Source: picture-alliance/dpa/B. Roessler Spring 2026 has become a moment of truth for the Lukashenko regime. While official statistics attempt to save face, external pressure is entering a new phase. The 20th EU sanctions package, adopted on 23 April, is yet another step toward eliminating the "Belarusian offshore" that for years helped the Kremlin circumvent Western barriers. Before analysing the new sanctions, it is worth examining the economic context in which Belarus and Russia already find themselves. Head of Swedish Military Intelligence Thomas Nilsson. Source: haqqin.az The head of Swedish military intelligence, Thomas Nilsson, stated directly in an interview with the Financial Times: the Kremlin is systematically manipulating figures. According to Swedish intelligence, Russia is understating its budget deficit by $30 billion. The official inflation rate of 5.86% is far below the real rate of 15%. Russia's economy is "living on credit" and is heading either toward a long-term decline or a sharp shock. For the Lukashenko regime, this is a warning signal: the "big brother," who is the main donor and market, is concealing the depth of its financial hole. If the Russian economy follows the "shock" scenario, the consequences for the Lukashenko regime will be avalanche-like. Data for the first quarter of 2026 paint a picture of a crisis economy in Belarus, where consumption is growing while production and investment are falling. Enormous warehouse stocks indicate that enterprises are operating at a loss to maintain employment, but their output finds no market. This is a "time bomb" for the financial stability of the system. Despite the efforts of lobbyists, the new EU sanctions package against the Lukashenko regime once again extended their validity until 28 February 2027. This is a signal that the "thaw" the Lukashenko regime had been counting on will not come. Investments will not arrive, borders will not open, assets will remain frozen. This encourages internal sabotage among those officials who still hoped to "wait it out.For the Kremlin, the value of Belarus as a "logistics hub" and "window to Europe and the world" is rapidly declining. If diamonds, computers, and spare parts can no longer be transported through Belarus, and its enterprises fall under sanctions alongside Russian ones, then it turns into a costly liability that simply needs to be maintained.This package, like several preceding ones, is aimed primarily at harmonising restrictions against the Lukashenko regime and Russia. The main goal is to make it impossible to use Belarus as a loophole for the Kremlin to circumvent sanctions. Harmonisation has affected a wide range of goods: bans have been imposed on certain types of raw materials, metals, minerals, steel scrap, chemicals, vulcanised rubber products, tanned furs, metal production tools, and industrial tractors, and import quotas on ammonia have been introduced. All these measures will be supplemented by tightened bans on transit through Russian territory. The list of goods prohibited from transit through Belarus has also been expanded. From 25 May of this year, the provision of cybersecurity services to Belarusian state bodies is prohibited. This is a blow to the technological development of the Lukashenko regime, which is building a "digital GULAG" in Belarus. The EU has also blocked the use of the "Belarusian digital ruble" before its official launch, planned for the second half of 2026. This system had not yet been fully launched but was considered a potential instrument for circumventing sanctions. This is a rare case where sanctions are directed not at an existing problem but at a future one. The regime is being deprived of the ability to create a new channel for circumventing restrictions before it even comes into existence. Any transactions through Belarusian crypto platforms have also been banned. These measures are aimed at preventing the regime from using digital payment systems to circumvent existing restrictions. This will significantly complicate settlements serving "shadow" operations to bypass sanctions. A strict traceability mechanism for trade in Russian diamonds has also been introduced. Importers in the EU must now prove that the stones are not of Russian origin. This measure closes the scheme of their resale through Belarus. As far back as 20 November 2023, the NAM had reported on the threat of circumventing sanctions against Russia's diamond industry via Belarus and had transmitted this data to the European Commission. A report on this matter was also published on 23 November 2023 in the major European outlet European Interest Media. In the new sanctions package, for the first time a Chinese state organisation has come under sanctions — one linked to the production of military equipment in Belarus through the joint venture "Volat-Sanziang". This is a clear signal from the European Union to Beijing: cooperation with Lukashenko in the military sphere is toxic and will have negative consequences. Thus, cooperation with the Belarusian military-industrial complex may have consequences not only for Russia but also for its partners. Overall, the toxicity of any projects linked to Belarus's military industry is sharply increasing, making them less attractive even for those who were previously willing to operate in the grey zone. Illustrative photo Also on the EU sanctions list is the Belarusian Oil Company (BOC), which strikes at one of the key sources of foreign currency revenue for the Lukashenko regime — petroleum products. Every operation for the company now becomes more difficult: banks are more cautious, partners demand additional guarantees, settlements take longer and cost more. As a result, the regime is forced to sell its products at greater discounts or through non-transparent schemes. In other words, exports partially remain but their efficiency declines. The European Union, in its new sanctions decisions, has moved toward radical measures against re-export through third countries. In particular, the