According to the adopted amendments, Alexander Lukashenko will be granted immunity after the termination of his presidential powers. He cannot be held accountable for actions committed in the exercise of his presidential duties, and as a result, he cannot be detained, deprived of personal freedom, or subjected to investigative and other procedural measures. Additionally, his family members, primarily his children, will also enjoy similar immunity. Thus, the adopted amendments explicitly reference functional immunity, specifically relating to official actions, which by definition do not encompass those associated with the commission of the most serious international crimes. Therefore, this law serves as a kind of placebo for the dictator, intending to mimic the immunity of Alexander Lukashenko, which, in reality, never existed. On the other hand, the three highest officials of the state, traditionally recognized as the head of state, the head of government, and the minister of foreign affairs, enjoy personal immunity in addition to functional immunity. Personal immunity remains in effect as long as the individual holds the respective position and applies to both official and private actions. Personal immunity ceases when the person leaves office or status, but continues to cover official acts performed during their tenure. It is worth considering that due to some states recognizing Alexander Lukashenko as someone who continues to control the system of public administration in Belarus, they may recognize his entitlement to the privileges of personal immunity. As per current international law, no exceptions exist for prosecuting a person with personal immunity. However, it is important to remember that once Alexander Lukashenko ceases to hold the position of the regime's leader, neither functional nor personal immunity will shield him from accountability for actions committed in his personal capacity, particularly his international crimes. Any state that possesses the desire and necessary legislation will have the opportunity to hold Alexander Lukashenko accountable for these crimes within the framework of its national jurisdiction. Furthermore, members of Alexander Lukashenko's family do not possess any personal immunities. If they are implicated in international crimes, they may face criminal prosecution in any country at present. Moreover, several states have started to acknowledge the possibility of not recognizing personal immunities of current heads of state concerning the most serious international crimes. A notable example is the recent arrest warrant issued by a French court for the current President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, for crimes against humanity. However, it is crucial to bear in mind that references to immunity are only relevant within the context of criminal prosecutions in national jurisdictions. Presently, Alexander Lukashenko's international crimes are already under the spotlight of the International Criminal Court (ICC), where immunities simply do not exist within their procedures. The ICC will undoubtedly undertake all necessary measures to ensure the completion of the required procedures. And NAM will certainly do everything possible in this matter to help bring all necessary procedures to their logical conclusion. Should an arrest warrant be issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, any state party to the Rome Statute is obligated to carry out the extradition procedure for the concerned individual if they appear within that state's jurisdiction. No law enacted in Belarus will have any impact on this matter. To illustrate how this mechanism operates, we recommend acquainting oneself with the fate of the former President of Sudan and a close friend of dictator Lukashenko, Omar al-Bashir, who evaded international justice for 10 years, with each of his trips outside the country fraught with constant risks of arrest. A similar destiny is inevitable for Alexander Lukashenko. In essence, the new law serves as a placebo for the dictator and his entourage, temporarily boosting his morale through self-deception, but it will in no way shield him from international criminal prosecution or grant him immunity.

Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador. This year marks a significant milestone in Polish-Belarusian relations – the Lukashenko regime will have been in power for 30 years on the eastern border of Poland. Throughout the years, there have been various phases in the relationship between Poland and Belarus under the rule of Lukashenko, but never before has there been such a deep freeze in modern history. This is not merely a figure of speech – these relations are currently frozen in a literal sense. However, it is essential to clarify that they are frozen specifically with the Lukashenko regime, while Poland's ties with Belarusian democratic forces have never been closer or more allied. According to a report from the Center for Law and Democracy Justice Hub, since May 2020, at least 136,000 individuals have fallen victim to crimes against humanity committed by the Lukashenko regime. These crimes include unlawful imprisonment, torture, murder, rape, other forms of sexual violence, including against minors, forced disappearances, and deportations. These atrocities are unfolding behind the eastern wall of Poland, and they represent the deliberate state policy of the Lukashenko regime. Of the hundreds of thousands of Belarusians escaping this policy, the majority have sought refuge in Poland. The assistance provided by Poland is invaluable, and it positions the country as a leading supporter of the Belarusian people within Europe. Poland has also been one of the most proactive forces in exerting pressure on Lukashenko's criminal regime. Undoubtedly, this role exposes Poland to serious threats emanating from the Lukashenko regime. As a result of the support extended to Belarusians in 2021, Lukashenko effectively waged a hybrid war against Poland. This war has manifested itself through a migration crisis, with Poland bearing the brunt of the burden, as well as the repression of the Polish national minority in Belarus. Additionally, there has been an information war characterized by virulent anti-Polish propaganda. This war has unequivocally demonstrated that Lukashenko's words hold no value. The dictator's promise, made on the eve of the conflict, that not a single soldier would enter Ukraine from Belarusian territory was followed by a treacherous stab in the back and a bloody massacre in Bucha, Irpen, Gostomel, and Borodyanka. Today, the same individual speaks about the importance of peace and refers to neighboring countries as "gifts from God." His shadow diplomacy is once again attempting to employ old tricks, signaling to the West that Lukashenko remains a "guarantor of sovereignty" and that he should be given "room for maneuver."

Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador. “The Ministry of Justice of Poland will pay special attention to human rights violations in Belarus,” noted Deputy Minister of Justice of Poland Krzysztof Smiszek during a meeting with the deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management Pavel Latushka.The meeting took place on January 4 following the agreements with the new Minister of Justice of Poland, Adam Bodnar. The Polish side conveyed a welcoming speech from the new minister and expressed their commitment to restoring the rights of victims of gross violations of human rights and international crimes in Belarus. Pavel Latushka provided detailed information about the current situation in Belarus, particularly emphasizing the daily repression and violence against the civilian population. The Polish side was given comprehensive information about war crimes committed by the highest military-political leadership of the Lukashenko regime against civilians in Ukraine, particularly minors. The need to hold the top military-political leadership of the Lukashenko regime accountable for crimes of aggression against Ukraine was emphasized, and Pavel Latushka presented the main directions of the National Anti-Crisis Management's work in bringing Lukashenko to justice. During the meeting, the following points were discussed: A request was made to the Polish side for assistance in advocating for bringing Lukashenko to justice for the war crimes and crimes against humanity he committed at the International Criminal Court (ICC); The Polish side proposed the creation of a working group between the Polish Ministry of Justice and the National Anti-Crisis Management to develop and implement specific mechanisms to ensure Lukashenko's criminal liability; The importance of addressing Lukashenko's responsibility for his involvement in aggression against Ukraine was highlighted by one of the leaders of the Polish Ministry of Justice. Krzysztof Smiszek assured that necessary efforts would be made to advocate for Lukashenko's responsibility in international criminal mechanisms. The Deputy Minister of Justice emphasized that the new government would not allow Belarus to be forgotten on the international stage. The Polish side proposed continued regular contacts to ensure the implementation of the discussed issues.