export of computers and radio stations from the EU to Kyrgyzstan has been banned due to the risk of them ending up in Russia or Belarus. This is an unprecedented precedent: the EU is imposing trade sanctions against an entire country caught facilitating the circumvention of existing restrictions. The new package also introduces a measure whereby sanctions can now be imposed on individuals and legal entities from any country if they assist in supplying prohibited goods to Belarus. This changes the rules of the game. If previously partners could count on a certain distance — arguing that they were not directly under sanctions — that distance no longer exists. Every transaction becomes a potential risk. Foreign counterparties will also no longer be able to claim compensation for failure to fulfil contracts if this is caused by sanctions. In the 20th sanctions package against Russia, a ban on liquefied gas terminal transshipment services has been introduced, which will come into force in 2027, reducing the overall revenues of the aggressors. Furthermore, in the new anti-Russian sanctions, the broadcasting ban has been extended to "mirror" structures that duplicate the content of sanctioned channels. This may also affect Belarusian platforms if they are used to broadcast Russian content banned by the EU. This is yet another blow to the propaganda of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. The 20th package is the result of systematic lobbying. Measures on sanctions against third countries, trade quotas, and transit restrictions had been consistently proposed by the NAM for implementation in 2023–2025. The European Union had until recently refused to adopt such radical measures. But now this is already a reality. Thus, the European Union is not striking at individual enterprises or individual sectors. It is striking at the very model upon which the regime's adaptation to sanctions was built. This means fewer opportunities for manoeuvre, greater risks for partners, higher costs for every operation, and the gradual narrowing of space for economic activity. This is precisely why the effect of this package will not be immediate but cumulative. With each new restriction, the system does not collapse, but becomes ever more burdensome, costly, and dependent. And this is, perhaps, the main result. At least until February 2027, the Lukashenko regime will remain in a state of resource exhaustion. The growth of real household incomes against the backdrop of falling production looks like a "feast during the plague," which will inevitably end in the financial crisis that European intelligence services are warning about. The Lukashenko regime must stop playing at aggression and dictatorship and embark on the path of democratic transition — otherwise it may be too late.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. Many have heard the abbreviation PACE, including in the context of the official delegation of the Coordination Council now working there. But what actually stands behind these four letters and why does it matter so much to all of us? The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is one of the continent's largest political platforms, uniting parliamentarians from 46 states. It is a body that shapes the European legal framework and adopts the most important political resolutions. These documents set the direction and serve as the legal basis for decisions made by European governments concerning our region. To get into PACE, Belarus has travelled a very long road. Performance of the "Free Choir" at the session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Strasbourg, France. 20 June 2023. Photo: tsikhanouskaya.org This is so because Belarus had no full-fledged representation in PACE for decades. In January 1997, PACE stripped Belarus of its "specially invited" status as a country that had deviated from the path of democracy. The reason was that in 1996, Lukashenko held an unconstitutional referendum, through which he concentrated power in his own hands and dissolved the legitimately elected parliament — the Supreme Soviet of the 13th convocation. From that moment on, our country's seat there was either empty or attempts were made — unsuccessfully — to fill it with regime appointees. But it was precisely due to the regime's anti-democratic policies that they did not succeed. But now the situation has changed fundamentally: PACE has established institutional relations with the democratic forces — the Coordination Council. Now in Strasbourg, it is not the lies of Lukashenko regime officials that are heard, but the real voice of society. We are the first country which, without being a member of the organisation, has its own official Coordination Council delegation there, representing society rather than a dictatorship. How did this become possible? Photo: NAM-media The key factor is ELECTIONS. The Coordination Council of the 3rd convocation became the first in history to be formed through the direct vote of Belarusian citizens. It was precisely this democratic mandate that became the decisive argument for international recognition. Without elections of this level, such representation in PACE would have been impossible to achieve, and this recognition simply would not have happened. And now, as members of the Belarusian delegation to PACE, we have the opportunity to work within committees, participate in debates, and contribute to the preparation of documents and decisions on Belarus together with our European colleagues. We successfully lobbied for the inclusion of Belarus's top military-political leadership in the resolutions on the creation of a Special Tribunal for aggression against Ukraine. We use this platform for concrete matters: from questions of accountability to resolving issues of legalisation of Belarusians abroad and protection of the rights of political prisoners. This is not merely a status in international protocol. This is a real instrument of international influence that we have returned to the Belarusian people.

Today the EU adopted the 20th sanctions package against Russia, which also concerns the role of the Lukashenko regime in supporting the Kremlin's aggressive war against Ukraine. It includes enterprises linked to the Belarusian military-industrial complex and the Lukashenko regime. For the first time, a Chinese state organisation is being targeted due to its role in the production of Belarusian military goods. Sanctions can now apply to individuals from third countries (neither Belarus nor the EU) if they assist in supplying prohibited goods to Belarus. In particular, sanctions have been imposed on Volat-Sanziang LLC, its Chinese founder, and Belarusian Oil Company CJSC. Volat-Sanziang is a Belarusian-Chinese joint venture established with the participation of the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant. It produces wheeled chassis for military equipment, including multiple rocket launch systems. Belarusian Oil Company CJSC is Belarus's leading oil exporter and is owned by several of the largest oil extraction and refining enterprises in the Republic of Belarus, including Belarusneft and Naftan. In addition, the package includes measures analogous to those imposed on Russia — in particular, new trade restrictions, cryptocurrency restrictions, and restrictions on the provision of cybersecurity and tourism services. Harmonisation continues. Diamond tracking requirements have also been strengthened, obliging importers of processed diamonds to provide a due diligence declaration confirming that the diamonds were not mined, processed, or manufactured in Russia. Belarus is known to have been a transit point for Russian diamonds. As far back as 20 November 2023, the NAM had reported on the threat of sanctions circumvention targeting Russia's diamond industry via Belarus and had transmitted this data to the European Commission. A report on this matter was also published on 23 November 2023 in the major European outlet European Interest Media. Any transactions involving the "Belarusian digital ruble" have also been prohibited — the launch of which the National Bank of Belarus had planned for the second half of 2026. The EU is effectively blocking this system before its full launch, depriving the regime of the ability to use it to circumvent sanctions. And we had warned the regime. For the first time in history, the EU is activating its anti-circumvention instrument, prohibiting the export of any computers with numerical control and radio stations to Kyrgyzstan, where there is a high risk that these products will be re-exported to Russia. All these measures will be supplemented by a strengthened ban on transit through Russian territory. The list of goods prohibited from transit through Belarus has also been expanded. Finally, the EU is introducing an import quota on ammonia. The proposals of the NAM and the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus on sanctions against third countries, trade quotas, and transit restrictions had been consistently put forward as far back as 2023–2025. The EU had until recently refused to adopt such radical measures, but now this has become a reality for the European Union. "Our efforts have yielded results. The EU's 20th sanctions package is, in part, the implementation of the systematic proposals of the NAM and the United Transitional Cabinet. For the first time, not only regime enterprises but also international evasion schemes have come under fire. We continue to close the 'Belarusian offshore' for Russian diamonds and technologies. This is a qualitative transition from targeted pressure to a strategy of 'full encirclement'," — stated Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the NAM. Sanctions against the Lukashenko regime have been extended by the EU Council until 28 February 2027.

Pavel Latushka, March 25, 2026. Photo by LookByMedia. Source: nashaniva.com According to recent polling data, the coalition led by Pavel Latushka and Movement "For Freedom" could secure an absolute majority of seats in the political representation of Belarus' independent society. Despite being the primary target of the regime's most aggressive propaganda "heavy artillery," the Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet remains untarnished. The former Minister of Culture, who joined the democratic movement in 2020, continues to be one of the opposition's most popular figures. This trend is confirmed by online polls regarding the popularity of candidate lists for the 4th Convocation of the Coordination Council, with elections scheduled for May 11–17, 2026. Few have the courage to cast their vote for the Coordination Council amidst ongoing repression. In the 2024 elections, 6,700 people voted via the electronic platform, despite the regime's attempts to use propaganda for intimidation and discredit. Nevertheless, their voting patterns remain broadly representative of the wider opposition support base. In a poll launched by Reform.news on April 20—which, according to observations by Nasha Niva, has so far remained free of the artificial 'vote-stuffing' typically signaled by sudden spikes in data—voter preferences were distributed as follows: Online poll of voter preferences for the elections to the 4th convocation of the Coordination Council in the Reform.news Telegram channel as of 14:58 on April 20. Screenshot. As of 2:58 PM, approximately 55% of decided voters intended to vote for the Pavel Latushka and Movement 'For Freedom'. This marks a significant increase from the 2024 elections, where he secured roughly 35% of the vote. Latushka’s block faces no clear rival. The 'Volya' list, primarily composed of current and former Kalinouski Regiment volunteers, is polling at approximately 9%. Meanwhile, the 'European Choice' list—led by Valery Matskevich, Chief of Staff of the United Transitional Cabinet—and blogger Tatiana Martynova’s 'Enough Fearing' list are each drawing around 7% of the vote. An earlier poll conducted by Euroradio yielded similar results, though it was briefly compromised by artificial 'vote-stuffing' in favor of the 'Law and Order' block. It appears the public views Pavel Latushka as a substantial figure capable of withstanding the pressure and worthily representing Belarusians. Ultimately, the regime’s smear campaigns only seem to strengthen the trust placed in him. It appears that the desertion or alleged espionage activity of Anzhalika Melnikava—who was originally nominated as Council Speaker by Latushka himself—has not undermined public trust in him. Meanwhile, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who had previously maintained a skeptical stance toward the Coordination Council, has nevertheless urged Belarusians to cast their votes for the body. "Those who have decided to run for the Coordination Council have made a conscious choice. They understood exactly what they would face: pressure, threats, and risks—yet they chose to stand anyway. This earns my deepest respect. Belarus is built with every decision, with every choice. The Coordination Council will be exactly what we make of it. At this stage of the campaign, it is especially important not to rush, but to carefully study the lists, the individuals running for the Council, and the substance of their programs. An informed choice begins with understanding. The better we know who and what we are voting for, the stronger our collective position will be. Now is the time to read, compare, look into the essence of these platforms, and decide—so that our voice is not just a vote, but a responsible choice for the future of Belarus," says Tsikhanouskaya. Elections for the 4th Convocation of the Coordination Council will take place from May 11 to May 17, featuring nine electoral blocks and 174 candidates. In her video address, the democratic leader expressed her gratitude to everyone who continues to support Belarus through their words and actions. She emphasized that meaningful change begins with active participation.

During the spring session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and member of the Coordination Council's delegation to PACE, held a meeting with Mathieu Mori, Secretary General of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. During the meeting, Pavel Latushka expressed gratitude for the recent decision of the Congress Bureau to extend the participation of the Coordination Council's delegation in Congress sessions for another two years. Pavel Latushka also noted that he highly values the Congress Bureau's initiative to prepare a special report entitled "The Role of Local and Regional Authorities in Supporting Belarusian Democratic Forces and Civil Society." This document will be of significant importance for expanding the capabilities of Belarusian civil society during the period of forced emigration. In addition, Pavel Latushka thanked for the opportunity granted to members of the CC delegation in the Congress to participate in election observation missions in Council of Europe member states. Mathieu Mori noted the active work of the CC delegation in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the fruitful cooperation between the CC delegation and the Congress, and congratulated them on their achievements as a result of their work in 2025–2026. During the meeting, particular emphasis was placed on the special role and importance of local and regional authorities in supporting released Belarusian political prisoners and repressed Belarusians. The Secretary General stated that this issue is a focus of the Congress's attention and that work in this direction is planned to be intensified. As an example of successful engagement, Mathieu Mori cited the Tuscany region in Italy, where support programmes are in place and communication has been established with Belarusian democratic forces and the People's Embassy of Belarus in Italy. Pavel Latushka separately drew attention to the problem of elderly Belarusians who were forced to leave the country being unable to receive their pensions on the territory of European states. One of the proposed solutions put forward by Pavel Latushka was the introduction of social support programmes implemented by local authorities. The meeting also addressed the issue of transnational repression carried out by the Lukashenko regime. The parties discussed how local authorities can assist Belarusians facing persecution, specifically in matters of legalisation and social affairs at the municipal level (provision of housing, assistance to those in need, etc.). Mathieu Mori noted that the Congress can also provide concrete support through contacts with local authorities. The CC delegation in the Congress may forward citizens' appeals to the Congress in order to facilitate the resolution of their problems.

"We understand the strategy of the EU and Belarus's neighbouring countries — Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia — which are investing significant financial resources in the construction of defensive structures on the border. At the same time, they are increasing defence spending. Nevertheless, I am convinced that a two-track strategy is needed. It is essential to invest significantly greater resources in countering the 'Russian world' — specifically into Belarusian society, because only it can serve as a security guarantee for its neighbours," — stated Pavel Latushka, delegate of the Coordination Council and member of the CC delegation to PACE, during the side event "How the 'Russian World' Works: Ideology and Practice of Hybrid Aggression Against Europe" during the spring session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The side event was organised by the CC delegation to PACE. "The Russian Federation has set a strategic goal — to change the mentality of Belarusians so that they support the aggression against Ukraine and hold anti-Western sentiments. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, are being invested in this. Russia is doing this with the support of the Lukashenko regime. The European Union and our partners, in turn, allocate significantly fewer resources for these purposes — insufficient to counter Russia's plans. If we do not change this strategy, we may arrive at dire consequences. It is important to understand that Belarusians are already taxpayers in Europe. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians have been forced to leave their homeland and are working and paying taxes in the EU. And this is a request from me, as a representative elected by Belarusians — a request for support for Belarusian society. If we do not follow this path, then, regrettably, within a few years we may reach a situation where, on the border between Belarus and European Union countries, there stands a person of Belarusian origin with a Russian consciousness. Or, what is even worse, in a Russian uniform and ready to attack the territory of the European Union," — emphasised Pavel Latushka. Pavel Latushka also presented to the side event participants three reports prepared by the People's Anti-Crisis Management, on how Russia, using the imperial ideology of the "Russian world" with the support of the Lukashenko regime, is attempting to change the mentality of Belarusians and prepare society for entering the war on the side of the Russian Federation: "Systematic Preparation by the Lukashenko Regime for Possible Entry into the War on Russia’s Side and Recommendations for Preventing This Scenario"; "The Union State as a Cover Instrument for Russia's Imperial Policy"; "The Battle for Belarus: The Lukashenko Regime’s Systemic Policy of Destroying Belarusian Identity and Promoting the 'Russian World'". In addition, participants were presented with a report prepared jointly by NAM and BELPOL: "Children without a future: the militarization of childhood in Belarus".

Photo: NAM-media The European Union has no intention of softening sanctions against the Lukashenko regime. This was stated by the EU's Special Envoy for Sanctions, David O'Sullivan, in response to a question from Coordination Council delegate and member of the CC delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Pavel Latushka. During a session of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy at the PACE spring session, Pavel Latushka put the following question to the EU representative: "Will new sanctions against the Lukashenko regime be introduced in the near future? And are there any obstacles to this at present?" He also emphasised that the Lukashenko regime continues to destabilise the situation on the borders with Belarus's neighbours that are EU member states: Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. In responding to Pavel Latushka's question, David O'Sullivan noted: "All sanctions that the EU imposes against Russia automatically extend to Belarus as well. The EU consistently adheres to this policy and has no plans to change it." "The United States has begun to ease sanctions against Belarus, which is causing concern within the EU, as this creates 'gaps' in the sanctions regime against Russia. The European Union considers this problematic and has no intention of following the same path." Following the event, Pavel Latushka and David O'Sullivan held a separate conversation devoted to the need for continued pressure on the regime. During the conversation, Latushka stressed that as long as Lukashenko does not change his internal repressive and external aggressive policies, European sanctions must not be lifted.

Photo: Ruslan Seradzyuk On 18 April, a press conference of the Coalition "Latushka and the 'For Freedom' Movement" was held at the Museum of Free Belarus in Warsaw, as part of the election campaign for the fourth convocation of the Coordination Council. During the event, the coalition's list of candidates was presented, and its official electoral programme was formally launched. Pavel Latushka presented the results of the coalition's work during the third convocation of the Coordination Council. The report covered six key pillars of the programme: Accountability, Independence, Solidarity and the Diaspora, Pressure, Foreign Policy, and the Future. Speakers at the press conference included members of the coalition: faction leader Pavel Latushka, chairman of the "For Freedom" Movement Yury Hubarevich, Coordination Council Speaker Artsiom Brukhan, head of the "Pritulai Miane" foundation Hanna Federonak, and head of the Coordination Council's Legal Commission Mikhail Kirylyuk. In his address, Pavel Latushka emphasised that in the fourth convocation of the Coordination Council, the coalition will continue its systematic work to hold representatives of the Lukashenko regime accountable. The faction leader stated that the goal is to secure 3 arrest warrants for Lukashenko: for crimes against humanity committed against the Belarusian people; for the war crime of deporting Ukrainian children; and for the act of aggression carried out against Ukraine. Latushka also noted that the coalition will continue to lobby for sanctions pressure on the regime in order to achieve a change in its internal repressive and external aggressive policies, as well as to pursue the release of all political prisoners. "The Coordination Council can and should be criticised — but one must not turn a blind eye to the fact that it operates on the front line of pressure from the regime's security services. A war is effectively being waged against us. The regime's goal, and that of its security services, is to destroy the representative body of the Belarusian people." "But despite this, we have achieved unprecedented results. Coordination Council delegates have held bilateral meetings with parliamentarians from dozens of democratic countries, lobbying on issues of accountability for representatives of the Lukashenko regime and sanctions pressure. Our representative body has been recognised by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe — in which, for the first time in the history of the democratic forces, our official delegations are working. The Coordination Council also has its own delegation in the Parliamentary Assembly of Euronest and a shadow delegation in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The Coordination Council has likewise been recognised by the European Parliament and the Senate of Poland." "We have successfully lobbied for a series of additions and amendments to European Parliament resolutionsconcerning sanctions pressure, accountability for the torture of political prisoners, international criminal responsibility for crimes against the Belarusian people, and for the aggression against Ukraine." "The House of Representatives or the Council of the Republic could not even have imagined what the Coordination Council has managed to achieve in just one year and ten months of work", said Pavel Latushka.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. How the Regime is Turning Belarus's Lakes into Family Assets The dictator's helicopter over the Mogilev region in these April days of 2026 is not simply a routine working trip by a "hands-on manager" to the Paluzh fish farm. It is a signal that the final stage of carving up yet another sector of the country's economy has begun. While propaganda paints pictures of "restocking the nation's waters with fish," a large-scale operation is unfolding behind the scenes — transforming state losses into the personal income of one family. The last few years in Belarusian fish farming are a textbook example of how glossy presentations shatter against the iron logic of inefficiency. Lukashenko planned a trout paradise — in reality, he is presenting a "goldfish" in a broken trough. An ambitious target was set earlier: to bring trout production to 5,000–7,000 tonnes. In practice, as of April 2026, output barely reaches 1,000–1,500 tonnes. Why? Because trout is not carp — it requires expensive imported feed, clean water, and high-tech equipment. Belarusian shelves are 90% stocked with imported saltwater fish, while the domestic share of carp and trout in citizens' diets does not exceed 12%. The majority of state fish farms have become financial "zombies." They exist only on paper and on subsidies that are instantly swallowed up by debts for electricity and feed. Many ask: if the industry is loss-making, why has Lukashenko taken it on? The answer lies in a sophisticated asset management scheme. This is not mere mismanagement — it is a strategy. First, the state uses taxpayer money and crushing loans to build high-tech complexes (such as Paluzh itself). Then a situation of artificial bankruptcy is engineered: enterprises are forced to purchase overpriced and dubious-quality feed from BNBK, direct sales channels are cut off, and social debts are loaded onto them. Once the enterprise has been driven into "financial coma," the "saviours" appear — management structures linked to the Presidential Property Management Directorate or to the family's wallets. The result: the people pay for the construction and the debts, while the family receives a ready-made operation, export flows to Russia, and foreign currency revenue from fish product sales. Aleksander Lukashenko visited the Krasnopolsky District on a working visit. Source: ont.by A fish processing plant has already been opened near Minsk as part of the takeover of the fishing industry. Its owner, Lyudmila Neronskaya, is a close friend of Lukashenko's daughter-in-law and is connected to the dictator's eldest son, Viktor. Their children attended the same prestigious Minsk gymnasium together. Neronskaya flies to Dubai on a private business jet with Viktor's wife and children. She serves as director of the company "Morskaya Gavan" ("Sea Harbour"), which runs the "Morskiye Sezony" ("Sea Seasons") project in the Vitebsk region and the recently opened complex in Kolyadichi. It has recently emerged that "Morskaya Gavan" has purchased the "Belryba" fish complex in Minsk — 24,000 square metres — along with refrigeration and administrative buildings on Radialnaya Street. Lukashenko's interest in fish is not about phosphorus in Belarusians' diets. Three factors converge here. First, currency hunger: premium fish is "living currency" on the Russian market. Second, opacity: accounting for fish in closed tanks is an ideal environment for black cash. Third, feudal instinct: in his home region of Mogilev, he wants to create a personal fiefdom where, eventually, every fish will belong to "the clan." Meanwhile, the industry is suffocating — literally and figuratively. Modern fish farming cannot function without European water purification systems and sensors. Import substitution has failed here completely: Belarusian alternatives work intermittently, and spare parts must be sourced through grey schemes at a 300% markup. As for fish feed, BNBK has never managed to produce a feed on which trout grows as fast as on Danish feed. The result is Belarusian fish that is "gold-plated" in terms of cost price and uncompetitive without budget subsidies. Where there are state subsidies and murky waters, corruption always flourishes. In recent years the industry has been rocked by scandals exposing the main schemes: premium feed purchased on paper, cheap mixture delivered in practice; mass falsification of stocking volumes; sale of the best fish for cash, off the books. The meeting at Paluzh is a death sentence for initiative. When handcuffs are threatened for fish die-offs, professionals leave. Only those eager to perform remain — people who understand that the dictator does not need the truth, he needs victory reports. In a system where a mistake is equated with sabotage, no one will introduce new technologies. Loyalty has become more important than competence. And while Lukashenko holds forth about the bright prospects of Belarusian fish farming, the industry continues to rot from the head down. Paluzh and the other fish farms today are not national assets. They are future branches of the Lukashenko family business — ones that we have already paid for in full, but whose profits the people of this country will never be allowed near. Fish in Belarus today swims only for those who sit at the top. When Lukashenko says "We must feed the people fish," what he means is: the people will pay for the factory's construction, then cover its losses through taxes, while the profits from selling caviar and trout flow offshore or into new residences. The situation at Paluzh is not a managerial approach. It is looting elevated to the status of state policy. The dictator does not engage with loss-making industries to save people — he engages with them only when he smells money. In Belarus today, that smell is fishy. The dictator has driven fish farming into the same trap as all of agriculture: agrarian feudalism, where a bad harvest earns you prison, and success earns you the attention of the regime's money men, eager to seize a profitable asset. The result: expensive imported fish on the shelves, and plundered fish farms across a country known as "the land of lakes." This is not an economy — it is a simulation of life under the watchful eye of an overseer.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. Pavel Latushka on the situation in the Belarusian economy as a result of the "brilliant" policies of the Lukashenko regime. Belstat data for the first quarter of 2026 paints a classic picture of an economy under severe external pressure, where the government is attempting to compensate for the decline in production by pumping up consumer demand. A "scissors effect" is emerging: household incomes are rising while the real sector is contracting. Household incomes grew by 7.2%, retail turnover by 6%. Meanwhile, GDP is falling (-1.2% for January–February 2026), and industry is in negative territory (-3.4% for Q1 2026). This means wages are growing faster than labour productivity and goods output. Money unbacked by any real value is being pumped into the economy. For now, inflation is being held back through rigid administrative price controls — but this "inflationary overhang" will sooner or later burst through either a sharp price spike or a weakening of the Belarusian rouble. A record high in warehouse stockpiles — 12 billion roubles as of 1 April 2026, equivalent to 90% of average monthly output — is a troubling indicator. The manufacturing industry (-5.7% in Q1 2026) has nowhere to sell its products. Sanctions have closed off premium Western markets and Ukraine, while the reorientation toward the East — Russia and Asia — has either reached its ceiling or is running into logistical obstacles. Belarus's main export market, Russia, is also in crisis: GDP contracted by 1.4% in the first two months of 2026, and the budget deficit exceeded 4.5 trillion Russian roubles in Q1 alone. In Belarus, factories are now producing goods simply to keep the conveyor belt running and avoid laying people off — but these goods are not converting into money. The decline in wholesale trade turnover (-3.8% in Q1 2026) is a vivid illustration of the consequences of Lukashenko's economic isolation. Belarus has historically earned its living from transit and wholesale re-export of goods. The closure of borders and logistical restrictions — caused by the repression and Belarus's participation in the actual aggression against Ukraine and the hybrid war against the EU — have destroyed this business model entirely. In the near term, the Belarusian economy faces stagnation with a high risk of financial destabilisation. The current standard of living and wage growth are being maintained artificially — through borrowing or drawing down reserves — while the foundation of the economy — production and exports — is cracking under the weight of inefficiency and sanctions.

Pavel Latushka: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for the Transition of Power, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the "Latushka Team and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. On 16 April, Lukashenko signed a decree "On Simplifying the Procedure for Providing Property to Agricultural Organisations." In practice, this decree authorises the transfer of movable property — machinery and equipment — to agricultural organisations for free use, without the prior consent that was previously mandatory. If translated from official bureaucratic language into plain speech: the dictator has effectively legalised the forced seizure of assets from functioning enterprises for the benefit of a dying agricultural sector. Previously, transferring property — a tractor, a truck, spare parts — from a factory to a collective farm was a complex procedure: economic justification was required, depreciation had to be paid for, and a stack of permits obtained. Now all barriers have been removed. The most egregious provision is the right to transfer assistance "regardless of financial results." This means a factory may be running deep losses, have no money for wages, yet it is obliged — or "entitled," which in a dictatorship amounts to the same thing — to hand over its machinery to a collective farm. The permission to write off the value of transferred assets against "additional capital" or "retained earnings" is a mechanism for concealing the real losses of the donor enterprise. On paper the factory may appear stable, while its fixed assets — its actual property — simply evaporate. Lukashenko at the Nestanovichi-Agro MTC in the Logoisk District. Source: president.gov.by Free servicing: Agricultural organisations are no longer required to pay for the maintenance and repair of what they have been given to "use." In other words, the factory hands over a truck and is also obliged to repair and fuel it at its own expense, receiving nothing in return. What is the catch? This is legalised feudal tribute. The word "entitled" in the decree is a trap. In Lukashenko's system, it means that the chairman of any district executive committee will show up at the director of any halfway-viable enterprise and say: "The decree exists? It does. Got a spare MAZ truck sitting around? Hand it over to the 'Path to the Cliff' collective farm — or you'll have problems." This is voluntary-compulsory de-kulakisation of industry. This is economic cannibalism. Instead of reforming agriculture and making it profitable, the regime has begun devouring other sectors. Industrial enterprises — already suffering from constant interference by Lukashenko's officials and a chronic lack of investment — will now be stripped of their machinery and equipment. This is a path to the degradation of both the factory and the collective farm — which will quickly destroy the equipment anyway, since it is "someone else's and free." This is the destruction of shareholder rights. For joint-stock companies, this decree is a death sentence for whatever remains of corporate governance. The opinions of shareholders — where these are not the state — no longer mean anything. The assets of a company into which people invested money can be transferred free of charge to some loss-making state enterprise on a phone call from above. This is the final death of the investment climate. This is a direct road to corruption and mismanagement. Granting state bodies the authority to decide on "sponsorship assistance" without obtaining corresponding approval is a blank cheque for the uncontrolled squandering of state property. When the transfer of valuable assets requires no accountability and no approval, a bottomless pit opens up for grey schemes and falsified records. The result: agriculture on a ventilator. This decree confirms what we said in our analyses of BNBK and Bellakt: the agricultural sector of Belarus is bankrupt. There is no longer money in the budget for direct subsidies — it is being consumed by debts to China and the security apparatus — so the dictator has decided to switch to a system of "barter in kind." The debt burden is only intensifying: the country's external sovereign debt stands at around 17–18 billion dollars, while total external debt exceeds 38 billion dollars. 2026 is one of the peak repayment years: in this year alone, the authorities plan to draw up to 4 billion dollars from reserves to service and repay debts — with no possibility of refinancing through new loans. Lukashenko has simply permitted one group of drowning people — the factories — to hand their life jackets to another group of drowning people — the collective farms. In the end, everyone goes to the bottom. But in the short term, it will allow the fields to be "sown" and a picture created for television. This is not "simplification of procedures" — it is legalised looting that delivers the final blow to the country's industrial capacity in order to sustain an agrarian myth. To this looting is added a bitter irony: the country that the dictator calls "the breadbasket of the region" is rapidly losing its food sovereignty. While factories surrender their last assets, Belarus is increasingly purchasing from Russia what it is supposed to produce itself. In 2025, imports of Russian pork into Belarus reached a record 131,000 tonnes — up 32.4% — covering nearly half of all Russian exports of this meat. The pig population in Belarus itself fell by 3.4% over the past year, and in the Vitebsk region it collapsed by a factor of one and a half. The situation with vegetables is no better: in 2025 Belarus became the largest buyer of Russian cucumbers, purchasing more than 17,000 tonnes — nearly 70% of all Russian exports — and leads in purchases of canned vegetables. In the first months of 2025 alone, imports of agricultural products from Russia grew by 20%, exceeding 1.1 billion dollars. This is the true outcome of "simplification decrees": domestic production is being hollowed out, while the "agrarian myth" is sustained on imported crutches — paid for out of Belarusians' own pockets, while their factories are stripped of machinery for the benefit of empty collective farm hangars.

Illustrated photo Recently, debates have grown louder over the blocking of Belarusian state media resources on Western platforms. Some call it a restriction of free speech — but a look at the facts makes one thing clear: this is a classic case of violating the rules of civilised coexistence and international law. Let us go through the reasons why the removal of ONT, STV, and BELTA channels is a logical and entirely justified step on YouTube's part. 1. A Toxic Asset: Sanctions Compliance YouTube is a global platform operating within the framework of international law. When executives, key figures, and entire organisations fall under serious international sanctions, their presence on commercial platforms becomes legally untenable. The list of sanctioned propagandists working within these structures is extensive: BELTA: The news agency was run by individuals directly responsible for supporting repression. Former agency heads Irina Akulovich and Dmitry Zhuk are under EU and UK sanctions. ZAO Stolichnoye Televideniye (STV): The outlet employs notorious figures such as Grigory Azarenok and Yevgeny Pustovoy — both under EU, UK, and Ukrainian sanctions. The EU list also includes Nikita Rachilovsky, host of the programme "Senat" on STV. ZAO Vtoroy Natsionalny Telekanal (ONT) and affiliated resources: Former board chairman Marat Markov and presenter Igor Tur appear on the sanctions lists of the EU, Canada, and Switzerland. Using YouTube to monetise or promote individuals recognised by the international community as accomplices of a dictatorship is a direct violation of the platform's own rules. 2. Disinformation and the Fabrication of Reality Freedom of speech ends where deliberate falsehood, manipulation, and incitement to aggression begin. These outlets ceased to be "media" long ago — they have become combat leaflets in an information war: Justifying foreign aggression: Systematic and aggressive support for the war against Ukraine, amplifying Russian narratives, and spreading claims about a "Nazi regime." Broadcasting fabrications: BELTA and the TV channels deliberately propagate the claim that the tragedy in Bucha is a "fake," cynically devaluing human lives. The migration crisis: Active participation in constructing a false narrative around the crisis at EU borders — artificially engineered by the regime — while simultaneously blaming Western countries. 3. Complicity in Repression and the Destruction of Independent Media The central cynicism of the situation is this: these very propaganda structures had a direct hand in destroying genuine, independent journalism in Belarus — and are now demanding "democratic treatment" for themselves. The BELTA Case: In 2018, the state agency served as the primary instrument for fabricated criminal prosecutions against journalists from TUT.BY, BelaPA, and other honest outlets. UN Special Rapporteur Miklós Haraszti explicitly described this at the time as a flagrant violation of human rights. Denial of torture and violence: Publications in which testimony about torture at Okrestina is dismissed as "fabrication" are not an alternative viewpoint. They are direct informational complicity in concealing crimes against the regime's own people. The blocking of ONT, STV, and BELTA channels is not an attempt to "silence" anyone. It is basic digital hygiene — protection of the information space from: the incitement of hatred and international hostility; the promotion of individuals directly linked to the repressive apparatus; the use of the technological achievements and platforms of the democratic world to undermine the very foundations of democracy. When a media outlet becomes a tool of repression, it forfeits the moral and legal right to call itself press. Removing such channels from global platforms is not censorship — it is a necessary act of sanitation.